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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Scholars of human rights and constitutional law have described in great detail the 
abuses perpetrated by the armed forces and secret services of the United States in the 
context of the ‘war on terror’.  There is copious literature explaining why these 
violations of fundamental human rights are not justifiable, and why they are not 
consistent with international treaties or that nation’s constitution. 
 
This thesis builds upon this research, but strikes out in a new direction.  It does 
so by asking whether these abuses, combined with the changes to the legal order of the 
United States that made them possible, have produced a qualitative transformation of 
its constitutional structure. In particular, this thesis tracks the empowering of the 
executive. Increasingly, whenever it purports to act in the interests of national security, 
the executive claims the authority to act unilaterally in a manner that overrides even 
non-derogable rights. 
 
These novel constitutional reserve powers, which this thesis demonstrates were 
derived from President Nixon’s theory of the executive, were used to justify indefinite 
arbitrary detention, torture, mass surveillance without warrants, and extra-judicial 
execution.  This thesis seeks to determine if the constitutional crisis inaugurated by this 
theory of executive supremacy over the laws has been terminated, or whether it has 
continued into the Obama Administration.   
 
If this theory is current within the executive branch, and especially if the 
violations of jus cogens norms has continued, it signifies a cross-party consensus about 
a paradigm shift in American constitutionalism.  Accordingly, given the fact that the 
abuse of executive supremacy is what led to the development of the rule of law, this 
thesis will ask the question of whether the United States is being governed in 
accordance with its basic minimum norms. 
 
This thesis explores whether the executive is still subject to checks and balances 
from the legislature and the judiciary, such that it cannot violate non-derogable rights 
at will and with impunity.  If the contrary proposition is true, it demonstrates that the 
crisis of the rule of law in the United States is ongoing, and this permanent state of 
exception demands significantly more scholarly attention.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
THE DISMANTLING OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  
SYSTEMATISATION OF EXECUTIVE IMPUNITY, 
DISPENSATION FROM NON-DEROGABLE NORMS, AND 
PERPETUALISATION OF A PERMANENT STATE OF 
EMERGENCY 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER ONE  
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched several 
initiatives that are either at the outermost limit of what international human rights law 
allows, or over this line.  These involved systematic violations of non-derogable rights.  
Four examples stand out.  First, killing those considered terrorists with drone strikes, in 
areas that are not currently the site of armed conflict.1 Second, continued indefinite 
detention of prisoners given the novel classification of ‘enemy combatants’ at the 
Guantánamo Bay detention camp, over ten years after the 9/11 attacks.2  Third, torture 
of those prisoners and detainees held elsewhere, some of whom were seized by the 
intelligence agencies far from combat zones.3  Fourth, rules authorising the military to 
1  UNHCR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur Philip Alston 2010/24’ A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 
2  Human Rights Watch No Direction Home (Human Rights Watch 2009) 17-22 
3  Human Rights Watch Getting Away with Torture (Human Rights Watch 2011)   
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hold suspects accused of providing material support for terrorism, so that they do not 
receive the protections of the criminal justice system.4 
Special Rapporteur Philip Alston noted in his 2010 study on targeted killings that 
‘the U.S. adopted a secret policy of targeted killings soon after the attacks of 11 
September 2001’.  This program sanctioned targeted killing in other nations, which 
were not in armed conflict.5  Estimates of civilian casualties in Pakistan alone range to 
‘many hundreds’.6  He concluded that the justification for the use of drone strikes in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries ‘does not address some of the most central legal 
issues’ they present, including ‘the scope of the armed conflicts in which the US asserts 
it is engaged, the criteria for individuals who may be targeted . . . and the existence of 
accountability mechanisms’.7  After discussing International Humanitarian Law, 
Alston concluded that ‘these factors make it problematic for the US to show that . . . it 
is in a transnational non-international armed conflict’.  Therefore, these killings are 
unlawful. 
Despite this criticism, the United States dramatically expanded this program during 
the presidency of Barack Obama, both in scale and in scope.  For the first time, 
American citizens are now subject to extra-judicial killing. ‘American[s] . . .  are placed 
on a kill or capture list by a secretive panel of senior government officials . . . . there is 
4  Congressional Research Report, National Defense Authorization Act (Congressional Research 
Report 2012) 18-23 
5  Alston supra n 1, 7 
6  Ibid, citing New America Foundation, Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010, 
<http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones#2010chart> accessed 26 May 2014 
7  Alston supra n 1, 8 
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no public record of the operations or decisions of the panel, which is a subset of the 
White House’s National Security Council . . . . Neither is there any law establishing its 
existence or setting out the rules by which it is supposed to operate.’8 
On the fifth anniversary of the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, Amnesty 
International described it as a human rights scandal.9  ‘International law has been 
flouted from the outset.  None of the detainees was granted prisoner of war status, nor 
brought before a competent tribunal to determine his or her status, as required by the 
Third Geneva Convention.  None has been granted access to a court to challenge this 
lawfulness of his detention.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 9), to which the United States is a party, mandates this access.10   
After seven years of the detainment camps’ existence, the United States Supreme 
Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that detainees must have a ‘meaningful opportunity’ 
to obtain writs of habeas corpus.11 However, the Court gave the executive ‘reasonable 
time’ to begin combatant status review tribunals. It ‘waffled again on the ultimate 
standards, announcing that certain accommodations can be made to reduce the burden 
8  Mark Hosenball  ‘Secret panel can put Americans on a kill list’ New York Times (New York, 5 
October 2011 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-cia-killlist-idUSTRE79475C20111005> 
accessed 26 May 2014 
9  Amnesty International Human Rights Scandal (Amnesty International Commission on Human 
Rights 2004) 
<web.archive.org/web/20060712192510/http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR410242004?op
enandof=ENG-USA> accessed 26 May 2014 
10  Ibid  
11  Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 723, 779 (United States Supreme Court) 
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habeas corpus proceedings will place on the military’.12 The Supreme Court’s 2012 
decision not to overturn Latif v. Obama13 reduced the chances of obtaining the writ to 
nearly nothing.  In Latif, the D.C. Circuit held that ‘federal judges must “presume” that 
government intelligence reports used to justify detention are reliable and accurate.’14 
There is ample evidence that Guantánamo detainees were tortured.  There is also 
substantial documentation to prove that cabinet level officials approved.  ‘Based on this 
evidence, Human Rights Watch believes there is sufficient basis for the US government 
to order a broad criminal investigation into alleges crimes committed in connection with 
the torture and ill-treatment of detainees . . . . Such an investigation would necessarily 
focus on alleged criminal conduct by the following four senior officials—former 
President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, and CIA Director George Tenet’.15  In his autobiography, former President 
Bush admitted authorizing the waterboarding of detainees.16 It should be noted that 
waterboarding ‘is a relatively recent name for a form of water torture that dates to at 
least the Spanish Inquisition’.17 
12  Kim Lane Schepple, ‘The New Judicial Deference’ [2012]  Boston University Law Review 89, 141-
142 (internal quotations removed) 
13  Latif v Obama [2011] 666 F3d 746 (D.C Circuit) 
14  Erwin Chermerinsky ‘Losing interest’ National Law Journal (Washington, 25 June 2012) 
15  Human Rights Watch supra n 3, 70 
16  George W. Bush, Decision Points (Crown Publishers, 2010) 170 
17  Human Rights Watch supra n 3, 54 
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Despite this evidence, the Obama Administration has refused to prosecute anyone 
for approving or carrying out this torture.  It also failed to prosecute a former CIA 
official who spoke openly of destroying evidence of torture in violation of a court 
order.18  The Supreme Court has refused to disturb a D.C. Circuit opinion that held that 
no U.S. court has jurisdiction over claims of torture by the Guantánamo detainees.19  
Additionally, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 immunised the torturers.20  Owing 
to the complete failure to create accountability for torture and ill-treatment of detainees, 
it continues.  Prisoners at Camp Seven are held in conditions that do not comply with 
the minimum standards of Article Three of the Geneva Conventions.21  Evidence 
obtained using torture is considered competent by Combatant Status Review Tribunals.  
Intelligence files that are considered presumptive evidence of guilt contain evidence 
obtained by torture.  A prisoner was ‘“leashed like a dog, sexually humiliated and 
forced to urinate upon himself” before implicating himself and other prisoners. . . those 
claims [implicating others] appear in the other[] [detainees] files “without any 
caveat”’.22 
18  Mark Mazzetti  and Charlie Savage, ‘No criminal charges sought over CIA tapes’, New York Times 
(New York, 10 November 2012) 
19  Al-Zahrani v Rodriguez [2012] 669 F3d 315 (D.C. Circuit) 
20  Military Commissions Act 2006, Public Law 109-366 section 7(e)(2) 
21  Peter Masciola, ‘Bullets in Furtherance of Meeting’ <http://ww.defenselink.mil/pubs/App11.pdf> 
accessed 26 May 2014; see also Charlie Savage ‘Guantanamo Conditions Slip’ New York Times (New 
York, 24 February 2012) 
22  Amy Davidson, ‘Wikileaks: the uses of Guantanamo’ The New Yorker (New York, 25 April 2011) 
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During the Bush Administration, lawyers working for the executive branch made 
strong claims.  They wrote memoranda claiming the President possesses a unilateral 
power to authorise the seizure and detention of United States citizens accused of support 
for terrorism.23  The military held and tortured José Padilla, an American, for four 
years.24 During his detention, the Supreme Court evaded reviewing his case.25  
Congress approved of this conduct.  It passed legislation in 2012 approving military 
detention of anyone accused of providing material support for terrorism.  The 
legislation does expressly allow for military detention of citizens arrested within the 
nation’s borders.26  However, ‘an amendment that would have expressly barred citizens 
from long-term military detention was considered and rejected’.27 
23  John Yoo and Robert Delahunty ‘Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities 
Within the United States’ (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 23 October 2001); Patrick Philbin, 
‘Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists’ (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel 
(6 November 2001) 
24  ‘Mr. Padilla’s Reply to the Government’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous 
Government Conduct,’ United States v. Padilla, Case No. 04-60001-Cr-COOKE/BROWN S.D. Fl., 
(Miami, 4 October 2006) 6 
25  Jenny Martinez, ‘Process and Substance in the “War on Terror’ [2008] Columbia Law Review 
1013, 1039  
26  Congressional Research Service supra n 4, 16 
27  Ibid 
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The right not to be killed without due process, not to be subjected to indefinite 
arbitrary detention, and not to be tortured are all peremptory norms.28 Therefore, the 
United States’ compliance with fundamental human rights law following the 9/11 
attacks is, at the least, an open question.  Unfortunately, these absence of these rights 
does not provide a basis on its own for judging whether a nation now has a 
fundamentally different constitutional order.  In order to assess the transformation of 
the legal regime of the United States since the 9/11 attacks, this thesis must make 
reference to another concept.  The thesis will determine whether the rule of law allows 
for a binary categorisation of nations, in a way that other norms related to human rights 
cannot.  The conclusion that a nation is not a rule of law state differs from the 
observation that it does not comply with particular norms, leading to different 
implications about its status in international affairs. 
This thesis will detail the crucial political and legal developments in the United 
States following the 9/11 attacks.  It will explain how these catalysed an unaccountable 
presidency, which the nation’s legislature or its courts cannot restrain.  In no small part, 
this was due to the failure to resist problematic theories of the executive constitutional 
reserve powers in times of crisis. The thesis will detail how these theories became 
dominant within the executive branch after the 9/11 attacks. It will also illustrate how 
they were implicitly ratified by Congress and the courts over the following decade.   
To prove the importance of resisting these theories to the rule of law in the United 
States, the thesis must detail their history. In particular, the thesis will describe how 
Nixon Administration officials had nearly destroyed the rule of law by using them to 
28  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Restatement of The Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States (American Law Institute Publishers 1987) section 702 
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create an unaccountable ‘Imperial Presidency’. Subsequently, it will explain how the 
9/11 attacks allowed the Bush Administration, which contained Nixon-era officials to 
redeploy theories of presidential power in a crisis. These officials argued the 9/11 
attacks and the passage of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against 
Terrorists29 activated a broad range of implicit presidential powers.  In particular, this 
thesis will detail these assertions of powers to authorise indefinite military detention,30 
warrantless wiretapping,31 torture,32 and targeted killing.33 
This thesis will then show how these theories came to become legally effective.  It 
will show this is largely because of the inaction of the other branches of government.  
First, it will demonstrate how Congress bolstered the executive, by giving it statutory 
powers whenever the executive’s assertions of reserve powers were untenable. It will 
show how this legislation also implicitly recognized these theories.  These legislative 
29  Authorization for the Use of Military Force 2001, Public Law 107-40115 
30  Yoo and Delahunty supra n 23; Philbin supra n 23 
31  John Yoo, ‘Memorandum for the Attorney-General from John C. Yoo’ (Washington, Office of 
Legal Counsel 2 November 2001) 
<http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/NSA_Wiretapping_OLC_Memo_Nov_2_2001_Yoo.pdf> accessed 
26 May 2014 
32  John Yoo ,‘Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President: The President’s 
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations and Nations Supporting Them’, (Washington, 
Office of Legal Counsel 25 September 2001) 
<http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70942/00110_010925display.pdf> accessed 30 May 30, 
2014 
33  Jo Becker and Scott Shane, ‘Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will’ New 
York Times (New York, 29 May 2012) 
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actions normalised problematic arguments about presidential authority.  Congress 
comprehensively dismantled these clear limits on the executive power, which had 
preserved the rule of law in the United States for almost thirty years.  This thesis will 
show that Congress also neutered the oversight structures and accountability-
reinforcing mechanisms created in the wake of the Watergate crisis. 
This thesis will also explain how and why the judiciary abandoned its responsibility 
to hold the executive branch accountable.  It will correct the prevailing account of the 
judicial review of indefinite detention and torture at Guantánamo.  It will demonstre the 
courts deliberately adopted a ponderous pace that allowed the executive branch to evade 
review of its most egregious abuses.  This thesis will show how the courts also tacitly 
accepted the executive’s theories of its reserve powers. It will also describe how the 
courts developed doctrines that ensured these theories could not be challenged 
successfully in the courts. 
This thesis will show that the result is an executive that now has the powers 
described by the Bush Administration’s lawyers.  These powers allow the executive to 
violate non-derogable norms without fear of correction or redress.  It will also 
demonstrate in passing there is negligible disagreement on these issues between the 
Obama and Bush Administrations.  The thesis will explain the creation of this 
‘bipartisan consensus’ between the two American political parties on the unrestrained 
executive.34  Finally, this thesis will show that the executive branch has been able to 
lay the foundation for the robust use of these powers in future crises.  The theory that 
the executive can wage aggressive war on its own authority, is now also uncontested.  
34  Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Harvard University Press 2010) 
119-23 
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The executive can now create the conditions that allow it to extend its powers, 
seemingly without limit.  As the thesis will explain, this constitutional order does not 
comply with the minimum requirements of the rule of law state. 
 
2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the American state has undergone a 
qualitative change in the years following the 9/11 attacks. The thesis will demonstrate 
that it now falls outside of the category of states that are governed by the rule of law.  
It will show that this transformation is not merely the product of the abrogation of 
prevailing, or even unanimously-observed, human rights. Rather, this conclusion is 
possible because the executive branch violates non-derogable human rights with 
impunity, without any possibility of effective control. 
3 AIMS OF THE STUDY  
This thesis aims to create an operational definition of the minimum norms of the rule 
of law state.  This definition will allow for a conclusive answer to the question of 
whether or not a country that engages in gross human rights abuses is being governed 
in accordance with the rule of law.  To that end, the thesis aims to demonstrate that 
there is no live dispute among scholars as to two minimum norms of the rule of law 
state.  The first is that the executive must be subjected to effective legal and political 
oversight. The second of these is that non-derogable rights may never be violated. 
Accordingly, it will be possible to conclude that if the executive has the power to violate 
jus cogens norms with impunity, it is not a rule of law state.   
10 
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The thesis aims to identify the definitive standards for both of these minimum norms.  
The list and definition of non-derogable rights are not controversial.  These are found 
in the ICCPR, the Siracusa Principles, and the Paris Minimum Standards.  The thesis 
aims to explain why the International Commission of Jurists’ reports on the rule of law 
provide the definitive standards for control over the executive.  It will explain why these 
standards are both uncontroversial and useful.  The thesis aims to demonstrate that these 
requirements provide an operational definition for this second minimum requirement 
of the rule of law state. 
The thesis will demonstrate how these requirements are addressed in the United 
States.  Namely, it will explain how the separation of powers found in the Constitution 
of the United States is one possible way to implement the requirements found in the 
reports of the International Commission of Jurists.  It also aims to show how these 
principles were eroded during the twentieth century, to the point that they needed to be 
reinforced with a superstructure of laws. 
Finally, the thesis aims to demonstrate that the developments that took place after 
the 9/11 attacks were a deviation from the baseline of executive accountability 
established in the wake of the abuses of the Nixon Administration.  In order to do so, 
the thesis will explain that in the twenty-first century, the United States fails to meet 
the criteria of the rule of law state, as enumerated in the next section.   
4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY  
The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate that while in some respects the 
concept of the rule of law is essentially contested, there is general agreement about what 
constitutes its essence.  The history of the rule of law demonstrates that its historical 
core is the regulation of the activities of the executive by the other branches of 
11 
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government and the ability to hold it accountable to clear legal standards, particularly 
when its activities implicate citizens’ non-derogable rights.  The next sections will 
demonstrate that it is possible to draw upon this consensus to create a global ‘yardstick’ 
that allows an observer to judge whether any given nation is a rule of law state. 
Chapter two addresses the question of whether the constitutional order of the United 
States that existed between the time of the Nixon Administration and the 9/11 attacks 
was wholly consistent with the rule of law principles being used to judge its 
contemporary non-compliance. This thesis will demonstrate that it was, as Congress 
and the courts clearly rejected theories of unbridled presidential power in the wake of 
Watergate and the findings of the Church Commission.35 In that era, these branches 
proved to be effective checks on the enlargement of executive power.  The most notable 
demonstrations of that efficacity were the rulings in United States v. Nixon36 and the 
passage of legislation that made the President accountable to Congress for his actions 
in national security matters, including the Hughes-Ryan Act and the War Powers 
Resolution of 1974. 37  
Establishing that the elements of the American constitutional order constraining the 
executive branch between 1974 and 2001 were largely congruous with the minimum 
requirements outlined in the Commission’s reports is essential to this thesis for two 
35  United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Final Report of the Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities’ (United States Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 1976) 
36  United States v Nixon [1974] 418 US 683 (United States Supreme Court) 
37  Hughes-Ryan Act 1974, Public Law No 93-559 section 32; War Powers Resolution 1974, Public 
Law 93-148 
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reasons.  First, it will demonstrate that the conception of the rule of law that is being 
used here is not an inappropriate measure.  Rather it will be argued that when functional, 
the protections found in the provision of the separation of powers from the Constitution 
of the United States’ separation of powers is one possible embodiment of the criteria 
for the rule of law being used in this thesis.  Second, this will demonstrate that the 
failure to abide with these domestic constitutional restraints might also constitute a 
more problematic abrogation of legal order, as Chapter 1 will demonstrate that the 
failure to meet these requirements constitutes a prima facie case that the state should 
not be considered to be governed by the rule of law. 
Chapter three will discuss the overbroad delegations of authority from the legislative 
branch to the executive, particularly the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
Against Terrorists.38 It will focus on the question of whether the executive is still 
responsible to the legislature after these cumulative delegations of broad powers.  This 
chapter must also discuss the executive’s appropriation of legislative authority, which 
has not been checked by Congress.  Special attention will be paid to the doctrine and 
use of executive signing statements accompanying legislation.  Significant attention 
will also be devoted to the use of Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel as 
binding interpretations of the law within the executive branch.  Both of these sets of 
sources were used to justify such actions as the targeted killing of American citizens 
and to make claims that the executive branch possesses constitutional powers that 
cannot be overruled by legislation.  This thesis must then answer the related question 
of whether the executive branch’s ability to make proclamations with the force of law 
38  Authorization for the Use of Military Force 2001, Public Law 107-40115 
13 
 
                                                 
Chapter 1: Introduction 14 
is subject to any checks and balances, as these are essential to the separation of powers 
and for the rule of law that they protect. 
Chapter four will discuss the judiciary’s responses to the executive’s assertions of 
its self-assumed powers to violate non-derogable rights.  The key question to be 
answered is whether the courts have been willing, when able, to rebuke the executive 
branch’s interpretation of its pre-eminence in matters of national security in principle, 
or whether they have restricted themselves to narrow holdings that address only the 
most problematic overreaching, or even to evasion of their responsibility to review 
allegations of violations of non-derogable rights.  To that end, this thesis will address 
the issue of whether the courts, and in particular the Supreme Court of the United States, 
have acted to enforce the constitutional and statutory restrictions on executive authority. 
Particularly, this thesis will discuss the restrictions erected in the aftermath of the 
Watergate crisis, and the question of whether judgements that have been interpreted as 
rebukes to the executive have actually limited its freedom of action or created any 
accountability for the serious and systematic failure of the executive to observe the 
laws.  This thesis will also examine other restrictions on executive authority imposed 
by the other branches of government that protect the rule of law, and the jus cogens 
norms that it is bound by these laws and restrictions to observe.   
Key Supreme Court cases this chapter will discuss include Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,39 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,40 and Boumediene v. Bush.41   Another important issue to be 
discussed is whether the Supreme Court has proven itself unwilling to review rulings 
39  Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2004] 542 US 507 (United States Supreme Court) 
40  Rumsfeld v Padilla [2004] 542 US 426 (United States Supreme Court) 
41  Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 723 (United States Supreme Court) 
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of lower courts that have given judicial imprimatur to the executive branch’s expansive 
interpretation of its power.  Examples of these rulings include the decision in Al-Aulaqi 
v. Obama and the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in the habeas corpus cases brought following 
Boumediene, particularly Latif v. Obama,42 Kiyemba v. Obama,43 and Al-Zahrani v. 
Rodriguez.44 
Chapter five will seek to explain the inadequate responses from the other branches 
of government.  It will demonstrate that both the judiciary and legislative branch have 
been compromised.  This will show that effective oversight is no longer possible.  
Accordingly, this chapter will be able to conclude that the twenty-first century crisis of 
the rule of law is not temporary, as was the case in the Nixon Administration.  As the 
two other branches cannot restrain the executive, even when it violates non-derogable 
rights, the United States is no longer a rule of law state.  The first sections of this chapter 
will explore the process by which the executive fostered a deferential judiciary.  It will 
detail the colonization of its highest branches with jurists who were closely connected 
and loyal to the executive.  In particular, it will demonstrate that the executive has filled 
the benches of the nation’s highest courts with former officials, who possessed no 
public record of their extensive support for executive supremacy. The remainder of this 
chapter will focus on Congress’ failure to address the executive’s assertions that it can 
violate non-derogable rights.  This chapter will discuss the apparent inability of the 
judiciary to address claims that the executive branch has exceeded its powers or used 
them in a manner that implicates citizens’ non-derogable rights.  Particular attention 
42  Latif v Obama [2012] 677 F3d 1175 (D.C. Circuit) 
43  Kiyemba v Obama [2009] 561 F3d 509 (D.C. Circuit) 
44  Al-Zahrani v Rodriguez [2012] 669 F3d 315 (D.C. Circuit) 
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must be paid to jurisdiction-stripping statutes, such as the Detainee Treatment Act of 
200545 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006.46  These statutes purport to deprive 
the judiciary of the right to review certain classes of claims, including petitions for the 
writ of habeas corpus.  This chapter will also address an important counter-argument 
to this thesis’ conclusion, advanced by defenders of the unbounded power possessed by 
the American President, notably Eric Posner and Adrian Vermuele.47  They have argued 
that checks and balances are unnecessary to a stable constitutional order that serves to 
protect rights, since the executive branch is purportedly restrained by the political 
process itself.   
Chapter six will recapitulate the findings of the preceding chapters in brief, 
explaining their importance to the key conclusions related to the question of whether 
the United States should continue to be considered a rule of law state.  
5 IS A GLOBAL ‘YARDSTICK’ POSSIBLE? 
This thesis must produce operational definitions of its key concepts,48 so that its 
assessment of whether or not the United States does not measure up to the criteria that 
define a rule of law state is not merely a subjective assessment, but rather a test that 
compares the nation’s governance against measurements that are both defined in 
45  Detainee Treatment Act 2005, 119 Statutes 2739 
46  Military Commissions Act 2006, amending United States Code, title 18, section 2241(e) 
47   Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 
(Oxford University Press 2011) 176-205 
48 Estela G. Adanza, Research Methods: Principles and Applications (Rex Publications 2011) 21 
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advance of the assessment, and which are acknowledged by the legal community as the 
relevant ‘yardstick’ for this measurement.  Accordingly, the task for this thesis’ first 
chapter is to provide a clear definition of the rule of law and the pertinent concepts out 
of which it is constituted. 
5.1 Rule of Law:  A Constitutional Concept Shaped by History 
This dissertation treats the rule of law as a constitutional concept, rather than 
describing the related concept in jurisprudence.  This is because it this thesis aims to 
outline the necessary features of a functional constitutional order, instead of describing 
the features of a legal system from the point of view of legal philosophy.  This approach 
is appropriate because ‘the Rule of Law is a historic ideal’ and fulfils that function with 
contemporary political debates.49 
Tamanaha described the rule of law as a constitutional concept that ‘congealed into 
existence in a slow, unplanned manner that commenced in the Middle Ages, with no 
single source or starting point.’50 It is a constitutive concept, one that has acquired its 
meaning through its historical development.  Since the concept was not created by 
reference to a comprehensive theory, it cannot be understood without reference to 
history.  The thesis’ explanation of the history of the rule of law is central to its 
identification of a normative ‘yardstick’ that measures a state’s compliance.  
Understanding how the concept is rooted within constitutional history will help this 
49  Richard H. Fallon Jr. ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97 
Columbia Law Review 1 
50 Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 
2004) 15 
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thesis to avoid certain problems that make a functional definition of the normative core 
of the rule of law impossible.  As Shklar noted, ‘contemporary theories [of the rule of 
law] fail because they have lost a sense of what the political objectives of the ideal of 
the rule of law originally were and have come up with no plausible restatement.’51   
In particular, this historical focus will assist this thesis’ identification of the 
minimum requirements of the rule of law.  The circumstances of this concept’s 
emergence, and especially the constitutional crises that precipitated its development, 
identify the normative core of the rule of law.  This thesis will explain how the state of 
affairs that existed before and during the creation of the rule of law state defines its 
minimum requirements. 
This section will demonstrate that the rule of law state is properly defined by 
reference to its antithesis.  Historically, the opposite of the rule of law state is one 
governed by an executive who is unaccountable to the courts or to a legislature.52  This 
fact, if coupled with the next section’s operational definition of the essential methods 
of control over the executive, will allow the thesis to create this thesis’ ‘yardstick’.     
5.2 The Medieval and Early Modern Pre-history of Rule of Law  
Tamanaha developed his historically-based definition of the rule of law by building 
on the works of legal historians.  Central among these are the efforts of Kenneth 
51 Judith N. Shklar, The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Carswell 1987)  
52  Leo Strauss, Liberalism Ancient and Modern (University of Chicago 1968) 75  
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Pennington53 and Harold Berman.54  These historians describe the tension in the Middle 
Ages between powerful monarchs and the legal theorists who sought to constrain their 
powers.  There was a prolonged legal struggle between the monarchy and the nobility 
over the scope of royal authority.55   The result of this process was a stable legal order 
in which ‘[t]he principle foundation upon which medieval political theory was built was 
the principle of the supremacy of law.’56 In England, the process that led to this state 
was the passage of Magna Carta as a statute.57 
This legal order, which was characterised as a mixed monarchy or dominium 
politicum et regale, was destabilized during the Early Modern era.  Monarchies became 
more powerful as commerce and roads made more centralised control possible.  This 
development frequently led to the development of absolute monarchies, predicated on 
theories of royal supremacy.58 
These theories had their adherents in England during the Early Modern era.59 
However, Parliament’s defeat of the Royalist cause during the English Civil War meant 
53  Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law 1200-1600 (University of California Press 1993)  
54  Harold Berman Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard 
University Press 2009)  
55  Tamanaha supra n 50, 15-27 
56  Anthony Matthews, Law. Order and Liberty in South Africa (University of California Press 1972) 6 
57  Magna Carta 1297 
58  Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 
59  Thomas Sorrell, The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge University Press 1996)  
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that they would never be put into practice.  The Glorious Revolution established the 
constitutional order for the remainder of that era.  The English Constitution now 
constrained the executive firmly.  In particular, after the reign of Queen Anne virtually 
all reserve powers could only be exercised on the advice of a government responsible 
to Parliament.60 
The constitutional histories of the nineteenth century lauded Parliament’s triumph 
over the executive.  The works of the Whig historians praised the English constitution, 
and in particular its restraints on the executive.  In particular, this was the theme of Lord 
Macauley’s History of England from the Ascension of James II.61 Samuel Rawson 
Gardiner’s work on the English Civil War also attests to the fact that this was the 
orthodox view of the English Constitution at that time.62  This viewpoint was not merely 
dominant at the time, but unchallenged.63  The essential feature of these histories was 
their glowing portrayal of the triumph over the executive.   
In addition to Macauley and Gardiner, the lawyer and historian Henry Hallam shaped 
the nineteenth century view of the English Constitution.  His Constitutional History of 
England argued that the English subject’s greatest liberty was not to be governed 
60  George Barnett Smith, History of the English Parliament, Volume Two (Ward, Lock, Bowden and 
Company 1892) 
61  Thomas Babbington Macauley, The History of England from the Ascension of James II (Longmans, 
Green, and Company 1889)  
62  Samuel Rowson Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, 1642–1649 (Longmans, Green, and 
Company 1888)  
63  Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (W. W. Norton 1965) 
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arbitrarily.64  This volume was so influential that it was described in the early twentieth 
century as “one of the text-books of English politics, to which men of all parties 
appealed.”65 
Before the twentieth century, the rule of law had not been defined in theoretical 
terms.  Rather, it was seen as a desirable product of a process of historical development.  
Historians, jurists, and lawyers lauded Parliament’s installation of a new dynast, who 
claimed he came to the throne in order to relieve the people of the oppression of an 
executive who “subjected them in all things . . . to arbitrary government . . . contrary to 
law . . . and to that express provision that no man shall lose his life . . . but by the law 
of the land.”66  They celebrated England’s Constitution as one that restrained the 
executive, especially from violations which it defined as non-derogable. 
The first influential definitions of the rule of law were produced during this period. 
This concept in constitutional law was shaped by this history and the way in which this 
history was interpreted at that time.  The next section will discuss Dicey’s formative 
definition.  It will explain how this definition is linked with certain political objectives.  
These can be understood by reference to the constitutional history that he drew upon 
64 Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England (Longmans, Green and Company 1827) 441 
65 Edmund Robertson, ‘Hallam, Henry’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica (Hugh Chisholm, ed.) (11th ed 
1911) 852 
66  Declaration of the Prince of Orange, October 10, 1688, reprinted in A Kingdom Without a King: The 
Journal of the Provisional Government in the Revolution of 1688 (Robert Beddard ed.) (Phaidon 1988) 
145-149 
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when creating it.  After this has been discussed, the thesis will be able to defend its 
definition of the normative core of the rule of law. 
5.3  The Pre-History of Rule of Law and its Ongoing Influence  
 Dicey’s functional definition of the rule of law is as follows: 
 
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of 
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the 
existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary 
authority on the part of the government . . . . It means, again, equality before 
the law. . . the ‘rule of law’ in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption 
of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs 
other citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals . . . . The notion 
that . . . affairs or disputes in which the government or its servants are 
concerned are beyond the sphere of the civil courts . . . . is utterly unknown 
to the law of England. 67 
 
 The definition has three elements.  The rule of law forbids the exercise of arbitrary 
power, it subjects officials to the law, and bars the executive from setting up special 
courts when citizens bring claims against the executive.  It is evident anyone acquainted 
with the English legal history described in the last subsection that this definition did not 
spring from Dicey’s forehead fully formed.  Rather, it is a highly conventional Victorian 
interpretation of the limitations on power imposed by the English constitution, which 
was connected with an orthodox view of the nation’s history, particularly the legal 
history of the seventeenth century. 
 Dicey was a serious student of legal history. Unlike those who advanced their 
criticism of his definition of the rule of law under the banner of analytical jurisprudence, 
he believed that the essential features of law could be explained by reference to its 
historical development. “[T]he English Constitution is historical in being in a special 
67 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan 1915) 120-
21. 
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sense the immediate result of conditions that govern English history.”68  In a footnote 
to this passage, Dicey laments what he sees as the failure of the English people to 
recognize the importance of “the English history of tradition & its influence”.  
Accordingly, it is imperative to approach this definition with a sense of the meaning 
that its words acquire when seen in the light of the historical tradition upon which he 
drew heavily.69 
 The first indicators of the importance of legal history to Dicey’s constitutional theory 
are his use of ‘arbitrary power’ and ‘prerogative’.  These terms have a precise meaning 
in the context of seventeenth and eighteenth century constitutionalism.70  They link 
Dicey to a constitutional tradition that is particularly concerned with control over the 
executive.  This continuity is demonstrated by Dicey’s particular attention to the 
executive’s reserve powers, and its subjection to the law in the regular courts. 
 Dicey’s definition of the rule of law is more than merely influential.  It is 
foundational.71   In discussing the modern history of this concept, H. Patrick Glenn 
notes that ‘the notion of the rule of law dates at least from Dicey’s adoption of it, 
arguing notably for submission of executive authority to review by superior courts of 
68  Albert Venn Dicey, General Characteristics of Existing English Constitutionalism, in General 
Characteristics of English Constitutionalism: Six Unpublished Lectures (Peter Raina, ed.) Peter Land, 
2009, 65  
69  Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Clarendon Press, 1992) 17 
70  John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority Of Law 
(University of Wisconsin Press 1993) 
71  Stephane Beaulac, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in Gianluggi Palombella and Neil 
Walker (eds) Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 197-224 
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general jurisdiction’.72  It is scarcely an exaggeration to argue that later definitions of 
the rule of law as a constitutional concept are glosses on Dicey’s.  This claim is not true 
within the field of jurisprudence, however.  Their arguments against Dicey will be 
discussed in the next subjection.  At present, this dissertation will continue by 
discussing the influence and ongoing importance of Dicey’s definition in global 
constitutional law.   
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that ‘human rights should 
be protected by the rule of law.’73  However, the Declaration does not define this 
concept, despite identifying it as necessary to the preservation of human rights.  There 
is no binding international definition of the rule of law, although some comments from 
the leaders of the international community provide an indication of how the concept is 
defined in practice.  In 2004, the Secretary General defined the rule of law as:  
[A] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence 
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.74 
 
72  H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Sustainable Diversity in Law’ in Brian Z. Tamanaha, Caroline Mary Sage & 
Michael J. V. Woolcock (eds) Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in 
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press 2012) 98 
73  UNGA Res 217 A(III)) (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
74  UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General, Strengthening the Rule of Law 49/519 (1994)  paras 5(a)-
(c), 5(k)  
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This language was drawn from a report of the Secretary-General to the General 
Assembly delivered in 1994, which also provides that nations seeking to develop into 
rule of law states should also possess ‘a strong constitution, which  . . . incorporates 
internationally recognized human rights and freedoms’.75  Notice that this definition 
starts with the Diceyan definition, which is found in the first sentence.  The second 
sentence contains further requirements, many of which are the subject of debate 
between legal philosophers, as discussed in the next subsection.  The introduction of 
these additional requirements with the phrases ‘it requires, as well’ provides some 
indication of the relationship between the requirements found before and after these 
words.  Those which come after are intended to promote or to realize what is found 
before, namely the submission of all authority to regular law. 
The Secretary-General and the General Assembly’s formulations bear witness to 
Dicey’s enduring influence and to the fact that the glosses to Dicey in global 
constitutional law have added to his definition, rather than subtracting from it.  It also 
demonstrates that prevailing definitions have both a core and a periphery, where the 
peripheral rules serve to implement or protect the essential Diceyan elements.  The only 
addition to the core found in these definitions is the caveat that this accountability shall 
be ‘consistent with international human rights norms and standards’. 
The prevailing conception of the rule of law promoted by international organizations 
contains more than just the features necessary for the neutral adjudication of disputes 
and for holding the state itself responsible for legal wrongs. It also refers to substantive 
provisions that define a set of wrongs that will be actionable, which are connected to 
the evolving definition of human rights.   However, these standards add little to Dicey’s 
75  Ibid 
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definition.  This is because the human rights standards that are applicable in every 
circumstance are minimal, universally recognized, and recognized by as non-derogable 
even in Dicey’s era. 
5.4 The Rights Protected by Core of the Rule of Law 
 The pre-history of the rule of law involved struggles against an executive that 
claimed the power to kill, torture, and to detain its subjects indefinitely.  The first of 
these rights was established as non-derogable in England by Clause 29 of the Magna 
Carta of 1297.  Repeated confirmation of this statute which elevated it above any other, 
giving it constitutional status.76  A century before Dicey, Blackstone confirmed that is 
was central to the rule of law and non-derogable:  
This natural life . . . cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any 
individual . . . merely upon their own authority. . . . [T]he constitution is an 
utter stranger to any arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without 
the express warrant of law. . . . To bereave a man of life . . . without accusation 
or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once 
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom.77 
 
Torture on the order of the executive was banned in England shortly before the Civil 
War.  This was accomplished by a statute now known as the Act Abolishing the Star 
Chamber 1641, which was at the time formally styled ‘an act for the regulating of the 
privy council, and for taking away the court commonly called the star-chamber’.78  After 
Parliament eliminated the jurisdiction of the Privy Counsel in the form of the Council 
76  Ryan Patrick Alford, Rule of Law at the Crossroads [2011] Utah Law Review 1203, 1244-1250  
77  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Volume One (Nabu Press 2010), 146-
47. 
78  Act Abolishing the Star Chamber 1641 
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Board, it was no longer possible for it to issue writs that authorized racking and other 
forms of torture.79 
Prolonged arbitrary detention by the executive was eliminated by the passage of the 
Habeas Corpus Act 1679, which closed several existing loopholes in earlier legislation.80  
The act specified that a writ from the executive could no longer be considered sufficient 
cause for detention.  It also prevented the executive from moving prisoners in order to 
avoid the jurisdiction of the court to which a petition for the great writ was submitted.81  
While the right to the writ could be suspended, this could only be done by Parliament 
and not the executive. 
These rights were all firmly established within the English constitutional tradition 
by the time Dicey created the modern definition of the rule of law.  They were also 
featured heavily in the works of the Whig historians which Dicey drew upon heavily 
when creating his definition.  In setting up the rule of law as the antithesis of ‘prerogative’ 
and ‘arbitrary power’, Dicey was operating within a tradition where these three rights 
were unarguably non-derogable by the executive. 
The international human rights standards which define the concept of the rule of law 
within global constitutional law add very little to what was present in Dicey’s era.  The 
only rights established as non-derogable by the ICCPR are, in addition to those 
79  Ryan Patrick Alford, ‘The Star Chamber and the Regulation of the Legal Profession 1570-1640’ 
(2011) 51 American Journal of Legal History 690, 723-726, David Jardine, A Reading on the Use of 
Torture in the Criminal Law of England (Baldwin and Cradock 1837) 
80  Habeas Corpus Act 1679, Habeas Corpus Act 1640 
81  Ibid 
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discussed above, the prohibition on slavery and servitude, imprisonment for debt, 
retroactive punishment, legal personhood, and freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion.82  All of these rights were protected by law in England at the time Dicey 
formulated his definition.83 
Both Dicey’s definition and that of the United Nations implicitly recognize that the 
protection of these non-derogable rights is the essence of the rule of law.  In Dicey’s 
case, this becomes clear when one considers the constitutional tradition in which he 
participated, and its relationship to English legal history.  In the case of the United 
Nations, one might note that General Comment 29 to the ICCPR states that Article 4’s 
provisions are “essential for the maintenance of the . . . rule of law.”84   
Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the protection of non-derogable rights 
from the executive, even during times of crisis, is the normative core of the rule of law.  
This was the problem that the rule of law was meant to address, and which it continues 
to address.  Additions that expand its reach should not distract from this fact.  However, 
controversies over the extension of the scope of the rule of law’s protections have 
created significant controversy.  This has led some scholars to question if the concept of 
the rule of law continues to have a stable meaning.  The next section will demonstrate 
that the normative core of the rule of law remains intact and uncontroversial. It will also 
82  ICCPR, Articles 6, 7, 8 (1) and (2), 11, 15, 16 and 18. 
83  Slave Trade Act 1807, Debtor’s Act 1869, Act of Parliament (Commencement) Act 1793, Married 
Women’s Property Act 1893, Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829, Jews Relief Act 1858, Universities 
Tests Act 1871 
84  General Comment 29 to the ICCPR para. 16 
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demonstrate that these scholarly debates implicitly confirm that there is no debate about 
the normative core of the rule of law, but only about how far it should be extended. 
5.5  Jurisprudential Debates About Rule of Law Confirm its Core 
 This thesis addresses the rule of law as a concept in global constitutional law, and 
not the related concept in jurisprudence.  However, scholars in jurisprudence have 
called into question whether the concept can serve a useful function within 
constitutional law.  Accordingly, this thesis must briefly address their arguments.  This 
section will show that the debate in jurisprudence about the rule of law does not 
establish that the concept cannot serve as a useful yardstick.  Rather, they demonstrate 
that there is no disagreement about the normative core of the rule of law, and its 
desirability. 
 Within legal philosophy, the key dispute in the mid-twentieth century about the 
meaning of the rule of law relates to the debate between positivists and natural law 
theorists.85  At the most fundamental level, it is a dispute about whether there is a 
connection between law and morality.86  This disagreement is important to the rule of 
law because this concept implies that there are more and less desirable legal regimes, 
and this may require moral in addition to legal judgment.87 
85  Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (University of Chicago Press 
2001) 186-222 
86  Sanne Taekema, The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory (Springer 2003) 197-206 
87  Frank I. Michaelman, ‘Constitutionally  Binding Social and Economic Rights as a Compelling Idea, 
in Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice (Routledge 2015) 
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 The criticism of the concept of the rule of law in jurisprudence can be traced to the 
reception of Lon Fuller’s assertion that positivist approaches in legal philosophy did 
not adequately account for all of the necessary features of a legal system.88  Fuller 
contended that the rule of law, which he presents in the form of the principle of legality, 
was essential to any legal order worthy of the name.89  The principle of legality requires 
that there be fixed laws, rather than merely someone who enforces his or her personal 
preferences. 
 Fuller’s equation of the rule of law with the principle of legality accords with 
another influential twentieth-century definition of that concept.  Friedrick Hayek stated 
that ‘stripped of all technicalities th[e] [rule of law] means that government in all its 
action is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible 
to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances’.90 
 Positivist legal philosophers did not take issue with this type of description.  Indeed, 
Jeremy Waldron notes that H.L.A. Hart did not disagree, despite the fact that Fuller’s 
88  Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law 
Review 593  
89  Ibid 
90  Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago Press 1944) 54  
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definition was prompted by Fuller’s disagreement with Hart.91  Waldron notes that in 
‘a little known essay’, Hart wrote the following: 
The requirements that the law . . . should be general (should refer to classes of 
persons, things, and circumstances, not to individuals or to particular actions) . . 
. should be publically promulgated and easily accessible . . . are usually referred 
to as the principles of legality.  The principles which require courts, in applying 
general rules to particular cases, to be without . . . bias . . . are referred to as rules 
of natural justice.  These two sets of principles define the concept of the rule of 
law.92 
 
Waldron also points out that Hart took a similar position in his book Law, Liberty, and 
Morality.93  When discussing the offense of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, he 
notes that ‘the particular value which they sacrificed was the principle of legality’.94   
 Naturally, Hart and other positivist legal philosophers did not agree with all of 
Fuller’s positions.  The key disagreement was whether or not the principle of legality 
demands recourse to moral principles.  This dispute, which is of critical importance in 
jurisprudence, is of no importance to this thesis.  This thesis is not concerned with 
whether the rule of law requires a moral foundation, or whether it is desirable.  Instead, 
this thesis is an empirical evaluation of the constitutional order of the United States.  
However, for this measurement against the ‘yardstick’ of the rule of law to be 
meaningful, that concept must not be internally inconsistent.  At the conclusion of the 
91  Jeremy Waldron, ‘Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller’ (2008) 83 New 
York University Law Review 1135  
92  H.L.A. Hart, ‘Problems of Philosophy in Law’, in Paul Edwards (ed) The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy Volume Five (Prentice Hall 1967) 264 
93  Waldron supra n 91, 1146 
94  H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford University Press 1963) 12  
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Hart-Fuller debate, there was as yet no evidence that the concept itself was unstable.  
Instead, both parties agreed that it was essential to constitutional legitimacy.  
Additionally, there was a consensus about the contents of the rule of law, namely rules 
of general application and neutral adjudication. 
 Unfortunately, fifty years after the Hart-Fuller debate, there is no such consensus 
about the meaning of the rule of law as a concept in jurisprudence.  Jeremy Waldron 
has noted that in that field of jurisprudence, the concept of the rule of law has been the 
subject of such intense disagreements that it should be considered an essentially 
contested concept. He meant that it was not merely a concept which is hotly debated, 
but rather one about which agreement is impossible.95  Tamanaha has also noted that 
there is no agreement amongst its leading legal philosophers as to precisely what it 
means.96  However, the terms of this debate confirm the last section’s conclusion about 
the normative core of the rule of law. 
The late twentieth-century debate about this concept centres on one question. 
Namely, whether a state can be characterized as being governed in accordance with the 
rule of law if it merely provides for neutral adjudication of disputes, without stipulating 
that citizens possess fundamental rights that the state is bound to respect.  The 
substantive, or ‘thick’ theory of the rule of law asserts that the procedural or ‘thin’ 
version of the concept is insufficient.97   However, the advocates of ‘thick’ theories of 
95  Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept?’ (2002) Law and 
Philosophy 137 
96  Tamanaha supra n 72, 4 
97  Michael Neumann, The Rule of Law: Politicizing Ethics (Blackwell Publishing 2002) 3-6 
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the rule of law do not dispute that the components of the ‘thin’ theories are also 
necessary.  While there is no agreement on the question of which rights the state must 
respect, there is no disagreement about the importance of the principle of legality. 
Another source of dispute is whether the legislature of a sovereign state possesses 
the power to change the laws and to abrogate citizens’ rights.98  This can also take the 
form of an argument over whether a written constitution that prevents the legislature 
from passing statutes that would violate fundamental rights is a necessary element of 
the rule of law.99 However, there is no disagreement on the need to restrain the 
executive from ignoring duly enacted law, in accordance with the non-arbitrariness 
principle.  As Arthur Goodhart argued, ‘when we turn from the control of the legislative 
power by the rule of law to the control of executive power we are on less controversial 
ground because all jurists—certainly in Western countries—agree that this is an 
essential part of government under law’.100 
The terms of these debates in legal philosophy demonstrate the implicit consensus 
about its normative core.  There has been no decisive break between the meaning of the 
concept of the rule of law in jurisprudence with that of the equivalent term in 
constitutional law.  Dicey’s definition was not destabilized in the late twentieth century.  
Instead, there are numerous arguments about whether the rule of law should guarantee 
98  T. R. S. Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism’ 
(1985) 44 Cambridge Law Journal 111  
99 T. R. S. Allan, Law Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism 
(Oxford University Press 1993) 
100 Arthur Goodhart, ‘The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty’, (1958) 106 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 943, 955 
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further protections, or whether by definition it must protect certain rights.  As noted in 
the last section, the extension of the rule of law to the protection of non-derogable rights 
is uncontroversial.  This state of affairs exists because these are jus cogens norms that 
are common to mankind, to which states have also bound themselves to observe in 
international instruments such as the ICCPR. 
Accordingly, the thesis can proceed towards its empirical evaluation of the 
constitutional order of the United States.  Relying on this consensus of the normative 
core of the rule of law, the next section will move to the next preliminary step.  This 
involves creating an operational definition for these minimum standards.  The next two 
subsections will accomplish this at two levels of specificity.  The subsection 
immediately following will lay out the general requirements for control over the 
executive branch, such that it cannot behave in an arbitrary fashion without concern for 
the laws.  This will require a discussion of the basic minimum standards of supervision 
and oversight of the executive, as established by the International Commission of 
Jurists.  The final subsection of this chapter will discuss the ways in which the United 
States has created this oversight regime in its municipal law.  It will demonstrate that 
the separation of powers is the means by which the United States has put into place the 
measures deemed necessary by the ICJ to ensure the existence of the rule of law. 
5.6 Rule of Law Applies to Matters Involving ‘National Security’ 
 There is another debate on the meaning of rule of law outside of constitutional law 
that this thesis must address briefly.  It is located primarily within political science, and 
relates to the boundaries of the rule of law.   Certain political theorists, some working 
at the intersection between political science and law, have argued that the rule of law is 
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of limited application to situations when the executive is responding to threats to 
national security.101  
 These theorists’ arguments for why the rule of law school be read to have this 
implicit limitation on its applicability are largely outside of the scope of what this thesis 
must address.  This is because their arguments about why this limitation is necessary or 
desirable would require this thesis to depart from its normative evaluation of the United 
States to engage in a political argument about the importance of a rule of law without 
broad exceptions.  However, it is appropriate to note here that the limitations that these 
theorists advocate appears to be inconsistent with the rule of law as a concept in global 
constitutional law.   
 One critic of a rule of law that is limited to situations that do not involve national 
security has argued that: 
It was a commonplace of classical political theory that assertions of threats of 
this kind are endemic to constitutional states, since this is the manner in which 
the executive branch of government typically seeks to extend its powers. 
Consequently, constitutional theorists across millennia (many of whom were 
known to and respected by the Framers) have rejected the emergency-based 
rationale for the expansion of executive powers. Indeed, it will be demonstrated 
below that the development of both the notion of constitutional government and 
the rule of law often stems from resistance to these claims on the part of consuls, 
emperors, and kings.102 
 
101 Oren Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011, see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, ‘The 
Constitution of Necessity’, (2004) 79 Notre Dame Law Review 1257  
102  Ryan Patrick Alford, ‘Is an Inviolable Constitution a Suicide Pact?’ (2014) 58 Saint Louis 
University Law Review 355, 359  
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Accordingly, these theorists’ definition of the rule of law would not be consistent 
with the historical context of its emergence, and would destabilize its normative 
core.  On a more pragmatic note, David Dyzenhaus has noted that any exception: 
exception . . . introduced into legal order and treated as such, will 
spread.  If the minister is a law unto himself in respect of national 
security, there is no principled reason to hold that anyone has a 
legitimate expectation, procedural or substantive, or for that matter 
to retain any of the entitlements that judges have crafted in putting 
together the modern law of judicial review.103 
6  THE ICJ’S DEVELOPMENT OF A ‘YARDSTICK’ 
As illustrated above, ‘the demand that the executive be subject to the laws was the 
main postulate of the rule of law state.’104  This fact, according to Kletacatsky, was the 
reason the International Commission of Jurists decided to focus on control over the 
executive when establishing the minimum standards of a rule of law state.  This section 
will establish that the ICJ has created an operational definition of these basic norms.  
Afterwards, it will be possible to hold the separation of powers created by the 
Constitution of the United States up to this standard.  By doing this, the thesis will 
determine if the unaltered constitutional order of the United States was a rule of law 
state.   
  The Commission, hereinafter referred to as the ‘ICJ’, provided the relevant 
guidelines in the International Commission of Jurists’ resolutions and reports from its 
Congresses held during 1955 in Athens, during 1959 in New Delhi, during 1961 in 
103 David Dyzenhaus, ‘Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication 
of National Security’ (2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, 41 
104  Hans Kletcatsky, ‘Reflections on the Rule of Law and in Particular on the Legality of 
Administrative Action’, (1963) 4 Journal of the International Commission of Jurists 209  
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Lagos, and during 1962 in Rio de Janeiro.  This thesis will rely on the ICJ’s particular 
conception of the necessary controls over the executive for several reasons.  First, it 
entirely compatible with the approach adopted in the last section.  Second, its definition 
is the result of a consensus developed by jurists from many different nations. The ICJ 
surveyed over 75,000 lawyers from 25 countries in preparation for the conferences that 
created its definition of the rule of law.105  Third, because this definition has proved 
influential, as the ICJ’s reform efforts have catalysed rule of law-related reform efforts 
by the legal profession around the world, something which attests to the popularity of 
its definition of the rule of law.106  While the ICJ’s definition of the rule of law has been 
criticized by legal philosophers such as Joseph Raz,107 these criticisms do not relate to 
the topic of the control of the executive. 
6.1 The ICJ’s Prohibition on the Executive Legislating 
The Rio Report specifies that legislation delegating the authority to make rules to 
the executive must ‘carefully define the extent, [and] purpose of the intended rules’, 
while standing committees of the legislature should scrutinize and report on the rules 
105 Howard Tolley, The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Human Rights 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 69 
106 Ibid 74-77 
107 Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ [1977] Law Quarterly Review 195, 211.  Raz argues 
the rule of law only extends to guarantees of procedural fairness, and takes issue with the claim that a 
rule of law state must protect its citizens against violations of jus cogens norms —a philosophical cavil 
that has no traction in practical jurisprudence. 
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and their enforcement.108  The proceedings of the Rio Congress indicate that the 
Commissioners were concerned with the problem was ‘the possibility of encroachments 
by the executive’, which ‘could arise for reasons of expediency, or from a desire for 
greater power’.109  Accordingly, its approach to limitations on executive power was not 
merely a response to the possibility of an inadvertent delegation of overbroad discretion 
to the executive, but to the reality that there are powerful incentives for any executive 
branch to enlarge its own authority in a manner that might upset the balance of powers 
inherent in any constitutional order. 
6.2 The Requirement of Judicial Review of Executive Action  
As noted above, the Rio Congress focused on challenges to the rule of law presented 
by abuses of state power by the executive branch. The report of the Committee on 
Control by the Courts and the Legislature over Executive action noted that ‘the 
existence of effective safeguards against the possible abuse of power by the Executive 
is an all-important aspect of the Rule of Law.’  Accordingly, it mandated that an 
‘inviolable right of access to the courts’ must exist ‘whenever the rights, interests, or 
status of any person[s] are infringed or threatened by executive action.’110  It provides 
a more explicit formulation than what is found in the conclusions of the Lagos 
108 International Commission of Jurists, Executive Action and the Rule of Law: A Report on the 
Proceedings of the International Congress of Jurists, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (reprinting the conclusions 
of the New Delhi Conference, the conclusions of the Lagos Conference and the conclusions of the Rio 
Congress, along with the proceedings of the Rio Congress) (1962: International Commission of Jurists) 
109 Ibid, 111 
110 Ibid, 27 
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Congress, which set up only ‘minimum requirements’ for judicial review of 
administrative or executive action, namely adequate notice of pending action, full 
disclosure of the reasons for such action, and a ‘fair hearing’ in which ‘the grounds 
given by the Executive for its action shall not be regarded as conclusive but shall be 
objectively considered by the court.’111 
The Rio Congress further specified that in addition to ex ante determinations of the 
legality of executive action, the judiciary should have ample powers for ex post facto 
review of that conduct, whenever this is challenged by a citizen who is affected by this 
action. Its report specified that courts should have broad powers when sitting in 
judgment on claims alleging executive abuses.  Accordingly, the judiciary must not 
only be empowered to determine whether ‘the Executive acts within the powers 
conferred upon it by the Constitution and [whether] such laws are not unconstitutional’, 
but also to examine whether the executive’s discretion ‘has been exercised in a proper 
and reasonable way and in accordance with the principles of natural justice’, and 
whether ‘the powers validly granted to the executive are not used for a collateral or 
improper purpose’.112  In order for the courts to be able to make this determination, the 
report mandates that ‘it should be for the Court to decide whether any claim not to 
disclose State documents is reasonable and justified’.113 
These criteria have sufficient substantive content to provide a clear ‘yardstick’ 
against which the avenues of judicial review of executive action can be compared.  
111  Ibid, 17 
112  Ibid, 27 
113  Ibid 
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However, one might criticize this mandate of judicial control over the executive for 
being too vague, not on the basis of the standard against which the executive will be 
judged, but rather on the question of whether it fails to define the type of executive 
action that should be considered reviewable.  Speaking of the requirement for judicial 
review contained in the Rio Report, Anthony Matthews has noted that it ‘either claims 
too much for the rule of law by suggesting that legal remedies are (or should be) 
available for every prejudicial executive action; or it avoids the question of precisely 
when an actionable invasion of rights, interests of status takes place’.114 
Accordingly, Matthews suggests that the rule of law requires only that there be 
‘limited and specific requirements for the legal control of the executive’, namely that 
the executive should be prevented by the judiciary from abrogating basic civil rights.115  
His approach is consistent with that of this thesis. Namely, he outlined the minimal 
criteria, so that there can be no disagreement on the basis of these differing models of 
the rule of law.  There can be no disagreement, even where more ample review of 
executive action might be thought by some jurists to be desirable, that if judicial review 
is a necessary component of the rule of law, that this should extend at the very least to 
claims that the executive has or will deprive a citizen of their non-derogable rights. 
However, the ICJ also noted that this important safeguard of citizens’ rights can be 
easily circumvented if the judiciary itself can be controlled.  This is because the right 
to bring these cases matters little if the judges are little more than creatures of the 
executive branch.   
114  Anthony S. Matthews, Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law — Dilemmas of the 
Apartheid Society (Juta and Co. 1986), 25 
115  Ibid 
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Accordingly, the Act of Athens states that judges must ‘resist any encroachments . 
. . on their independence’116 in order to be able to enforce the provisions of the rule of 
law that depend upon their scrutiny of the executive.  The New Delhi Report specifies 
the conditions under which judges must work in order for the judiciary to be considered 
independent. The preconditions for independence are that judges are appointed in 
accordance with a procedure that involves the judiciary, and receive adequate 
remuneration, which should be fixed and inalterable during a lifelong term of office.117   
The Resolution of Rio noted that the ICJ needed to address the ‘the independence 
of the judiciary . . . and its freedom from control, direct or indirect, by the Executive.’118  
The Rio Report concluded that the judiciary must also have adequate authority for 
judges to be considered independent.  It states that the judiciary ‘must be given the 
jurisdiction to determine in every case upon application whether the circumstances have 
arisen or the conditions have fulfilled, under which such power [delegated from the 
legislature to the executive] is to be or has been exercised.’119 This formulation implies 
that the courts must have the final word when determining their jurisdiction over the 
executive. In other words, they must have a Kompetenz-kompetenz power.120   
116  ICJ supra n 108, 3 
117  ICJ supra n 108, 12 
118   ICJ supra n 108, 23 
119  ICJ supra n 108, 17 (emphasis added) 
120  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph H H Weiler, The European Courts and 
National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 1998) 92-103 
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This jurisdiction must extend to every possible claim of infringement of non-
derogable human rights by the executive, and includes the power to determine whether 
evidence sought from the government by the plaintiff can be properly withheld in the 
interest of state security. 121  The jurists responsible for the Rio Report also reaffirmed 
that the review of executive action should not be reserved to special tribunals, but 
‘entrusted to the ordinary or the administrative courts’.122 
It should be noted that these reports contain no exceptions in these requirements of 
an independent judiciary and legal profession for times of crisis or even for states of 
emergency.  The Act of Athens further states that jurists should enforce the rule of law 
‘without fear’.123  However, the greatest challenge to this requirement relates to the 
pressure put on the justice system during these periods, and accordingly the ICJ has 
discussed the challenges to the rule of law that relate to states of emergency in detail. 
6.3 The ICJ on the Legislative Oversight During an Emergency  
The last requirement is vital to ensuring the rule of law remains in place during any 
state of emergency.  The Rio Report reiterates that in a constitutional state, the 
proclamation of such a crisis does not suspend all of the laws and abrogate every 
fundamental right. Rather, the state of emergency exists within a legal framework.124  
The executive must act in accordance with legislation that remain in place during an 
121  ICJ supra n 108, 27 
122  ICJ supra n 108, 107-08 
123  ICJ supra n 108, 3 
124  Matthews supra n 114, 265 
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emergency.  The New Delhi Report also states that the legislature may not abrogate 
fundamental human rights.125   
7  Separation of Powers as Implementation of the Rule of Law 
Within domestic American legal discourse, the concept most often employed when 
discussing constitutional safeguards against abuses of authority and excessive 
accumulation of power in a manner that damages the integrity of the legal system is not 
the rule of law, but the separation of powers.  This is largely the result of the time when 
the Constitution of the United States was created. The phrase ‘rule of law’ was 
popularized after 1787, whereas before that date, the concept that this phrase describes 
was normally described by reference to the political structures advocated by proponents 
of limited monarchy.  In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the terminology that described 
the sort of constitutional order that protected the supremacy of law over the rule of men 
was usually referred to as a ‘mixed’ or ‘balanced’ constitution.126 
The genesis of this idea within the Anglophone jurisprudential tradition lies in the 
response to monarchs who attempted to govern in a manner that was not consistent with 
England’s traditional mode of governance, which was not absolute monarchy, but rather 
dominium politcum et regale.127  The monarch’s key constitutional function was not to 
make law or to act as a judge, but rather to execute the laws.  Unfortunately, under a 
mixed constitution no clear barriers to the monarch’s usurpation of these other functions 
125  ICJ supra n 143, 8 
126  M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Liberty Fund 1998) 36-43 
127  John Fortescue, The Governance of England: Otherwise Called the Difference Between an 
Absolute and a Limited Monarchy (first published 1714, Lawbook Exchange 2010) 109-13 
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of government existed.128  The reaction to the early Stuarts’ overreaching created the 
demand for a constitutional order that limit royal powers. ‘[After 1649] [t]he idea that 
the King should be limited to the exercise of the executive function was now well 
understood.’129   
‘When the Restoration came in England it all but swamped the new doctrine [of 
separation of powers] by assimilating it . . . to the complex theory of the balanced 
constitution; in the America of 1787 the doctrine of the theory of checks and balances 
was modified . . . by the theory of checks and balances drawn from the older conception 
of English constitutional theory.’130  The approach of the American revolutionaries, 
who in framing the new country’s mode of government were influenced strongly by 
Montesquieu and Blackstone, was to create a more rigid division of responsibilities 
between the branches.131  
This theory of the separation of powers grants the legislature exclusive authority to 
make law, the executive only the power to enforce it, and to the judiciary it gives the 
ability to referee disputes, and to determine whether the actions of the other branches 
of government comply with the constitution’s commands.   This approach is outlined 
explicitly in the Constitution of the United States.  The exclusivity of Congress’ law-
making power is explained at the beginning of Article I. ‘All legislative Powers herein 
128  J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English History (Oxford University Press 1955) 66-79 
129  Vile supra n 126 
130  Ibid 133 
131  Ibid 110-15 
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granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States’.132   In order to prevent the 
President from enlarging the scope of his own powers, Article II makes it clear that the 
constitution invests him with ‘executive powers’, which are specifically enumerated in 
section four.133  Article III vests the judicial power of the United States exclusively in 
the judiciary.  It is granted in section one to the federal judiciary and section two 
specifies that ‘the judicial power [thus vested exclusively in the courts] shall extend to 
all cases in law and equity’.134 
It is a simple matter to illustrate that the intention of this constitutional design was 
to prevent the accumulation of power within one branch government, as contemporary 
writings by its key authors urging its ratification say so, and these tracts pay special 
attention to the problem of executive aggrandisement.  James Madison, who is 
commonly called the ‘Father of the Constitution’135 justified the proposed 
constitution’s separation of powers by reference to principles of fundamental justice.  
‘No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly 
bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with 
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; 
yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial 
132  Constitution of the United States of America, article 1 
133  Constitution of the United States of America, article 2, section 4 
134  Constitution of the United States of America, article 3, sections 1 and 2 
135  Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (University of Virginia Press 1971)  229 
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determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the 
rights of large bodies of citizens?’136 
On this same subject, in the Federalist No. 47 he argued that ‘The accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny’, and quoting Montesquieu he put the 
question as follows. ‘“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person or body,” says he, “there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest 
the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical 
manner.” Further, in the same letter Madison argues “[w]ere the power of judging 
joined with . . . the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an 
oppressor.” Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but 
briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have 
put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.’137  
Alexander Hamilton explained the importance of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of the laws in Federalist No. 78. He argued that ‘where the will of the 
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared 
in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. 
They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those 
which are not fundamental’.138  Accordingly, we can see in the American constitution 
a clear commitment to the principles of the supremacy of law and to checks on the 
136  James Madison, ‘Federalist Number Ten’, in Clinton Rossiter (ed) The Federalist Papers (1st 
paperback edition, Penguin Putnam 1991) 47 
137  Ibid 271 
138  Ibid 436 
46 
 
                                                 
Chapter 1: Introduction 47 
powers of the government in an organic law establishing the nation’s constitutional 
order.  
This thesis will demonstrate that of the executive’s enlargement of powers in the 
twenty-first century, combined with the other branches’ acceptance of that 
aggrandizement, subverts the Constitution of the United States.  The executive 
definitively rejected the core principles of the rule of law embedded within it, which 
are found in the principles of the separation of powers and judicial review of 
unconstitutional law-making.    This separation of powers is the operationalization of 
the principles of control over the executive specified in the ICJ’s reports within the 
United States.  Accordingly, the subversion of these principles, when it empowers the 
executive to violated non-derogable norms with impunity, is also the destruction of the 
rule of law in the United States. 
8  CONCLUSION 
This chapter of this thesis has defined its central objective.  Its goal is to demonstrate 
that the United States has not been governed in accordance with the rule of law since 
the changes to its mode of government that were implemented after the 9/11 attacks.  It 
has outlined how it will go about proving this point.  This will be done by demonstrating 
that the two other branches of the American government have abandoned their role as 
checks on the executive during this period, fatally undermining the principles of the 
separation of powers that previously prevented the executive branch from violating 
citizens’ non-derogable rights with impunity.  This chapter also defined the concept of 
the rule of law that will be used when judging these changes to the country’s 
constitutional order, and outlined the particular criteria against which the oversight and 
control of the executive branch must be judged.  As these goals, definitions, and 
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operational criteria have all been set forth, this thesis can now proceed to the empirical 
examination of the changes that have taken place and to 
 the normative assessment of this transformation.
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Chapter 2 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter outlined a defensible definition of the rule of law that this thesis 
can use as a ‘yardstick’ to judge the United States after the 9/11 attacks.  However, this 
thesis does not aim solely to produce a normative judgement. It must also explain how 
this transition was possible for a country that was once an exemplar of a rule of law 
state.  This task includes a consideration of a narrower issue, namely how it is possible 
that a nation could remain within the norms of the rule of law for centuries before 
abandoning its limitations.   
To address these issues adequately, it is necessary to discuss the crises that 
periodically tested the durability of the constitutional order of the United States 
throughout its history.  It will become apparent in this chapter ainthat the design of the 
American republic, and, in particular the separation of powers that safeguards its rule 
of law, was a response to its framers’ fears of particular sorts of crises.  They believed 
that these types of emergencies would reinforce the power of the executive. 
Accordingly, without certain safeguards, the nation would begin to take on the 
characteristics of tyranny that the American revolutionaries revolted against.      
As this chapter will describe, the separation of powers that restrained the executive 
was powerful enough to resist the sorts of temporary crises that characterized American 
political life during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  However, as the 
framers predicted, the factor that tends to catalyse the growth and increased power of 
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the executive most effectively is a state of prolonged war. The United States did not 
encounter this state of affairs until the mid-twentieth century.1 
1.1 The Resiliency of the Rule of Law from 1787 to 1940 
Until the twentieth century, the rule of law was protected adequately by the 
separation of powers defined in the Constitution of the United States.2  In the first one 
hundred and fifty years of the nation’s existence, Congress and the courts checked the 
powers of the President as its Framers intended.3 Although ambitious presidents 
attempted to expand their powers during crises, they were repeatedly rebuffed, from the 
earliest days of the American republic.4   
The Framers contemplated the possibility of these sorts of crises, and believed that 
the design of the Constitution was sufficiently robust to resist the dangers to the rule of 
law that would ensue.  While they were concerned about the ability of the executive 
branch to enlarge its own powers and to become unaccountable,5 the Federalists who 
exercised a decisive influence on the framing believed in a science of politics that would 
1  Note that the United States was actively involved in the First World War only during its final year, 
and the American Civil War, its most prolonged war until the Second World War, lasted only four 
years. 
2  Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Mariner 2004) x-xv 
3  Gene Healey, The Cult of the Presidency: America’s Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power (Cato 
Institute 2008) 46 
4  Ibid 38-45 
5  Alexander Hamilton, ‘Federalist No. 8’, in Charles R. Kesler and Clinton Rossiter, (eds) The 
Federalist Papers (Mentor 1999) 36 
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allow them to construct a system that could preserve a stable constitutional order.6  
They found another possibility more worrisome.  Like many other political theorists 
before them, they were concerned with the impact of prolonged warfare on the balance 
of powers.7  Alexander Hamilton noted that ‘[i]t is of the nature of war to increase the 
executive at the expense of legislative authority’, as it necessitates ‘strengthening the 
executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a 
progressive direction towards monarchy’.8  This was an alarming prospect. It is clear 
that the isolationism and general disengagement from European controversies9 during 
the early years of the republic was driven by the fear that prolonged warfare would 
distort the separation of powers that ensured that their constitutional order was ‘a 
government of laws and not of men’.  As Hamilton argued: 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct   . 
. . . the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will 
compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to 
the institutions which have a tendency to destroy their political and civil rights.10 
 
Hamilton also noted that since warfare empowered the President and led to dangers 
to civil rights, there was a persuasive rationale for taking the powers of war and peace 
6  James Madison, ‘Federalist No. 10’, in Charles R. Kesler and Clinton Rossiter (eds), The Federalist 
Papers (Mentor 1999) 45-52 
7  Healey supra n 3, 28-33 
8  Hamilton supra n 5, 36 
9  Neutrality Act 1794, ch. 50, 1 Statutes 38; Neutrality Act 1817, 3 Statutes 370, section 1 (1817); 
See Jules Lobel, ‘Covert War and the Constitution’, (2012) 5 Journal of National Security Law and 
Policy 393, 398-399 
10   Hamilton supra n 5, 35 
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out of the hands of the executive, as these powers would subject it to excessive 
temptation.  He argued that ‘[t]he history of human conduct does not warrant that 
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise to commit interests of so 
delicate and momentous a kind . . . to the sole disposal of . . . a President’.11   Hamilton, 
in short, thought that since the executive branch could enlarge its powers during a 
prolonged war, the power to declare war must be jealously guarded by Congress.  James 
Madison argued in 1793 that ‘war in fact is the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.  
In war, a physical force is to be created; and it is the executive will, which is to direct 
it . . . . Hence it has grown into an axiom that the executive is the department of power 
most distinguished by its propensity to war: hence it is the practice of all states . . . to 
disarm this propensity of its influence’.12  
Accordingly, Madison also concluded that Congress hold the exclusive power to 
declare war, since its powers would not be increased, but rather diminished by a 
prolonged state of conflict. Madison later intimated that a President might create a 
foreign crisis merely to increase his domestic powers, noting that ‘Perhaps it is a 
universal truth, that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against 
danger, real or pretended, from abroad’.13  As this chapter will demonstrate below, the 
Framers’ fears were not misguided. Accordingly, the contemporary relevance of 
11  Ibid 419 
12  James Madison, ‘Letters of Helvedius’, Nos. 1-4, in Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 
Volume Two (J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) 67 
13  James Madison, ‘Letter to Thomas Jefferson of May 13, 1798’, in Letters and Other Writings of 
James Madison Volume Two (J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1865) 141 
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executive unaccountability after the executive’s creation or manipulation of crises as a 
threat to the rule of law deserves serious consideration. 
Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw the possibility as well. He predicted that ‘[i]f the 
existence of the American Union were perpetually threatened . . . the executive would 
assume an increased importance’.14   He, like Madison, underlines the conflict of 
interest that would be created if the executive branch managed to obtain control over 
the field of foreign affairs such that it could bring the nation to war by either overt or 
covert means.  This problem was apparent to many political thinkers during the 
nineteenth century.   
The prophecies about the danger of the temptation to create an empowered executive 
finally came to pass in the twentieth century. At this time prolonged warfare and 
sustained alarms of danger from abroad, whether real or pretended, were used as a 
means by which the executive branch enlarged its own powers and curtailed liberty, in 
a manner that threatened the separation of powers and the rule of law.  America broke 
decisively from its pattern of isolation in 1941, and over the course of the next thirty 
years of warfare the powers of the chief executive grew to the point that they could be 
described aptly as those of an ‘imperial presidency’.15  What must be demonstrated in 
this chapter is that these wars imperilled the rule of law, and why.  This demonstration 
will require an explanation of how these wars were entered into or enlarged owing to 
decisions made by the executive branch alone.  It will also require a description of how 
the executive enlarged its powers during this crisis period so decisively that, at its 
zenith, it effectively removed itself from effective oversight and control of the 
14  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1, (George Adlard 1839) 130 
15  Schlesinger supra n 2, 100-187 
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legislature and the judiciary.  It will be demonstrated that it did so in a manner that the 
previous chapter demonstrated was entirely incompatible with the minimum 
requirements of the rule of law state. 
1.1.1 Rule of Law from Framing to 1860: Constitutional Supremacy 
The first clear example of attempted executive aggrandizement is instructive. As 
President, Thomas Jefferson attempted to become the ultimate arbiter of constitutional 
questions, in an attempt to supplant the Supreme Court, which he derided once in 
office.16  Attempting to pursue political ends in the courtroom, he sought to withhold 
documents from the defence during a politically motivated treason trial.17   The 
Supreme Court rejected his arguments for an executive role in legislative and 
constitutional interpretation in Marbury v. Madison.18 Chief Justice Marshall did the 
same when disposing of Jefferson’s claims of executive privilege against subpoenas, in 
United States v. Burr.19  During the early years of the republic, the judiciary quickly 
proved itself to be an effective check on the executive. John Marshall established that 
the judiciary was a co-equal branch of government with a special responsibility to 
16  Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 7 H. A. Washington (ed) (Taylor & 
Maury 1854) 178 
17  Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side (Elephant 1989) 71-72); Gary 
Wills, ‘The Strange Case of Jefferson’s Subpoena’ New York Review of Books (New York, 2 May 
1974) 
18  Marbury v Madison [1803] 5 US 137 (United States Supreme Court) 
19  Burr v United States [1807] 25 FCas 30 (Central District of Virginia Circuit Court) 
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protect citizen’s constitutional rights against invasion by the other branches of 
government.20 
  
20  Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (Touchstone 2005) 86 
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1.1.2 The Rule of Law in the 19th Century: Tested, but Unyielding 
During the next century, the Civil War would put separation of powers to the test, 
by offering compelling rationales for the expansion of executive powers beyond the 
bounds of accountability to the law and the other branches of government.   President 
Abraham Lincoln unilaterally suspended habeas corpus at the beginning of this 
conflict, but he acknowledged that his action was irregular and that it required 
Congress’ sanction.21  Furthermore, the executive’s decision to try alleged conspirators 
before military tribunals while the civilian courts remained open was rebuked by the 
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan.22  Accordingly, the four years of civil war did not 
result in substantial changes to the separation of powers. As had been the case with 
other crises, presidential assertions of emergency powers and allegations of superiority 
over the other branches of government were soon forgotten after the danger receded.23   
After the Civil War, Congress soon re-established its power to punish executive 
encroachments of its authority to set government policy. President Andrew Johnson 
was impeached for attempting to undermine Congress’ policies by dismissing officials 
in a manner that violated the Tenure of Office Act of 1867,24 which it passed over 
Johnson’s veto.  This action demonstrated that the legislative branch was determined 
not to allow the executive to interpret legislation in a self-serving manner that enlarged 
21  Jonathan Hafetz, ‘A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus during the Lincoln and Bush 
Presidencies’, (2008) 12 Chapman Law Review 439, 444-446 
22  Ex Parte Milligan [1866] 71 US 2 (United States Supreme Court) 
23  Schlesinger supra n 2, 66 
24  Tenure of Office Act 1867, 14 Statutes 430, section 154 
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the President’s powers.25 Johnson believed that the Act was unconstitutional, and 
argued that because of that fact he still possessed the power to dismiss Secretary of War 
Edward Stanton, who was implementing Congress’ Reconstruction policy of using the 
military to enforce its laws enfranchising African-Americans.  The impeachment side-
lined Johnson, destroying his credibility and his ability to influence policy. On this 
basis, one can conclude that the legislature proved itself an effective restraint on 
executive usurpation during the nineteenth century. 
 2 THE COLD WAR PRESIDENCY AND THE RULE OF LAW  
Between 1941 and 1971, a period in which the United States was continuously at 
war, either hot or cold, the executive branch exceeded the limits of what the 
Constitution allowed.  It did so by starting new wars on the President’s own initiative, 
wiretapping political activists, and preventing bills limiting the executive’s powers 
from becoming laws.  At the same time, the oversight and regulation of the other 
branches of government withered during this slow process of aggrandizement.26  The 
presidential unaccountability that this created27 was the genesis of the severe 
constitutional crisis that erupted during the Nixon Administration. At that time, the 
executive used these broad powers in a manner that openly side-lined both the 
25  Ibid 71-75 
26  Ibid 61 
27  Schlesinger supra n 2, x 
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legislature and the courts, until these branches acted decisively to restore the separation 
of powers. 
This chapter of the dissertation will describe in detail both the creation and the 
dismantling of the imperial presidency.  It will demonstrate that the rule of law was put 
into serious peril, but after the reassertion of congressional and court oversight, the 
United States was governed in accordance with the requirements of the rule of law.  
This state of affairs persisted until the emergence of a new state of prolonged warfare 
inaugurated by the 9/11 attacks. As noted above, the four following subsections of this 
chapter will describe a set of developments in turn.  First, it will outline the growth of 
unchecked presidential powers between 1941 and 1968.  Second, it will detail the use 
of these powers by President Nixon, and how this constituted a decisive break with the 
rule of law, owing to his rejection of any oversight or control.  Third, it will chronicle 
the discovery of the scope of the abuse of presidential powers during this period, as 
they were later detailed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, hereinafter 
described as the ‘Church Committee’. Fourth, it will describe how Congress and the 
courts’ reaction re-implemented the rule of law.      
This will demonstrate that during a period of prolonged war, the executive was able 
to obtain broad delegations of power that made it effectively immune from oversight 
and control from the other branches in the way that the Constitution and the rule of law 
require. During this period, the rule of law was undermined to the point that the 
executive could violate citizens’ non-derogable rights with impunity.  The backlash to 
Nixon’s abuses, however, reinforced and entrenched the rule of law in the domestic 
law of the United States.  Accordingly, the evaluation of the rule of law in the United 
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States after the 9/11 attacks can focus on the willingness of Congress and the courts to 
protect these features of the rule of law in a turbulent and belligerent era.  
Until the twentieth century, the United States pursued an isolationist foreign 
policy.28  Outside of crises like the Civil War, the executive branch was presented with 
few opportunities to expand its powers, much less expand them to the point that it could 
violate citizens’ non-derogable rights without facing scrutiny and rebukes from 
Congress and the courts.  The decision to commit American troops to battle in Europe 
in 1917 was controversial, and the one year of warfare did not yield any opportunities 
for the executive to gain or to use executive powers that might destabilise the rule of 
law.   
In the early years of the Second World War, it appeared likely to many observers 
that the United States would remain neutral, and thereby avoid a political crisis.29  The 
nation shifted suddenly into crisis governance after a devastating surprise attack.  The 
attack on Pearl Harbour plunged the United States into a state of war that would 
transition repeatedly from ‘hot’ to ‘cold’, but as will be demonstrated below, the nation 
remained in a constant state of emergency.  This attack also inaugurated a shift away 
from the requirements of the rule of law, such that even the most fundamental rights of 
citizens, to due process, to be free from prolonged arbitrary detention, and even to life 
itself, were abrogated by the executive without any resistance from other branches of 
28  Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century 
(Princeton University Press 1995) 12 
29 Ronald E. Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism and Europe 1901-1950 
(Gruenwood 1991) 110 
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government, and without any redress.  As this chapter will illustrate, this would remain 
the norm until this process reached its logical terminus during the Nixon administration. 
Between 1941 and 1968 the executive branch acquired extensive powers that far 
exceeded what was granted by Article II of the Constitution of the United States.30  This 
gradually made it unaccountable, defeating the purpose of the separation of powers that 
safeguards the rule of law and guarantees citizens’ protections against violations of jus 
cogens norms by the executive branch.  While these powers were initially used only 
infrequently, they created a precedent.31 
As noted above, the crisis period began with the attack on Pearl Harbour, an act so 
shocking to Americans that it allowed President Franklin Roosevelt to take 
unprecedented action in a political atmosphere that precluded any resistance or 
criticism.32 The President was able to assume to himself broad new powers, which were 
in the main not derived from Congress, but instead from Declarations of National 
Emergency that he issued.33  These national emergency powers authorized the President 
to ‘seize property, organize and control the means of production, seize commodities, 
assign military forces abroad, institute martial law . . . and, in a variety of ways, control 
30 Healey supra n 3, 89-104 
31 Schlesinger supra n 2, 176 
32  Christine Ann Lobasso, ‘Elevation of the Individual: International Legal Issues that Flow from the 
American Internment of the West Coast Japanese during World War II’, (1998) 8 Touro International 
Law Review 45 
33  Schlesinger supra n 2,115 
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the lives of United States citizens’.34  The Second World War allowed Roosevelt to 
assume supplementary powers that were not expressly delegated by Congress, which is 
in tension with the requirements of the rule of law as outlined in the last chapter.  
Roosevelt believed that he also possessed emergency powers owing to his status as 
the Commander-in-Chief in wartime, and because of his inherent duty to ‘take measures 
to avert a disaster which would interfere with the winning of the war’.35  Roosevelt 
elevated this duty above the laws. In one early example, he told Congress that if 
agricultural provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act were not repealed within 
three weeks, he would refuse to enforce the statute.36  Congress capitulated to this 
unwarranted assertion of executive power.  More regrettably, the Supreme Court did 
likewise when Roosevelt took actions that deprived American citizens of their right to 
be free from arbitrary detention and from death sentences imposed without due process. 
These actions that illustrate the implications of the abrogation of the rule of law.37 
On May 19, 1942, all American citizens of Japanese ancestry were ordered to leave 
their homes and relocate to internment camps, pursuant to the Civilian Restrictive 
Order.  This order was authorized by Executive Order 9066, itself issued three months 
earlier by the president.38 It should be noted that the Office of Naval Intelligence earlier 
34  Congressional Research Service ‘National Emergency Powers’ (Congressional Research Service 
2007) 1 
35  Remarks of Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress of 27 September 1942, quoted in Schlesinger supra 
n 2 115 
36  Ibid 
37  William H. Rehnquist All the Laws But One 136-137, 184-202 (Knopf 1988) 137-38, 184-202 
38  Executive Order No. 9066, 7 Federal Register 1407 (25 February 1942) 
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found that there was no evidence that Japanese Americans were involved in any 
clandestine activity at that time.  Despite the fact that this vitiated the rationale of 
internment, Solicitor-General Charles Fahy withheld this evidence from the Supreme 
Court, in violation of his duty of absolute candour.39  However, the Supreme Court 
appeared predisposed to rule in the government’s favour during the internment cases 
that followed, especially after Congress acted quickly to rubber-stamp this ‘most 
shameful abuse of power’.40 
Certain Justices believed that the internment was unconstitutional, as it was 
recognized some forty years later.41 Despite that belief, they failed to follow Chief 
Justice Marshall’s example in standing up to executive overreaching. Instead, they 
defended broad presidential powers in wartime even when they are unconstitutional on 
their face.  Justice Jackson wrote in dissent that ‘defense measures will not, and often 
should not, be held within the limits that bind civil authority in peace’, as ‘military 
decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal’.42  To meet the basic 
requirements of the rule of law state, a nation must have a judiciary empowered to stand 
up to the executive when it violates citizens’ non-derogable rights.  However, a 
dangerous precedent was set during the Second World War, when both the executive 
and public opinion were aligned against the Justices.  If this same dynamic can be seen 
39  Neal Katyal (Acting Solicitor General of the United States), ‘Confession of Error: The Solicitor-
General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases (20 May 2011) 
<blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/1346> accessed 26 May 2014 
40  Schlesinger supra n 2, 115 
41  Korematsu v United States [1984] 584 FSupp 1406 (Northern District of California) 
42  Korematsu v United States [1944] 323 US 245 (United States Supreme Court) (Jackson J) 
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at work outside of a transient crisis, it calls into question whether the state is in 
compliance with the basic requirements of the rule of law state. 
Another example of the Courts’ abdication of responsibility during the intense 
political pressure created by the fear, anxiety and hatred fomented when the United 
States was propelled into the Second World War is found in its Ex Parte Quirin 
opinion.43 This opinion discussed the military trial of eight alleged German saboteurs, 
one of whom was an American citizen, captured shortly after arriving in the United 
States by submarine.  Rather than trying these prisoners in the civilian courts, as Ex 
Parte Milligan requires, Roosevelt convened a secret military tribunal for an 
unconstitutional purpose.  The tribunal process was designed to introduce otherwise 
inadmissible evidence, in order to secure a favourable verdict.44 
The Supreme Court, when presented with a petition for a writ of certiorari after the 
denial of writs of habeas corpus, went to great lengths to accommodate Roosevelt, even 
announcing the denial of relief almost immediately, and before deciding upon the 
rationale for their decision.  After the Court declined the petition, but before it 
publically explained its reasoning in this momentous case, Justice Jackson circulated a 
draft opinion. This opinion influenced the development of the Court’s deferential 
approach in the cases challenging executive power that were to follow.45  In it, Jackson 
argued that the treatment of prisoners of war was an issue related to foreign policy and 
43  Ex Parte Quirin [1942] 317 US 1 (United States Supreme Court) 
44  Glenn Sulmasy, ‘Ex Parte Quirin and Military Commissions under the Obama Administration’, 
(2010) 41 University of Toledo Law Review 767, 773 
45  Jack Goldsmith, ‘Justice Jackson’s Unpublished Opinion in Ex Parte Quirin’, (2006) 3 Green Bag 
Law Journal (2nd series) 223, 226 
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national security with which the President was entrusted, and which the court was not 
competent to second-guess.  This approach set a precedent for the Court’s later attempts 
to maintain its legitimacy when it chose not to decide cases involving invasions of 
citizens’ non-derogable rights. The Justices now possessed the raw material out of 
which they could build a doctrine of deference to the executive in matters involving the 
military and national security. To do so, the Court developed a tactic, to be deployed 
when faced with controversial cases when there was no popular or political support for 
challenging the other branches of government. Its strategy was to ‘use[] procedural 
rules to avoid decisions of substance’.46 
In addition, despite the fact that the type of military tribunal at issue in Quirin was 
not provided for by statute, Jackson argued ‘the President had inherent authority to 
create military commissions’, ‘a remarkable analysis [that] hints at an exclusive 
Commander-in-Chief power without any citation of authority’.47  The published 
decision also distinguished Ex Parte Milligan by stating that in the case at bar, the 
petitioners were ‘unlawful combatants’,48 despite this having only been proven in a trial 
that lacked due process.  It ruled in this manner despite this being the key fact that the 
petitioners contested in their request for the writ; they were motivated to seek an order 
transferring them to civilian court because it would allow them to prove otherwise.  
Again, this proved to be a dangerous precedent for cases in the future that make claims 
46   S Scheingold, The Law in Political Integration: The Evolution and Integrative Implications of the 
Regional Legal Processes in the European Community (Harvard University 1971) 21. Scheingold was 
referring in particular to the European Court of Justice. 
47  Goldsmith supra n 45, 227 
48  Quirin supra n 43, 30-31 
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related to arbitrary and indefinite detention. It provided the basis for the executive to 
claim that the judiciary possessed no right to review its own determination of the facts 
that the petitioners claim were wrongly decided, even if the executive branch’s 
procedure did not comply with the principles of natural justice. 
If in wartime the executive possessed, after declaring a national emergency, the 
unreviewable authority to refuse to enforce statutes, to imprison thousands of American 
citizens, and to unilaterally designate citizens as enemy combatants who could be tried 
and executed without due process and without access to the civilian courts or writs of 
habeas corpus, it seems possible to conclude, on the basis of the definition established 
in chapter one, that the United States was not a rule of law state during the Second 
World War and its aftermath.  Here, the executive violated citizens’ non-derogable 
rights not to be subjected to prolonged arbitrary detention, to have access to the courts, 
and ultimately, not to be killed.   
Despite these manifest failures to conform to the minimum standards of the rule of 
law, no one made the argument that the United States was, at that time, not a rule of 
law state.  This omission can be attributed to two factors. First, criticism of the President 
and Commander-in-Chief during wartime was considered tantamount to sedition.  
Second, because many hoped that this was merely the result of a transient crisis, such 
as that which led Lincoln to suspend habeas corpus. Admittedly, there is a distinction 
between a state that is temporarily out of compliance with the requirements of the rule 
of law and one which is no longer a rule of law state.  The facts that this thesis must 
turn to here relate to what happened when the emergency never ended.  It can then 
65 
 
Chapter 2: Historical Development of the Rule of Law 66 
discuss the implications of this to the status of the rule of law in the United States at 
that time.    
2.1 From Hot War to Cold: New Challenges to the Rule of Law  
In the wake of American triumph in the Second World War, the failures of the rule 
of law were quickly forgotten, as no one had any interest in calling attention to actions 
they thought were aberrational. Even the victims of Japanese internment were anxious 
to ignore and forget the injustices that they suffered.  Congress briefly reasserted itself 
against the executive branch, which also was weakened considerably by the succession 
of Harry Truman.  It should be noted that at this time, Vice President Truman was 
elected to that office only three months prior to Roosevelt’s death. He lacked an 
independent power base in national politics.  His approval rating fell to 33% by 
September of 1946.49  
This formal return to the strictures of the rule of law made possible by the weakness 
of the American executive outside of times of crisis was very tenuous, as that year also 
heralded a new conflict, which was soon labelled the cold war. ‘The end of the Second 
World War brought the customary diminution of power . . . . But this time the 
diminution was brief. The Cold War, by generating a climate of sustained and indefinite 
crisis, aborted the customary reversion of power to the coordinate branches’.50  While 
49  Roper Center for Public Opinion Archives, ‘Job Performance Ratings for President Truman’, Roper 
Center for Public Opinion, 
<http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating_detai
l.cfm?allRate=True&presidentName=Truman#.UJWMCoaTZpg> accessed 26 May 2014 
50  Schlesinger supra n 2, xv 
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the nature of this crisis was initially unclear, it was soon recognized as an existential 
threat to the United States. Accordingly this emergency became the justification for 
ever broader assertions of unreviewable executive powers,  the termination of which 
waited for some resolution of what appeared to be an irresolute conflict between the 
‘free’ and communist spheres of influence.51  
1947 also witnessed the birth of the Central Intelligence Agency, which will 
hereinafter be referred to as the ‘CIA’.  This agency soon became a key tool for the 
executive, as it allowed for great freedom of action without any accountability.  This 
unaccountability involved a failure to provide for effective legislative oversight of 
incredible discretionary powers, which included the ability to direct the CIA’s private 
armies and to catalyse new wars and expand those already in progress.52 
The Berlin blockade quickly demonstrated that minor skirmishes between the two 
blocs had the capability to develop into a conflagration.  The development of a Soviet 
nuclear arsenal in 1949 showed that this could invite a level of destruction that was 
previously unimaginable.  The invasion of South Korea by an army equipped by the 
Soviet Union led President Truman to declare a national emergency, because ‘world 
conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggression that have 
been loosed upon the world’.53  This state of emergency would remain in effect until 
1978.54  The declaration gave the executive specific extraordinary powers, but these 
51  Healey supra n 3, 93-94 
52 Schlesinger supra n 2, 167 
53  Presidential Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Federal Register 9029 (19 December 1950) 
54  See United States Code, title 18, section 1601 
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were less significant to its political fortunes than the political climate the Cold War 
created.  As will be described below, this new atmosphere allowed the executive branch 
to assume powers that dwarfed those emergency powers that were expressly delegated.  
‘From the start, the Cold War fostered an overarching sense of crisis. By 1947, the 
concern of the nation was focused on the perceived threat posed by Soviet expansionism 
. . . the first comprehensive analysis of the nation's position after World War II predicted 
an indefinite period of foreign relations crisis and recommended a massive military 
expansion . . . [which]  echoed throughout the Cold War’.55 
Truman set another important precedent that greatly expanded executive power 
when he committed American forces to battle without a declaration of war, or even 
implicit congressional approval.56   In fact, Truman decided not to seek it, relying 
instead on a constitutional case that ‘was far from conclusive’.57  However, Congress 
failed to react, as ‘Korea beguiled the American government first into an unprecedented 
claim for inherent presidential power to go to war and then into an ill-advised 
resentment against those who dared bring up the constitutional issue’.58   The political 
atmosphere of the Cold War prevented Congress from challenging this overreaching, 
which clearly contradicted the Constitution’s War Powers Clause.59   This set a 
55  Jill Elaine Hasday, ‘Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing the Rule of Law at the End of the Cold 
War’ (1996) 5 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy, 137 
56 Healey supra n 3, 89-91 
57  Schlesinger supra n 2, 133 
58  Ibid 135 
59  Constitution of the United States, article 1, section 8, clause 11 
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precedent that continued throughout this prolonged crisis, which was used to justify 
such actions as the American invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965.60  Congress 
uncovered President Johnson’s misleading comments about the circumstances of that 
latter invasion, but he was not held accountable.61 The legislature failed to exercise 
oversight or hold the executive responsible.  Congress felt that this would expose it to 
negative public opinion and the charge that it was ‘soft’ on Communism.  Congress 
also feared that its defence of the principle of legislative oversight and the constitutional 
limits of executive power would be characterized as nothing more than a cover story 
for purportedly unpatriotic and ideologically suspect motives. 
Truman received one major setback.  The Supreme Court ruled against him in The 
Steel Seizure Case.62 The Court held that the executive did not have the power to seize 
private property except when it was given that right explicitly by Article II of the 
Constitution or by statute, although the fractured plurality makes it very difficult to 
determine the case’s holding and legal effect.  The majority opinion restated the 
traditional rule that the President possessed no power to act except where explicitly 
authorized by congress, but the concurring opinions made it clear that this holding did 
not have a support of the majority of the Justices. This lack of consensus illustrated a 
momentous shift in the Court’s theory of the Constitution,63 which can best be 
explained by the political climate created by the Cold War. Edward Corwin applauded 
60  Ibid 178 
61  James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Brookings Institution 1981) 239-241 
62  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer [1952] 343 US 579 (United States Supreme Court) 
63  Ken Gormley, ‘Foreward: Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: A Symposium’, (2002)  41 
Duquesne Law Review 667, 667-678 
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the concurring opinions, arguing that ‘Nature abhors a vacuum; so does an age of 
emergency’,64 making it clear that he thought that the executive simply must have 
implied constitutional powers.  This argument directly contradicts the Framers’ views 
on the powers given the executive. It also ignores their well-founded fears of how such 
powers could be used to destabilize the separation of powers that is an essential element 
of the rule of law.   
Nevertheless, these concurrences did set some limitations on executive power, as the 
Constitution would not bear the interpretation that the executive could act directly 
contrary to statute.  The President still could not defy clear congressional orders, as 
Truman had when seizing the steel mills.  However, this limitation was taken only to 
apply in domestic matters, where the Court held the Commander-in-Chief Clause 
conferred no authority,65 leaving the President largely unimpeded in his ability to 
regulate foreign affairs when Congress remained silent.66  This reservation to domestic 
affairs can also be explained by reference to the unwillingness of the other branches of 
government during the Korean War to be seen as impediments in the struggle against 
communism. This view would have impaired their popular legitimacy in this highly 
charged political atmosphere. 
In foreign affairs, the President could rely not only on the power to mobilize and 
control the military, but also on his ability to direct the CIA, which was used to 
64  Edward S. Corwin, ‘The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw’ (1953) 53 Columbia 
Law Review 53, 66 
65  Schlesinger supra n 2, 143-147 
66  Zemel v Rusk [1965] 381 US 1 (United States Supreme Court) 
70 
 
                                                 
Chapter 2: Historical Development of the Rule of Law 71 
overthrow a number of foreign governments during the Cold War, namely those of Iran, 
Guatemala, Egypt, Chile, and Laos.67  Executive orders:  
[H]ad, in effect, amended the National Security and Central Intelligence Acts by 
a long series of Top Secret NSC directives, thereby creating a ‘secret charter’ to 
which the Agency became far more responsive than to the statutes themselves.   
Though the CIA was persistently, ingeniously and sometimes irresponsibly 
engaged in undertakings that confronted the nation with the possibility of war 
[i.e., provoking the Cuban missile crisis], Congress had no effective means of 
control or of oversight or of even finding out what the Agency was up to.68  
 
As described in the previous chapter, this failure of oversight is not in accordance 
with the minimum requirements of the rule of law.   Here, the power to conduct covert 
operations was delegated to an agency that reported only to the chief executive.  No 
limitation were set on those powers, even where it was apparent that misuse or even 
overuse of those powers could lead the nation in to war —precisely the sort of conflict 
of interest for the executive branch that the Framers feared.    
On this evidence, it is possible to conclude that between 1950 and 1968, the 
executive branch was acting in ways that violated fundamental precepts of the rule of 
law.  That said, there were still some checks on the executive branch during this period, 
such that it might be said that the nation had not diverged significantly from the rule of 
law.  The president, at least in domestic matters, was still nominally responsible to the 
other branches of government, which consecutive presidents chose to evade rather than 
to openly defy.69  Citizens subjected to serious abuses that implicated the rule of law, 
such as the threat of arbitrary detention, were able to challenge the executive 
successfully in the courts.  Following The Steel Seizure Case and other key cases from 
67  Schlesinger supra n 2, 167 
68  Ibid 
69  Schlesinger supra n 2, 151-187  
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this period the courts continued to police the actions of the executive when they acted 
in a way which directly contradicted the law of the land.  Notably, in Joint Anti-Fascist 
Review Committee v. McGrath70 the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of 
the executive branch’s blacklists barring alleged communists from government 
employment, and banned them in Peters v. Hobby.71 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that Congress was inclined to give the executive 
freedom of action. Congress was concerned about being outflanked politically and 
vilified for impeding the intelligence agencies’ and the military’s ability to fight a cold 
war against a shadowy communist enemy that many American citizens believed was 
lurking in every corner, both at home and abroad.  It could do so and retain some 
legitimacy and a justification for its efforts owing to its continued ability to pass 
domestic legislation that responded to the interest of its constituents and competing 
interest groups.  However, the judiciary faced a more difficult dilemma.   
The courts could not abdicate their responsibilities to monitor and control the 
executive’s actions where they implicated the constitutional rights of citizens without 
a fatal loss of institutional legitimacy.  The federal judiciary’s key mandate since 
Marbury v. Madison has been the enforcement of constitutional limitations on the other 
branches of government.  As such, its decisions can usually be described as 
accommodations of competing values.  On one side, it wanted to allow the executive 
to have some freedom of action where this was universally popular, despite the fact 
that the disputed action was often unconstitutional and in conflict with core principles 
70  Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v McGrath [1951] 341 US 123  (United States Supreme 
Court) 
71  Peters v Hobby [1955] 349 US 331 (United States Supreme Court) 
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of the rule of law.  On the other, it could not allow the executive complete freedom to 
ignore either congressional or constitutional commands without consigning itself to 
irrelevance.72 
The Supreme Court’s protection of the constitutional rights of alleged communists 
being mistreated by the executive at the height of McCarthyism sent a strong message 
that the judiciary would continue to assert its relevance.  The federal judiciary remained 
an effective, although by no means perfect, forum for those challenging violations of 
their civil rights during the Cold War, at least whenever the executive’s actions could 
not be ignored without putting the courts’ institutional relevance into question.  An 
accommodation was achieved during the Cold War.  Namely, as long as the 
implications of its control over the intelligence agencies and the military was ignored 
by the other branches of government, the executive branch continued to comply with 
the commands of Congress and the courts.  Accordingly, there was no assertion 
immediately following The Steel Seizure Case of a constitutional theory that would 
give the executive branch pre-eminent powers to act in the interest of national 
security.73  
Covert evasion of the requirements of the rule of law, however, would not be 
sufficient for an Administration that was determined to take radical action when faced 
with opposition from the legislature and judiciary.  As will be described below, the 
72  This analysis draws upon neofunctionalist theories of judicial decision making (which are 
themselves derived from neorealism in political science); these theories ‘explicitly brought political 
interests into the judicial calculus’.  Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The 
Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University Press 2001) 40-45 
73  David Gray Adler, ‘The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power’, (2002) 19 
Constitutional Commentary 155, 160 
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executive branch proved willing to take actions that would unilaterally expand its own 
power at the expense of the other branches that were charged with restraining it.  It 
would then be impossible for the legislature and the judiciary to ignore this 
overreaching, without permanently conceding the role in overseeing and restraining the 
executive, as required by the rule of law. Richard Nixon seized the horns of this 
dilemma, those of admitting either defeat or provoking what theretofore were quiescent 
branches of government.  He insisted on escalating the Vietnam War in the face of 
determined opposition from Congress and the populace.  The consensus about enlarged 
presidential powers during the Cold War would crack under the strains of this conflict.  
Afterwards, the introduction of a period of détente would provide an opportunity to 
return the nation to a state of affairs in which a robust separation of powers served to 
guarantee the rule of law. 
The stage was now set for a confrontation between the executive on one side and the 
legislature and the courts on the other.  This would be the decisive test of whether or 
not an executive empowered as it was in the course of the Cold War was consistent 
with the rule of law. Nixon would attempt to use all of these powers to create an 
unaccountable executive, even when he took actions that enlarged his own powers 
unilaterally and asserted directly that the executive was above the law.  If Nixon were 
to have succeeded in this endeavour, it would have been evident not only that there was 
no rule of law in the United States during a crisis.  It also would have been clear that 
this was a permanent state of affairs, with no apparent means of reversal.  However, as 
the next section will demonstrate, by this time the other branches were now aware that 
they would lose all of their own constitutional powers if they did not restore the 
executive to a state of legal accountability.  This, however, would require a 
constitutional crisis over the right of the executive to declare war, bar legislation even 
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when passed over his veto, and to derail investigations into many other abuses. It would 
end in Nixon’s resignation. 
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3 THE BATTLE OVER AN UNACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
   
President Nixon inherited the responsibility for the Vietnam War from his 
predecessors.  President Johnson obtained some measure of congressional approval for 
committing American troops to battle, in the form of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.74  
Nixon was elected on a promise to end the war.  It should be noted that his predecessor 
had initiated peace talks that might have succeeded, were they not sabotaged by Henry 
Kissinger, on Nixon’s orders.75 Once in office, Nixon decided to escalate the war.  For 
this he was alone responsible, as Congress did not countenance any expansion.   
However, the war was deeply unpopular by the time that Nixon assumed control.  
Accordingly, the executive could no longer rely on reflexive support for war-making 
predicated upon popular support for anti-communist measures.  Nevertheless, Nixon 
was determined to escalate the conflict as part of a set of policies about which only he 
and his closest personal advisors were aware.  His inability or unwillingness to create 
any support in Congress for his policies set the stage for significant conflict between 
the branches of government, which were catalysed by a more aggressive use of the 
executive powers his predecessors had accumulated during the Cold War, where these 
74  Southeast Asia Resolution 1964, Public Law 88-308 
75  See Mark Lisheron ‘In Tapes, LBJ accuses Nixon of treason’ 2008-12-05 Austin American-
Statesman (Austin, 5 December 2008) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081208104725/http://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/l
ocal/12/05/1205lbjtapes.html> accessed 26 May 2014 
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powers were now being directed against the legislature and the courts themselves, in a 
way that challenged their continuing relevance in a direct and unmistakable manner. 
In March of 1969 Nixon ordered secret bombings of Cambodia.  This involved 
assigning targets within Vietnamese air space as a cover story, and then issuing 
substitute orders to pilots specifying new locations in Cambodia after they launched 
their aircraft.  ‘[F]alse reports on each mission were filed through regular channels’, 
such that ‘“only a few United States officials were aware of the B-52 operations in 
Cambodia’”.76   ‘The State Department, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air 
Force Chief of Staff were all kept ignorant of the bombing, as were the relevant 
congressional committees’.77  This was not legal, but there was no immediate fallout, 
as the secrecy of Operation Menu was maintained for almost another three years. 
However, as this led to the fall of the neutral Sihanouk regime and the North 
Vietnamese decision to support the Khmer Rouge, Nixon decided to follow up the 
bombing with a ground assault in April of 1970, something which could not be kept 
secret.   
Nixon announced the invasion to the American people on television, arguing that 
despite the fact that there was Congressional authorization, he possessed not only the 
right but a duty to launch this offensive into a neutral nation. He argued that ‘I shall 
meet my responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action 
76  Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency (University of Michigan Press 2005), 80 quoting 
Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (Georgia State 
University Press 2001), 50-51 
77  Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 
(University of Chicago Press 2008), 67 
77 
 
                                                 
Chapter 2: Historical Development of the Rule of Law 78 
necessary to defend the security of our American men’.78  He argued that ‘[t]he legal 
justification . . . is the right of the President of the United States under the Constitution 
to protect the lives of American men’.79  This theory of a constitutional reserve power 
to protect the nation vested in the executive implied that congressional authorization 
was wholly unnecessary.  It was also a harbinger of assertions to come.   
Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia was prompted by the fact that its neutralist 
government was allowing the North Vietnamese Army to use areas that bordered South 
Vietnam as a route for the transportation of arms and as a staging area for attacks.  
Nevertheless, as it was far from certain whether he would obtain the necessary support 
from Congress to widen the war in Indochina dramatically, he chose to put the 
legislature on the horns of a dilemma. They could either allow him to continue over 
their protests and risk irrelevance, or they could flout the danger of appearing patriotic 
at the very moment that American soldiers were in harms’ way. The latter course of 
action risked their popularity, even though Nixon was responsible for the decision to 
place the troops in that dangerous position in the first instance.   
The risks associated with the second course of action were apparently perceived by 
Congress to be too large to run, but this moment still marked a turning point in its 
relations with the executive branch.  As popular support for the war weakened among 
the populace, and the tendency to rally behind the President subsided, Congress took 
ever more bold steps in opposing executive usurpations of legislative power.  It did so 
78  Schlesinger supra n 2, 187 
79  Ibid 
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because it learned that they were running a much larger risk though inaction. There was 
now a very real danger that they could be side-lined permanently. 
3.1 Restraining Executive War-Making: The WPR 
Both the legislature and the country as a whole reacted in shock to Nixon’s unilateral 
escalation of the Vietnam War.  Senator Javits spoke for many legislators when he 
argued that ‘the President has apparently defined his authority as Commander in Chief 
in such a broad and comprehensive manner as to intrude upon, and even pre-empt, the 
powers reserved so explicitly to the Congress under the Constitution’.80  Student 
protests erupted nationwide, and these were transformed into a student strike after 
National Guardsmen and police officers shot and killed unarmed protesters at Kent 
State and Jackson State Universities.81  The anti-war movement soon became a serious 
threat to the Nixon Administration. 
Congress reacted to the invasion of Cambodia by revoking the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution in January of 1971. When voting, members noted that this would ‘deprive[] 
the President of his legal authority to carry on the [Vietnam] war’.82  In response, Nixon 
turned to the head of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, William 
Rehnquist, to provide a justification of his theory that the Commander-in-Chief Clause 
authorized him to continue the war, which was quickly forthcoming, despite the fact 
80  Sundquist, supra n 61, 250, quoting Senator Jacob Javits’ remarks as recorded in the Congressional 
Record of 1 May 1970 
81  Rudalevige supra n 76, 81 
82  Schlesinger supra n 2, 187 
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that Rehnquist’s ‘case was persiflage’,83 i.e., frivolous.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
Rehnquist was later nominated by Nixon to be Chief Justice, which, as will be discussed 
in chapter four, set a dangerous precedent of the executive arranging for the 
appointment of reflexively pro-administration jurists to the body that would scrutinize 
its theories of executive power. Nixon would use the same logic for the initiation of a 
massive bombing campaign in another neutral country, Laos, which was done not 
merely to impair the transit of Vietnamese forces, but to intervene in a domestic conflict 
by destroying the Pathet Lao.84   
Nixon was at this point engaging in the second of the three categories of action 
outlined by Justice Jackson in The Steel Seizure Cases, which held that executive 
authority was strongest when they acted with congressional authorization, but that less 
deference was due when they intervened where Congress was silent.  Shortly, he would 
venture into the third category, by taking actions the legislature expressly forbade.  He 
did this despite Jackson’s admonition that this could never be considered 
constitutional.85  As will be demonstrated below, Nixon soon resolved to prevail over 
both Congress and the Courts, and to destroy the separation of powers, replacing it with 
what Theodor Lowi called a ‘plebiscitary presidency’86 that was accountable 
periodically to the electorate, which is incompatible with the rule of law, as outlined in 
chapter one.   
83  Ibid 191 
84  Ibid 203 
85  Youngstown supra n 62, 637-38 (Jackson, J. concurring) 
86  Healey supra n 3, 7-9 
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Schlesinger and Lowi argued that Nixon intended to create an executive branch that 
was not accountable to any other part of government, not even, theoretically for 
violations of citizens’ non-derogable rights, but which was only accountable 
periodically to the electorate. By the beginning of Nixon’s second term, the executive 
was in a position to attempt to do so because it seized or expanded upon its delegated 
powers, and because Nixon now refused to recognize any attempts to control his 
freedom of action or to remove or trim these grants of power. His officials flouted 
legislative and court oversight by refusing to provide candid testimony, and he later 
interfered with investigations into his conduct more directly. Nixon developed a theory, 
which will be explained below, that purportedly established that he need not comply 
with laws of which he did not approve.  He developed another theory that allowed him 
to prevent bills that were against his interests from being passed into law.  As will be 
explained below, this is the point at which Congress was compelled to resort to sterner 
measures. 
In 1972 Congress began to consider bills that would explicitly require the President 
to obtain its approval before committing troops to battle,87 to explicitly forbid actions 
like Nixon’s unilateral invasion of Cambodia. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 gave 
the executive a sixty-day deadline for obtaining legislative approval for military 
action.88  It was ‘acclaimed as a triumph of congressional self-assertion’, but Nixon 
clearly indicated that he intended to ignore it, as he argued ‘any attempt to make such 
alterations [to his purportedly constitutional reserve powers] by legislation alone is 
87  Schlesinger supra n 2, 302 
88  War Powers Resolution 1973, Public Law 93-148 
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clearly without force’.89  In the winter of 1973, the executive again ordered heavy 
bombing on Cambodia in support of the Lon Nol government, and not merely to protect 
American troops in Vietnam, relying this time exclusively on a theory of the executive’s 
constitutional powers.90  In response, Senator Fulbright commented that he ‘retain[ed] 
total confidence in the ability of this administration to come up with some specious 
legal justification . . . the Nixon administration has shown that it will not be gotten the 
better of by anything so trivial as a law’.91   
Nixon’s failure to comply with a clear command from the legislature would await 
the reckoning of all his unconstitutional actions.  However, it was now clear that Nixon 
was not restrained by the Constitution itself, as it was clear from its text that he could 
cite no basis to declare or expand wars, especially against Congress’ explicit command.  
It was now obvious that the legislature needed two things. First, it required much more 
effective oversight, so that it could remain aware of how the executive was using its 
powers in an illicit manner even when the administration sought to disguise that fact. 
Second, it required enforcement mechanisms to call the executive to heel when it was 
found to be abusing its powers.  As will be demonstrated in the next subsection below, 
89  Schlesinger supra n 2, 434 
90  Rudalevige supra n 76, 83 
91  Sundquist supra n 61, 256 
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the problem was that the executive exercised delegated powers which were so great that 
it could argue that Congress could not lawfully restrain it. 
3.2 Congress’ Response to Distortions of the Legislative Process 
During the final years of Nixon’s presidency, Congress finally roused itself to deal 
with other assertions of unconstitutional executive powers.  Two of the most 
problematic implicated Congress’ control over legislation and spending, namely 
impoundment and the pocket veto.  The first of these challenged the legislature’s 
competence to spend tax monies, a power explicitly committed to Congress by the 
Constitution’s Taxing and Spending Clause.92  The second challenged Congress’ ability 
to pass any legislation at all, by ignoring the manner in which the Constitution’s 
Presentment Clauses93 indicated that the legislature could override his failure to sign a 
bill into law. 
Nixon followed his predecessors in claiming a right not to spend money which 
Congress allocated for particular purposes, although he initially claimed that this was 
justified by the need to balance the federal budget.  However, it was clear by 1972 that 
Nixon was using this process to derail policies that he did not like, even when these 
were outlined in duly enacted laws, and to assert legislative powers he did not possess 
in order to reward loyalists and punish his adversaries in Congress, who were 
increasingly bold in confronting him over his escalation of the conflicts in Indochina.  
92  Constitution of the United States, article 1, section 8, clause 1 
93  Constitution of the United States, article 1, section 7, clauses 2-3 
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In doing so, Nixon ‘breached the rule usually followed by his predecessors of avoiding 
a direct and open flouting of the will of Congress.’94    
‘Here, as in other areas, Nixon upped the ante at the outset by defining his powers 
as inherent and nonnegotiable’,95  relying on advice from the OLC that argued that 
‘substantial latitude to refuse to spend’ flowed from the ‘executive power vested in 
[Nixon] by the Constitution’.96  ‘Deputy Attorney General Joseph T. Sneed grounded 
the president’s power on a combination of constitutional and statutory language but left 
little doubt that in the department’s opinion, the inherent powers were sufficient.   
While the OLC could be counted upon to be generally supportive of the chief 
executive’s positions owing to its status as part of an agency located under his direct 
control, the process of politicization of this office accelerated during the Nixon 
Administration. It argued that ‘To legislate against impoundment even in the domestic 
area would deprive the President “of a substantial portion of the ‘executive power’ 
vested in him by the Constitution”’.97  A federal court noted that ‘if the power sought 
94  Sundquist supra n 61, 203 
95  Rudalevige supra n 76, 89 
96  Joseph T. Sneed, ‘Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Joseph  T. Sneed to the Senate 
Committee on Separation of Powers: Presidential Authority to Impound Appropriated Funds’, 
(Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 6 February 1973) 10-11 
97  Sundquist supra n 61, 208, quoting the testimony of Deputy Attorney-General Joseph T. Sneed of 7 
February 1973 before the Senate Governmental Operations and Judiciary Committee 
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here were found valid, no barrier would remain to the executive authorizations if he 
deemed them . . . to be contrary to the needs of the nation’.98 
In addition to frustrating congressional policies by impounding duly authorized 
funds, Nixon attempted to derail the passage of whole acts of legislation when he could, 
by failing to return bills he refused to sign to Congress so they could attempt to override 
his veto.  This was wholly unprecedented, and had the potential of not merely delaying 
the passage of the bills, but of denying Congress any power to legislate entirely.  
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution states that the President may either sign a bill 
into law or return it unsigned to Congress within ten days whenever the legislature is in 
session.  In 1938, the Supreme Court held in Wright v. United States that Congress 
could appoint representatives to accept bills when it was in session but temporarily 
adjourned.99  In 1970, however, Nixon decided not to return a bill to Congress after it 
appointed a representative to receive it, in precisely the manner Wright approved.100 
Had he done so, his veto would clearly have been overruled, as this bill was passed in 
the Senate with a vote of 64 to 1 and in the House of Representatives by 345 to 2, where 
only two-thirds majorities would be required to override his failure to sign the bill into 
law.101 For the first time, but not the last, Nixon asserted that he possessed the power 
98  Local 2677 v Phillips [1973] 358 FSupp 60 (District Court for the District of Columbia) 
99  Wright v United States [1938] 302 US 583  (United States Supreme Court) 
100 Schlesinger supra n 2, 244 
101  Ibid 
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to prevent a unanimous Congress from passing legislation, despite the Constitution 
explicitly specifying that it possessed the power to override his objections. 
This tactic and numerous other measures were elements of ‘the Nixon revolution 
[which] aimed at reducing the power of Congress at every point along the line and 
moving towards rule by presidential decree’.102  This of course was necessary, since no 
consensus supporting his policies existed in either Congress or the population as a 
whole.  Indeed, from 1970 onwards his Administration was under sustained pressure 
and was the subject of continuous protests and other forms of popular resistance.103 At 
this stage, an impasse was clearly on the horizon.  The executive was committed to 
extra-constitutional extensions of its own power, which clearly invaded the 
prerogatives of the legislature.  However, this was made possible owing to Congress’ 
failures during the course of the Cold War.  Congress gave such broad discretion to the 
executive that it was unclear whether domestic law did, in fact, allow the legislature 
and the courts to survey and regulate the president’s activities when he claimed 
otherwise.  However, the full range of the executive’s secret and unreviewable powers 
was yet to come to light.  After the full range of discretion and domestic power that 
flowed from the ability to control the intelligence agencies’ clandestine activity became 
102  Ibid 246 
103  Seymour M. Lipset, ‘Polls and Protests’, (1971) 49 Foreign Affairs 548, 550-553 
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clear, there would be a new sense of urgency in their efforts to re-implement the rule of 
law. 
3.3 Nixon’s Trump Card: Control over the Intelligence Agencies 
In order to reinforce his power against his enemies, Nixon turned to the intelligence 
agencies, which during the Cold War became tools the President could use at his 
discretion and in secret. As will be demonstrated below, he used this power to overturn 
governments and assassinate unfriendly foreign leaders, while Congress remained 
blithely unaware.  During the early phases of this conflict, many citizens were swept up 
due to over-inclusive definitions of ‘subversives’ or ‘threats to national security’, but 
under Nixon these agencies were used to specifically target people for whom he 
harboured personal animosity, often merely because they threatened his political 
agenda.  These actions were illegal, but they could be undertaken owing to pervasive 
secrecy.  This secrecy was made possible by the lack of congressional oversight.   
The executive’s unilateral control over the intelligence agencies made possible the 
most grievous abuses of the Nixon Administration, but it also led to his downfall.  There 
is evidence that Nixon made use of his personal control over the secret services from 
1970 onwards.   In 1970, he ordered the head of the CIA to organize a coup in Chile,104 
actions which Henry Kissinger, his closest advisor, oversaw personally.105 Nixon 
104  Central Intelligence Agency, ‘CIA Notes on Meeting with the President on Chile’, (National 
Security Archive, 15 September 1970) <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch26-
01.htm> accessed 26 May 2014 
105 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘CIA Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting’, (National 
Security Archive, 16 October 1970) 
<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc05.pdf > accessed 26 May 2014  
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frequently confused constitutionally protected dissent with subversion, and radicalism 
with communism.  The temptation to use these capabilities against personal enemies 
became substantial as his struggle to impose his unilateral will intensified. 106  Nixon’s 
first authorization for illegal wiretapping was a response to leaks about the secret 
bombing of Cambodia, as he feared, correctly, that this information threatened to 
reinvigorate the anti-war movement.107  To justify this activity, his Attorney-General 
claimed that the chief executive possessed ‘inherent presidential power to tap without 
warrants in the interest of domestic security’.108  Again, the chief executive was relying 
on self-serving advice from an executive branch official, although it could be argued 
that such a prominent figure would want to protect their good name and would thus be 
restrained from offering strained interpretations of the constitution. 
By the time that Nixon sought to wiretap his personal opponents, the Supreme Court 
had already rejected Nixon’s argument that the executive was the only branch 
competent to decide whether he was using his surveillance powers in the interest of 
national and domestic security. The likely reason was because the Court recognized 
that the executive’s theory of the interpretation of its own powers would reduce the 
judiciary to irrelevance.  In the Keith Case,109 the Court addressed this issue squarely 
after John Mitchell refused to disclose the source of electronic surveillance information.  
Mitchell argued that the applicability of an exception to the requirement for a warrant 
106  Schlesinger supra n 2, 257 
107  Ibid 
108 Ibid (emphasis added) 
109  United States v United States District Court [1972] 407 US 297 (United States Supreme Court) 
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when ‘a clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the government’110 
was a question that only the President could decide.  
The executive’s allegation of an existential threat to the nation appeared quite 
questionable, however, as the defendants were members of a Detroit collective 
described as ‘radical counter-culturalists’ who advocated ‘rock and roll, dope, sex in 
the streets and the abolishing [sic] of capitalism’.111  The judge at the trial court 
disagreed with Mitchell’s conclusions about unreviewable executive discretion, noting 
that the lack of disclosure was a critical violation of the defendants’ due process rights, 
and ordered the information to be released.112   
When the appeal reached the Court, Justice Douglas outlined the stakes of this 
dispute about the executive’s inherent powers, noting that ‘if the Warrant Clause [of 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution] was held inapplicable here, then the federal 
intelligence machine would literally enjoy unchecked discretion’.113  The Supreme 
Court’s unanimous decision was a stinging rebuke to the constitutional theory that 
Nixon was increasingly relying upon, as it indicated that all of the Court’s members 
understood how Nixon’s theory that he could interpret the scope of his own powers was 
110  Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968, Public Law 90-351 
111  Meikejohn Civil Liberties Institute, Landmark Cases Left Out of Your Textbooks: Herein 
Restored by the Original Lawyers and Litigants and by Meiklejohn Legal Interns (Meiklejohn Civil 
Liberties Institute 2006) 46 
112  United States v Sinclair [1971] 321 FSupp 1074  (District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan) 
113  United States v United States District Court [1972] 407 US 325 (United States Supreme Court) 
(Douglas J) 
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an assault on the rule of law that threatened the Court itself.  Justice Powell’s opinion 
held that executive discretion of this sort would constitute ‘unchecked surveillance 
power’, noting the implications of a lack of oversight. Nixon was ‘saying that the 
President, on his own motion, could declare—name your favorite poison—draft 
dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a clear and 
present danger to the structure or existence of government’.114  Unbeknownst to Justice 
Powell, this was far more than a reductio ad absurdam.  In fact, the intelligence 
agencies were civil rights activists in this manner, as the subsequent revelation of the 
warrantless wiretapping of Martin Luther King, Jr. would later confirm.115 
The decision was significant both because of the explicit nature of the president’s 
claims and the fact that the judiciary presented a united front against executive 
overreaching.  The Supreme Court’s opinion was not merely a rejection of the 
executive’s contention that it could judge whether its wiretapping fit into a statutory 
exception allowing it not to seek a warrant, rather it took a more general view, in line 
with the requirements of the rule of law.  It held that broad ‘presidential discretion . . . 
is inconsistent with the [Constitution]. Neither the President nor the Attorney General 
can act as [a] neutral and detached magistrate’ when it is in its interest to construe its 
114  Ibid 315 (Powell, J quoting Senator Gary Hart) 
115  United States Senate ‘Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans’, S. Rep. No. 94-755, book 
2, 7 (1976) 
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own powers broadly.116  The executive branch was stunned by decision, as ‘When Keith 
came to the Court, President Richard Nixon had appointed four new Justices considered 
to be law-and-order conservatives sympathetic to the President's position on 
wiretapping. In fact, one of those new appointees, Lewis F. Powell Jr., had prior to his 
appointment penned a controversial op-ed article supporting wiretapping in national 
security cases a few months before Keith was decided.’117  Both the ‘public and the 
press saw this [as] stunning’,118 but in fact it was predictable from the point of view of 
functionalist institutional theory.  Nixon’s arguments directly challenged the Court’s 
core justification, its special competence to interpret and adjudicate constitutional 
disputes, implicitly threatening to reverse Marbury v. Madison.  This no jurist could 
accept, even one who was so inclined to law and order as Lewis Powell. 
Nixon had no intention of complying with the Court’s holding in the Keith Case.  
However, faced with the possibility that official records created by the intelligence 
agencies might be made available to those they prosecuted, Nixon was compelled to 
create his own secret unit within the White House, which would pursue his personal 
enemies without obeying even the minimal restrictions that bound the intelligence 
agencies.  Members of this ‘Special Intelligence Unit’, better known as the White House 
‘Plumbers’, were later caught breaking in to plant recording devices at the headquarters 
of the Democratic National Committee within the Watergate Hotel, and within a week 
116  Tracey Macklin, ‘The Bush Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Fourth 
Amendment's Warrant Requirement: Lessons from Justice Powell and the Keith Case’ (2008) 41 
University of California Davis Law Review 1259, 1289 
117  Ibid 1264 
118  Ibid 1263 
91 
 
                                                 
Chapter 2: Historical Development of the Rule of Law 92 
after their arrests Nixon ‘approved a plan to have the CIA obstruct the FBI investigation 
into the burglary’.119  Unfortunately for Nixon, this conversation was conducted within 
a room that automatically recorded all discussions.   
Nixon attempted to withhold the incriminating tapes from the Special Prosecutor 
appointed to investigate Watergate, but the Supreme Court ruled against him in United 
States v. Nixon.120  It is important to note that Nixon used these proceedings to articulate 
his theory of unchecked executive power, and that the Court’s rejection of this theory 
proved vital to the preservation of the rule of law in the United States. If they had not 
done so, the executive would have retained the power to determine whether it was in 
compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. Within such a legal regime, the 
executive branch would be able to use this power to operate with impunity even when 
it violated non-derogable rights, as it would then be the judge of its own cause. This is 
precisely the opposite of what the rule of law requires.   
In essence, the Court ruled that the President should not be allowed to determine 
whether the documents are irrelevant or too sensitive to divulge. Rather, the judiciary 
should have the last word when the President asserts a privilege.121  This is an 
affirmation of one of the key principles of the separation of powers and the rule of law, 
that no man should be the judge of his own cause.  This decision was a vital step towards 
the re-establishment of the rule of law in the United States after years of erosion during 
the Cold War. The Supreme Court again declared that it possessed the power to 
determine whether the executive was violating citizens’ rights.  However, the battle 
119  Rudalevige supra n 76, 93 
120  United States v Nixon [1974] 418 US 683  (United States Supreme Court) 
121  Shane supra n 77, 123 
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would not be won until the legislature followed suit, taking back the delegations of 
legislative power that far exceeded what the rule of law allows, and re-imposed 
oversight and legislative regulation of these powers. 
3.4 Nixon’s Resignation as Restoration of the Rule of Law 
As this subsection will make clear, Congress’ attempts to remove Richard Nixon 
from office were not merely a response to his obstruction of the investigation of the 
Watergate.  The Judicial Committee of the House of Representatives passed the Articles 
of Impeachment against Nixon for destroying the separation of powers that serves to 
protect the rule of law in the United States by constraining the executive.  Article 2 of 
these Articles alleged that he ‘repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the constitutional 
rights of citizens’ by misusing the intelligence agencies to compile information 
intended to ‘prejudice the constitutional right of the accused to fair trial’, and that ‘in 
disregard of the rule of law, he knowingly misused the executive power’.122  Article 3 
states that ‘in refusing to produce these papers and things [viz., the tapes of 
incriminating conversations] . . . [Nixon] interposed the powers of the Presidency 
against the lawful subpoenas of the House of Representatives’.123 
This indictment highlighted the fact that Nixon abused the extensive executive 
powers that it assumed to itself during the Cold War in a manner that impinged upon 
citizens’ constitutional rights, and condemned him for having attempting to avoid the 
oversight of Congress and the courts when they investigated these abuses.  
122  Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, Articles of Impeachment of Richard 
Nixon, House of Representatives No. 1305, 93rd Congress 2nd Session, section 2 (1974) 
123  Ibid, section 3 
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Unfortunately, Nixon denied Congress the opportunity to prove these charges against 
him by resigning before he could be tried in the Senate.  However, a meaningful 
opportunity to address these abuses presented itself after Nixon’s resignation.  Congress 
could take advantage and ensure that the powers that Nixon abused would be 
permanently denied to the executive. It could also restore meaningful oversight over 
the executive in the manner that the rule of law requires.  Congress did so, and this 
would constitute a large part of its legislative agenda over the next five years.   
As will be demonstrated below, the success in this legislative agenda created a new 
framework for the rule of law.  The legislative grants of discretion to the executive 
branch, particularly in the most dangerous areas, such as control over the military and 
the intelligence agencies, were now limited and oversight over these limitations was 
retained by Congress.  The legislature and the judiciary also asserted explicitly that the 
executive would not have the final say over whether it was complying with these 
restrictions on its powers.  After these changes are set forth, this thesis will demonstrate 
that these brought the United States back into compliance with the minimum 
requirements set forth by the ICJ.   It remains to be seen if this compliance would persist 
into the next period of crisis, in which the executive would again be empowered to test 
these limitations. 
4 REIMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULE OF LAW 1974-80 
The Congressional resurgence that allowed for the reimplementation of the rule of 
law did not happen overnight.  It took concerted action to close all of the loopholes in 
the broad grants of discretionary power that the executive exploited during the course 
of the Cold War.  However, by the end of this process, both oversight and a means of 
holding the executive responsible were now guaranteed.  This took place over the 
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course of several stages of legislative and judicial action, beginning with the 
reclamation of the ability to declare war and the destruction of the executive’s purported 
legislative powers.  
As noted above, even before Nixon’s fall Congress wrested back formal control of 
war powers from the executive branch.  Soon afterwards, Congress, ‘led by a bipartisan 
coalition in the Senate, forced Nixon to accept a legislatively imposed cut-off of 
funding for military activity in Indochina as of August 15, 1973’.124  Congress exercised 
its power of the purse to terminate American involvement in Indochina, another bill 
prevented monies from being used for ‘reconstruction’,125 in order to prevent back-
channel military funding, and finally, the WPR served to prevent the creation of another 
military crisis that would empower the executive.  Support for further measures 
wresting control back from the executive branch was quite broad by April of 1973.  As 
Representative Gillis Long stated: 
The President has overstepped the authority of his office in the actions he has 
taken.  Congress will not stand by idly as the President reaches for more and 
more power . . . . Our message to the President is that he is risking retaliation for 
his power grabs, that support for the counter-offensive is found in the whole 
range of congressional membership.126 
 
The reckoning arrived later that month, but it did not end with Nixon’s resignation. 
This merely cleared the field for the attempt to subject the executive branch to 
limitations. ‘Congress, having battled Nixon the president, was now ready to turn its 
124  Shane supra n 77, 63 
125  Ibid 
126  Rudalevige supra n 76, 102 quoting the remarks of Representative Gillis Long on the floor of 
Congress 
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attention to the institution of the presidency’.127 This was essential, as all of the levers 
of power that Nixon used to subvert the separation of powers, and thus, the rule of law, 
remained in place.  Accordingly, it appeared to be merely a matter of time before 
another President would make the same use of them as Nixon, thereby imperilling the 
rule of law and the relevance of the other branches of government. The next phase of 
the struggle focused on taking control of the legislative process, into which the 
presidency intruded during the Cold War.  Congress was aided by the Supreme Court 
in this endeavour.  The Court consolidated all of the legal challenges to impoundment 
under the caption of Train v. City of New York.128  The Supreme Court’s unanimous 
ruling against the executive in that case was a ‘clear defeat for the administration’, and 
other courts interpreted it as holding that ‘the executive [was] trespass[ing]’ into law-
making and this could not be permitted, as this would ‘make impossible the attainment 
of the legislative goals’ set forth by Congress in its bills.129  
The Train decision served to ratify Congress’ passing of the Impoundment Control 
Act,130 which was designed to protect the legislature as a ‘viable institution’ in the face 
of concerted action aimed at creating a ‘presidential government’.131   The Act, 
127  Rudalevige supra n 76, 100 
128  Train v New York [1975] 420 US 35 (United States Supreme Court) 
129  Campaign Clean Water Inc v Train [1975] 489 F2d 498.  (Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals) 
130  Congressional Budget Act and Impoundment Act 1974, Public Law 93-344 
131  Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War and Spending (Texas A&M Press 2000) 119, 
quoting Senator Sam Ervin’s speeches from the floor. 
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combined with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,132 placed Congress firmly back 
into control over its spending powers, as the Constitution mandated.133 Congress 
‘recaptured from the executive its constitutional role in controlling the power of the 
purse’,134 that power that allowed Congress to terminate the Vietnam War. 
Addressing executive interference within the legislative process was only the 
beginning of Congress’ efforts.  Another battle in its campaign to restore the rule of law 
involved a struggle to impose statutory restrictions on the executive, which would 
clearly underline the illegality of the type of violations for which Nixon was forced to 
resign. Alongside this struggle was another related effort to establish the mechanisms 
of oversight that would serve to bring any such violations to its attention. ‘When the 
House Select Committee on Committees held its hearings on structural reform of the 
House of Representatives in 1973, no single weakness commanded more attention than 
“the failure . . . really to engage . . . in anything like the beginning of an adequate 
oversight function’”.135  To make it possible for the legislature to police the limits of 
executive discretion, however, it would first need to set clear limits on these delegated 
powers, as the rule of law requires.   
This Congress accomplished through a series of laws limiting the executive passed 
between 1974 and 1980, which would then be enforced by a new committee structure, 
which will be described in section five below.  In implementing this reform agenda, 
132  Congressional Budget Act and Impoundment Act 1974, Public Law 93-344 
133  Rudalevige supra n 76, 128-130; United States Constitution article 1, section 8, clause 1.  See also 
United States v Butler [1936] 297 US 1 (United States Supreme Court) 
134  Rudalevige, supra n 76, 130, quoting the remarks of Senate Budgetary Chair Brock Adams 
135  Sundquist supra n 61, quoting Committee Reform Amendments 1974, House Report 93-916 
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Congress created bodies that were specifically charged with ensuring the executive 
branch did not overstep the boundaries of the powers delegated by the legislature. 
4.1 Establishing Clear Statutory Limits on Executive Discretion 
One of the ways in which the defective separation of powers was deficient in meeting 
the minimum obligations of the rule of law related to the broad grants of discretionary 
authority by the legislature to the executive during the Cold War.   These grants were 
so broad that it was often impossible to determine if the executive was exceeding its 
powers, due either to the vagueness of the provisions or the utter failure to specify what 
the executive could not do in support of these very general directives.  As will be 
demonstrated below, Congress brought the executive back into line with what the ICJ 
requires with respect to delegated authority by passing statutes that clearly specified 
what the executive could not do, in particular, explicitly barring violations of non-
derogable norms, and by creating other laws that would make it impossible for the 
executive to hide any such abuses. 
The Privacy Act of 1974136 responded to such abuses as Nixon’s scrutiny of his 
enemies’ tax returns, which warranted a mention in the Articles of Impeachment, and 
created limitations on governmental use of private information provided to agencies for 
limited purposes.  Citizens’ right to control over these records was further underlined 
by the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act.137  Now citizens could 
request the files compiled on them by government agencies, even intelligence agencies.  
It should be noted that the subsequent release of these files shocked many activists and 
136  Privacy Act 1974, Public Law 93-579 
137  Freedom of Information Act 1966, Public Law 89-554 
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politicians, and helped to catalyse support for a sweeping reform of the intelligence 
agencies’ oversight, which will be discussed in the following subsection.   
The Privacy Act also confirmed the principle of judicial oversight over executive 
decisions that affected citizens’ rights, as ‘[j]udicial review of executive determinations 
that something needed to be kept secret was now authorized,’ over President Ford’s 
veto of the legislation.138 This legislation had the effect of making it more difficult for 
the executive branch to operate in secret, something which it relied upon when using 
the intelligence agencies in ways that contradicted relevant statutory law, while 
avoiding any oversight from Congress.  The increased likelihood of abuses being 
uncovered by individuals targeted by the executive, and the possibility of subsequent 
congressional investigations and censure, was a clear victory for the rule of law. 
In response to Nixon’s attempt to exploit statutory exceptions that referred to 
national emergencies, Congress sought to restrain all of the executive’s emergency 
powers.  The clear priority, however, was the emergency power that allowed for the 
violation of one of citizens’ most important non-derogable rights, the right not to be 
subjected to prolonged arbitrary detention.  The Internal Security Act of 1950,139 which 
was passed at the beginning of the Cold War, allowed for executive detention of the 
type to which Japanese-Americans were subjected during the Second World War.  
These provisions, which were also known as the Emergency Detention Act, were never 
invoked during the Cold War.  However, some feared at the time that Nixon might 
138  Rudalevige supra n 76,106-08 
139  Internal Security Act 1950, 64 Statutes 993 
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invoke its provisions as the turmoil catalysed by the escalation of the Vietnam War 
increased.140  
Congress was spurred to action by a grassroots movement fearful of Nixon’s 
discretionary power under this statute to subject American citizens to indefinite 
detention without trial.  These fears which were later revealed to be quite warranted, 
given the creation of a report by the director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency at the Army War College in 1970 that called for the detention of ‘up to 21 
million “American Negroes” in the event of a national black militant uprising’.141 
Accordingly, Congress passed the Non-Detention Act of 1971.142  The Act explicitly 
barred any and all executive authorization of mass internment.   
The executive branch’s powers under the state of emergency declared by Truman in 
1950 to invoke discretionary powers were terminated by the National Emergencies Act 
of 1974.143  This Act also served to prevent any future emergency from becoming 
indefinite, by requiring the President to justify the declaration of any national 
emergency to Congress.  The legislature asserted its power to override the executive’s 
determination, thereby terminating the broad powers contained in 470 statutes that 
140  Masumi Izumi, ‘Prohibiting “American Concentration Camps”: Repeal of the Emergency 
Detention Act and the Public Historical Memory’, (2005) 74 Pacific Historical Review 165, 170-178 
141  Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement (University of 
Chicago Press 1996), 310 
142  Non-Detention Act 1971, Public Law 92-128 
143  National Emergencies Act 1974, Public Law 94-412 
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granted discretion to the executive in the event of a national emergency.144  The 
president’s ability to order sanctions against foreign nations on his own initiative, which 
was a simple matter during the pendency of Truman’s Declaration of National 
Emergency, was also limited by the passage of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act of 1977,145 which was ‘designed to constrain emergency economic powers 
over the regulations of international and domestic financial transactions and to limit the 
latter to periods of declared war’.146 
 Presidents were able to use their power to restrain trade with nations they 
deemed to be enemies of the United States in a manner that took control of foreign 
policy entirely out of Congress’ hands.  This state of affairs was not in conformity with 
the rule of law, as this invaded the legislature’s exclusive prerogative of law-making.  
Emergency powers also allowed the executive to breach minimal rule of law norms in 
more dramatic ways, such as when they were used by President Roosevelt to violate 
the non-derogable rights of Japanese-Americans not to be subjected to prolonged 
arbitrary detention.  Accordingly, it was essential that the emergency powers law be 
reformed to conform to the ICJ’s criteria.   
144  Congressional Research Service, ‘Martial Law and National Emergency’ (2005) 1; Senate 
Committee on Government Operations and the Special Committee on National Emergencies and 
Delegated Emergency Powers, ‘The National Emergencies Act’  
145  International Emergency Economic Powers Act 1977, Public Law 95-223 
146  Rudalevige supra n 76, 114 
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5 THE CHURCH COMMITTEE’S CALL TO ACTION 
There were a number of serious violations of citizens’ non-derogable rights 
committed by the executive branch that would have called into serious question whether 
the United States was a rule of law state between 1941 and 1973.  However, these 
abuses did not come to light until after Watergate, as previously the executive possessed 
unquestioned and unreviewable control over these agencies.   
When various committees began to investigate the secret activities of these agencies, 
the abuses that came to light quickly catalysed a movement to make the executive 
branch accountable for its conduct of covert affairs.  The executive branch did not need 
to rely upon emergency powers when taking action that violated citizens’ fundamental 
rights, if they instead used the simple expedient of employing the intelligence agencies.  
This was possible largely due to the unilateral modification of these agencies’ charters, 
itself made possible by the fact that there was no reporting structure in place to allow 
for legislative oversight of these grants of discretionary authority.147   
There was, however, some impetus for intelligence reform in the period immediately 
following Nixon’s resignation, as the Church Committee revealed that these agencies 
facilitated the White House Plumbers’ illegal surveillance, which included providing 
false identities to the Watergate burglars, and the electronic equipment required for 
bugging and wiretapping.148  This momentum would be accelerated significantly by 
147  Frederick Schwarz and Aziz Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of 
Terror (W.W. Norton and Company 2007), 50-53 
148  Ibid 120 
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other revelations of unlawful activity, which were repugnant both to popular opinion 
and the rule of law. 
5.1 The Committee’s Outline of Structural Problems and Solutions 
The exposure of the problems related to a broad grant of discretionary and 
unreviewable authority over the intelligence agencies to the executive would not itself 
help to bring the United States back into line with the rule of law.  In order for the 
executive branch to be subjected to the oversight and control of the legislature when it 
exercised delegated authority over these agencies, legislation repealing the earlier 
vague and overbroad delegations would need to be passed.  The Church Committee did 
much, however, to illustrate how vital this reform was to the rule of law. 
By the time its final report was published, the Committee rejected a theory of 
renegade intelligence agencies, faulting instead the ‘senior officials who were 
responsible for controlling intelligence agencies [who] generally failed to assure 
compliance with the law’ after they ‘delegat[ed] broad authority’ by invoking ‘national 
security’ or ‘subversion’.149  Looking back after the Committee’s findings were 
supported by other subsequently declassified documents, scholars have concluded that 
‘ultimate responsibility was fixed with presidents, attorneys-general, and other high 
executive branch officials’.150  In particular, Senator Walter Mondale identified the key 
problem that led to the abuses detailed in the report as ‘presidential unaccountability to 
the law’ since ‘the grant of power to the CIA and these other agencies is, above all, a 
149  Church Committee Report, book 2, 137, 265 
150  Schwarz and Huq supra n 147, 44 
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grant of power to the President.’151  The Committee’s report made it clear that in 
allowing unreviewable executive control over the intelligence agencies, the legislature 
enabled the executive’s violation of one of the key norms of the rule of law state.   
The ultimate aim of the Church Committee was to ‘determine what secret 
governmental activities are necessary and how they best can be conducted under the 
rule of law’.152  In keeping with the American conception of how the rule of law is best 
protected, the Committee proposed legal restraints on the executive’s discretion when 
directing the activities of the intelligence agencies, as ‘power must be checked and 
balanced . . . the preservation of liberty requires the restraint of laws, and not simply 
the intentions of men’.153  However, it remained to Congress as a whole to determine 
how best it might constrain the executive branch with legal restraints on its discretion 
and to impose oversight to ensure these limitations were observed.  A statutory regime 
that served these ends would be developed during the four years following the issuance 
of the Church Committee Report. 
The Church Committee clearly understood that the rule of law required that the 
executive not be able to use the intelligence agencies in secret, as this led to violations 
of non-derogable rights.  In articulating its message clearly, it helped to catalyse the 
legislative reform that re-implemented the rule of law in the United States, a state of 
affairs that would last until the crisis precipitated by the 9/11 attacks, where the statutes 
passed in response to the Church Committee’s report would be the first targets of an 
151  Kathryn S. Olmstead, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of 
the CIA and FBI (University of North Carolina Press 1996) 88, 96 
152  Church Committee Report, section 18, 1 
153  Church Committee Report, book 2, v 
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executive branch determined to re-establish its dominant position of unreviewable 
authority, with the secrecy and efficiency of the intelligence agencies used as a rationale 
for abandoning this statutory regime. 
6 REFORMING THE CIA, THE NSA, AND THE FBI 
The Church Committee’s Report revealed that the executive’s unilateral and 
unchecked control over the intelligence community allowed it to plan and execute 
operations that threatened the rule of law in secret.  ‘Unsurprisingly, one of the 
Committee’s main points was the need for clear laws to guide and limit the intelligence 
agencies.  In 1976, the CIA, the NSA, and the FBI all lacked detailed statutory mandates 
. . . the NSA was entirely a creature of executive branch regulations’.154 This meant that 
since Congress frequently issued to the executive a blank cheque, via a delegation of 
power merely to use these agencies in the interests of ‘national security’, the executive 
could create regulations that empowered ever more problematic conduct.  When doing 
so, the staff of these agencies began to regard their violations of the law as 
unproblematic, owing to the fact that this behaviour was not challenged by Congress.  
However, this sort of challenge was impossible at the time, as the executive insisted 
that it had the right to withhold the evidence of this from the legislative committees that 
nominally possessed the responsibility of oversight.  Accordingly, the first step towards 
crafting delegations of legislative authority for the operations of these agencies that 
154  Schwarz and Huq supra n 147, 51 
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were in conformity with the ICJ’s criteria would be for Congress to create statutory 
charters outlining clearly what these agencies could and could not do. 
One major reform of intelligence activity was the requirement that the NSA’s 
wiretapping would now be comprehensively supervised by the judiciary. This mandate 
was created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, herein after referred 
to as ‘FISA’.155  This was in part a reaction to Nixon’s argument that he possessed an 
inherent presidential power to conduct wiretapping in the interest of both national and 
domestic security, which led to similar abuses as his unwarranted scrutiny of private 
citizens’ tax records.  The scale of the latter was revealed when intelligence records 
were released pursuant to Freedom of Information Act requests, hereinafter referred to 
as ‘FOIA requests’, and the subpoenas of the Church Committee.  Congress’ reaction 
was forceful.  Representative William Cohen noted that ‘[w]hen the chief executive of 
this country starts to investigate private citizens who criticize his policies . . . the rattle 
of the chains that would bind up our constitutional freedoms can be heard’.156  
  
155  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978, Public Law 95-511 (hereinafter ‘FISA’) 
156  J. Anthony Lukas, Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years (Ohio University Press 1999) 
541, quoting Representative William Cohen 
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7   CONCLUSION 
While the creation of this new oversight apparatus was a victory in the struggle for 
the rule of law, the possibility of legislative control did not guarantee that this would 
be effective.  Senator Frank Church opined that while oversight, and, in principle, the 
power to enforce clear restrictions on the use of these delegated powers and to police 
any abuses now existed, ‘[p]olitical will can’t be guaranteed.  The most we could do 
was to recommend that permanent surveillance be established.  We did that knowing 
that the Congress being a political animal will exercise its surveillance with whatever 
diligence the political climate of the time makes for’.157 
That said, in the political climate after Watergate, the political will to supervise and 
discipline the intelligence agencies was evident.  ‘By the end of the decade [the 1970s] 
Congress had appeared to have made its point.  There could be no more secret wars, no 
more secret covert operations, not even secret scandals . . . the attitude of defiance 
toward the legislature’s claims that characterized the later years of the Nixon 
administration was gone’.158  It remained to be seen how long this newly restored 
separation of powers allowing for oversight and control of the executive branch’s use 
of the intelligence agencies in national security matters would last.  At this point it 
remained unclear whether Congress could weather the storms of a new political climate, 
in which legislators’ attempts use these powers would be challenged. In particular, 
during the Reagan administration, exercising this oversight would require them to 
157  Frank Smist Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989 
(Knoxville, University of Texas Press 1990) 81, quoting interview of Senator Frank Church by Frank 
Smist, Jr. of 23 April 1983 
158  Sundquist supra n 61, 331 
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withstand challenges from a resurgent executive, buoyed by a high level of public 
support.  
The effect of these new mechanisms of legislative oversight can best be judged by 
reference to the Iran-Contra scandal, which will be discussed in the next section.  It will 
describe how the executive was prohibited from using the official channels within the 
intelligence services when it attempted to derail Congress’ foreign policy agenda and 
ignore laws that were passed to prevent unilateral executive action.  It will also illustrate 
that the legislative branch by this point possessed the capacity to quickly uncover the 
extent of the wrongdoing, and to hold very senior officials of the executive branch 
responsible, in the manner that the rule of law requires in order to maintain 
accountability.  The executive was now subjected to oversight, and the next section will 
demonstrate that this control met the criteria specified at the Rio and Lagos congresses 
of the ICJ.  Furthermore, the mechanisms thus imposed proved robust enough to 
function during a non-emergency period.  The question that will remain to be asked 
after comparing this control to the formal requirements of the ICJ is whether these 
would be sufficient during a prolonged crisis, such as that which was inaugurated by 
the 9/11 attacks. 
That said, at the end of this period of resurgence, scholars doubted whether this trend 
would continue.  Writing in 1978, Harvey Zeidenstein argued that ‘Unlikely in the near 
term, but not in the more distant future, is the reassertion of presidential primacy . . . . 
The conditions for this scenario would include one or more of the following: the 
dimming of Vietnam and Watergate in Congress’ institutional memory . . . and some 
severe crisis or emergency . . . comparable to the Depression or World War II, in which 
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Congress gave the President virtual carte blanche’.159   As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, Zeidenstein was correct.  Although there were many challenges to the 
framework that was created between 1973 and 1980 during the two decades that would 
follow, due to such events as the Iran-Contra crisis and the bombing of Serbia,160 this 
framework remained largely intact.  Rather, ‘it is George W. Bush’s presidency that 
provides the clearest, because most openly claimed and aggressively argued, case of 
presidential unilateralism in the post-Watergate era.’161 The next sections of this thesis 
will demonstrate that this clarity has continued unabated into the Presidency of Barack 
Obama, and that this unilateralism has taken the United States outside of the rule of law 
paradigm, as defined in chapter one. 
 
Chapter 3 
OVERBROAD AUTHORITY GIVEN TO AND 
APPROPRIATED BY THE EXECUTIVE AFTER THE 
9/11 ATTACKS 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The restoration of the rule of law after Congress and the courts erected clearer legal 
restrictions on the executive proved relatively stable from 1974 to 2001.1  However, 
159  Harvey G. Zeidenstein, ‘The Reassertion of Congressional Power: New Curbs on the President’, 
(1978) 93 Political Science Quarterly 393, 409 
160  Rudalevige supra n 82, 196-203 
161 Ibid 212, 511 
1  Brian R. Dirck, Waging War on Trial (ABC-CLIO 2003) 71-74 
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during this period members of Presidents Nixon and Ford’s senior staffs were unhappy 
both with the failure of the United States to make aggressive use of its military and the 
reduced role of the executive during this period of relative peace.2  As this chapter will 
demonstrate, this faction, commonly known as the ‘neo-conservatives’,3 argued that 
the reassertion of the constitutional order characterized by the separation of powers and 
the rule of law was unconstitutional, owing to the limits it placed upon the executive’s 
ability to take action it deemed to be in the interest of national security.  
As will be described below, the 9/11 attacks catalysed a remarkably broad 
delegation of legislative authority from the legislature. This chapter will demonstrate 
that this single piece of legislation alone placed the United States’ compliance with one 
of the core principles of the rule of law into question.  The initial grant of authority by 
the legislature to the executive was a text that was given a number of expansive glosses 
in what amounted to executive law-making, in the form of signing statements and the 
opinions of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.  During this period, 
unrestrained and unsupervised executive law-making, which was specifically marked 
out by the ICJ as antithetical to the rule of law,4 was used to justify radical departures 
from the most fundamental norms, both international and domestic in nature.   
Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that this executive law-making and the 
assumption of unsupervised emergency powers was not merely aimed at securing 
freedom of action to violate the aforementioned jus cogens norms.  Rather, the 
2  James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (Viking 2004) 10, 12, 100 
3  Ibid 90-94 
4  International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a Free Society: A Report (International 
Commission of Jurists 1959) 217-218 
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executive now aimed to succeed where Nixon failed, creating a state of affairs in which 
the executive would not be accountable to the other branches of government.  
Accordingly, it will be possible to conclude at the end of this chapter that the 
constitutional order of the United States risked being abrogated in perpetuity if 
Congress and the courts would not reassert themselves vigorously.  At that point, this 
thesis will then move to the assessment of the responses of the judiciary and the 
legislature, respectively. 
2  EXECUTIVE RESISTANCE TO THE NEW RULE OF LAW  
As demonstrated in chapter two, the rule of law was restored by 1980, owing to the 
imposition of statutory restraints on the executive and permanent oversight to ensure 
that vague delegations of power were never again used to violate non-derogable rights, 
or as part of an attempt to create an unaccountable presidency.  While the political 
climate created by the revelation of the ‘Watergate horrors’ and the Church 
committee’s report on the gross abuses of the intelligence community created a near 
consensus that this was necessary, these changes were bitterly resisted by some 
executive branch officials.5 
  Foremost among those whom this chapter must discuss is Dick Cheney, who would 
occupy a number of prominent positions inside the executive branch at key moments 
in its recent history. This is not only because of his central role in the presidential 
administration at that time which was the first to be affected by the congressional 
resurgence, although this is significant.  Cheney was Gerald Ford’s Chief of Staff, ‘an 
5  Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American 
Democracy (Little, Brown, and Company 2007) 34-37 
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extraordinarily powerful position’6 within the executive branch.  However, what is 
even more significant is the fact that while serving in that position, Cheney developed 
the strategy for the executive’s eventual counteroffensive.  As Vice-President, he 
would also be the key to putting it into place, after the 9/11 attacks.7    
This section will demonstrate that Cheney was consistent in resisting the 
congressional resurgence and attempting to restore to the executive branch the powers 
it possessed during the Nixon Administration.  It will further demonstrate that he was 
at the centre of a group of officials that would occupy critical positions in the executive 
branch after the 9/11 attacks, especially in the Office of Legal Counsel.  This group 
included John Yoo and Jay Bybee.  Within the Department of Defense, this group 
included Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz.  These organizations would formulate 
and implement theories of executive power that are incompatible with the rule of law.    
Cheney became White House Chief of Staff directly following Nixon’s resignation.  
Accordingly, he received ‘his chance to wield the powers of the presidency from high 
in the executive branch hierarchy just as those powers had come under fierce assault’.8  
On Ford’s behalf, Cheney opposed the Freedom of Information Act and the Church 
committee’s attempts to obtain information on the executive’s role in the CIA’s 
6  Ibid 26 
7  Charlie Savage, ‘Takeover: Return of the Imperial Presidency’, (2009) 48 Washburn Law Journal 
299, 306  
8  Savage supra n 5, 26 
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assassination campaigns.9  Following the Democratic Party’s return to the White House 
in 1976, Cheney entered the legislature.   
Despite the change of parties occupying the executive branch, Cheney’s views on 
its supremacy remained constant. ‘Throughout its fights to expand presidential power 
at the expense of the legislative branch, the White House would find no greater ally 
than Representative Cheney’.10 He acted in this capacity most notably when the other 
branches of government, exercising an oversight and accountability-creating function 
essential to the rule of law, investigated and punished the executive for the Iran-Contra 
Scandal, as discussed in chapter two above. 
2.1 Cheney’s Minority Report on Iran-Contra and its Significance 
The majority report of Congress’ Iran-Contra Committee was clear on the 
wrongfulness of the executive’s conduct.  It noted, ‘[t]he common ingredients of the 
Iran and Contra policy were secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law’.  The culpable 
officials ‘undermined a cardinal principle of the Constitution’ and the ‘most significant 
check on Executive power’.   Executive ‘officials viewed the law not as setting 
boundaries for their actions, but raising impediments to their goals.   When the goals 
9  Ibid 26-37 
10  Ibid 50 
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and the law collided, the law gave way’.11  Cheney, however, broke ranks with his own 
party leadership in disavowing the report and its conclusions.12   
To do so, Cheney revived theories about inherent presidential power that dated to 
the Nixon Administration.13  Like Nixon, Cheney argued that Congress and the Courts 
simply possessed no authority to operate a check on the presidency when he purported 
to act in the interests of national security.  It must be remembered that Nixon stated 
that ‘any action a President might authorize in the interests of national security would 
be lawful’.14  This position was unconstitutional, and it was fundamentally antithetical 
to the rule of law that it protects.15  Ignoring this, Cheney argued that his position 
simply must be constitutional, as he held that the imperatives of national security 
required a concentration of power within the executive branch.16   
Using this reasoning, Cheney condemned all the statutes that set limits on what the 
executive branch’s actions in the field of national security, particularly when this 
involved the intelligence agencies.  He argued ‘the President has the authority, without 
11  Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (Random House 
1988), quoted in Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line (Hill and Wang 1991) 17-24 
12  Ibid 375-462 (minority report) 
13  See supra chapter two 
14  Church Committee Report, book 4, p. 166 
15  Ryan Patrick Alford, ‘Is an Inviolable Constitution a Suicide Pact?’ (2014) 58 Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 355 
16  Remarks of Richard Cheney for the minority, in Report of the Congressional Committees, supra n 
11, 360 
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statute, to [order covert operations] . . . Congress cannot . . . invade an inherently 
presidential power’.17  This meant that any statutes or court orders to the contrary could 
simply be ignored.  The Iran-Contra Minority Report that Cheney commissioned made 
it clearer what these inherent powers entailed.  According to the report ‘the Constitution 
allocated “powers of deployment and use of force,” as well as “negotiations, 
intelligence gathering, and other diplomatic communications’, and accordingly, the 
‘“president’s inherent powers’  . . . allowed the executive to act ‘when Congress was 
silent and even, in some cases, where Congress had prohibited an action.”’18   
As demonstrated above, this was a reassertion of Nixon’s view, which was contrary 
to and contradicted by the Supreme Court’s decision in The Steel Seizure Case, the 
Articles of his impeachment, the Constitution itself, and finally by numerous statutes 
passed after Watergate.19  Furthermore, if Nixon and Cheney were correct, then there 
would be no rule of law in the United States, at least according to the International 
Commission of Jurists’ definition, as the executive would be able to make its own rules, 
which were given the force of law.  It would also be able to ignore the other branches 
that were charged with supervising the constitutionality of the exercise of the rules and 
emergency powers that it invoked.20  However, before the 9/11 attacks Cheney’s view 
was clearly in the minority, even within his own party.  This is illustrated by the fact 
17  Richard Cheney, ‘Covert Operations: Who’s in Charge?’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 8 May 
1988) 
18  Frederick Schwarz and Aziz Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of 
Terror (W.W. Norton and Company 2007) 160-61 
19  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, [1952] 343 US 579 (United States Supreme Court) 
20  See supra chapter 1 
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that the senior Republican Senator on the Iran-Contra Committee described Cheney’s 
report as ‘pathetic’.21   
Despite the unpopularity of these views, Cheney persisted in advocating them. He 
also made the claim that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional, despite the 
fact that it merely reiterates what is found in the Constitution’s Declare War Clause.22   
Extending his view that the President possessed a ‘constitutionally protected power of 
withholding information from Congress’,23 which would make the legislative oversight 
the rule of law requires impossible, he argued that the executive could launch covert 
operations and initiate military action without informing Congress, as only the 
President can decide ‘when it is safe to tell Congress about them’.24  ‘Cheney hence 
rejected any legislative limits on executive power in national security matters’.25 As 
Nixon’s resignation under threat of impeachment made clear, the executive might 
apply the convenient label of ‘national security matters’ to any program it might 
undertake, even if what was envisioned was a mass violation of citizens’ non-derogable 
rights in support of a drive to elevate the executive above all legal limitations.  This is 
simply a rejection of the rule of law.  Consistent with these views, Secretary of Defense 
Cheney counselled President George H. W. Bush to ignore the constitutional 
21  Savage supra n 5, 56 
22  Ibid 61 
23  Minority Report of the Iran-Contra Committee, in Report of the Congressional Committees, supra 
n 11, 160 
24  Savage supra n 5, 60 
25  Schwarz and Huq supra n 18, 160 
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requirements for the use of force that the War Powers Resolution merely reiterated. He 
‘urged Bush to launch the Gulf War without asking Congress for authorization’.26  
In Cheney and Nixon’s view of inherent presidential reserve powers, this was 
acceptable, but this does not answer the question of why this was desirable.  Cheney’s 
unpublished writings provide the key.  In them, he argued that Congress does not like 
to authorize war, and accordingly the ‘War Powers Act tilt[s] the balance away from a 
patient, measured application of force either towards a quick strike or inaction’.27 
For this argument to be logically valid, one must make explicit the hidden premise. 
It is that war, or, as Cheney euphemistically described it, the ‘measured application of 
force, is desirable.  Once that is done, the argument for expansive executive powers 
can be stated as a complete syllogism. The second premise is that the executive is more 
likely to use the power to declare war than the legislature.  The conclusion is that the 
executive must have been given the power to commit the nation’s troops to battle, 
despite the law to the contrary.  As this section will make clear, the desirability of war 
was a minority view, but it was shared by a number of former executive branch officials 
and foreign policy experts who would return to prominence shortly before the 9/11 
attacks.   
  
26  Savage supra n 5, 61 
27  Richard Cheney, ‘Congressional Overreaching in Foreign Policy’, 
<http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/339579/congressional-overreaching-cheney.pdf> accessed 
30 May 2014 
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2.2  PNAC’s Blueprint for Executive Supremacy in Foreign Policy 
To understand why Cheney believed that war is desirable, one must turn to the 
discourse of the neo-conservative policymakers with whom he is closely associated.  
Many other executive branch officials from the Nixon and Reagan years are on record 
supporting Cheney’s view that war is desirable, as signatories of a document entitled 
‘Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New 
Century’, a report commissioned by a think-tank known as the Project for the New 
American Century, hereinafter referred to as ‘PNAC’.  Its drafters and signatories 
included many who would return to power in the administration of George W. Bush, 
namely Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Director Paul 
Wolfowitz, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee Richard Perle, 
and Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John 
Bolton, among many others.28   
The report argued that war is desirable whenever America’s pre-eminent position in 
global affairs was challenged, or merely when its interests are threatened. It must do 
so, the report argues, because this is the most effective means by which the United 
States could maintain its hegemony, which, its authors argued, was imperilled.  
Accordingly, PNAC’s report contained ‘plans for an era of American global 
domination, for the emasculation of the UN, and an aggressive war against Iraq’.29  It 
28 Project for the New American Century, ‘Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and 
Resources for the New Century’ (2000), <http://www.webcitation.org/5e3est5lT> accessed 30 May 
2014 
29  Ebrahim Afsah, ‘Creed, Cabal or Conspiracy — The Origins of the current Neo-Conservative 
Revolution in US Strategic Thinking’, [2003]German Law Journal 901, 903 
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noted that to achieve this goal, what was needed was principally ‘a foreign policy that 
boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership 
that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities’.30  However, the authors made 
mention of the inertia that would make it difficult for Congress to authorize 
‘simultaneous major theater wars’; progress toward that goal would be slow ‘absent 
some catastrophic and catalyzing event––like a new Pearl Harbor’.31  When George 
W. Bush was elected, there was no sign of such an event on the horizon. The crisis 
precipitated by the arrival of such an event would be all the more useful an opportunity 
for the executive branch, or at the least for those officials who wanted to disregard the 
rule of law after it was re-established by the congressional resurgence. These officials 
wished to re-create a state of affairs in which the executive was unbounded by the laws 
and free of any oversight from the legislature. 
3 IMPETUS FOR EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AFTER 9/11  
President George W. Bush was elected in 2000 after a campaign in which he ‘spoken 
frequently of the diminution of presidential power’, something which he pledged to 
oppose, saying ‘I’m not going to let Congress erode the power of the executive branch.  
I have a duty to protect the executive branch from legislative encroachment’.32  Bush’s 
press secretary clarified that this meant he ‘wanted to restore . . . the executive authority 
30 John Ehrenberg et al., (eds), The Iraq Papers (Oxford University Press 2010) 21 (reprinting the 
PNAC ‘Statement of Principles’ of 3 June 1997) 
31  Ibid 51 
32  Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency (University of Michigan 2005) 211 
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that the President had been able to exercise’.33  However, the controversial 
circumstances of his victory34 were such that he did not possess much political capital 
in the first phase of his presidency.  In addition, Bush was confronted with the opposing 
party’s majority in the House of Representatives, and with a Democratic Party minority 
in the Senate that was large enough to prevent bills from passing, owing to the Senate’s 
complex rules for invoking cloture.35  
This stalemate ended abruptly on September 11, 2001.  It is difficult to exaggerate 
the immediate and overwhelming response of the American public to the events of that 
date.  To say that the psyche of the nation plunged into a profound state of shock would 
not be an overstatement. On 9/11: 
Rumors flew as people stayed glued to their television sets and their cellphones, 
watching endless replays of the crumbling towers—of the desperate people on 
the upper floors leaping to their deaths . . . . speculation was reported [on 
television] as widely as fact.  Were there more targets?  Was Washington 
burning? Media reports suggested car bombs at the State Department and fires 
on the Mall, with tens of thousands dead in New York.36 
 
One must remember that not only was the United States unaccustomed to sizeable 
terrorist attacks, a substantial portion of its population believed that their nation was 
unassailable.  For over two centuries, its home continent was safe from attack from its 
33  Ibid 
34  Bush v Gore [2004] 531 US 98 (United States Supreme Court) 
35  Rules of the Senate of the United States No. 22 
36  Rudalevige supra n 32, 213.  On a personal note, the author recalls that many of his students were 
too frightened to return to classrooms for more than a week after the attacks, and were outraged at the 
suggestion that classes should recommence.  Any suggestion of a return to normality at that time was 
treated as sacrilege.  
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enemies.  Many of its citizens attributed this to divine providence.37  It seemed as if the 
majority of the populace were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder for months 
afterwards, existing in a state where even the briefest and most oblique reminders of 
the events of 9/11 could bring back the terror they experienced that day, such that 
‘television producers rushed to digitally remove the Twin Towers [of the World Trade 
Center] from segments shot before 9/11 to be aired later.  They feared the viewers 
would be traumatized . . . by the sight of the towers’.38  This state of anxiety was further 
enervated by what seemed to be a new phase of attacks using weapons of mass 
destruction. Panic ensued after weaponised anthrax was discovered in letters at various 
locations, along with the message ‘09-11-01 This is next take penacilin [sic] now death 
to America death to Israel Allah is great’.39 
Predictably, a frightened and angry population rallied behind President Bush.  In his 
first speech after the attacks, he announced the inauguration of what he described as an 
epic battle between the forces of good and evil, that he was to lead: 
[T]his is the world’s fight.  This is . . . the fight of all who believe in progress 
and pluralism . . . . I will not forget the wound to our country and those who 
37  Stephen Webb, American Providence: A Nation with a Mission (Continuum 2004) 20-27 
38  Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, ‘Kodak Moments, Flashbulb Memories: Reflections on 9/11’, 
(2008) 47 The Drama Review 11, 12 
39  United States Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/a-post-letter.pdf> 
accessed 30 May 2014 
121 
 
                                                 
Chapter 3: Overbroad Authority: The Executive After 9/11 122 
inflicted it.  I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle 
for freedom and security for the American people.40 
 
    A week earlier, Bush’s approval ratings were at approximately 50% of the 
electorate. After the speech they were at roughly 90%.  One of the most liberal 
legislators conceded that in the wake of this speech, the President possessed support 
for almost ‘anything that he wants to do’.41 
The 9/11 attacks were precisely the cataclysm that the PNAC report contemplated. 
This would allow for the two interconnected objectives detailed by Cheney to be 
realised at once, namely stronger executive power and a new era of war.  ‘The 
unfolding crisis provided an opportunity to expand presidential power’42 and much like 
the attacks on Pearl Harbour, they cleared the way for involvement in a war that seemed 
unthinkable only days before. The authors and signatories of the PNAC report quickly 
understood the nature of this opportunity. ‘[E]ven as the Pentagon building was still 
burning on the morning of September 11 . . . [Secretary of Defense] Donald Rumsfeld 
told his aide Stephen Cambone . . . “Hard to get a good case.  Need to move swiftly.  
Near term target needs—go massive—sweep it all up, things related and not”’.43  These 
notes, released only years later, pursuant to requests filed under the Freedom of 
Information Act, appear to indicate that Rumsfeld was aware that the executive, if it 
40  Rudalevige supra n 32, quoting President Bush’s speech of September 14, 2001 
41  Ibid, quoting Representative Maxine Waters 
42  Savage supra n 5, 76 
43  Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Central Asia (Viking 2008) 64  
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moved swiftly to take advantage of the new political climate, would be able to strike 
targets, like Iraq, that were unrelated to the terrorist attacks.   
This interpretation is confirmed by the comments Richard Clarke, the National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, about a meeting held on September 12, 2001. ‘At 
first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting al-
Qaeda.  Then I realized . . . that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take 
advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq’.44  This would 
be a difficult endeavour, as a drive for an aggressive war unrelated to the 9/11 attacks 
produced a significant anti-war movement, which threatened this agenda and the 
Administration itself, just as the anti-Vietnam War movement threatened Nixon’s.  
War could empower the executive, but it also might contain the seeds of an 
administration’s destruction, as Nixon’s forced resignation demonstrated.45 
Cheney, a keen student of executive power in American history, was determined not 
to repeat Nixon’s mistakes.  This would be vital, as the executive branch now led the 
nation towards what the neo-conservative executive branch officials understood to be 
an open-ended era of warfare, against not only those who sponsored terrorism, but 
those who stood in the way of continued global hegemony.  Nixon understood how war 
could empower the executive.  During the Vietnam War he almost succeeded in 
becoming permanently unaccountable to the law and to the other branches of 
government, in a manner that clearly violated the fundamental norms of the rule of law.  
44  Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (Free Press 2004) 30 
45  See supra chapter 2 
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However, he did not use the tools of repression effectively against his opponents, and 
this led to his downfall.46   
Nixon deemed wiretapping, harassment, and even the threat of widespread arbitrary 
detention necessary, but they created a backlash from the other branches of 
government.  If these powers could instead be obtained from Congress, a key source 
of opposition could be pre-empted.  The key would be to obtain authorizations for the 
use of force and other measures that were much more explicit than the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, a slender legislative reed upon which Nixon relied to his detriment.47   The 
executive would seek that authorization on the day following the 9/11 attacks, in the 
form of what appeared merely to be an authorization for the use of military force, but 
which the executive would subsequently argue, allowed for all the aforementioned 
Nixonian measures, which would have taken the United States outside of the rule of 
law if the other branches of government did not intervene. 
3.1 The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists 
The key piece of legislation delegating broad and vague powers to the executive 
branch was passed within days of the 9/11 attacks.48  The legislative history of the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force of 2001, hereinafter referred to as the 
‘AUMF’, reveals that the executive branch actively attempted to shape the discretion 
46  Michael Genovese, ‘Impeachment of Richard Nixon’ in The Encyclopedia of the American 
Presidency (Facts on File 2010) 267 
47  Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Mariner, 2004) 187 
48  Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate 
(University of Michigan 2005), 215   
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they were accorded such that it would effectively free it of any restrictions whatsoever.  
The AUMF, despite being narrower than initially envisioned when passed, was 
ultimately invoked in defence of purportedly implicit delegations of incredible power.  
However, in its original form presented to Congress on September 12, 2001, it is very 
broad.49 
‘The language . . . prepared by the White House [] would have given the President 
power to ‘deter and pre-empt future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United 
States.’50  ‘It would have seemingly authorized the President, without durational 
limitation, and at his sole discretion, to take military action against any nation, terrorist 
group or individuals in the world, without having to seek further authority from 
Congress.’51  This formulation would have effectively handed the executive branch the 
power to declare war in perpetuity. The President would not have needed the approval 
of Congress to go to war in Iraq, or indeed to invade any other nation, if he indicated 
that he believed that it would ‘pre-empt’ ‘aggression’, whether this might come from 
the distant future or in forms of aggression that fall short of traditional casus belli.52  
 It should be noted that this would have constituted a delegation of power broad 
enough to allow the executive to commit the crime of aggression, known since 
49  United States Congressional Record, 107th Congress, 1st Session, October 1, 2001, S9949-S9551; 
see also Congressional Research Service, ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 
9/11 Attacks: Legislative History’ (Congressional Research Service, 16 January 2007) 
50  Rudalevige supra n 32, 216 
51  Congressional Research Service supra n 49, 2 
52  Ibid 
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Nuremburg as the ‘supreme international crime’.53 This would also have allowed the 
executive to do so on its own initiative, in any situation where the executive sought fit 
to rely on its novel theory of pre-emptive self-defence, which was itself a gross 
distortion of fundamental norms of international law.  President Bush also asserted that 
he possessed constitutional power to do that exactly that, even without congressional 
approval.  This claim was later set forth in the National Security Strategy of the United 
States published on September 17, 2002: 
[T]he first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has 
been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring 
American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and 
counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do 
grave damage . . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, 
the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent 
right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to 
preempt emerging threats.54 
 
The executive did not succeed in its effort to convince Congress to rubber-stamp its 
theory of a constitutional reserve power that would allow the executive to commit the 
nation to ‘pre-emptive’ warfare.  This would make it necessary for the executive to 
attempt to create additional sources of authority that surpassed even the broad statutory 
delegation. This will be discussed in section four below.  Significantly, ‘Congress 
limited the scope of the President’s authorization to use military force . . . to military 
actions against only those international terrorists and other parties directly involved in 
53  United States v Goering [1946] 41 American Journal of International Law 186 
54  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (22 September 2002) 
<mssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf> accessed 14 May 2014 
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and aiding or materially supporting’ the 9/11 attacks.’55  It also added that ‘Nothing in 
this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution’.56   
In this manner, Congress avoided a ‘wholesale, perpetual delegation of the war 
power’.57  However, as will be demonstrated below, however, even this limited 
delegation of power may not be compatible with the rule of law’s requirement that such 
delegations of power must be carefully constrained and scrutinized after the fact.  
However, what was clear even as this bill was passed is that the executive sought 
complete freedom of action, by seeking to insert language that would prevent Congress 
from questioning the way in which it exercised the unfettered discretion that it sought. 
When the Senate was preparing to pass a bill which trimmed the authorization to 
those who instigated or supported the 9/11 attacks, the executive attempted to broaden 
its scope in another key fashion. Namely, it tried to obtain authority to use military 
force and authorize military detention inside the United States, in a manner that were 
clearly foreclosed by various statutes, some of which responded to Nixon’s abuses, 
such as the Non-Detention Act. Others, such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,58 
were even more firmly rooted in American law.59 
55  Congressional Research Service supra n 49, 3 
56  Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists 2001, Public Law 1070-40 
57  Gene Healey, Cult of the Presidency: America’s Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power (Cato 
Institute 2008) 153 
58  Posse Comitatus Act 1878, 20 Statutes 152 (1878)  
59  Matthew Hammond, ‘The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal’, (1997) 75 
Washington University Law Quarterly 953, 956-961 
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It is telling how the executive attempted to use the political environment created by 
the fresh crisis to achieve its objective, which purportedly created substantial time 
pressures. The Senate voted on the bill after only two of its members spoke on it.60  
With respect to the executive’s drive to obtain authorization to employ the military 
within the United States, former Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle noted that:   
Literally minutes before the Senate cast its vote, the administration sought to 
add the words ‘in the United States and’ after ‘appropriate force [against those 
nations, organizations of persons he determines planned, authorized or 
committed or aided the terrorist attacks] in the agreed-upon text. This last-
minute change would have given the President broad authority to exercise 
expansive powers not just overseas—where we all understood he wanted 
authority to act—but right here in the United States, potentially against 
American citizens. 
 
Congress rejected this and accordingly the AUMF does not supersede those earlier 
restrictions on the use of military force within the United States.  However, as will be 
described below, this clear legislative history would not prevent the executive from 
arguing that it contained an implicit authorization for this action. 
The AUMF was not the blank check for war the executive sought, which it would 
later claim could be found in other sources of law.   It also did not free the executives 
from the constraints of the War Powers Resolution, the Non-Detention Act, and other 
explicit protections against the executive taking on powers that would give it unlimited 
discretion without any possibility of effective oversight or control by the other branches 
of government.61  Nevertheless, the AUMF was a victory for an executive intent on 
obtaining significant freedom of action in after the 9/11 attacks. 
60  Healey supra n 57, 153-54 
61  Staff of the Majority of the Members of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, The 
Constitution in Crisis: The High Crimes of the Bush Administration and Blueprint for Impeachment 
(Skyhorse 2007), 130-131 
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First, it should be noted that Congress authorized military force against non-state 
actors, something which was ‘unprecedented in American history, with the scope of its 
reach yet to be determined’.62  As subsequent subsections of this chapter will 
demonstrate, this allowed the executive to continue to use military force for a longer 
period. This also allowed the executive to create a political climate that was conducive 
to its attempts to expand its own powers at the expense of the rule of law.  Second, 
Congress authorized the executive to take action against countries, organizations and 
individuals that were yet to be determined.63  
This second feature of the bill was problematic in itself, but the breadth of the 
discretion granted to the executive is even more notable.  One must note that it was the 
executive alone who was given the authority to make this the central decision about 
military action.  The AUMF explicitly states that ‘the President is authorized to use 
force against’ those ‘he determines’ to have been involved with the 9/11 attacks.  While 
the members of Congress clearly believed that they were authorizing a limited 
campaign against those who were responsible for one particular terrorist attack, and, 
possibly, Afghanistan as the nation that harboured them,64 the language of the bill made 
it possible for the executive to expand this into approval of a broader struggle, much 
62 Congressional Research Service, ‘Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military 
Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications’, (Congressional Research Service 2011) 14 
63  Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists 2001, Public Law 1070-40 (18 
September 2001), at section 2(a) (‘the President is authorized to use . . . force against those nations . . . 
he determines . . . aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such persons’) 
64  Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 
(University of Chicago Press 2008), 93 
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as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution empowered Nixon to escalate hostilities far beyond 
what was envisioned by the legislators that approved it.  However, Bush now possessed 
significantly more legal authorization for his actions.65 
For the AUMF to serve the purposes that the executive envisioned, as evidenced by 
the original draft presented to the legislature, the executive would need to find a way 
to ignore its explicit words.   By the beginning of the Bush Administration, a set of 
infrequently applied techniques now existed that would allow the executive to put the 
laws into force as the executive wished they read, rather than according to their actual 
text.66  These were the signing statement and the OLC memorandum.   
As this chapter will demonstrate, these statements and memoranda would allow the 
executive branch to enlarge its own powers and to effectively remove itself from the 
oversight and control of the other branches of government.  This was done in a manner 
that this chapter will demonstrate is not in accord with the minimum requirements of 
the rule of law.  In addition, it will show that they specifically violate the constraints 
on executive law-making, as set forth by the ICJ, namely that the executive’s own rules 
and emergency powers were not subject to restraints by the other branches of 
government.  However, before demonstrating how these techniques offend against the 
rule of law, this chapter must describe them.  After this has been completed, it will be 
possible to specifically detail how they were used to shape the meaning of the AUMF, 
to allow for much more than what Congress intended. 
65  Gary Minda, ‘Congressional Authorization and Deauthorization of War: Lessons from the Vietnam 
War’, (2007) 53 Wayne Law Review 943, 953-954 
66  House Judiciary Committee Majority Staff, supra n 61, 185-190 
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The following section will show how the limited authorization for the use of military 
force was construed by the executive as the inauguration of a state of prolonged war, 
against organizations and nations it could determine in its sole discretion, which 
allowed the executive to regulate all of the ‘incidents’ of warfare.  This argument was 
used to authorize a number of illicit practices, many of which constituted violations of 
non-derogable rights.  Namely, the executive argued that the AUMF allowed the 
executive to create military tribunals that lacked the basic elements of fundamental 
justice, to arbitrarily detain persons for indefinite periods, after asserting that they 
would be tried by those commissions, to torture those who were thus detained, and to 
create a vast system of warrantless surveillance which was designed to produce 
suspects who might then also be subjected to this irregular and unconstitutional 
jurisdiction.  As this system was predicated upon violations of jus cogens norms by the 
executive, it will be clear that if this was not addressed by the other branches of 
government, the United States cannot be considered to be in compliance with the basic 
norms of the rule of law. 
4 EXECUTIVE LAW-MAKING CONSTRUING THE AUMF 
Cheney, along with the other veteran executive branch officials who returned to the 
White House in the Bush Administration, understood the levers of power that the 
executive could use against Congress, many of which emulated the Nixonian strategies 
that placed the United States outside of the boundaries of the rule of law.67  As was the 
case with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,68 the AUMF could be construed to imply 
67  See supra chapter two 
68  Southeast Asia Resolution 1964, Public Law 88-408  
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authorization for many activities that it did not explicitly mention.69  The executive’s 
goal would be to direct its officials to interpret the document as the President and his 
close advisors indicated.  As these officials took their orders from the president, this 
was a simple matter.70  The difficulties would lie in making these implausible 
interpretations of this legislation appear authoritative, and where this was impossible, 
keeping these secret.  As this section will demonstrate, there are two main methods by 
which the executive can frustrate or subvert Congress’ legislative intention.  The first 
is the signing statement, wherein the executive purports to reveal the true construction 
of a bill that Congress just passed.  In these statements, the executive purportedly 
clarifies how the law it describes should be executed.71 
The signing statement as a formal tool of statutory interpretation was developed in 
order that this process might appear to produce a document that had the status of law, 
as the executive purportedly fixes a single authoritative meaning to the supposedly 
ambiguous statute at one point in time, rather than as it sees fit on a case by case basis.72  
However, as the next subsection will make clear, the signing statement can be more 
69  Gene Healey, The Cult of the Presidency (Cato Institute, 2008) 154 
70  Rachel Ward Saltzman, ‘Executive Power and the Office of Legal Counsel’, (2009) 28 Yale Law 
and Policy Review 449-462 
71  American Bar Association Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine, Report of 8 August 2006, 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/2006082
3144113.authcheckdam.pdf>, 14-28 accessed 30 May 2014 
72  Charlie Savage, ‘Last Word: The Constitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements’ 
(2007) 16 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 1, 18-19 
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opaque than the law it purports to interpret.  As will be demonstrated below, this allows 
the executive great discretion, such that it can be said that it used an illicit procedure 
to make law, in such a way that it regains unfettered freedom of action to act against 
the wishes of the other branches of government, thus destabilising the rule of law. 
There is another method of executive law-making used to expand upon the AUMF 
to be discussed here.  That method is the use of the memoranda of the Department of 
Justice’s OLC.  While these memoranda might be used merely to embellish the 
interpretations the executive gave to legislation, the second subsection will explain how 
the executive branch’s internal memoranda came to acquire the status of laws. This 
allowed the OLC to write memoranda that could go even further than signing 
statements in frustrating Congress’ intent as will be detailed below.  Following 
Cheney’s logic, which vitiated that of Justice Jackson in The Steel Seizure Case, the 
executive encouraged the OLC to write memoranda that directly contradicted what the 
legislature ordered, thus allowing the President to do what Congress prohibited.   
Both of these methods were used to construe the AUMF in a number of problematic 
ways, which contradict both the ICJ’s limitation on executive law-making and the 
requirement that the executive be accountable to the other branches of government.  
Accordingly, it will be possible to conclude at the conclusion of this chapter that if the 
legislature and the judiciary did not react adequately to these attempts by the executive 
to make laws that effectively gave it unfettered discretion then the United States cannot 
be considered a rule of law state, as in that situation the executive would be able to 
commit violations of citizens’ non-derogable rights with impunity.   
This chapter will also establish the significance of the next two chapters’ discussion 
of Congress and the courts’ responses to the executive’s claims, especially the claims 
that that it could make laws that frustrated oversight and accountability for what it 
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labelled as national security activities. Before beginning that discussion, this chapter 
will have made it clear that the rule of law required a vigorous response from these 
branches, on the penalty that they be permanently eclipsed by an imperial presidency, 
one that surpassed even Nixon’s designs. 
4.1 The Development and Use of Presidential Signing Statements 
 Signing statements are letters written by the President that in certain cases are 
attached to bills when he elects to sign those bills into law.  Until the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan, these statements did not purport to have any legal significance.  Rather, 
they served only a rhetorical purpose.  Accordingly, only seventy-five statements were 
issued over the course of the two centuries that preceded his inauguration.  After 
Reagan revitalized the practice, he, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton together 
issued two-hundred and forty-seven signing statements.  Then Assistant Attorney 
General Walter Dellinger noted that at this point, they were no longer being issued for 
a rhetorical purpose, but were used to order the executive branch in a contentious 
manner, either by shaping the interpretation of key terms in the law, or by asserting 
that the law should not be enforced owing to its purported unconstitutionality.73  Both 
of these new uses are in tension with the rule of law.74  This would become clearly 
apparent when President George W. Bush began to use these after the 9/11 attacks to 
73  Walter Dellinger, ‘Memorandum to the Counsel to the President, The Legal Significance of 
Presidential Signing Statements’, (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 3 November 1993) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20140113185128/http://www.justice.gov/olc/signing.htm> accessed 30 
May 2014 
74  American Bar Association, Report of the Committee on Separation of Powers Adopted by the 
House of Delegates August 8, 2006 supra n 71 
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define the scope of his powers under the AUMF to act in the interests of national 
security. 
This use of signing statements during his Administration was notable both in terms 
of the purposes of these statements and their sheer volume. ‘Bush . . . broke all records, 
using signing statements to challenge about 1,200 sections of bills over his eight years 
in office, about twice the number challenged by all previous presidents combined’.  
This figure was eighty times more than the combined total of all the statements issued 
before the Reagan Administration.75  In addition, he claimed explicitly that ‘his 
constitutional power as head of the executive branch gives him the right’ to do so.76  
Signing statements have a dual role.  They allow the President to signal his intention 
that he will not execute the statute as written, and they also allow him to articulate a 
controversial theory of his powers under the Constitution.  Both are problematic, both 
in theory and in practice. As will be demonstrated in the next two chapters, the 
precedent set by Bush was embraced by Obama, who has outpaced every President 
other than his predecessor,77 and used them in a manner that is just as problematic.   
The American President plays a role in the legislative process, having been given a 
limited role, namely to sign or veto bills, and to propose laws.  Scholars have pointed 
75  Charlie Savage, ‘Obama Looks to Limit Impact of Tactic Bush Used to Sidestep New Laws’, New 
York Times (New York, 9 March 2009) 
76  Faith Joseph Jackson, ‘The Constitutionality of Presidential Signing Statements,’ (2009) 35 Journal 
of  Legislation 1, 9 
77  Eli Lake, ‘Obama Embraces Signing Statements After Knocking Bush for Using Them’, The Daily 
Beast (4 January 2012) <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/04/obama-embraces-signing-
statements-after-knocking-bush-for-using-them.html> accessed 30 May 2014 
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out that ‘the Framers took great pains to limit and qualify this power through the 
painstaking process of enactment, [which was] embodied in Article I, section 7, clause 
2.’78 These ‘[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and 
define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative 
process.’79 The Constitution also assigns him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.80  
The use of the signing statement as means of making law, in particular by nullifying 
legislation, is inconsistent with the separation of powers that is at the heart of both the 
Constitution and the rule of law’s mandate.  This practice grants to the executive a 
legislative power far in excess of what the Constitution granted, namely the power to 
propose and veto bills.   
4.1.1  The Signing Statement of the AUMF and its Significance 
Given the fact that the AUMF gave the executive very broad powers to declare and 
war and expand it, it may seem surprising that it was deemed necessary to widen the 
scope of this delegation by means of a signing statement.  Despite this fact, the 
executive did issue a significant signing statement.  To adequately understand the 
executive’s drive to become paramount and unaccountable after 9/11, which centred 
78  Marc N. Garber and Kurt A. Wimmer, ‘Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of 
Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power’, (1987) 24 Harvard Journal on Legislation 
349, p. 372 
79  INS v Chadha [1983] 462 US 919, 965 (United States Supreme Court) 
80  William D. Popkin, ‘Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique’, (1991) 66 
Indiana Law Journal 699, 702-704 
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on the tacit declaration of an open-ended era of war, one must first be clear on the 
importance of the statement appended to the AUMF. 
As usual, the statement purports merely to be explaining the text of the legislation. 
In fact, it expanded the executive’s freedom of action significantly.  Whereas the 
AUMF itself gives the executive freedom to use the military without oversight, it at 
least attempted to define some limits to such uses of force, by specifying that the 
executive was authorized to target only the nations involved in the 9/11 attacks, or in 
sheltering the perpetrators.  On the contrary, the signing statement claimed that the 
AUMF ‘recognizes the seriousness of the terrorist threat to our Nation’ without noting 
that the statute was a response not to the threat of terrorism in general, but rather that 
it referred to the acts of one terrorist group in particular, namely al-Qaeda.  The signing 
statement goes on to state that the AUMF is a response to the nation’s commitment not 
merely to ‘a direct, forceful, and comprehensive response to these terrorist attacks’, but 
also to a military response to ‘the scourge of terrorism against the United States and its 
interests’.81  
4.1.1.1 The AUMF Signing Statement: Authority over the Residuum of al-Qaeda 
Accordingly, the signing statement represents the difference between the legislative 
contemplation of military force directed at al-Qaeda and the ‘war on terrorism’, which 
is unlimited in time or space.  Insofar as any attack that influences the global markets 
has an impact on the United States, terrorism in any corner of the globe can then be 
said to threaten that nation’s interests.  This signing statement effectively transforms 
81  Statement of the President of 18 September 2001 on signing the Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush, 2001, book 2, 
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003) 1124-1125 (emphasis added) 
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an authorization for attacks against a specific set of wrongdoers into a charter of 
unlimited war. 
This interpretation did not end with the Bush Administration.  Indeed, there is ample 
evidence that now that the Obama Administration has embraced this vision of a ‘war 
on terror’ as articulated not by the AUMF, but rather by Bush’s signing statement, 
which was not repealed or otherwise disavowed.  The best evidence of this proposition 
stems from the speech of Jeh Johnson, General Counsel of the Department of Defense 
at the Oxford Union on November 30, 2012. In this address, Johnson states that the 
war against al-Qaeda ‘and associated forces’ is an unconventional conflict, against an 
unconventional enemy, and will not end in conventional terms’.  It should be noted that 
the term ‘associated forces’ is not found in the AUMF.  It will be demonstrated below 
that it plays an increasingly important role in the executive’s arguments that it is 
empowered to use military force worldwide on its own initiative.   
Johnson goes on to rule out how the war against terrorism might end.  He flatly 
denies any possibility that al-Qaeda would renounce terrorism, stating that ‘Al Qaeda 
is not in that category’.  A negotiated end having been ruled out by fiat, he states that 
‘I can offer no prediction about when this conflict will end, or whether we are, as 
Winston Churchill described it, near the “beginning of the end.”’  He then details what 
criteria the executive branch would use to decide whether it has destroyed the enemy, 
at which point a war would presumably be considered won. ‘[T]here will come a 
tipping point – a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al 
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Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to 
attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States’. 
4.1.1.2 The AUMF Signing Statement’s Creation of Affiliates of al-Qaeda   
This would seem to put some meaningful limit on the war on terror, even if it still 
lies entirely within the executive branch’s discretion to determine whether this ‘tipping 
point’ has been reached.  However, close attention to this sentence reveals this to be an 
illusion.  The key problem is the inclusion of the word ‘affiliates’.  The executive, in 
both the Bush and Obama Administration, has affixed this label to groups that have no 
connection to those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.  For instance, the terrorist group 
known as al-Shaabab was deemed by the executive to be an affiliate of al-Qaeda, 
although the group is an indigenous offshoot of one of the factions in Somalia’s civil 
war.  It is difficult to take seriously the claim that this group presents a threat of a 
‘strategic attack’ to the United States, of the type contemplated by the AUMF.    
Furthermore, al-Shaabab was only designated a terrorist group in 2008.82  
According to the intelligence agencies within the executive branch, it then merely 
‘affiliated’ with a set of individuals that had no direct connection to the 9/11 attacks.  
That latter group is known as Ansar al-Sharia/Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
which is comprised primarily of Yemeni tribesmen.  However, as al-Shaabab was a 
designated terrorist group which already was being subjected to sustained drone strike 
82  United States Department of State, Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 
73 Federal Register 31, Public Notice 6136 (26 February 2008) 
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campaigns before this purported affiliation with Ansar al-Sharia, this affiliation was 
used to justify the prior use of military force directed against it retroactively.   
The executive’s freedom of action in designating ‘affiliates’ of new franchises of 
al-Qaeda is facilitated by the fact that it is very difficult to determine whether reports 
that clandestine groups did in fact identify with al-Qaeda are drawn from objective 
sources, or whether they simply represent the say-so of the intelligence agencies the 
executive controls.  Similar comments could be made about purported affiliates in 
locations such as Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.  Experts in area studies have also questioned 
the executive’s assertion that these groups should be considered affiliates of al-
Qaeda,83 rather than merely threats to the United States’ omnipresent regional interests. 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are rather like Theseus’ ship. Its parts are replaced 
repeatedly, but it sails on. The question of whether it should be considered to be the 
same organization is never asked, despite the very tenuous relationship between, for 
example, a Tuareg guerrilla movement challenging the government of Mali and the 
group of largely Saudi terrorists who executed the 9/11 attacks.  By introducing the 
idea that the AUMF applies equally to the ‘affiliates’, the signing statement made 
possible a series of low-intensity wars on multiple continents.  Finally, the United 
States has broadened its reach even further by claiming that the AUMF’s authorization 
also applies to ‘associated forces’, which are not even affiliates of that group, but which 
have ‘entered the fight alongside al Qaeda and are co-belligerent with al Qaeda in 
83  Ken Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism’ (Routledge, 2004), 65; see 
also Scott Baldauf, ‘What is Somalia’s al-Shabaab?’ Christian Science Monitor (Boston, 26 October 
2011) 
140 
 
                                                 
Chapter 3: Overbroad Authority: The Executive After 9/11 141 
hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition partners’, a definition that now expands the 
‘interests’ of the United States to encompass those of its allies.   
This is a far cry from the relevant statutory text, which is the actual grant of 
discretionary authority. If the executive continues to able to make this argument about 
‘affiliates’ and ‘associated forces’, then there may never be an end to the general 
declaration of war against terrorism that the executive crafted out of the AUMF in its 
signing statement.  One prominent legal scholar commenting on Johnson’s speech 
noted that the ‘AUMF [as construed by the executive] identifies the affiliates of al-
Qaida as the enemy, as well as al-Qaida itself’. ‘As long as those affiliates remain in 
existence, the United States will be at war with them. And because “al-Qaida” has 
become a kind of brand that any group can lay claim to, al-Qaida affiliates will be 
around as long as radical Islam is’.84  On this basis, the war on terror, itself an expansion 
of delegated powers that offended against the rule of law, was thereby expanded into a 
war against an ideology, which can be defined ever more broadly by the executive. 
It should also be noted that this interpretation does not only authorise limited attacks 
such as drone strikes against members of these groups. The construal of the AUMF to 
allow military force to be used against these affiliates also purportedly allows for 
conventional wars to be commenced against any nation that the executive concludes is 
sheltering a member of this proliferating and unlimited set of terrorist groups.  For 
example, the executive is currently using this rationale to engage in combat operations 
in Yemen, despite the fact that the international community has noted that the internal 
84  Eric Posner, ‘The War on Terror Will Ever Be With Us’, Slate Magazine, (11 December 2012) 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/12/jeh_johnson_is_wrong
_the_fight_with_al_qaida_continues.htm > accessed 30 May 2014 
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conflict in that country does not rise to the threshold under International Humanitarian 
Law that would justify the use of military force.85   
Before discussing the use of OLC memoranda that would construe the AUMF as 
allowing for the invasion of Iraq, torture, indefinite arbitrary detention, and extra-
judicial killing, one final comment must be made about the text of the AUMF and the 
signing statement expounding upon it.  Both of these documents appear to recognize 
inherent executive reserve powers under the Constitution, despite the fact that these do 
not appear in its text.   
The AUMF’s final ‘whereas’ clause states that ‘the President has authority under 
the Constitution to prevent acts of international terrorism’.  This is likely a reflection 
of the uncontroversial belief that the President has some limited reserve powers in an 
emergency to act when time is of the essence and Congress cannot react in a timely 
manner.  The signing statement broadens this power. It states that ‘the authority of the 
President under the Constitution [is] to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the 
United States’, implying that the executive may act even when the threat is not 
immediate.   
This second statement is a reiteration of what Cheney and other Nixon and Ford 
Administration officials said about the WPR, namely that is was an ‘unconstitutional 
invasion’ of executive prerogative.  As will be described in the next subsection, this is 
a fringe theory, which has no jurisprudential support and which contradicts the text of 
the Constitution’s Declare War Clause, and the explanation of its principal author, 
85  Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘When is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror’, (2005) 
22 ILSA Journal of Comparative Law 1 
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James Madison.86  Congress recognised after the Vietnam War how executive 
discretion to start wars was entirely incompatible with the rule of law. The previous 
chapter described how the executive was nearly to destroy the rule of law in that 
manner.  Executive declarations of war would once again destabilise the separation of 
powers. 
The AUMF and its signing statement marked the inauguration of a new crisis for 
the rule of law in the United States.  The document has the characteristics of both the 
1950 declaration national emergency and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.  The former 
strengthened the executive immeasurably, while the latter gave the executive vague 
and unspecified powers to create wars and crises.  The second set of powers allows the 
executive to catalyse conditions that are favourable to the adoption of even broader 
authority, and to remove itself from the control of the other branches of government.  
However, as the arguments in support of this assault on the rule of law were made 
within OLC memoranda, this chapter must first describe the development of this 
pernicious form of executive law-making, which itself calls the rule of law into 
question. 
  
86  See e.g. James Madison, The Writings of James Madison Volume Six (G.P. Putnam and Sons 1906) 
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4.2 OLC Memoranda Construing the AUMF & Their Significance 
The OLC “has been deemed ‘the most important governmental office you’ve never 
heard of’”.87  It functions in the manner of a private law firm, with the President as its 
only client.  Accordingly, it often presents the President with aggressive interpretations 
of the law that suit his own purposes.  Many signing statements, for example, followed 
after memoranda of the OLC stated that so-called intrusions into the exclusive domain 
of the executive branch were unconstitutional.88 However, these memoranda can 
function as a sword, and not merely a shield.89  They advise the President that he need 
not heed the laws as they are written.  This has been described as a “‘Get Out of Jail 
Free Card” for the party seeking the opinion’.90 As will be outlined below, OLC 
memoranda can also specify the particular interpretation of the law that will govern, 
despite Congress’ intentions to the contrary. 
The possibility of executive law-making by the OLC is particularly problematic 
because this office is both unaccountable to Congress and a highly politicized body.  
Not only are the head of the agency, but all four of his deputies political appointees of 
the current president. The tenure of the attorneys who serve under these appointees is 
87  Bradley Lipton, ‘A Call for Institutional Reform of the Office of Legal Counsel’, (2010) 4 Harvard 
Law and Policy Review 241, 249 
88  Christopher May, Presidential Defiance of ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws: Reviving the Royal 
Prerogative (Greenwood, 1998) 131-49 
89  See Ross L. Weiner, ‘The Office of Legal Counsel and Torture: the Law as both a Sword and a 
Shield’, (2009) 77 George Washington Law Review 524 
90  Lipton supra n 87, 250 
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generally shorter than that of the President.91  This politicization and the self-serving 
legal interpretations that it fosters are exacerbated by the fact that these opinions are 
confidential, protected by assertions of “deliberative prerogative” and attorney-client 
privilege, despite the fact that they may purport to make law, in addition to opining 
upon it.92  
That said, it is best to begin a survey of the OLC memoranda with a description of 
how they can serve the President and his agents in a defensive capacity.  As a former 
head of the OLC opined:  
It is practically impossible to prosecute someone who relied in good faith on an 
OLC opinion, even if the opinion turns out to be wrong . . . . OLC speaks for 
the Justice Department, and it is the Justice Department that prosecutes 
violations of criminal law.  If the OLC interprets a law to allow a proposed 
action, then the Justice Department won’t prosecute those who rely on the OLC 
ruling.  Even independent counsels would have trouble going after someone 
who reasonably relied on one . . . . It is one of the most momentous and 
dangerous powers of the government.93 
 
OLC memoranda purportedly interpreting the AUMF were used to violate and to 
immunize the violation of a number of non-derogable rights, as the next subsections 
will demonstrate.  However, this section will demonstrate that these memoranda were 
also used for a more fundamental and troubling purpose, namely to prolong and expand 
the state of emergency that allowed the executive to assume further powers.  One 
particular claim of this nature found in the OLC memoranda was the argument that the 
91  Ibid 254-55 
92  See Dawn E. Johnsen, ‘Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive 
Power’, (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review 1559 
93 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration (W.W. 
Norton and Company 2007) 144 
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AUMF allowed the executive to order the invasion of Iraq without further authorization 
from Congress.94  It will also demonstrate that this was done in order to build support 
for an aggressive war and with the additional aim of destabilizing the rule of law. 
4.2.1 OLC Memoranda Authorizing an Invasion of Iraq 
As was the case before the Gulf War of 1990-91, Dick Cheney resisted the 
suggestion that the executive should obtain an authorization for the use of military 
force from Congress.  Bush Administration officials were candid about their reasons 
for avoiding this, at least when speaking anonymously, saying ‘[w]e don’t want to be 
in the legal position of asking Congress to authorize the use of force when the President 
already has that full authority’.95  The executive was able to take this position because 
of the memoranda of its own lawyers.   
First, they argued that the AUMF ‘encompassed such action’, and second, that the 
executive possessed reserve constitutional powers that would allow it to do this on its 
own initiative, were this not the case.96  The first argument was quite problematic, as 
it rested on the Administration’s claims that Saddam Hussein’s regime was sheltering 
members of al-Qaeda, which did not appear even minimally plausible, owing to the 
94  John Yoo ,‘Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President: The President’s 
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations and Nations Supporting Them’, (Washington, 
Office of Legal Counsel, 25 September 2001) 
<http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70942/00110_010925display.pdf> accessed 30 May 30, 
2014 
95  Rudalevige supra n 32, 219 
96  Ibid 
146 
 
                                                 
Chapter 3: Overbroad Authority: The Executive After 9/11 147 
documented hatred between the Baathist regime and Islamism.97   
Despite this implausibility, the executive argued that Hussein was sheltering 
‘terrorists’, and noted that the signing statement did not limit the use of military force 
to only those individuals involved in planning and executing the 9/11 attacks.  This 
was a rather poor justification, as it turned out that the terrorists to which the executive 
referred were members of Mujahedin-e Khalq, a group which focused its efforts 
exclusively on overthrowing the Islamist regime in Iran.98  Accordingly, the executive 
settled upon the theory that Iraq was planning terrorist attacks against the United States, 
which the signing statement purportedly authorized him to pre-empt, whatever their 
source.  It was argued that this attack might involve the nonexistent weapons of mass 
destruction, which formed the central premise of the executive’s argument that it was 
empowered by international law to attack that nation.  ‘Secretary of State Colin Powell 
even raised the alarming prospect that … pilotless aircraft could sneak into the United 
States to carry out poisonous attacks on American cities’.99   
These claims also failed to meet the minimum requirements of plausibility, even in 
97  Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, ‘Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on 
Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With 
Prewar Assessments’, 8 September 2006 <http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf> accessed 
30 May 2014 
98  People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v United States Department of State, [2004] 182 F3d 17, 
21 (District of Columbia Circuit).  It should also be noted that the Department of State subsequently 
delisted the MEK, ‘revok[ing] its designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization’.  ‘Delisting of the 
Mujahedin-e Khalq’, U.S. Department of State, 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198443.htm> accessed 30 May 2014 
99  Associated Press, ‘Iraqi Drones not for WMD’, Associated Press, (Washington, 11 February 2009) 
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the overheated media environment that followed after the 9/11 attacks.  Descriptions 
of drones that could spread chemical or biological weapons were revealed to be 
references to a ‘primitive craft — its wings held together by tin foil and duct tape and 
two wooden propellers — [that] looked more like a high school science project than 
the “smoking gun” that could spark a war’.100  
Since the executive could not convince the legislature that Iraq was connected with 
the 9/11 attacks or that it was planning terrorist attacks on the United States, it was 
forced to argue that it possessed inherent authority to launch an attack against that 
nation for another entirely different reason.  Namely, they argued that Iraq had not 
divested itself of weapons of mass destruction as the United Nations ordered in 1991.  
However, the OLC argued that the executive possessed the inherent authority to 
enforce this command, 101 even after the United Nations failed to sanction such an 
attack on that basis. 
In essence, the executive resorted to the argument that it could launch an aggressive 
war, on its own initiative.  The alleged source of law for this proposition was an internal 
and secret OLC memorandum that argued for the existence of constitutional reserve 
powers that empowered the executive to act as he saw fit in the interests of national 
security.  This thesis’ description of Congress’ reaction to this remarkable claim will 
need to be postponed until the next chapter, however, as this chapter must also detail 
the other troublesome acts of executive law-making by the OLC.  In particular, the next 
subsections will describe OLC memoranda that claimed it was constitutional for the 
100 Scott Peterson, ‘The Case of the Deadly Drone’, The Christian Science Monitor (Boston, 13 March 
2003) 
101 Yoo supra n 94 
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executive to subject people to indefinite arbitrary detention and torture, such that these 
violations of non-derogable rights could not be corrected by the other branches, which 
imperilled the rule of law. 
4.2.2 OLC Memoranda Creating a Parallel Legal System 
Devoted to Violating Non-derogable Rights and Prolonging the 
Emergency 
As chapter one demonstrated, Dicey noted when proposing his definition of the rule 
of law that one of its key features is its guarantee of regular legal procedures for all 
those accused of crimes, which precludes the creation of special courts controlled by 
the executive branch that deprive suspects of the basic protections of due process.  This 
subsection and those that follow will demonstrate that the creation of this sort of system 
was a priority for the executive after the 9/11 attacks.  Further, the creation of the 
system accomplished this via executive law-making, thereby violating two of the 
minimum requirements of the rule of law. Finally, the chapter will show that this was 
done as part of a plan to prolong the state of war and political crisis that its architects 
hoped would allow for a permanent return to the imperial presidency. 
The creation of these special executive tribunals and the detention regime created 
under their jurisdiction at Guantánamo Bay was undertaken with the goal of giving the 
executive freedom to ignore the most basic safeguards preserved by the rule of law.  
Foremost among these are the rights to be free from prolonged arbitrary detention and 
torture. It created this regime to violate these non-derogable rights while immune from 
all oversight and possible restraint. This is a situation that is not merely a violation of 
the core norms of the rule of law. Rather, it is the creation of a legal order that is its 
exact opposite.   
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In addition, the executive branch had an underlying goal for precisely these 
violations of non-derogable rights within the detention facilities that struck at the heart 
of the rule of law: it put these measures into place with the goal of obtaining false 
confessions that would make the case for further military campaigns, thereby 
prolonging the state of emergency and allowing for additional consolidation of power 
within the executive branch.  This subsection must discuss the executive’s creation of 
the tribunal apparatus, and then turn to the authorization of prolonged arbitrary 
detention and torture by means of OLC memoranda, and demonstrate why these 
presented a serious crisis to the rule of law in the United States. 
4.2.2.1 OLC Memoranda Establishing Special Tribunals 
The Bush Administration has consistently characterized the commissions which it 
erected after the 9/11 attacks as normal features of its military justice system, 
employing orthodox procedures to deal with individuals who traditionally would have 
been subjected to military trials.102  Both of these assertions are false, although it is the 
second proposition that has received the most attention. That said, this subsection must 
not neglect detailing the problems with the first. 
The United States has a system of law known as the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, hereinafter referred to as the ‘UCMJ’.  This code was created by Congress, 
pursuant to the authority granted by the Constitution’s Article I, § 8, in 1950.  It is 
merely the latest iteration of Articles of War established by Congress, which date back 
to a code enacted in 1806, which itself replaced regulations dating to the Revolutionary 
102 Savage supra n 5, 134-38 
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War.103  In addition to providing regulations for the disciplining of members of the 
armed forces, the UCMJ also specifies that other classes of individuals may be 
subjected to its jurisdiction, namely, prisoners of war,  and details the legal basis for 
their trial and punishment, i.e., as war criminals.104   
Despite the fact that Congress established the jurisdiction and procedures of the 
nation’s military justice system, the executive, over the protests of many dissidents, 
including the military’s own lawyers,105 created a new set of procedures after the 9/11 
attacks, which would redefine who could be detained and tried, and how they would 
be treated in custody.  This effort began in October of 2001, when lawyers from the 
White House Counsel’s Office were charged with drafting an executive order that 
would set up the commissions.106  Even before the OLC gave its imprimatur to the 
executive’s plan, it was decided that the commission would admit ‘any evidence “of 
probative value”’ [i.e., no matter how that was obtained.  This included statements 
made during ‘enhanced interrogation’], and that the commission’s judgments would be 
subject to ‘no review of any U.S., foreign, or international courts’.107  
After lawyers participating in a State Department initiative argued that this would 
require a specific authorization from Congress, the executive directed its lawyers to 
103 Journals of the Continental Congress, Articles of War, June 30, 1775 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/contcong_06-30-75.asp> accessed 30 May 2014 
104 Uniform Code of Military Justice, article 18, United States Code, title 10, section 818 
105 Savage supra n 5, 137-139 
106 Ibid 134 
107 David Glazier, ‘A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantánamo 
Military Commissions’, (2008) 121 Lewis & Clark Law Review 148 
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bypass the State Department and the National Security Council.  Vice-President 
Cheney finalized the order setting up the tribunals over the vociferous objections of the 
Attorney-General of the United States.108  ‘Cheney circumvented normal government 
processes’ in doing so, preventing the relevant officials from making their views 
known, especially where they might have objected to his views about the proper scope 
of executive power, which were incompatible with the rule of law.109  Observers within 
the executive branch wondered how to finesse the question of presidential authority to 
order commissions that ignored both a statute in force and the plain text of the 
constitution.  The answer to this was provided by the OLC, which wrote a secret 
memorandum to that end.   
Patrick Philbin had no experience in constitutional law. He had joined the OLC a 
month earlier with the understanding that he ‘would handle only questions of 
administrative law’.110 Nevertheless, Philbin was the author of a vital memorandum, 
entitled ‘Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists’.111 In it, he 
argued that the AUMF and inherent constitutional reserve powers would each allow 
the President to establish these tribunals.  Notably, the only case that Philbin cites in 
the summary introducing his argument is Ex Parte Quirin. As described in the last 
chapter, this case involved a gross abuse of justice in which the President initiated an 
108 Savage supra n 5, 138 
109 Glazier supra n 107, 147 
110 Savage supra n 5, 136 
111 Patrick Philbin supra chapter 1 n 23, 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20011106.pdf> accessed 30 May 
2014 
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ex parte communication with the Chief Justice, indicated that he would not comply 
with an order to release the defendant, and which ultimately ended with a decision to 
allow the executive to execute an American citizen, whose conviction depended upon 
hearsay.  It did so in the absence of a judicial opinion justifying this order, as the 
Justices could not agree on a rationale supporting the executive until several months 
later. 
It should be noted, however, that the AUMF did not explicitly authorize the 
creation of military commissions.  Furthermore Congress expressly defined the 
jurisdiction and procedure of military tribunals in the UCMJ, in a manner that 
precluded the executive’s plans.  Accordingly, the argument of Philbin’s secret 
memorandum was strained and circular. He argued that the UCMJ’s text should not 
construed as ‘restricting the use of military commissions’ set up unilaterally by the 
executive, because if the statute was read that way, this would constitute ‘an 
infringement on core executive powers’, thus begging the question of whether these 
powers existed.  This memorandum also inaugurated the trend of using ‘contingent 
constitutional arguments [based on fringe theories of inherent executive powers] to 
preserve authorization for executive action even in the event that relevant statutes were 
found to prohibit it’,112 an argument that flies in the face of the Steel Seizure Case and 
the minimum requirements of the rule of law, which make it clear that the legislature 
must have the power to prohibit executive rulemaking, especially when this is done to 
relieve the executive branch of the burden of complying with jus cogens norms or as 
part of a drive to create an entirely unaccountable presidency. 
112 Rachel Saltzman, ‘Executive Policy and the Office of Legal Counsel’, (2010) 28 Yale Law and 
Policy Review 439, 445 
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On November 13, 2001, on the basis of the OLC memorandum, which followed 
the draft order given to Philbin by Cheney’s counsel David Addington, Bush signed 
the ‘Military Order’. While the ostensible rationale for the order was to provide for the 
trials of the terrorists who plotted the 9/11 attacks, it soon became apparent that the 
Military Order allowed for a very wide range of activities, against a broad number of 
possible subjects.  The first activity which this section must address, however, is the 
detention of terrorism suspects in military custody. 
4.2.2.2  Memoranda Authorizing Indefinite Arbitrary Detention 
The Military Order ‘directed the Secretary of Defense to create military tribunals 
and to take into custody at once anyone the President names as subject to the Order’.113  
The creation of the tribunal’s jurisdiction thus justified the immediate detention of 
anyone whom the executive nominated. The order did not specify that only those 
suspected of a connection with the 9/11 attacks could be apprehended and detained, it 
merely required that the executive affirm that it had ‘reason to believe’ that they are 
involved in some form of ‘international terrorism’,114 echoing the signing statement’s 
broadening of the AUMF from retribution against the 9/11 plotters to an unbounded 
‘global war on terror’.  Despite this, the executive promised Congress that the executive 
113  Neal K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, ‘Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals’, (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1261 
114 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Federal 
Register 57,833 (13 November 2001) 
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would imprison only ‘foreign enemy war criminals’,115 a claim that was soon exposed 
as wholly untrue.   
In fact, the executive continually tried to expand the tribunals’ jurisdiction, such 
that it would have unlimited freedom of action to subject those it nominated to 
violations of their non-derogable rights.   This subsection will demonstrate that the 
executive attempted to ensure that it would be able to apprehend and indefinitely detain 
anyone, without restriction, and that this incarceration rises to the level of a violation 
of the non-derogable right not to be subjected to prolonged arbitrary detention, as the 
executive refused to provide any timeline for adjudication of its claims, or even any 
due process at all, by blocking attempts by detainees to obtain judicial review of the 
executive’s detention orders with petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 
After the invasion of Afghanistan, the executive quickly obtained prisoners, some 
of whom were foreigners suspected of involvement with al-Qaeda, at least by those 
who sold them for bounties to the CIA.  The executive claimed that they could hold 
these prisoners owing to their status as unlawful combatants without first allowing 
them to prove that this status was inapplicable as required by Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions.116  It did so on the basis of OLC memoranda that interpreted international 
law in a manner that would allow for complete discretion on the part of the executive. 
115 Katyal and Tribe supra n 113, 1261 
116 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections 
of Victims of International Armed Conflict, adopted June 8, 1977, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  While the 
United States did not ratify Protocol I, it has the status of customary international law and is therefore 
binding upon it. See Michael Matheson, ‘The United States Position on the Relation of Customary 
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention’, (1987) 2 
American University Journal of International Law and Policy 427-428 
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A draft OLC memorandum, from January of 2002, written by John Yoo, flatly 
stated that the Third Geneva Convention’s protections did not extend either to members 
of al-Qaeda, and then extended the category of those whom the executive could hold 
under the commissions’ jurisdiction to include even those members of the Taliban’s 
armed forces that fought openly and in an organized fashion, by claiming that because 
this government was not recognized as legitimate, it were not a continuing party to the 
Third Geneva Convention.117  The finalized memorandum argued that despite the fact 
that the Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan, they were not entitled to 
the Conventions’ protections because it was a ‘failed state’.  It also argued that even if 
the Geneva Conventions did apply, the executive possessed the power to ‘determine 
that they [the detainees] all, as a class, could be said to fall outside of the definition of 
prisoners of war’.118 
 The Obama Administration has continued all of these policies.  First, in May of 
2009, the President accepted several key premises of the detention regime, namely that 
certain prisoners could be held indefinitely without trial, while others could be tried by 
117 John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, ‘Draft Memorandum for William J. Haynes II: Application of 
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees’ (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 9 
January 2002) <http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020109.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
118 Jay S. Bybee Memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and Department of Defense 
General Counsel William J. Haynes II: Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 22 January 2002) 
<http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020122.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
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military commissions.119  Later that year, the Administration then revived the then-
dormant commissions by initiating new proceedings against five detainees.120 
Furthermore, the Administration has continued to press the same tenuous arguments 
for executive supremacy in the litigation brought by detainees seeking writs of habeas 
corpus.  In particular, the executive continues to appeal orders that detainees be 
released, including those which the executive admits are factually innocent.  It argued 
in these appeals that federal district judges lack any power to order the release of 
detainees who have been properly granted the writ.121  These cases will be discussed 
in detail in chapter four. 
The Obama Administration, however, has managed to avoid significant criticism 
for perpetuating these policies, largely because it is perceived to have made a good-
faith effort to reverse the course set by the Bush Administration.  This is false, but it is 
an understandable error, given the many statements that the President has made about 
his desire to ‘close Guantanamo’, something that was a key promise of his electoral 
119 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on National Security’ (21 May 2009 ) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09> accessed 
30 May 2014 
120 Department of Justice and Department of Defense Press Release, ‘Departments of Justice and 
Defense Announce Forum Decisions for Ten Guantanamo Detainees’, 19 November 2009 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-ag-1224.html> accessed 30 May 2014  
121 See e.g. Kiyemba v Obama [2010] 605 F3d 1046 (D.C. Circuit) 
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campaign in 2008 and which he reiterated shortly after being admitted to office.122  
This misunderstanding stemmed from the supporters of the new presidents’ optimism 
and willingness to read much more into his promises that what was intended.   
In fact, President Obama only promised to ‘close Guantanamo’, that is, to literally 
shutter the facility.  This statement did not imply that he would dismantle the military 
detention regime. That fact is made perfectly clear by the pertinent executive order, 
which explicitly charged various departments with identifying new sites at which the 
same prisoners would be held, on the same authority.123  It was soon leaked that the 
executive was considering purchasing a disused prison in Illinois to this end.124 
This plan to relocate Guantanamo quickly ran afoul of bipartisan Congressional 
opposition, which was made possible by the fact that the proposal would require the 
expenditure of funds within the United States, something which Congress can control 
easily through its power of the purse.125  This opposition makes it possible for the 
executive to shift the blame for the failure to ‘close Guantanamo’ to the legislature, as 
122 See CBS News, ‘Obama Makes Plans to Close Guantanamo’, (11 February 2009), 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/14/eveningnews/main4606261.shtml> accessed 30 May 
2014  
123 Executive Order 13492, ‘Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay 
Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities’, 74 Federal Register 4897 (22 January 2009) 
124 Charlie Savage, ‘Plan to Move Guantanamo Detainees Faces New Delay’, New York Times (New 
York 9 December 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/us/politics/23gitmo.html> accessed 
30 May 2014  
125 Ibid 
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do laws that require certification by the executive when detainees are released to third 
countries.126 
This disguises the fact that the executive possesses incontrovertible power to 
dismantle the entire detention regime by merely releasing every detainee.  Under the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, the President possesses the power to 
release any detainee, should he invoke ‘reasons of national security’.127  The executive 
could simply do this passively, by not opposing requests for the writ of habeas corpus.  
However, for undisclosed reasons, the Obama Administration has fought hard in the 
courts to preserve this detention regime, which violates one non-derogable right 
directly while facilitating the violation of others. This battle will be described in detail 
in the next chapter.  At present, it merely necessary to note that it has used this battle 
as an opportunity to reassert claims of executive supremacy that are inconsistent with 
the rule of law.  For example, in 2011 the Obama Administration issued an executive 
order authorizing indefinite detention, arguing implicitly that it possessed the power to 
do so, without any delegation of legislative authority.128 
None of the arguments in support of executive power to create and maintain a 
parallel regime of indefinite arbitrary detention were well-founded.  Accordingly, the 
126 Charlie Savage, ‘Bill to Ease Transfers of Guantánamo Detainees Moves Through Senate’, New 
York Times (New York, 24 June 2013), <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/bill-allowing-
guantanamo-detainees-to-be-moved-advances.html> accessed 30 May 2014 
127 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Public Law 111–383 
128 Executive Order 13567 ‘Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force’, (7 March 2011) 
<https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13567.htm> accessed 30 May 2014 
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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as the ‘IACHR’, 
took issue with this analysis, and pointed precisely to the incompatibility of the 
executive’s position and the rule of law.  The IACHR noted that these memoranda 
amounted to a grant of carte blanche from the executive to itself: 
According to official statements from the United States government, its 
Executive Branch has most recently declined to extend prisoner of war status 
under the Third Geneva Convention to the detainees, without submitting the 
issue for determinations by a competent tribunal or otherwise ascertaining the 
rights and protections to which the detainees are entitled under US domestic or 
international law.  To the contrary, the information available suggests that the 
detainees remain entirely at the unfettered discretion of the United States 
Government.129 
 
 The IACHR correctly concluded that the executive was simply declaring that these 
detainees were subject to the jurisdiction of its commissions, which were entirely the 
creature of the executive branch.  Not only did the executive set them up in a manner 
that ignored a statute that remained in force, but it did so via an order that ‘installs the 
executive branch as lawgiver as well as law-enforcer, and law-applier, asserting for the 
executive branch the prerogative to revise the jurisdictional design of the system as it 
goes along’.130  As the Supreme Court observed, the ‘blending of executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers in . . . one branch of government is regarded as the very acme of 
absolutism’.131 It is also important to note that this is also the exact opposite of what 
the rule of law requires.  
129 Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) 41 ILM 
532 (2002) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) 
130 Katyal and Tribe supra n 113, 1266 
131 Reid v Covert [1957] 354 US 1, 11 (United States Supreme Court) 
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 The OLC created the legal rationale for a system of executive detention at 
Guantánamo Bay that resulted in a number of Afghans and other foreign nationals 
being detained for years, without any semblance of legal process.  Rendering this 
detention completely arbitrary required that it be insulated from any form of judicial 
review.  This was a key objective for the executive when this system was being 
established. Even before the decision was made to transfer detainees to Guantánamo 
Yoo and Philbin opined that anyone transferred there would have no access to habeas 
corpus.132  They came to this conclusion even before the OLC concluded that the 
executive possessed the legal power to commit detainees to that facility. 
Indeed, the executive’s decision to locate the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay 
was largely motivated by the fact that it believed that the federal courts would not 
entertain petitions from detainees held there.  They decided to erect a ‘legal black 
hole’133 where those who were detained on the say-so of the executive could be held 
for years without access to the courts.  The executive contended that anyone could be 
held in such a facility, with one exception, namely United States citizens.  This was 
because this was explicitly forbidden by the Non-Detention Act of 1971.  However, 
the OLC soon drafted new memoranda that again stated that executive was simply not 
bound by that law when it impeded its freedom to act in the interest of national security, 
and shortly thereafter even American citizens were subjected to prolonged arbitrary 
detention. 
132 Philbin, supra n 111 
133 Johan Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, (2004)  53 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1 
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On May 8, 2002, a United States citizen named José Padilla was arrested in Chicago 
pursuant to a material witness warrant issued by a federal court.  The following month, 
President Bush issued an order directing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to take 
custody of Padilla.  This was purportedly authorized by OLC memoranda,134 which 
referenced the executive’s ‘inherent powers as Commander in Chief’.135  Similarly, the 
authority of the Domestic War Powers Memo and the Military Commissions Memo 
were invoked to authorize the transfer into military custody and detention of Ali Saleh 
Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatari national in the United States lawfully in possession of a 
student visa, which should have given him the legal protections due to a citizen, albeit 
temporarily.136  A Senate Judiciary Committee Majority Staff Report described these 
two cases as follows: 
The al-Marri case, like the Padilla case, has the following features: the civilian 
arrest of a person lawfully in the United States; the order by the President that 
the person be turned over to military custody for potentially indefinite 
incarceration . . . the denial to that individual of legal counsel and other essential 
aspects of due process to permit him to challenge the bases of his detention; the 
claim that the President enjoys such powers over the individual’s right to liberty 
as Commander in Chief . . . . The implications of the President’s view of his 
power are obvious and ominous: ‘This intolerable reading of the law would 
leave a President free to suspend the rights of anyone, including American 
citizens.’137   
 
134 Patrick F. Philbin,’ Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President: Legality of 
the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists’ (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 6 
November 2001) <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20011106.pdf> 
accessed 30 May 2014 
135 Ibid 
136 See e.g. Zadvydas v Davis [2004] 533 US 678, 692-93 (United States Supreme Court) 
137 Senate Majority Staff Report supra n 11, 105, quoting editorial staff of the New York Times, 
Tortured Justice, New York Times (New York, 8 December 2008) 
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It was unclear to many at the time why the executive branch was so committed to 
creating a legal black hole.  They asked how the utility of the Guantánamo Bay Camp 
could possibly outweigh the considerable loss of respect the United States suffered in 
the international community, when even the leading jurists of its staunchest allies lined 
up to condemn this practice?138  The answer only became clear after leaks revealed 
more about the nature of the questioning of its prisoners, and after it was revealed that 
the OLC was arguing that detainees should not be formally charged or given Geneva 
Convention protections in order ‘to facilitate interrogations’.139  Various memoranda 
made it clear that the end not only justified the means, it was the reason these means 
were adopted. White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote that the ‘nature of the 
new war places a high premium on . . . the ability to quickly obtain information from 
captured terrorists and their sponsors . . . [this] new paradigm renders obsolete 
Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners’.140  It will be 
demonstrated below that the executive was determined to free itself of even the most 
basic international norms, such that it possessed complete freedom of action to violate 
non-derogable rights, in a decisive break from the rule of law. 
138 Steyn supra n 133 
139 Rudalevige supra n 32, 226 
140 Alberto Gonzales, ‘Memorandum to President Bush: Decision Re Application of the Geneva 
Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban’ (25 January 2002) < 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020125.pdf> 30 May 2014 
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4.2.2.3 OLC Memoranda Authorizing Torture 
Torture was not incidental to prolonged involuntary detention at Guantánamo Bay.  
While there are many reports of atrocious conditions of confinement and casual abuse 
by the staff of that facility that would support findings of torture or degrading treatment, 
these pale in comparison to the techniques that were authorized at the highest level of 
the executive branch and then employed in order to obtain information from the 
detainees.  Again, this behaviour was specifically prohibited by both domestic and 
binding international law.  Even torture outside of the United States is specifically 
prohibited by federal law,141 and the Convention Against Torture142 is both customary 
international law and ratified by the United States.  What this means is that even if the 
OLC’s conclusion that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the detainees, these 
instruments should have prevented it. However, once again the OLC proved ready to 
give the executive complete discretion to engage in violations of non-derogable human 
rights. 
John Yoo drafted a memorandum on behalf of Jay Bybee that concluded that the 
state of war created by the AUMF relieved the executive of the burden to respect these 
prisoners’ rights.  Insofar as the President possessed the power to command the army 
on the battlefield, Yoo argued, he had unreviewable authority to direct how prisoners 
should be interrogated.  Legislative and judicial ‘restrict[ions on] the President’s 
141 United States Code, title 18, section 2340A 
142 United Nations Convention on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (10 December 1984) 
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plenary power over military operations, including the treatment of prisoners’ would, 
according to Yoo, be ‘constitutionally dubious’.143 
The claim that inherent constitutional reserve powers allowed the executive to 
authorize torture was put more forcefully in another memorandum written by Yoo and 
signed by Bybee seven months later.  In it, they claimed that ‘[a]ny effort to apply [laws 
against torture] in a manner that interferes with the President’s direction of such a core 
war matter thus would be unconstitutional.’144  Here, the OLC claimed that any laws 
that Congress might pass to forbid torture would be ineffective.  The executive simply 
could not be restrained by another branch of government when it decided to commit 
these violations of non-derogable rights.  When it came to torture, the executive ‘was 
above the law’.145  This cannot be reconciled with the rule of law. 
The OLC memorandum signed by Bybee explicitly authorizes torture. It also 
describes waterboarding in detail, as follows. ‘In this procedure, the individual is bound 
securely to an inclined bench, which is approximately four feet by seven feet. The 
individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. 
Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is 
lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth’.146 It should be noted that this is not 
143 Yoo supra n 118 
144 Jay Bybee, ‘Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards for 
Conduct of Interrogation (1 August 2002) 
<http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf> accessed 30 May 
2014  
145 Rudalevige supra n 32, 229 
146 Bybee supra n 134, 3 
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‘simulated drowning’ but actual asphyxia, which causes death if the torturer does not 
carefully monitor the victim’s oxygen levels.  It is a sign of these memoranda’s paucity 
of analysis that they failed to note that waterboarding was recognized as torture both 
in international law, particularly at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
where American military judges presided,147 and in American domestic law.148  
‘Historical analysis demonstrates that U.S. Courts have consistently held that artificial 
drowning interrogation is torture, which, by its nature, violates U.S. statutory 
prohibitions’.149 
Once approved, waterboarding was applied without any sense of proportion.  While 
just one session of this form of torture can leave psychological scars that last for years, 
a CIA briefing document reveals that one detainee was waterboarded 183 times.150  
This detainee confessed during interrogation that he ‘was responsible for the 9/11 
operation, from A to Z’, and that he was responsible for plotting the assassinations of 
Jimmy Carter and Pope John Paul II’ and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  It is 
clear that at least some of these confessions were false, as it is was established beyond 
147 See Evan Wallach, ‘Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts’, (2007) 
45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 468, 484-489, discussing United States v Nakamura [1947] 
(International Military Tribunal for the Far East) 
148 United States v Lee [1984] 744 F2d 1124 (Fifth Circuit) 
149 Wallach supra n 147, 468 
150 Stanley Moskowitz, ‘Memorandum for the Record: Interrogations’, (Congressional Research 
Service 30 November 2004) 
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all reasonable doubt that this last crime was the work of others.151 The detainee himself 
alleges that he revealed false information ‘to please his captors’, including statements 
incriminating innocent parties. Even U.S. authorities recognize this to be the case. ‘One 
CIA official cautioned that many of [his] claims during interrogation were “white 
noise” designed to send the U.S. on wild goose chases or to get him through the day's 
interrogation session’.152  This, however, has not prevented the OLC from arguing that 
waterboarding this detainee produced results when justifying the utility of torture. One 
unfounded claim referenced in subsequent memoranda was that the waterboarding of 
the aforementioned detainee helped to foil a major plot to destroy Los Angeles’ Library 
Tower.153 This is an illogical assertion, as the plot was abandoned by the conspirators 
a year before this detainee was captured.154 
151 See, Havlish v Bin Laden [2011] 2011 US Dist Lexis 155899 (Southern District of New York), 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at para. 94 
152 Richard Bonney, False Prophets: The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the Global War on Terror (Peter 
Lang 2008), 265 
153 Stephen Bradbury, ‘Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the 
Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High 
Value al Qaeda Detainees’, (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 30 May 2005) 29 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20100215233105/http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_0530
2005_bradbury.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
154 Timothy Noah, ‘Water-Bored: Al-Qaida’s Plot to Bomb the Liberty Tower Was Not Worth 
Torturing Anyone Over’, Slate Magazine (Washington 29 April 2009) 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2009/04/waterboredhtml> accessed 30 
May 2014 
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There is no credible information that waterboarding yielded actionable 
intelligence,155 which is not surprising, as the leading experts in interrogation have long 
derided the efficacy of torture.156  Accordingly, it is difficult to explain the single-
minded focus of the executive on promoting this and other methods of torture, 
especially over the objections of its own military and experienced interrogators from 
the FBI, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the governments of certain key 
allies, and the united front of civil society.157  The executive’s motivation becomes 
clearer when one considers why torture has been used in the past, namely to break 
detainees’ spirits and to extract false confessions. Indeed, waterboarding in particular 
was identified by Americans as a particularly useful technique for this purpose when it 
was used by its adversaries.158 
A 2008 Senate Armed Service Committee report identified the particular false 
confession that the executive was pushing its torturers to obtain from detainees.  The 
executive sought confessions that al Qaeda was sponsored by Iraq during Hussein’s 
155 Ali Frick, ‘Why Bush’s “Enhanced Interrogation” Program Failed’, Think Progress 
<http://thinkprogress.org/report/why-enhanced-interrogation-failed/?mobile=nc#Ic> accessed 30 May 
2014; see also the comments of former CIA Director Mike Hayden, ‘I'm willing to concede the point 
that no one gave us valuable or actionable intelligence while they were, for example, being 
waterboarded’ <http://www.weku.fm/post/did‐harsh‐interrogation‐tactics‐lead‐bin‐laden> accessed 30 
May 2014 
156 Philippe Sands, The Torture Team (Palgrave McMillan 2008) 116-120 
157  Jeffrey Kassin, ‘United States Moral Authority Undermined: The Foreign Affairs Costs of 
Abusive Detentions’, (2006) 4 Cardozo Public Law Policy and Ethics Journal 450 
158 David Glazier, ‘Playing by the Rules: Combating al-Qaeda Within the Rule of Law’, (2010) 
51William and Mary Law Review 1030 
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dictatorship.159 The report details that Department of Defense ‘reverse engineered . . . 
Cold War communist techniques [e.g., waterboarding] used to secure false 
confessions’,160 as a response to pressure from senior executive officials. Major Paul 
Burney testified before the Committee that ‘while we were there [at Guantánamo Bay] 
a large part of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between Al Qaeda 
and Iraq and we were not being successful in establishing a link between Al Qaeda and 
Iraq. The more frustrated people got in not being able to establish this link . . . there 
was more and more pressure to resort to measures that might produce more immediate 
results.’161   
This pressure for torture aimed at producing false confession came from the highest 
reaches of the executive branch. The Armed Services Committee report details how 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz called ‘to express concerns about 
insufficient intelligence production’ at Guantánamo Bay, namely that it had not yielded 
a link to Iraq.  Wolfowitz suggested that the interrogators use more brutal methods.  
Another intelligence official confirmed this account and specified why these 
interrogations were so persistent, and why ‘extreme methods were used . . . for most of 
2002 and into 2003, Cheney and Rumsfeld, especially, were also demanding proof of 
159 Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘Inquiry of the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody: 
Report of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate’, 110th Congress, 2nd 
Session (20 November 2008) 
160 Mark Benjamin, ‘Torture Planning Began in 2001, Senate Report Reveals’, Salon Magazine, 
(Washington, 22 April 2009) <http://www.salon.com/2009/04/22/benjamin/> accessed 30 May 2014 
see also Sands supra n 156, 63, 81, 118 
161 Senate Armed Services Committee Report supra n 149, 41 
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the links between al Qaida and Iraq’.162  Former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State 
Powell Lawrence Wilkerson also asserted that Dick Cheney personally ordered 
waterboarding of detainees shortly before the interrogators produced a breakthrough in 
obtaining the false confession that the executive was seeking in February of 2002.163 
The torture authorized by the OLC finally produced the desired results. Ibn al-
Shaykh al-Libi was waterboarded regularly until he ‘confessed’ that Iraq trained al-
Qaeda members to use chemical and biological weapons.  Immediately afterwards, 
‘[al-]Libi’s statements became a key basis for the Bush-Cheney administration’s claim, 
in Secretary of State Colin Powell’s pre-war United Nations Security Council 
presentation’, which stated that ‘Al Qaeda continues to have a deep interest in acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction . . . I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative [al-
Libi] telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to Al-Qaida.  Fortunately, 
this operative is now detained, and he has told his story’.164  
Al-Libi soon recanted his statements, however, and the CIA admitted that he ‘had 
no knowledge of such training [in weapons of mass destruction by Iraqi agents] or 
162 Jonathan S. Landay, Report: Abusive Tactics Used to Seek Iraq-al Qaida Link, McClatchy 
Newspapers, (Washington 21 April 2009) <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/04/21/66622/report-
abusive-tactics-used-to.html> accessed 30 May 2014 
163 Lawrence Wilkerson, ‘The Truth About Dick Cheney’, The Washington Note (Washington, 13 
May 2009) <http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2009/05/the_truth_about/> accessed 30 May 
2014 
164 Colin Powell, Speech to the Plenary Session of the United Nations Security Council of February 5, 
2003 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070109235502/http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/
2003/17300.htm> accessed 30 May 2014 
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weapons and fabricated the statements because he was terrified of further harsh 
treatment’.165  He then was seen as a potential embarrassment, and dealt with 
accordingly. Rather than being put on trial before a military commission, he was 
transferred to Libya in 2006, despite the fact that refoulement to that country violated 
the Convention Against Torture’s provisions barring the repatriation of those who 
would be subjected to further abuse.166   
Human Rights Watch rediscovered Al-Libi in a Libyan prison in April of 2009, 
after having lost track of him when the United States refused to disclose his 
whereabouts.  Within a week of this visit, he was dead of what his captors described as 
a suicide However, ‘Those with whom Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’) spoke who 
knew al-Libi said he was very religious and cited this as the main reason why they were 
surprised by—and disbelieved—the government’s claim that he had committed 
suicide’.167  Photographs obtained by HRW show a sheet looped around his neck and 
attached to the wall, but his feet are ‘firmly on the ground’ and his body was marked 
with ‘large’ and ‘dark’ bruises and long ‘scratches’.168   
165 Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, ‘CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described’, ABC News, 
(18 November 2005) <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=132866> accessed 30 May 
2014 
166 UN General Assembly, ‘Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’, 28 July 1951, UNTS, vol. 
189, art.33, 137 
167 Human Rights Watch, ‘Delivered into Enemy Hands: U.S.-led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents 
to Gaddafi’s Libya’ (6 September, 2012) 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0912webwcover_1.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
168 Ibid 
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His death occurred as the Senate report into torture was nearing completion, 
something which Colin Powell’s former deputy Lawrence Wilkerson insinuated not to 
be coincidental. He described al-Libi’s death by noting that ‘al-Libi just “committed 
suicide” in Libya’. Interestingly, several U.S. lawyers working with tortured detainees 
were attempting to get the Libyan government to allow them to interview al-Libi’.169  
This assessment is reinforced by the statements of the head of the Washington office 
of Human Rights Watch, who confirmed that the effect that al-Libi’s testimony to the 
Senate committee might have been very negative for the executive: 'I would speculate 
that he was missing because he was such an embarrassment to the Bush administration.  
He was Exhibit A in the narrative that tortured confessions contributed to the massive 
intelligence failure that preceded the Iraq war’.170 
This narrative illustrates how the OLC memoranda that authorized the prolonged 
arbitrary detention and torture of these detainees freed the executive of all of the 
limitations of domestic and international legal obligations, thus vitiating the rule of 
law. It also clarifies that this was done with a purpose that challenged the rule of law’s 
fundamental norms on an even more problematic fashion.  The aim of these violations 
of non-derogable rights was to make the case for an aggressive war, which would serve 
to prolong the wartime emergency.  This would then allow the executive to entrench 
its immunity from the law and freedom from the oversight and control of the other 
branches of government.  As the description of the detention and torture of Padilla and 
169 Wilkerson supra n 163 
170 Peter Finn, ‘Detainee Who Gave False Iraq Data Dies in Prison in Libya’, Washington Post 
(Washington, 12 May 2009) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/11/AR2009051103412.html> 30 May 2014 
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al-Marri make clear, the OLC was determined to give the executive complete freedom 
of action not only outside of, but within the nation’s borders.  To illustrate this more 
adequately, the next subsection must discuss the executive’s illicit law-making in its 
battle against one of the key statutes that made it responsible to Congress and the courts 
in the course of actions purportedly undertaken in the interest of national security. That 
statute is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  It will be demonstrated that the 
executive was unwilling to tolerate any oversight of its control over the intelligence 
agencies, despite the obvious dangers to the rule of law that this created, as evidenced 
by the Watergate crisis described in chapter two. 
4.2.2.4 Memoranda Authorizing Intelligence Agencies’ Surveillance 
One of the most prominent statutory features of the congressional resurgence 
against the executive lawlessness made possible by unilateral control over the 
intelligence agencies was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, hereinafter 
referred to as ‘FISA’.  It specified that even if the executive believed it needed to 
conduct surveillance of citizens in the interests of national security, it needed to obtain 
warrants. The term “in the interests of national security” had served previously as a 
nebulous catch-all allowing for complete freedom of action, but after FISA the 
executive would need to obtain judicial warrants even when it invoked that rationale.  
Like many pieces of legislation that were passed in the wake of Watergate, FISA 
reiterated that the executive was subject to the Constitution’s clear commands. In this 
case, the requirement that judicial officers specifically describe and delimit search 
parameters after probable cause is set out in the Fourth Amendment.   
This limitation on executive power was seen as crucial means of preventing the 
executive from obtaining sufficient leverage to make another push for supremacy and 
unaccountability. In 1976 Senator Church ‘warned that total tyranny would result if the 
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agency were to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications’.171  
Church here was not referring to the FBI or the CIA, but the NSA, an agency devoted 
to using its massive computing resources to gather vast amounts of data, out of which 
it might winnow actionable intelligence.  It became one of the key tools after the post-
Watergate reforms, as ‘[t]he law has not kept up with communications technology and 
the technology of spying’.172  Few could have imagined at that time that the NSA would 
one day have the resources to record and review every telephone call between the 
United States and another country.   
FISA’s warrant requirement ostensibly prevented the NSA conducting a massive 
surveillance program involving all of the electronic communication within the United 
States, one which would dwarf Operation Minaret and the other unlawful programs 
exposed by the Church Commission.  After the 9/11 attacks, the executive was clearly 
unhappy with these restrictions.  In October 2001, Dick Cheney asked what sort of 
program would be possible if the NSA were not constrained by the laws.173  After 
learning about the NSA’s capabilities, Cheney presented a draft authorization for 
surveillance unconstrained by FISA to President Bush.  The executive ‘did not seek 
legislation.  They would rely on the president’s asserted authority as commander in 
171 Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice-Presidency (2008 Penguin) 141, quoting Senator Frank 
Church, ‘Meet the Press’, National Broadcasting Corporation (29 October 1975) 
172 Philip Taubman, ‘Sons of the Black Chamber’, New York Times (New York, 19 September 1982) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/19/books/sons-of-the-black-chamber.html?pagewant> accessed 30 
May 2014 
173 Gellman supra n 171, 142 
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chief to defy explicit prohibitions of law’.174  Only later, when the OLC was called 
upon to provide a minimally plausible justification, it would argue that this was also 
implicitly authorized by the AUMF. 
The argument that the hostilities authorized by the AUMF relieved the executive 
of the burden of complying with FISA’s warrant requirement was implausible on its 
face. The statute itself expressly considered the possibility of a congressional 
declaration of war, and stated that this would give the executive only a 15-day grace 
period before its provisions would return into force.  Other contemporaneous 
legislation, namely the USA PATRIOT Act, as passed on October 26, 2001, altered the 
time period during which the executive would need to present the warrant application 
to the judge, but left the requirement itself firmly intact.175   
Once again, John Yoo was asked to provide a legal opinion that would allow the 
executive to claim that it was not violating the law when it chose to ignore the 
commands of the legislature and the judiciary. By this time, however, it was clear that 
the executive was deciding to disregard a statute and the Constitution even before it 
asked for what purported to be a neutral evaluation and interpretation of the relevant 
legal framework.   
Yoo and Delahunty’s memorandum concluded that the United States was a 
battlefield after the 9/11 attacks, and the new program could therefore be justified as 
the collection of ‘battlefield intelligence’.  In a shocking lapse, it failed to even mention 
FISA They preferred to address the Fourth Amendment rather than the clarification of 
the burden FISA imposed on the executive, in a statute that was passed with the 
174 Ibid 
175 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978, Public Law 95-511 
175 
 
                                                 
Chapter 3: Overbroad Authority: The Executive After 9/11 176 
intention of preventing exactly the sort of program that was currently being 
implemented.176  This level of negligence was only possible because these memoranda 
were classified, despite the fact that they were considered binding law within the 
executive branch, and because they allowed for the creation of a surveillance program 
of staggering size and scope. 
The program, which was first entitled ‘Total Information Awareness’, quickly 
became a sprawling enterprise: 
The U.S. government was sweeping in e-mails, faxes and telephone calls made 
by its own citizens, in their own country.  Transactional data, such as telephone 
logs and e-mail headers, were collected by the billions . . . .  The program 
branched out from the NSA.  Other government agencies, including the CIA, 
the FBI, and elements of the Defense Department, used information gleaned 
from the NSA to do additional surveillance.  Vehicles could be tagged.  Cell 
phones could be located, even when switched off.  Cash machines, credit cards, 
bank transfers, changes of address, air and hotel and rental car reservations—
all of these could help the government track not only the activities but the 
physical locations of its targets.177 
 
All of this was illegal, and precisely what Congress banned explicitly in statutes 
after the scope of the executive’s misuse of the intelligence services and the ‘White 
House horrors’ were revealed by the Church Committee.  The executive decided to 
overrule FISA, the Keith Case and the Fourth Amendment. It did so in secret and then 
obtained classified advice that could have only approved of such activity either due to 
manifest bias, ineptitude, or both.  Most importantly, it concluded that the executive 
could take this action because of constitutional powers that it did not possess.  
Moreover, if it did in fact possess this ability to ignore the laws in the interest of 
176 Yoo and Delahunty supra 23 
177 Gellman supra n 171, 145-46 
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national security, the rule of law that was reconstructed after Watergate would no 
longer exist.   
The executive ignored the law in order to erect a regime of surveillance and control 
that served to make the executive much more powerful, to the point where it began to 
resemble the Nixon Administration at the peak of its powers- when it was unclear 
whether it could ever be restrained by the other branches of government.  The reaction 
of Congress and the judiciary, which will be described in the next two chapters below, 
would determine whether this circumvention of the rule of law would be temporary or 
permanent.  However, before this thesis addresses their responses, it must first lay out 
the essence of the claim of constitutional reserve power that OLC fleshed out in the 
above-described memoranda, as a back-up to their argument that the AUMF authorized 
all of these activities.  After the next subsection outlines this in more detail, it will be 
possible to see how this claim itself is entirely incompatible with the fundamental 
norms of the rule of law. 
5 DEFENDING INHERENT EXECUTIVE RESERVE POWERS 
As noted above, the OLC memoranda written between 2001 and 2003 made two 
sets of arguments. First, that Congress implicitly authorized the violation of non-
derogable rights and the abrogation of statutes and treaties when it passed the AUMF.  
Second, that the executive possessed inherent constitutional reserve powers that 
allowed it to ignore even the most explicit prohibitions of domestic and international 
law pertaining to jus cogens norms.  As noted above, the OLC’s arguments about the 
AUMF are not plausible, given the legislative history of the statute that reveals its 
limited purpose, and which shows that Congress rejected the interpretation which the 
executive subsequently gave to the bill.   
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The OLC’s constitutional arguments present more complex issues. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to comprehensively rebut the argument that the Constitution 
implicitly grants the executive power to ignore it in times of crisis, which is an example 
of a legal argument that is so contrary to basic norms that it is difficult to even begin 
to describe its errors.  This thesis avoids addressing this directly for two reasons.  First, 
it need only determine that the American legal order would be incompatible with the 
rule of law were this true, as the OLC claimed. Second, the OLC’s arguments on this 
point were roundly rejected in both academic circles and the legal profession generally. 
There is widespread agreement within the American legal profession that the 
memoranda discussed above were not merely incorrect, but egregiously negligent. One 
memorandum in particular was the subject of a ‘near consensus that the legal analysis 
was bizarre’.178  For example, Dean Harold Koh of the Yale Law School described the 
memorandum authored by John Yoo and signed by Jay Bybee as ‘perhaps the most 
clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read’.179  Another highly qualified observer 
commented that this memo ‘has no foundation in prior OLC opinions, judicial 
decisions, or in any other source of law’.180 
The reasoning of all of the memoranda written by Yoo, Bybee, and Philbin was so 
problematic that after the change of administration in 2009, the Department of Justice’s 
178 David Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb’, (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1425 
1444 
179 Trevor Morrison, ‘Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch’, (2006) 106 Columbia Law 
Review 1189, 1231 (quoting Harold Koh) 
180 David Glenn, ‘“Torture Memos” vs. Academic Freedom, Chronicle of Higher Education’, 
(Washington, 20 March 2009) quoting former Assistant Deputy Attorney General Jack Goldsmith 
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Office of Legal Counsel withdrew at least some of these, along with another written by 
Stephen Bradbury,181 effectively striking down the law that they established within the 
executive branch, and the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility, 
hereinafter referred to as the ‘OPR’, brought an investigation against officials involved 
in the production of these memoranda for violations of the basic standards of the legal 
profession.   
These senior career members of the OPR concluded that Yoo ‘knowingly failed to 
provide a thorough, objective, and candid interpretation of the law’.182 ‘Yoo placed his 
desire to accommodate the client [the head of the executive branch] above his 
obligation to provide thorough, objective, and candid legal advice, and that he therefore 
committed intentional professional misconduct’.183  The OPR also found that ‘Bybee 
knew or should have known that there was a substantial likelihood that the Bybee 
Memo did not present a thorough, objective and candid view of the law      . . . . he 
181 David Barron, ‘Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel 
Opinion’, (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 11 June 2009) 
<http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/memo-barron2009.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
182 Office of Professional Responsibility, ‘Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Related to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists’, (29 July, 2009), 251 
<https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20090729_OPR_Final_Report_with_20100719_
declassifications.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
183 Ibid 254 
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acted in reckless disregard of his obligation to provide thorough, objective and candid 
legal advice’.184 
This investigation took over four years to complete, and the OPR only made its 
finding of professional misconduct after concluding that no reasonable doubts were 
possible as to Yoo and Bybee’s culpability.  However, in what was labelled an ‘unusual 
step’, David Margolis, a power broker in the Department of Justice ‘who for decades 
has served as consigliore to top Justice officials’ known for his ‘almost mythic powers 
of . . . political foresight’ decided to overturn this decision.185 Strangely, this official 
made the decision ‘to weigh Yoo’s strongly held views of executive power as evidence 
against a misconduct finding’.186  Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis 
was the subject of criticism in the past, after he had allegedly spared well-connected 
officials in the Department of Justice from ethics investigations, even when their 
behaviour arguably violated the rules of professional responsibility.187  
Accordingly, Bybee and Yoo, who subsequently retired from government service 
to serve as a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
and a Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, respectively, were 
184 Ibid 257 
185 Joe Palazzo, ‘David Margolis—the Institutionalist’, Main Justice: Politics, Policy and the Law (19 
April 2010) <http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/04/19/the-institutionalist/> accessed 30 May 2014 
186 Ibid 
187 Scott Horton, ‘Prosecutorial Ethics Lite’, Harper’s Magazine (New York, 12 January 2008) 
<http://harpers.org/blog/2008/01/prosecutorial-ethics-lite/>  
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spared any form of sanctions.  As they now both serve in positions with lifetime tenure, 
‘Judge Bybee and Professor Yoo . . . . are home free’.188 
In addition to absolving Yoo and Bybee, Margolis’ memorandum had two other 
effects.  First, it muddied the waters about whether it was proper to authorize 
techniques of interrogation that clearly amounted to torture. One critic argued that 
‘Margolis has codified the principle that we can make up new ethics standards 
depending on who the lawyers in question are and the exigency of the national security 
crisis, which isn't all that different from making up new interrogation standards 
depending on who the prisoner is, and the exigency of the national security 
situation’.189  Second, it left open the question of whether the executive has a 
constitutional reserve power that allows him to ignore the laws in a crisis.  As noted 
above, if this is true, then the United States cannot be considered a rule of law state. 
John Yoo testified before the OPR inquiry that the executive’s power to ignore 
domestic and international law and to deprive individuals of their non-derogable rights 
was boundless.  In one exchange, Yoo was asked whether the executive could ‘order a 
village of civilians to be [exterminated]?’  His response was ‘Sure’.190  As noted, Yoo 
was not punished for a view of executive powers that could not be more antithetical to 
the rule of law. He was exonerated because of his purportedly sincere beliefs in the 
188 David Luban, ‘David Margolis is Wrong’, Slate Magazine (22 February 2010) 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/02/david_margolis_is_wrong.html> 
189 Dalia Lithwick, ‘Torture Bored’, Slate Magazine (22 February 2012) 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/02/torture_bored2.html> 
accessed 30 May 2014 
190 OPR supra n 182, 64 
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executive’s supremacy and unaccountability.  Accordingly, even after the change of 
administration, it was unclear whether this view of inherent constitutional reserve 
powers was current within the executive, even after it was used to justify the 
executive’s purported power to wage aggressive war and to violate non-derogable 
rights.   
As the attitude of the executive to its accountability to the other branches remains 
at best ambivalent, the enduring compliance of the nation with the minimum 
requirements of the rule of law depends upon the reaction of the legislature and the 
judiciary.  However, before turning to this issue, this thesis must first conclusively 
demonstrate that the framework for executive power that was erected by the executive 
after the 9/11 attacks cannot be reconciled with the basic elements of the rule of law, 
as outlined by the International Commission of Jurists. 
6 THE 9/11 CRISIS AND THE ICJ’S RULE OF LAW 
The aggrandizement of the executive branch following the 9/11 attacks can only be 
said to jeopardize the United States’ standing as a nation governed in accordance with 
the principles of the rule of law if, after these delegations and assumptions of power by 
the executive, the four criteria outlined by the International Commission of Jurists were 
no longer being met.   
The changes to the constitutional order of the United States that relate to criteria 
three and four, as drawn from the Lagos Report, have yet to be discussed.  This thesis 
has yet to discuss the judiciary’s response to the assertions of broad executive powers 
found in the signing statement to the AUMF and the OLC memoranda referenced 
above.  Similarly, this chapter did not discuss Congress’ reaction to the executive law-
making that invaded the province of the legislature.  These responses will be discussed 
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in the next two chapters, which will demonstrate that the other branches failed to 
prevent a temporary crisis of the rule of law from ossifying into a permanently broken 
constitutional order.   
Accordingly, this section can only address the proposition that the delegation and 
assumption of powers by the executive during the post-9/11 crisis violated two of the 
ICJ’s criteria, such that the United States could not be considered a rule of law unless 
the legislature and the judiciary addressed these failures adequately after 2003, when 
the immediate crisis passed.  To that end, the two subsections below must consider two 
questions.  First, whether the AUMF granted powers to the executive that placed it 
outside of the control of the legislature, which violates the ICJ’s first criterion.  Second, 
whether the executive then itself created emergency powers, in the form of the 
AUMF’s signing statement and subsequent OLC memoranda, which could be invoked 
in order to relieve itself of any and all control by the other branches of government, in 
violation of the ICJ’s second criterion.  After it is demonstrated that these criteria were 
not met from 2001 to 2003, it will be clear that if the other branches did not act to 
remedy the situation after this crisis, the rule of law can no longer be considered to be 
in place in the United States. 
6.1 Illicit Law-Making Granting Unbridled Emergency Powers 
This chapter also demonstrated that OLC memoranda written from 2001 to 2003 
were blatant and self-serving distortions of the existing law, including the AUMF, 
which created unreviewable emergency powers.  These arguments were so problematic 
because the executive branch insisted that it possessed the right to engage in clearly 
unlawful activities that violated non-derogable rights.  However, after clarifying the 
executive’s motivation for these activities, the most problematic challenge to the rule 
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of law that these entail becomes apparent.  Namely, executive branch officials were 
determined to use information gleaned from a system that violated a number of jus 
cogens norms, constitutional provisions, and statutes, to extend the political crisis that 
made further illicit extensions of executive power possible. 
This chapter detailed the results of several recent investigations, by the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Human Rights Watch, and others, which demonstrated 
that the executive’s underlying motivation for ignoring the law of war and setting up a 
parallel system of judicial black holes and ad hoc military tribunals was to allow for 
further military action against Congress’ express wishes, and which would allow the 
executive to prolong the crisis.  It explained how this would allow the executive to 
extend its own powers at the expense of the other branches of government even further.  
To be precise, the goal of Guantánamo Bay and the regime of torture, which senior 
executive branch officials authorized for use therein was designed to generate false 
confessions.  It was hoped that these would implicate Iraq as an al-Qaeda sponsor, 
leading to a much larger war, which would itself catalyse further misuse of the 
intelligence agencies and the creation of a more elaborate system of scrutiny and 
repression within the United States.   
As described above, in order to obtain these false confessions, many prisoners with 
no connection to al-Qaeda or the Taliban were taken to foreign sites, denied the 
protections of the Geneva Conventions, denied access to lawyers and the courts, and 
subjected to torture.  These violations of non-derogable rights were substantial, but the 
most lasting damage to the rule of law stemmed from the OLC memoranda’s assertion 
that the executive could not be prevented from doing so by Congress or the courts.  
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However, even more hazardous to the rule of law was the dynamic that the executive 
was attempting to put into place with these acts of executive law-making. 
In essence, between 2001 and 2003, the executive was attempting to use illicit 
emergency powers to create a feedback loop between a state of war and the violation 
of non-derogable rights. 9/11 made it politically possible to set up the Guantánamo 
regime, which was explicitly designed to produce information that would extend the 
crisis into a near-permanent state of warfare in the Middle East. Warfare in Afghanistan 
gave way, after false confessions and other dubious intelligence reports, to war in Iraq, 
which might lead to the wars in Syria and Iran that the Project for the New American 
Century’s report advocated.  These new wars, if the OLC memoranda written at that 
time are taken as any indication of the executive’s plans, would likely have been 
followed by further violations of non-derogable rights.   
These memoranda also show that the executive speculated that the political climate 
created by these larger wars would make it more difficult for the legislative and judicial 
branches to assert that the executive was assuming extra-constitutional emergency 
powers, or to stand up against a realignment catalysed by a permanent crisis, which 
threatened to irrevocably destroy the separation of powers that protects the rule of law 
in the United States.  Congress and the courts’ political will during this crisis to 
condemn the signing statement and OLC memoranda would determine whether the 
rule of law would survive the first decade of the twenty-first century.  
7 CONCLUSION: THE RULE OF LAW IN THE BALANCE— 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES 
After the 9/11 attacks, executive branch officials who opposed the imposition of the 
restrictions on the executive that the rule of law required during the Ford 
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Administration sought to restore the imperial presidency.  These officials, who 
believed that the executive should have complete freedom of action in national security 
matters, seized the opportunity that the attacks presented to create an unaccountable 
presidency during the crisis that existed between 2001 and 2003.  This was illustrated 
by the executive’s decision to violate the non-derogable rights of terrorism suspects, 
by subjecting them to indefinite arbitrary detention and torture, while maintaining that 
these actions were unreviewable. 
These abuses were not merely evidence of a failure to observe the basic norms of 
human rights, but of a breakdown of the rule of law.  According to the ICJ, a nation is 
not a rule of law state if the executive is permitted to create the rules for its own 
conduct, if these rules are not subject to being scrutinized and overturned by the 
legislature or the judiciary.   
No grant of rulemaking authority from the legislature may give the executive the 
final say over decisions that implicate fundamental rights, if the nation is to remain 
within the boundaries of the rule of law.  Unfortunately, the AUMF did precisely this, 
by allowing the executive to determine which organizations and nations could be 
attacked and invaded in response to the 9/11 attacks.  This delegation of authority was 
not in keeping with the ICJ’s first criterion of the rule of law state.   
The ICJ’s second criterion is that the emergency powers of the executive must 
always be limited in scope and duration.  This was not the case after the 9/11 attacks.  
Instead, the executive assumed, on its own initiative, vast emergency powers, 
bypassing the statutory scheme by which these are normally triggered, and ignoring 
the law-making process mandated by the separation of powers altogether.  Instead, the 
executive branch wrote its own laws, creating its emergency powers by means of 
186 
 
Chapter 3: Overbroad Authority: The Executive After 9/11 187 
executive law-making, which the ICJ explicitly condemned as being incompatible with 
the rule of law.  
 For this crisis of the rule of law to be more than merely transient, the legislature and 
the judiciary must abdicate their responsibility to respond to executive overreaching.  
Accordingly, the next two chapters of this thesis will examine their responses.  
However, it should be noted that the executive attempted to use the overbroad 
delegation of power and the emergency powers it granted itself to make this more 
difficult.  It is particularly unfortunate that the ‘intelligible principle’ requirement of 
the nondelegation doctrine was ‘rendered virtually meaningless’191 after Roosevelt’s 
victory over the Supreme Court.  If John Marshall was right, and there are ‘important 
subjects which must be regulated by the legislature itself’,192  surely he, along with his 
contemporaries among the Framers would have included the right to declare war.  As 
Marshall, Madison, and Hamilton recognized, giving the executive the power to 
declare war empowers it to destroy every other limit on its authority. 
 The post-9/11 constitutional crisis was made considerably more intractable by the 
fact that the executive was using these powers to create and prolong a political 
environment that would make it more difficult for Congress and the courts to respond.  
That said, it is clear that if these branches did not respond adequately to the executive’s 
lawlessness, and in particular to its claim to be empowered by the Constitution to be 
immune and unaccountable to any restraint, then the United States would no longer be 
in conformity with the minimum requirements of the rule of law.
191 Ibid 634 
192 Wayman v Southard, 23 US 1 [1825] [United States Supreme Court] 
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Chapter 4 
THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIARY  
TO EXECUTIVE OVERREACHING 2003-2012 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The federal judiciary is charged with ensuring that the executive does not violate 
constitutional rights.  Its response to the lawsuits challenging these violations of non-
derogable rights would be central either to terminating or prolonging this state of 
exception.  One might reasonably expect that the judiciary would do what was required 
of it by both the Constitution of the United States and the rule of law, but twentieth-
century American history indicates that the courts may not protect constitutional rights, 
especially when doing so would be very unpopular.  As described in chapter two, this 
is frequently the case during a serious crisis, when popular opinion falls solidly into 
place behind the executive. 
This chapter will demonstrate that the judiciary’s response to the executive’s 
reassertion of dominance after the 9/11 attacks entailed a consistent evasion of their 
constitutional responsibilities.  Even after 2003, the higher levels of the American 
judiciary became satisfied with asserting its power to enforce the executive’s 
constitutional limitations in purely rhetorical terms. This will be demonstrated through 
an analysis of the Boumediene opinion and the on-going failure to enforce the rights 
that it announced.   
This chapter will make it clear that even after the executive proved it was committed 
to the on-going violation of non-derogable rights, the judiciary proved itself content to 
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limit itself to chastising the executive, but producing decisions that only appeared to 
restrain the executive’s freedom of action.   
Accordingly, the conclusion will contend that unless these courts adopt a different 
response to these issues, the only hope for the rule of law stems from the possibility 
that the legislature might act to re-impose restrictions on executive law-making and 
forbid the violation of non-derogable rights.  Congress could empower the courts to 
enforce these limitations, in the manner that the rule of law requires. 
2  HABEAS CORPUS 
Long before court challenges to torture and illegal surveillance were brought, the 
executive’s decision to openly defy worldwide opinion and create a parallel system of 
detention at Guantánamo Bay catalysed a strong reaction from the legal community, 
which fought a long campaign against indefinite arbitrary detention. Although the 
Supreme Court’s decisions addressing prolonged arbitrary detention are frequently 
described as victory for the rule of law,1 close attention to the holdings of these opinions 
reveals that they have allowed for the continuation and formalization of this detention 
regime, not merely at Guantánamo Bay, but also in Afghanistan.2  In particular, close 
attention to court decisions reveals that the power to grant the writ of habeas corpus 
has become purely abstract after the D.C. Circuit held that lower courts have no ability 
1  Seth Harold Weinberger, Restoring the Balance: War Powers in an Age of Terror (2009 
Greenwood) 115-116 
2  Anthony Gregory, The Power of Habeas Corpus in America: From the King’s Prerogative to the 
War on Terror (2013 Cambridge University Press) 257-269 
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to actually release detainees.3  In addition, captives taken in other parts of the world 
who are taken to American detention centres in Afghanistan were barred by that court 
from even requesting a writ, even if this would only have symbolic force.4   
2.1 The Supreme Court’s Delayed and Inadequate Response 
The first decision that was described as a rebuke to the Administration was Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld.5  As noted in chapter two, an American citizen named Yasir Hamdi was 
captured in Afghanistan and imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay, before being transferred 
to a military prison in the continental United States.  His father filed a habeas petition 
on his behalf.  In response, the government produced only a ‘vague and general 
declaration’6 asserting that Hamdi was a Taliban militiaman.  The trial court noted: 
While it is clear that the Executive is entitled to deference regarding military 
designations of individuals, it is equally clear that the judiciary is entitled to a 
meaningful judicial review of these designations when they substantially 
infringe on the individual liberties, guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution, of American Citizens.7 
 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, in what was the first of many cases wherein 
the lower courts would prove willing to defend constitutional rights while appellate 
3  Kiyemba v Obama [2009] 561 F3d 509 (District of the District of Columbia) 
4  Al-Maqaleh v Gates [2010] 605 F.3d 84 (District of the District of Columbia) 
5  Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2004] 542 US 507 (United States Supreme Court) 
6  Kim Lane Schepple, ‘The New Judicial Deference’, (2012) 92 Boston University Law Review 89, 
112  
7  Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2002] 243 FSupp2d 531 (District of the District of Columbia) 
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courts would defer to the executive,8 arguing that the ‘constitutional allocation of war 
powers affords the President extraordinarily broad authority and compels courts to 
assume a deferential posture.’9  It was left to the Supreme Court to decide between 
these two competing views about whether the judiciary should play any role in policing 
the constitutional limits of executive power after it invokes a theory of its war powers 
that is incompatible with the rule of law.  
The Court’s fractured plurality opinion, in which Justice O’Connor took the middle 
position, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Rehnquist, while Justices 
Ginsburg and Souter concurred in part and dissented in part, is most often remembered 
for its assertion of the judiciary’s responsibilities: 
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that the separation of 
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such 
circumstances . . . . We have long since made it clear that a state of war is not a 
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens.  Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the 
Executive . . . it must assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when 
individual liberties are at stake.10 
 
However, this stirring defence of the courts’ role in protecting individual liberties 
seems rather less impressive when reviewed in the context of the Court’s actual holding, 
which ‘nonetheless found that Hamdi’s [indefinite military] detention was in fact 
8  Ibid.  See also e.g. Padilla v Rumsfeld [2003] 352 F3d 695 (Second Circuit), 724 ; ACLU v NSA 
[2007] 436 FSupp2d 754 (District of the District of Columbia), Ali Ahmed v Obama [2009] 657 
FSupp2d 51 (District of the District of Columbia), Amnesty International v Clapper [2011] 667 F3d 
163 (D.C. Circuit) (all cases discussed below). 
9  Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2003] 316 F3d 450, 459 (D.C. Circuit) 
10  Hamdi v Rumsfeld, [2004] 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (United States Supreme Court) 
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authorized.’11 The Court found that Congress implicitly authorized this detention when 
passing the AUMF, despite the fact that this statute does not appear to contemplate 
anything other than military strikes themselves.12  The Court decided to allow the 
petitioner’s detention to continue, despite the fact that the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause requires Congress to pass a statute explicitly authorizing military custody.  It 
should also be noted that the AUMF violates the Non-Detention Act, which the Court 
failed to even mention.  It also ignored the fact that the civilian courts remained open, 
despite the fact that its earlier opinions held that this fact precluded the use of military 
commissions.13   
A second opinion in a case styled Rasul v. Bush was released the same day.14  The 
primary issue in Rasul was whether a civilian court had jurisdiction to review a habeas 
petition filed by a Guantánamo detainee.  The executive branch decided to erect that 
detention camp in part owing to the conclusion of John Yoo and others at the OLC that 
it was a location that was outside of the reach of any court15.  As Lord Steyn famously 
11  Schepple supra n 6, 118 
12  Schepple supra n 6, 119 
13  Ex Parte Milligan [1866] 72 US 2 (United States Supreme Court) 
14  Rasul v Bush [2004] 542 US 466 
15  Patrick Philbin and John Yoo, ‘Memorandum to William J. Haynes, General Counsel, Department 
of Defense: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’, (Washington, 
Office of Legal Counsel, 28 December 2001) 
<http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20011228.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
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said, it was a ‘legal black hole.’16  The Court’s opinion differentiated this case from 
Johnson v. Eisentrager,17 which held that American courts possessed no jurisdiction 
over the claims of German citizens captured by U.S. forces in China and imprisoned in 
occupied Germany, after being found guilty of war crimes at a military commission 
convened in Nanking in 1946.18   
The opinion noted that the petitioners in Eisentrager received some degree of due 
process at their trials, while the petitioners faced indefinite detention without any 
possibility of proving their innocence.19  Accordingly, the Court held that that ‘§ 2241 
[the habeas corpus statute] confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' 
habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base.’20   
Commentators have described this holding as ‘an astonishing legal victory for the 
detainees.’21  However, it was merely a victory on paper. Not one detainee was released 
or even placed into conditions of confinement consistent with the Geneva Conventions 
owing to this ruling, or, as will be demonstrated below, due to the opinions that 
16  Johan Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1 
17  Johnson v Eisentrager [1950] 339 US 763 (United States Supreme Court) 
18  Ibid. 777; wee also Trials of War Criminals, vol. XIV (1949, United Nations War Crimes 
Commission) 
19  Rasul supra n 14, 476 
20   Ibid 483 
21  Schepple supra n 6, 128 
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followed.  The purely preliminary nature of the relief granted by the Court can be best 
illustrated by reproducing its statement about what it explicitly did not hold: 
Whether and what further proceedings may become necessary after respondents 
make their response to the merits of petitioners’ claims are matters that we need 
not address now. What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts 
have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially 
indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of 
wrongdoing.22  
 
That said, access to habeas review seemed to provide the detainees with possible 
route to release.  However, Hamdi and Rasul merely held that the Guantánamo Bay 
petitioners must be given an opportunity to assert that they were factually innocent, and 
that the executive was not providing this due process.  However, it was ‘the language 
of the Hamdi opinion [that is, its dicta, rather than the holding] that dominated the 
media’s attention,’23 which reported that the Court dealt a severe blow to the 
Administration’s detention regime.24    
These opinions’ most stirring passages also distracted the press from a third, rather 
dry and technical majority opinion released on the same day, which failed to affirm the 
reasoning of multiple lower court opinions that held squarely that the executive branch 
could not detain an American citizen arrested within the United States indefinitely and 
without counsel.  In José Padilla’s case, the Second Circuit held that ‘when the 
executive acts, even in the conduct of war, in the face of apparent congressional 
22  Rasul supra n 14, 485 
23  Ibid 120 
24  See, e.g., Stephen Henderson, ‘Detainees Win Access to Courts; Supreme Court Rulings Deliver a 
Legal Blow to the Administration’s Antiterrorism Policy’, Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia, 29 June 
2004) 
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disapproval, challenges to his authority must be examined and resolved by the Article 
III courts.’25  
Despite the fact that ‘the Padilla case may have seemed the easier one because it was 
not a battlefield capture and all the judges below had found fault with the detention, the 
Supreme Court decided to avoid the question.’26   
As Jenny Martinez wrote of the Padilla litigation as a whole: 
The courts’ patience with the government’s procedural games also left open the 
possibility that other citizens might be similarly detained in the future 
(particularly in the Fourth Circuit, where the decision finding some legal 
authority for such detentions remains on the books as a precedent, albeit a 
weakened one).27 
 
Another commentator noted that the Supreme Court’s ‘odd decision in the case can 
hardly be understood as anything other than an evasion.’28  The dissenting Justices 
made it clear that this failure to address Padilla’s claims was an inexcusable failure to 
restore the rule of law: 
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society.  Even 
more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their 
successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the 
rule of law.  Unconstrained executive detention for the purpose of investigating 
and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber.  For if 
this nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield 
the tools of tyrants.29 
25  Padilla v Rumsfeld [2003] 352 F3d 695, 724 (D.C. Circuit) 
26  Schepple supra n 6, p. 115 
27  Jenny Martinez, ‘Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”’, (2008) 108 Columbia Law 
Review 1013, 1039 
28  Schepple supra n 6, 116 
29  Rumsfeld v Padilla [2004] 542 US 426, 465 (United States Supreme Court) (Stevens, J., joined by 
Breyer, Ginsberg, Souter, JJ., dissenting) 
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Another dissent to the companion case noted that ‘the very core of liberty secured 
by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite 
imprisonment at the will of the Executive.’30  Accordingly, the procedural evasion 
allowed the Court not only to avoid whether the executive branch could imprison 
Americans indefinitely without trial, but whether it could do so despite the fact that 
Congress barred this practice.  The Non-Detention Act of 1971,31 hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘NDA’, which states that ‘[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except by Act of Congress,’ and despite the fact while:  
[T]he Administration has argued that Section 4001(a) [of the NDA] ‘does not 
apply to the military’s wartime detention of enemy combatants [and that the 
NDA] . . . has no bearing on the military’s authority to detain enemy combatants 
in wartime . . . . The legislative history does not support that interpretation, 
which would leave open some inherent presidential power to accomplish the 
same feat by military means.32 
 
The Congressional Research Service’s report on this statute concluded: 
The political climate of the Non-Detention Act (fear and anxiety by U.S. 
citizens of arbitrary imprisonment and detention) combined with the legislative 
history provide persuasive evidence that the purpose of repealing the 
Emergency Detention Act and adding the Railsback Amendment was to strip 
from the executive branch — both its civilian and military components — of 
any claim of independent authority to round up, imprison, and detain disfavored 
individuals.33 
 
Despite the presence of these pressing issues of paramount concern, owing to 
Padilla’s alleged error in filing his petition in the wrong court, the majority forced 
30  Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2004] 542 US 508, 554 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) 
31  Non-Detention Act 1971, Public Law 92-128 
32  Congressional Research Service, ‘Detention of American Citizens as Enemy Combatants’ 
(Congressional Research Service, 15 March 2004), 2. 
33  Ibid 5 
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Padilla to begin his quest for justice from the beginning, only to have his case made 
moot by his transfer to civilian custody after he again came before the Supreme Court.34  
The outrageousness of the Administration’s attempts to avoid review of a crucial issue 
were so blatant that ‘Judge Luttig [of the Fourth Circuit] even stepped down from the 
bench, amid stories that the Bush Administration had lied about Padilla’s involvement 
in terrorism and had therefore put him in the untenable position of upholding a 
controversial detention that had no basis in fact.’35  The Supreme Court facilitated this 
evasion by approving Padilla’s transfer out of military custody.36  The Court could have 
written a judgement clarifying whether the President has the power to detain American 
citizens indefinitely. On that day it did not, and to date it has failed to do so. 
The civil rights organizations that represented the detainees responded to this failure 
by filing challenges to the constitutionality of the purported congressional authorization 
of the executive’s detention regime.  The first of these cases to be decided was Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, which challenged the military commissions that were set up by the 
President in response to Rasul.37  The Hamdan opinion ruled that these commissions 
did not meet the minimum standards specified by Congress’ last word on how these 
must be conducted, found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, hereinafter referred 
34  See Human Rights First, ‘José Padilla, U.S. Citizen’, In the Courts 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20100217085312/http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/sup
reme_court_padilla.aspx >  
35  Schlepple supra n 6, p. 121. 
36  Hanft v Padilla [2006] 546 US 1084 (United States Supreme Court) 
37  Hamdan v Rumsfeld [2006] 548 US 577 (United States Supreme Court) 
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to as the ‘UCMJ’.38  The court decided that either the UCMJ’s incorporation of the 
Geneva Convention protections or Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions itself 
provided a set of minimum safeguards, which the President could not sidestep.   
Despite having held that the tribunals were insufficient as they were then constituted, 
the plurality opinion left open two courses of action for the executive when defending 
indefinite military detention.  First, the Court seemed to indicate that in some 
circumstances the President could seek to demonstrate that there was a military 
necessity that allowed him to deviate from the UCMJ,39 a line of reasoning that seems 
to implicitly approve of the executive branch’s claims of inherent constitutional powers 
in wartime.40  Second, the Court’s holding seemed to indicate that if Congress 
authorized new forms of tribunals, this would preclude further judicial scrutiny.   
The Hamdan decision also did not free any detainees. It restrained its relief to:  
requiring that the military commissions be put on hold while Congress took up 
the matter, [which] only served to delay Hamdan’s trial while not substantially 
improving the procedures from his point of view . . . . During this time, Hamdan 
was placed in solitary confinement.  His lawyers argued that his mental state 
had deteriorated to the point that he could no longer assist in his own defense.41   
 
This narrow holding necessitated only the modification of the executive’s system of 
prolonged arbitrary detention, rather than its abolition.  Regardless, the decision was 
38  Uniform Code of Military Justice, United States Code title 10 ch. 47 
39  Rasul v Bush [2004] 542 US 466, 612 (Stevens, J.) (United States Supreme Court) (plurality 
opinion) 
40  This was also implicitly supported by the logic of Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 723, 794-95 
(United States Supreme Court) 
41  Schepple supra n 6, 135 
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once again described by the press as a ‘broad[] rejection of the Bush plan to try 
detainees.’42 As will be demonstrated below, this is not an accurate characterization, 
unless undue weight is placed upon the opinion’s rhetorical effect.  However, the 
practical impact of the Court’s deference to the executive would not become clear to 
legal observers until after a series of cases brought by detainees were decided during 
the following five years. 
An effective challenge to a new set of tribunal procedures set up after Hamdan would 
take two more years to wend its way through the courts.  In Boumediene v. Bush,43 the 
Court finally asserted that no one could rubber-stamp the president’s plans to deny 
detainees evidentiary hearings that would meet the requirements of Common Article 
Three of the Geneva Conventions, unless Congress formally invoked the Suspension 
Clause to deny the detainees habeas corpus.  This decision can be seen as a ‘dare[]’ to 
‘Congress to suspend the right overtly.’44  The Court again seems to implicitly assert 
that the rule of law only applies insofar as the other branches of government have not 
explicitly rejected it.  This approach can hardly be considered a heroic defence of the 
42  Linda Greenhouse, ‘Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees’, New York Times 
(New York, 29 June 2006) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/30/washington/30hamdan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 
30 May 2014 
43  Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 723 (United States Supreme Court) 
44  Schlepple supra n 6, 140 
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principles of natural justice, which demand access to a neutral arbiter and the 
opportunity to present one’s defence.45 
At best, the Boumediene decision merely sketched out what manner and degree of 
access to the courts the detainees still possessed in the absence of formal suspension of 
habeas corpus.  Kim Schepple described the Court’s fundamentally deferential 
approach to the Administration as follows: 
According to the Court . . . . ‘The Executive is entitled to a reasonable period of 
time to determine a detainee’s status before a court entertains that detainee’s 
habeas corpus petition.’  Then the Court waffled again on the ultimate standards, 
announcing that ‘certain accommodations can be made to reduce the burden 
habeas corpus proceedings will place on the military without impermissibly 
diluting the protections of the writ,’ without beginning to say what those 
accommodations could be.  At the end of what appeared to be a bold judgment, 
the lip service to old deference emerged, tempered by the new deference that 
has come to be the signature of the post-9/11 jurisprudence.46 
 
It is important to also remember that it took the Court almost six years to reach this 
position, and during this period it rejected several opportunities to rule that indefinite 
executive detention was simply unacceptable, as the Suspension Clause was not 
invoked by Congress and the civilian courts remained open.  In the end, the Court 
contented itself with merely a pressure valve in the form of tightly restricted 
opportunities for the detainees to prove their innocence, without even requiring release 
in that event.  This failure to re-establish the rule of law was masked by soaring rhetoric, 
which unfortunately was followed only by minor adjustments to an inadequate status 
quo. 
45  Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andy Le Sueur (eds) ‘Procedural Fairness: Introduction, History 
and Comparative Perspectives’ in De Smith’s Judicial Review (Sweet & Maxwell 2007), 317-357 
46  Schepple supra n 6, 141-42 
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Furthermore, the Boumediene decision again provided support for theories of the 
president’s inherent powers in national security, and left open the door for the 
reassertion of extreme variations on that theme by the executive:   
[P]roper deference must be accorded to the political branches . . . . The law must 
accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who 
pose a real danger to our security . . . . Security depends upon a sophisticated 
intelligence apparatus and the ability of our Armed forces to act and to interdict 
. . . . Our opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as Commander-
in-Chief . . . . it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers 
undefined.47    
 
The Supreme Court’s indifference to the outcome of the habeas petitions brought 
after Boumediene appears to provide ample support for the conclusion that the Court 
was more concerned with preserving the appearance than the substance of the rule of 
law in these post-9/11 cases.  After implicitly validating executive detention pending 
court review of claims of actual innocence and military tribunals, the Court left it to the 
D.C. Circuit to determine the rules for the hearings in which detainees can prove their 
innocence. 
2.2 The D.C. Circuit’s Repudiation of Habeas Corpus Relief 
The Court’s decision to shift the responsibility to supervise the implementation of 
its purported remedy for prolonged arbitrary detention was telling, since the D.C. 
Circuit is the most reflexively pro-government of the federal appeals courts, as will be 
explained in the next chapter. Its bench includes unitary executive theorists such as 
Laurence H. Silberman, former mentor to John Yoo.48  Since then the ‘Supreme Court 
47  Boumediene supra n 43, 976-98 
48  Jess Braven, The Terror Courts: Rough Justice at Guantanamo Bay (2013 Yale University Press) 
27-28 
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has apparently lost interest in the difficult and important issues raised by the indefinite 
detention of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay . . . .[as] the D.C. Circuit has . . . effectively 
nullified the Court’s decision in Boumediene.’49 
After Boumediene was decided, a group of Chinese Uighur detainees filed a petition 
for habeas corpus.  These detainees were living peacefully in small villages until they 
were swept up by bounty-hunters searching for foreigners who could be sold to the 
American authorities and sent to Guantánamo. The ‘government had admitted as early 
as 2003 that the imprisoned Uighurs were improperly detained and eligible for 
release.’50  However, after concluding that they could not be repatriated to either 
Afghanistan or China, the executive could not locate a country that would accept them.  
This presumed that the United States itself was an unsuitable destination, an argument 
that the executive never articulated. 
The petition in Kiyemba v. Obama was filed after months of waiting turned into 
years.  In response, the executive branch effectively conceded that it had no basis to 
detain these men other than unspecified reserve powers, which one judge summarized 
as follows: 
The Executive chose not to file returns to the petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
for a majority of the petitioners . . . . the Executive neither claimed petitioners 
were ‘enemy combatants’ or otherwise dangerous, nor charged them with a 
crime, nor pointed to other statutory grounds for detention, nor presented 
reliable evidence that the posed a threat to U.S. interests.  The Executive did not 
deny it detained the prisoners.  The district court understood the Executive to 
49  Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘Losing Interest’, National Law Journal (Washington, 25 June 2012) 
<http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202560493349/Losing-interest?slreturn=20140430212937> 
accessed 30 May 2014 
50  Center for Constitutional Rights, ‘Kiyemba v. Obama: Synopsis’ <http://ccr.justice.org/Kiyemba-v-
Obama> accessed 30 May 2014 
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argue instead that it had extra-statutory ‘wind-up’ authority.51 
 
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the majority opinion of the D.C. Circuit 
overturning the trial court’s order to release these petitioners agreed with the executive, 
and also concluded that the trial court possessed no power to order the release of the 
detainees,52 or even to order the executive to bring its prisoners before the court.53 There 
is no way to reconcile these conclusions with the right to habeas corpus and the rule of 
law  If the authority to issue the writ has any meaning, it allows a judge to order the 
executive to produce a prisoner, and if his detention cannot be justified, to order his 
release.  However, in allowing this opinion to stand the Supreme Court has reduced the 
right to habeas trumpeted in Boumediene to a charade.  Following Kiyemba even where 
the petitioners can prove their innocence, the executive can continue to detain them 
indefinitely.  
Despite the fact that this opinion was affirmed by the barest of margins on en banc 
rehearing, which usually provokes the Supreme Court into accepting review, the 
Supreme Court declined certiorari. Instead, it issued a statement that admitted that it 
had no interest in resolving what it apparently considered an abstract question.  This 
question was whether a federal district court had the power to order a petitioner’s 
51  Kiyemba v Obama, No. 08-5424, 2 (D.C. Circuit) (Rogers, J., concurring) 
<http://ccrjustice.org/files/2009-02-18%20Kiyemba%20opinion.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
52  Ibid 
53  Order, Kiyemba v Obama, No. 08-5424 (20 October 2008) 
<http://ccrjustice.org/files/stay%20order.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014 
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immediate release when ‘other remedies’ were purportedly available.54  It might be 
argued that with this statement, the Court blots out its fine phrases about the rule of law 
from its earlier opinions.  This argument can be supported by reference to later opinions, 
which ignore the rhetoric and exploit every possibility for judicial deference to the 
executive.  The majority of these opinions have been authored by the D.C. Circuit. 
The Court has also allowed the D.C. Circuit to eviscerate its Boumediene holding in 
ways that are less dramatic than the decision in Kiyemba. Whenever the executive has 
been able to produce some form of evidence, however slight, that would seem to 
suggest some association between the petitioners and any involvement in hostilities in 
Afghanistan, the D.C. Circuit has insisted that this justifies their indefinite detention in 
Guantánamo Bay, even where the district court, which was the finder of fact on the 
petitions, came to the opposite conclusion.  This has created precedents that require trial 
courts to deny petitions for habeas due to this flimsy evidence. 
The most problematic of the opinions creating these skewed evidentiary standards 
was Latif v. Obama.55  This opinion follows a series of petitions granted by trial courts 
because of the use of highly problematic witness testimony credited by these detainees’ 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, hereinafter referred to as the ‘CSRT’s.  In Ali 
Ahmed v. Obama, the trial court granted a petition for the writ where ‘the credibility 
and reliability of the detainees being relied upon by the government has either been 
directly called into question by government personnel or has been characterized by 
government personnel as undermined,’ or ‘based upon multiple levels of hearsay,’ or 
54  Statement of Breyer, J., joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ., 
<www.lawfareblog/2011/04/supreme-court-denies-cert-in-kiyemba> accessed 30 May 2014 
55  Latif v Obama [2012] 677 F3d 1175 (D.C. Circuit) 
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‘riddled . . . with equivocation and speculation.’56  It also noted that the prosecution 
relied on testimony by a witness about which there was ‘evidence that [he] underwent 
torture’ at Bagram Air Base and the CIA’s ‘Dark Prison’, and that as a result he suffered 
from severe psychological problems, about which the executive apparently knew when 
it relied upon his testimony.57  
After this decision was released, it became apparent that every detainee seeking 
review of their CSRT would be able to make a similar challenge.58  At this point, the 
D.C. Circuit found another way to uphold these rulings, by requiring trial courts to place 
inordinate weight on the only other evidence routinely used by the military tribunals —
confidential intelligence reports.  Latif held that ‘federal district judges must “presume” 
that government intelligence reports used to justify detention are reliable and 
accurate.’59  In essence, this allowed the executive to repackage critically flawed 
witness testimony as intelligence reports, despite the fact that this attenuated the 
aforementioned hearsay problems even further. 
The D.C. Circuit appears to have placed its faith in these intelligence reports owing 
to the fact that they might be considered the product of careful and systematic 
56  Ali Ahmed v Obama [2009] 657 FSupp2d 51, 57 (District of the District of Columbia); see also 
Andy Worthington, ‘Judge Condemns “Mosaic” Of Guantánamo Intelligence, And Unreliable 
Witnesses’,14 May 2009, <http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/05/14/judge-condemns-mosaic-of-
guantanamo-intelligence-and-unreliable-witnesses/> accessed 30 May 2014 
57  Ibid 58 
58  See Jasmeet K. Ahuja and Andrew Tutt, ‘Evidentiary Rules Governing Guantánamo Habeas 
Petitions: Their Effects and Consequences’, (2012) 31 Yale and Policy Review 185, 198-199 
59  Chemerinsky, supra n 49 
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procedures employed by intelligence professionals.  Since these reports and the policy 
manuals and memoranda that guided their creation were classified, it was unlikely that 
anyone outside of the intelligence community would ever be in a position to say 
otherwise.  However, a fortuitous leak of this information by WikiLeaks, which is now 
allegedly the subject of a Grand Jury investigation due to this activity,60 exposed the 
shoddiness of this intelligence. It also revealed why the D.C. Circuit’s instruction that 
these reports were entitled to ‘a presumption of regularity’ reduced the habeas process 
mandated by Boumediene to a travesty of justice. 
As the New York Times reported after reviewing these leaked files, ‘the documents 
reveal that the analysts sometimes ignored serious flaws in the evidence’, including 
‘that the information came from other detainees whose mental illness made them 
unreliable’.  ‘Some assessments quote witnesses . . . but omit the witnesses’ record of 
falsification or misidentification’, and fail to note that these statements ‘were later 
withdrawn, often attributed to abusive treatment or torture’.61  Evidence obtained under 
torture, which was previously used to justify further wars of aggression, was now being 
60  Birgitta Jónsdóttir, ‘Evidence of a US Judicial Vendetta Against WikiLeaks Activists Mounts’, The 
Guardian (Manchester, 3 July 2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jul/03/evidence-
us-jdicial-vendetta-wikileaks -activists-mounts> accessed 30 May 2014 
61  Scott Shane and Benjamin Weiser, ‘Judging Detainees Risk, Often With Flawed Evidence’, New 
York Times, (New York 24 April 2011), available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo-files-flawed-evidence-for-assessing-
risk.html?pagewanted=all> accessed 30 May 2014 
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used to justify the detention of those who were tortured to produce it,62 in order to keep 
the details of this ‘intelligence production’ secret, as the next section will detail. 
The leak also revealed that the guidelines given to the intelligence professionals 
preparing the reports were highly flawed, leading ‘analysts [to] seize[] upon the tiniest 
details as a possible litmus test for risk.’63  For example, the JTF-GTMO Matrix of 
Threat Indicators For Enemy Combatants lists the following as one of the criteria by 
which one might conclude that a detainee is a high risk: he ‘[o]perated or [was] captured 
in an area dominated by al-Qaeda or Taliban forces . . . including but not limited to . . . 
Kabul . . . Kandahar . . . Konduz . . . Mazar-e-Sharif.’64 This memorandum fails to note 
that these are four out of the five largest cities in Afghanistan. 
In essence, these guidelines appear to provide a basis for considering almost anyone 
to be an enemy combatant.  Applying them, one intelligence report ‘suggests a dire use 
for his pocket calculator, namely “[c]alculators can be used for indirect fire calculations 
such as those required for artillery fire.’”65  It should be noted that the analyst fails to 
62  Memorandum of Human Rights Watch Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, (30 April 2008), 2 (‘military commissions set up to try terrorism 
suspects at Guantanamo explicitly authorize the use of evidence obtained in cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading interrogations’) 
63  Ibid 
64  JTF-GTMO Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants 
<www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/04/24/world/guantanamo-guide-to-assessing-prisoners.html> 
accessed 30 May 2014 
65  Shane and Weiser supra n 61 
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note any instances in which al-Qaeda or the Taliban have employed artillery fire after 
the 2001 invasion.  
While this is merely one example of this sort of paranoid reasoning to which a 
‘presumption of regularity’ a deference is now owed following Latif, it appears that on 
the basis of the JTF-GTMO Matrix, more than fifty detainees have been assessed as 
some degree of threat on the basis of, in addition to other bizarre criteria, the possession 
of a Casio F91W-1 or A-159W wristwatches.  ‘JTF-GTMO identified the watch as ‘the 
sign of al-Qaida,’66 as it was allegedly used by al-Qaeda bomb-makers to make timers.  
The report fails to note that this model of watch has been a ‘“huge seller” all over the 
world’ for over twenty years.67  Detainee Usama Hassan Ahmend Abu Kabir told his 
Tribunal that ‘I have a Casio watch due to the fact that they are inexpensive and last a 
long time.  I like my watch because it is durable.  It . . . was waterproof’.68 
In addition to attributing very peculiar significance to various quotidian items, the 
Threat Matrix displays further paranoia, by suggesting that innocent explanations were 
actually a potential sign of sophisticated counter-intelligence training. ‘A prisoner 
caught without travel documents?  It might mean he had been trained to discard them 
to make identification harder, the guide explains.  A detainee who claimed to be a 
simple farmer or a cook?  . . . . Those were common Taliban and Qaeda cover stories, 
66  Threat Matrix supra n 64, 4 n9 
67  Denise Winterman, ‘Casio F-91W: The Strangely Ubiquitous Watch’, BBC News Magazine 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-13194733> accessed 30 May 2014 
68  Associated Press, ‘Common Casio Watch Becomes Evidence at Guantanamo’, Associated Press (9 
March 2006) <http://www.sddt.com/Search/article.cfm?SourceCode=200603091aq#.UQQqZIbLHIU> 
accessed 31 May 2014 
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the analysts were told.’69  The ‘Threat Matrix’ forecloses every innocent explanation if 
detainees refused to cooperate or to explain themselves, this was also evidence of their 
guilt, as this is noted to be an al-Qaeda resistance technique.70  The Threat Matrix is 
fatally flawed, yet the intelligence reports created following its instructions were held 
to be so trustworthy that district courts must rely upon them. 
2.3 The Supreme Court Fails to React to Denial of Habeas Corpus 
In his dissent from the decision in Latif, Judge David S. Tatel noted that ‘it is hard 
to see what is left of the Supreme Court’s command in Boumediene’.71  However, the 
Obama Administration directed the Solicitor-General to submit a brief opposing the 
petition for certiorari, and the Supreme Court duly declined review.  As Hanna Madbak 
noted:  
[T]he question the Supreme Court has refused to answer is whether a detainee 
truly has a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to challenge his detention if he cannot 
unseal evidence against him, or if a mathematical evaluation of the evidence 
allegedly lowers the government’s burden of proof against him even below the 
low preponderance of the evidence standard.72 
 
The decision to give the D.C. Circuit free reign to ignore Boumediene casts doubts 
on the commitment of the Supreme Court to maintaining the rule of law.  In declining 
review of Kiyemba and Latif, the Court has been content to allow the limited remedy 
69  Shane and Weiser supra n 61 
70  Ibid 
71  Latif v Obama [2012] 677 F3d 1175, 1215 (D.C. Circuit) (Tatel J dissenting) 
72  Hanna F. Madbak, ‘U.S. Supreme Court Denies Guantánamo Detainee Cert. Petitions Concerning 
Habeas Review’, New York State Bar Association Blog 
<nysbar.com/blogs/ExecutiveDetention/2011/05/> accessed 31 May 2014 
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afforded by Boumediene to become doubly pointless.  First, one cannot meaningfully 
challenge indefinite detention. Second, even if one could, the trial court cannot grant a 
petitioner’s request for release.  Once again, Guantánamo Bay can be described as a 
black hole, from which not even an innocent detainee can escape.   
Erwin Chemerinsky, who argued the first petition for habeas corpus of the detainees 
held in military custody, noted that at that time he:  
[C]ould not have possibly imagined that more than ten years later . . . the 
government would still be holding these individuals as prisoners. When the 
Supreme Court finally ruled in Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene v. Bush that 
Guantánamo detainees had a right to seek habeas corpus relief in federal courts, 
I never could have imagined that this would be a pyrrhic victory and the Court 
would allow the D.C. Circuit to nullify the availability of habeas corpus.73 
 
Chemerinsky should not be accused of naïveté, as the amount of cynicism 
appropriate to the Court’s jurisprudence can only be discerned in retrospect.  It is by 
now apparent, however, that the timid and halting approach to the problem, and its 
abandonment of the issue once it faded from public view, can be most easily explained 
as the result of an attempt not to do substantial justice, but rather to convince the public 
that justice was being done and that the rule of law was being upheld.  The slow 
timetable itself operated as a pressure valve, periodically dissipating liberal concern for 
the erosion of the separation of powers. The Court’s stirring rhetoric concealed 
fundamental concessions to executive power, but it nevertheless convinced many that 
it was protecting non-derogable rights against executive overreaching.  It is now clear 
that this was largely a spectacle for the benefit of the legal profession and others 
concerned with human rights and the rule of law.  
  The Court, while preserving the appearance of habeas corpus to save its own 
blushes, has implicitly affirmed the executive’s right to indefinitely detain suspects in 
73  Chemerinsky supra n 49 
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military custody even without the approval of Congress in certain situations, and has 
also affirmed the existence of other un-enumerated presidential ‘war powers.’  Some 
might argue that this does not deserve serious concern, relying on the assumption that 
the Obama Administration is winding down the military detention regime at 
Guantánamo.  This supposition initially appears to be correct, given the fact that no one 
has been transferred to that facility since 2008 despite leaving this possibility open.74  
However, this ignores the fact that the executive has built a replacement, and there may 
be many other places where detainees are held in secret.  This included CIA-run 
detention facilities known as the ‘black sites’, which were first acknowledged only five 
years after the 9/11 attacks.75  The next section will demonstrate that detainees are still 
being tortured in these facilities. 
2.4 The D.C. Circuit Preserves a Judicial Black Hole  
This section discusses the replacement for the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, 
which is located in Afghanistan.  It is located within the Parwan Detention Facility, 
hereinafter referred to as ‘Parwan’, which is found next to Bagram Airfield.  This larger 
facility is also known as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility.  It holds nearly three 
74  Julian E. Barnes, ‘Will U.S. Send more Detainees to Guantanamo?’ Wall Street Journal, New York, 
(13 July 2011) <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/07/13/will-u-s-send-more-detainees-to-
guantanamo/> accessed 31 May 2014 
75  BBC News, ‘Bush Admits to CIA Secret Prisons’, (7 September 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm> accessed 31 May 2014 
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times as many detainees as Guantánamo did at its peak.76  Some of these detainees are 
not Afghan citizens, or even foreign fighters captured in Afghanistan.  They are 
prisoners who were transferred there, rather than to Guantánamo, after the courts 
allowed petitioners held at the Cuban base to have access to counsel and the right to file 
petitions for habeas corpus.77   
Insofar as some foreigners held at Parwan alleged that their transfer to that facility 
was an attempt to evade the judiciary scrutiny, and as they alleged they were held there 
for over six years, it was not surprising that trial courts would be receptive to their 
claims.  In Al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 78 a trial court addressed the claims of non-Afghan 
detainees at Parwan apprehended in Dubai and Thailand, among other places.  As in 
Boumediene, the trial court found that attempts to strip the judiciary of its jurisdiction 
to receive these petitions were unconstitutional,79 and that ‘detainees who are not 
Afghan citizens, who were not captured in Afghanistan and who have been held for an 
unreasonable amount of time...without adequate process’ were entitled to the writ.80 
76  Spencer Ackerman, ‘U.S. may indefinitely detain secret prisoners held in Afganistan’, The 
Guardian, Manchester, (30 May 2014) < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/30/afghanistan-
troops-withdrawal-bagram-detainees> accessed 30 November 2014 
77  Adam Goldman and Kathy Gannon, ‘Death Shed Light on CIA ‘Salt Pit’ Near Kabul’ Associated 
Press (28 March 2010) < http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36071994/ns/us_news-security/#> 
78  Al-Maqaleh v Gates [2009] 604 FSupp 205 (District of the District of Columbia) 
79  Ibid 230 
80  Ibid 235 
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Unfortunately for the petitions—and for the rule of law in the United States—the 
D.C. Circuit again disagreed.81  It ruled that the executive did not have as much control 
over Parwan as it did over Guantánamo, such that it could distinguish the holding of 
Boumediene, which was that federal courts possessed that jurisdiction.82  The court 
alluded to ‘differences’ between these facilities,83 such as the fact that the United States 
needed to cooperate with the government of Afghanistan to run the facility, to justify 
this conclusion.  This is very poor legal reasoning.   It also ignores the reality of the 
relationship between America and its client state, which is run by a regime that exists 
at America’s pleasure.  The D.C. Circuit also failed to note that the government of 
Afghanistan opposes the detention of foreigners at Parwan, of which there are at least 
fifty,84 although the executive refuses to confirm a figure or release details of where 
and how they were captured, but this is irrelevant in practice, because the tools of the 
American executive are in no way answerable to Hamid Karzai.  As Stephen Vladeck 
noted when describing how the D.C. Circuit misconstrued Boumediene: 
Even if [the court’s] logic follows (and I don’t think it does), it’s beside the point 
. . . . To the extent that the United States is simply not “answerable” to the 
government of Afghanistan for the detentions of non-Afghans at Bagram (and 
the related extent to which the government of Afghanistan has no incentive to 
81  Al-Maqaleh v Gates [2010] 605 F3d 84 (D.C. Circuit) 
82  Ibid 95 
83  Ibid 95-99 
84  Graham Bowley, ‘United States Puts Transfer of Detainees to Afghans on Hold’, New York Times 
(New York, 9 September 2012), <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/world/asia/us-puts-afghan-
transfers-at-parwan-prison-on-hold.html?_r=0> accessed 31 May 2014 
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play such a role for non-Afghans captured outside of Afghanistan), the second 
Boumediene factor should militate in favor of habeas, not against it.85 
 
Not only is the detention regime at Parwan contrary to Afghan law,86 but the United 
States also resisted Afghan demands to transfer the facility to its authority.87  The 
nominal Afghan commander of the facility had no control over who enters or leaves, 
and he was not allowed to attend any meetings outside of the presence of his 
‘advisors’.88  This appears to demonstrate both that the executive is not answerable to 
the nation’s ‘ally’, and that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling distorted not only the law, but the 
facts.  The argument that the Afghan government has any control over these prisoners’ 
confinement is not supported by any evidence.  
The dismissal of the petitions for habeas corpus that were pending at the time of the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Al-Maqaleh represents ‘the end of the line for the possibility 
85  Stephen Vladeck, ‘Al-Maqaleh II: Formalizing Boumediene’s Functional Approach to Habeas 
Jurisdiction’, Lawfare Blog, October 2012 <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/10/more-on-maqaleh-
ii/> accessed 31 May 2014 
86  Quil Lawrence, ‘Afghans Worry Bagram Could Turn Into Guantanamo’, Morning Edition 
(Washington, National Public Radio 4 June 2012) 
<http://www.npr.org/2012/06/04/154268385/afghans-worry-bagram-could-turn-into-guantanamo> 
accessed 31 May 2014 
87  Bowley supra n 84 
88  Rod Nordland, ‘Detainees Are Handed Over to Afghans, but Not Out of Americans’ Reach’, New 
York Times, (New York, 30 May 2012)  <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/asia/in-
afghanistan-as-bagram-detainees-are-transferred-united-states-keeps-its-grip.html?pagewanted=all> 
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of habeas jurisdiction’ over black sites.89  Accordingly, the executive can now abduct 
someone at any point on the globe, transfer them to the Black Jail in Parwan, and they 
can then be subjected to indefinite arbitrary detention, upon nomination by the 
executive. The detainees have no access to any court, something which the D.C. Circuit 
approved.  However, the creation of another judicial black hole is only the beginning 
of what it will tolerate.  These detainees can also be subjected to torture, as the D.C. 
Circuit will not adjudicate claims that follow the executive’s revival of this practice in 
Afghanistan.  As was the case with prolonged arbitrary detention, torture was 
formalized and legalized, not least because of the willingness of the D.C. Circuit to 
ignore violations of non-derogable rights, another demonstration that the United States 
is no longer in minimal compliance with the requirements of a rule of law state. 
3  TORTURE 
Lawsuits alleging torture in military custody followed on the heels of the actions 
challenged prolonged arbitrary detention.  This was a predictable sequence, as 
information about torture at Guantánamo Bay was not made public until revealed in 
the petitions for habeas corpus.  Even as the executive made a public spectacle of the 
fact of the detention, it kept horrific details of this detention regime top secret.90  
89  Benjamin Wittes, ‘Comments on Maqaleh and Hamidullah’, Lawfare Blog (19 October 2012) 
<http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/10/comments-on-maqaleh-and-hamidullah/> accessed 31 May 
2014 
90  Patrick O’Neill, ‘U.S. Press Blackout at Guantánamo Pierced, Brutal Treatment Exposed’, The 
Militant, (Washington, 1 April 2002) < http://www.themilitant.com/2002/6613/661302.html> accessed 
30 November 2014 
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However, after their release, many Guantánamo detainees brought suits alleging their 
jailers tortured them.  These suits also named the senior officials who developed and 
authorized these procedures, who also hoped to obtain false confessions implicating 
Iraq in terrorist plots.  These lawsuits have all been dismissed, although many obtained 
initial success in trial courts.  However, as the appeals of these cases were not followed 
closely in the media, the judiciary was free to elaborate new doctrines mandating 
deference to the executive.  These doctrines allowed these courts, in particular, the D.C. 
Circuit, to avoid decisions on the merits in lawsuits alleging torture.  It then did so, 
even when there was no doubt of the relevant facts. 
 The first set of these cases will demonstrate that the appeals courts were willing to 
extend ‘qualified immunity’ to those involved in gross abuses of non-derogable rights, 
as long as these officials purportedly lacked a subjective belief that they were breaking 
the law.  This implicitly affirmed the OLC memoranda authorizing this conduct, since 
the courts were willing to accept that a rational lawyer could have created such poor 
legal arguments in good faith, and accepted that this was enough to immunize them. 
Discussing the torture cases, Stephen Vladeck argued that they demonstrate the 
‘existence of a new national security canon — a body of jurisprudence in which distinct 
(and sometimes poorly articulated) national security concerns have prompted courts to 
disfavour relief, even when . . .  relief should otherwise have been available  . . . . the 
heads-we-win, tails-you-lose quality to this body of decision-making, it is difficult to 
rebut the conclusion that, at least at the circuit level, more is going on than just faithful 
application of existing precedent’.91  One of the clearest examples of the appellate 
91  Stephen Vladeck, ‘The New National Security Canon’, (2012) 61 American University Law 
Review 1295, 1329 
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courts’ decision to create new doctrine to protect the executive from responsibility for 
torture is found in the opinion that disposed of the lawsuit brought by José Padilla 
against John Yoo.  This case did not allow the judiciary to use the standard doctrinal 
arsenal of judicial evasion, since Padilla was a United States citizen, located in the 
United States, and suing in his own name for conduct that occurred within that nation.  
However, the Ninth Circuit was more than willing to both misstate the facts and to bend 
the law in support of a conclusion that absolved Yoo of any wrongdoing. 
First, it should be noted that its opinion quibbled with the conclusion of the trial 
court, whose factual determinations are ordinarily accorded great deference on appeal, 
namely, that Padilla was tortured.  The Ninth Circuit said that Padilla’s allegations that 
his guards subjected him to severe mental and physical harm were ‘conclusory’, but 
they did not remand for further fact-finding, since  it also determined that even if his 
mistreatment amounted to torture, the fact ‘that such treatment was torture was not 
clearly established in 2001-2003’.92   Second, the court concluded that Yoo’s assertion 
that Padilla was not entitled to the Constitution’s protections because the executive’s 
decision to authorize his military detention and torture was not ‘beyond debate’.  
Accordingly, the court accepted Yoo’s argument that, owing to a doctrine known as 
‘qualified immunity’, he was liable for what it characterized a simple misreading of the 
law in the performance of his duties.  This ignores the fact that Yoo was not merely 
mistaken, or even negligent. As detailed in chapter three above, the OPR concluded that 
Yoo repeatedly ignored directly applicable law that made it clear he was authorizing 
illegal acts.  It also bears mentioning that the Ninth Circuit was implicitly sitting in 
judgment not merely on Yoo, but his unindicted conspirator Jay Bybee.  Bybee was the 
92  Padilla v Yoo [2009] 670 F3d 540, 548 (9th Circuit) 
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signatory of Yoo’s OLC memoranda, who was likewise investigated by the OPR.   
Between the time that Yoo wrote the memorandum for Bybee and the filing of Padilla’s 
lawsuit, Bybee was appointed to be the life-long colleague of the judges who decided 
on the merits of the claims being made against Yoo, and implicitly, Bybee.   
The only way to reach this particular result was for the court to secretly put a thumb 
on the scales of justice, but other appellate courts openly advocated this approach. In a 
related appeal before Fourth Circuit, which addressed the conduct that occurred within 
its jurisdiction, the court opined that when assessing arguments such as those made by 
Padilla against Yoo, the courts should hesitate in construing  facts against the 
government, since ‘the Constitution delegates authority over military affairs to 
Congress and to the President as Commander in Chief.  It contemplates no comparable 
role for the judiciary’.93   
This statement renounces the responsibility of the judiciary to adjudicate 
constitutional claims against the executive, combined with acquiescence to the 
executive’s erroneous theory of the scope of its powers to command the military. It 
makes the judicial oversight that the rule of law requires impossible.  As one academic 
commentator noted, ‘[i]f this [invocation of the interests of national security by the 
executive] is a “special factor” counseling hesitation against inferring a . . . remedy, 
one is hard-pressed to imagine any challenge to the conduct of national security policy, 
whether here or overseas, that could survive such a test’.94 
The suits brought by Guantánamo detainees alleging torture and other abuses were 
procedurally more complex than Padilla’s, since they involved non-citizens and took 
93  Ibid 548 
94  Vladeck supra n 91, 1317 
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place outside of the United States.  This did not bode well for their success.  However, 
the Supreme Court decided in Boumediene that despite these jurisdictional 
complications, petitions for habeas corpus could be brought to the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia.   
Accordingly, it seemed likely that trial courts in the District of Columbia would 
conclude that they had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ tort claims.  Unfortunately, 
while this prediction proved correct, it failed to account for the willingness of the D.C. 
Circuit to distort the holdings of the Supreme Court and to create new doctrines of 
executive deference to shut this down, something which the Supreme Court failed to 
rebuke, even as the D.C. Circuit dismantled its earlier jurisprudence, in the same 
manner as in the appeals of the habeas petitions described in the last section. 
Apart from jurisdiction, the most significant procedural hurdle for the detainees 
bringing these claims was the sovereign immunity of the federal government, since 
under American law, the government may only be sued when it has expressly permitted 
plaintiffs to bring against it claims of that nature.  Accordingly, Shafiq Rasul and three 
other British detainees who brought claims alleging ‘specific methods and acts of 
physical and psychological torture’ would find that the clearest path to relief was 
afforded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, hereinafter referred to as 
‘RFRA’.95  This is because that statute authorizes suits against the federal government.  
The trial court concluded that the government should be held responsible since 
95  Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993, Public Law 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (16 November 1993) 
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‘[f]lushing the Koran down the toilet and forcing Muslims to shave their beards falls 
comfortably within the conduct prohibited from government action’ by RFRA.96   
This much seemed clear, and it would be difficult to argue that even the most 
intellectually challenged executive branch officials would have recognized that this was 
prohibited conduct, which would appear to foreclose a qualified immunity defence.  
However, the D.C. Circuit held that the officials at Guantánamo, despite being aware 
that this conduct would violate the law if committed in the United States, may have had 
a reasonable belief that they could not be punished for breaking the law outside of the 
nation’s borders.97  Namely, it held they could have reasonably believed that the OLC 
was correct and that the detention camps were located within a ‘judicial black hole’.  
Thus, even though the Supreme Court concluded that this was not the case during the 
applicable period, Guantánamo was retroactively deemed a zone of immunity because 
of executive officials’ purportedly sincere belief that it was outside the law. 
One year later, the D.C. Circuit proved ready to attack the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Boumediene more directly.  The vehicle for the development of new doctrine that 
favoured the executive was the case of Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez,98 a case brought by 
the representatives of the estates of two detainees who died at Guantánamo Bay on June 
10, 2006, in suspicious circumstances.  These representatives alleged that although the 
executive labelled these deaths suicides, their relatives were killed during interrogations 
96  Rasul v Myers, No. 06-5209 (24 April 2009) (D.C. Circuit) 
<http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/1C572595EB3EF7248525780000761C90/$file/06
-5209-1177375.pdf> accessed 31 May 2014 
97  Ibid 
98  Al-Zahrani v Rodriguez [2012] 669 F3d 315 (D.C. Circuit) 
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at a secret facility known as Camp Seven, the existence of which the executive formally 
denies.  An investigation by reporters ‘raises serious questions . . . and suggests the U.S. 
government is covering up details of what precisely happened . . . before the deaths’.99  
An academic report refuted the official narrative, concluding that ‘there is no 
explanation for how three bodies could have hung in cells for at least two hours while 
the cells were under constant supervision, both by video cameras and guards continually 
walking the corridors guarding only 28 detainees’.100 
The representatives’ allegations were further supported by testimony from four 
American soldiers, and by the fact that marks were found on the victims’ bodies that 
are consistent with torture. In addition, a Swiss pathologist noted that one of the 
victim’s neck injuries were ‘not those he would normally associate with hanging’.101  
Despite the seriousness of these claims and the presence of ample evidentiary support, 
the lawsuit was dismissed, and the D.C. Circuit used the appellate proceedings as an 
opportunity to make sure that no tort claims brought by former detainees, even if they 
99  Pete Yost, ‘Questions Raised Over Deaths of 3 Guantanamo Detainees Raised by Magazine 
Article’, Canadian Press (Toronto 2010) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20100121041245/http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/arti
cle/ALeqM5h97BGvSdx97hHzNDkUiDzI8JsB7A> accessed 31 May 2014 
100 Mark Denbeaux et al., ‘Death in Camp Delta’, Seton Hall University School of Law Center for 
Policy and Research, p. ii, 
<http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch/upload/gtmo_death_camp_delt
a.pdf> accessed 31 May 2014 
101 Scott Horton, ‘The Guantánamo “Suicides”: A Camp Delta Sergeant Blows the Whistle’, Harper’s 
Magazine, (New York, March 2010) <http://harpers.org/archive/2010/03/the-guantanamo-
suicides/?single=1> accessed 31 May 2014 
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involved shocking allegations of torture or unlawful killing, could ever be heard in any 
American court. 
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the detainees could 
be removed by statute from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  It held that Section 7 
of the Military Commissions Act could not prevent the detainees from filing lawsuits.  
In Al-Zahrani, the D.C. Circuit held that the holding of Boumediene applied only to 
petitions for habeas corpus, despite the fact that the Supreme Court struck down the 
entire section that had purportedly stripped the courts of jurisdiction, and despite the 
fact that this case held that ‘the United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and 
control over the base, maintains de facto sovereignty’.102  There is no logic to the 
argument that the detainees should possess the constitutional right to habeas corpus but 
no other rights, except an argument premised upon belief that detainees should be 
deprived them of as many rights as possible, and that the ends justify the means when 
doing so. 
In misconstruing Boumediene and other precedents from the Supreme Court, which 
did not appear to foreclose damages claims owing to the executive’s violation of 
constitutional rights where there was no alternate remedy or forum available,103 the 
D.C. Circuit set up in its place a rule of remarkable breadth. The new rule is that a 
detainee cannot bring to an American court any action premised on ‘foreign’ conduct, 
other than a request for a writ, a meaningless remedy after the D.C. Circuit’s earlier 
rulings. Citing its opinion in Kiyemba, which held that innocent prisoners who were 
granted the writ possessed no right to be actually released, the court noted ‘not every 
102 Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 771, 755 (United States Supreme Court)  
103 Minneci v Pollard [2012] 132 SCt 617 (United States Supreme Court) 
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right yields a remedy, even when the right is constitutional’.104  Here, the right at issue 
was perhaps the most fundamental of all, the right to life.  There could be no clearer 
example of the courts abdicating their responsibilities.  The doctrine which this opinion 
announced is incompatible with the rule of law.   
Owing to the holding in Al-Zahrani, it is now simply impossible to bring a claim 
against the executive if the torture occurred outside of the United States, even if it was 
in an area exclusively controlled by the agents of the executive, i.e., Guantánamo, 
Afghanistan, ships on the high seas, or merely in some foreign country that allows its 
prisons to be used as ‘black sites’, and which permits the executive’s agents to operate 
freely.  For instance, this holding foreclosed actions brought by those abducted and 
subjected to ‘extraordinary’ rendition, such as Khaled el-Masri,105 a German national 
taken, beaten, and sodomised106 by the CIA in Macedonia, and tortured in Afghanistan, 
merely because his name was similar to that of terrorism suspect.  He would only obtain 
relief at the European Court of Human Rights for the relatively minor conduct of the 
Macedonian authorities who allowed the CIA to kidnap him,107 while the executive 
branch’s conduct cannot be punished in any court.  On the same basis, the D.C. Circuit 
has also dispensed with the claims of detainees held by the American military in Iraq 
104 Rasul supra n 96 
105 El-Masri v United States [2007] 479 F3d 296 (D.C. Circuit) 
106 El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2012] No. 39630/09 (European Court of 
Human Rights) 13 December 2012, 63 
107 Ibid 
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and Afghanistan, ‘which are generally even more appalling than those that allegedly 
occurred at Guantanamo.’108 
The judiciary’s unwillingness to put an end to the regime of prolonged involuntary 
detention, and the torture which inevitably accompanies it, ignores the breakdown of 
the rule of law that it represents.  Executive dominance above the laws has not only 
been tolerated, it was subsequently ratified in court opinions.  While the executive 
sought to keep its internal legal advice secret, perhaps for fear or being rebuked by the 
courts, these opinions proved that these anxieties were groundless.   
Consequently, a legal regime that sanctions the violation of non-derogable rights has 
been formalized by the courts.  This has various effects, which will be introduced here 
and discussed in detail below.  First, it ties the hands of judges in trial courts, many of 
whom now openly express dismay that they have been rendered powerless to offer relief 
to those who are suffering, or who have suffered, grievous harms.  Second, it provides 
a green light for the executive to continue subjecting those it nominates to violations of 
their non-derogable rights. 
 
3.1 The Response to the Appellate Courts’ Green Light to Torture 
This section will demonstrate that the violations on non-derogable rights described 
above have continued unabated after the transition to the Obama Administration.  It 
will show that the same jus cogens norms are being violated, and that this is being done 
for the same reasons, which serve to further undermine the rule of law.  Consideration 
108 Elizabeth Wilson, ‘“Damages or Nothing”: The Post-Boumediene Constitution and Compensation 
for Human Rights Violations After 9/11’, (2001) 41 Seton Hall Law Review 1491, 1512-13 
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of the executive’s on-going attempts to hold prisoners who have been proven innocent 
sheds some light on why it is committed to perpetuating this regime of prolonged 
arbitrary detention and torture. 
Certain difficult questions must first be raised. Namely, why has the Obama 
Administration fought so hard to keep detainees at Guantánamo Bay when the President 
campaigned on a promise to close it? Why does the executive continue to detain 
prisoners at Camp Platinum, where according to the Chief Military Defense Counsel of 
the Office of Military Commissions, prisoners are still held in conditions that do not 
comply with the minimum standards of Article Three of the Geneva Conventions,109 
and where they can be tortured with impunity following Al-Zahrani?  Finally, why has 
the Obama Administration argued in 2012 that these detainees should no longer have 
access to lawyers?110  Why has it constructed the Parwan Detainment Facility?  Even 
without answers, these questions themselves make it evident that the executive is trying 
to return the detention system to one that no light can ever penetrate so that it can 
continue to torture detainees.  
The Bush Administration’s impetus for the creation of this system was the extraction 
of false confessions. It is impossible to discern any other reason why the Obama 
109 Charlie Savage, ‘Guantánamo Conditions Slip, Military Lawyers Say’, New York Times (New 
York, 24 February 2012)  See also Peter Masciola, ‘Memorandum of Col. Peter Masciola, Bullets in 
Furtherance of Meeting of 4 February 2009’, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/App11.pdf> accessed 
31 May 2014 
110 Respondent’s Motion To Refer The Counsel-Access Issue For Decision By A Single District Judge 
And To Hold In Abeyance Former Petitioners Esmail’s And Uthman’s Motions For Order Concerning 
The Protective Order, Abdah v Obama [2012] No. 04-Civ-1254 (District of the District of Columbia) 
<http://images.politico.com/global/2012/07/gitmocounselmotn.pdf> accessed 31 May 2014 
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Administration has sought to return its detention and interrogation regime to the level 
of secrecy that the 2001-2003 OLC memoranda contemplated.  That said, there are also 
indications that detainees are still being held and tortured at Guantánamo and various 
black sites, most notably at Parwan and other facilities operated by the Joint Special 
Operations Command in Afghanistan.  This should be considered when discussing the 
executive’s attempts to eliminate these detainees access to lawyers and the immunizing 
of torturers.  At Parwan, detainees are held without any access to lawyers, since the 
D.C. Circuit affirmed that they have no right to petition for habeas corpus, and they 
can be tortured and even killed with impunity, since it also affirmed that they do not 
have rights that can be enforced in American courts. 
There is substantial evidence that the executive is subjecting detainees at Parwan to 
conditions and interrogation methods that rise to the level of torture.  For example, there 
are multiple reports confirming the torture of detainees at the so-called ‘Black Jail’, the 
facility at Parwan operated by the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense 
Counterintelligence Field Activity. It is also staffed with personnel from the highly 
secretive Joint Special Operations Command.111  The Open Society Institute has 
documented its conditions, and noted that they do not comply with the basic guarantees 
of the Third Geneva Convention.  Its report also noted that representatives from the 
111 Marc Ambinder, ‘Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram’, The Atlantic, (Washington,14  
May 2010) <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/10/05/inside-the-secret-interrogation-facility-
at-bagram/56678/#> accessed 31 May 2014  
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International Committee of the Red Cross have been barred from the facility and others 
that have been designated as Special Operations camps.112   
Congress obtained a significant amount of positive publicity in 2005, when it 
restricted the military to the techniques of interrogation outlined in the Army Field 
Manual.   This legislation was ‘sold to the public as a return to civilized norms’,113 but 
few noted that this action left the executive free to rewrite the manual, something which 
it did shortly afterwards.114  When President Obama, in a much-heralded executive 
order115 restricted the CIA to the techniques outlined in the rewritten manual, few noted 
that Amnesty International concluded that it now contained an appendix that allowed 
techniques that ‘do not comply with the international law regulations prohibiting 
torture’.116  Furthermore, the manual continues to rely on a categorization of certain 
112 Open Society Foundations Regional Policy Initiative on Afghanistan and Pakistan, ‘Confinement 
Conditions at a U.S. Screening Facility on Bagram Air Base’, (14 October 2010) 
<http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/confinement-conditions-20101014.pdf> 
113 Jeffrey S. Kaye, ‘How the U.S. Army’s Field Manual Codified Torture – and Still Does’, AlterNet, 
(6 January 2009) 
<http://www.alternet.org/story/117807/how_the_u.s._army%27s_field_manual_codified_torture_--
_and_still_does> accessed 31 May 2014 
114 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ‘Human Intelligence Collector Operations (FM 2-22.3 
(amending FM 34-52))’ September 2006 <https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf> 
accessed 31 May 2014 
115 Executive Order 13491, ‘Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’, (22 January 2009), available online at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations 
116 Amnesty International, ‘The Army Field Manual: Sanctioning Cruelty?’  (19 March 2009), 
<http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/comments/20575/> accessed 31 May 2014 
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prisoners as ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ whom the executive deems unilaterally not 
to be entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention, a procedure which 
itself does not comply with the Geneva Conventions. 
It should also be noted that Executive Order 13491, which purportedly prevented the 
CIA from torturing detainees, also contained an opt-out procedure wherein a ‘Special 
Task Force’ could propose ‘additional or different guidance [than the Army Field 
Manual] for other agencies’,117 such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose 
procedures would remain classified and would not receive much attention, despite the 
fact that it is the agency conducting interrogations at the Black Jail at Parwan Detention 
Facility and other Special Operations camps.  ‘Although the CIA’s interrogation 
program was investigated . . . the Defense Department’s parallel activities have been 
given little scrutiny’.118  Naturally, when this ‘different guidance’ was adopted, it was 
classified above ‘Top Secret’.  Accordingly, it is unclear what methods the Defense 
Department has approved for DIA interrogations,119 although one can infer from the 
fact that certain techniques amounting to torture have been declassified, these methods 
must be considerably less acceptable, although it is impossible to determine at this time 
whether particular techniques such as waterboarding have been re-authorized. 
The executive has reaffirmed a detention regime involving black sites, secrecy, and 
torture even at a time when interrogators and intelligence officials continue to reiterate 
117 Executive Order 13491, ‘Ensuring Lawful Interrogations’, section 5(e), (22 January 2009) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Ensuring_Lawful_Interrogations> accessed 31 May 
2014 
118 Ambinder supra n 111 
119 Ambinder supra n 111 
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that this paradigm does not produce useful intelligence,120 something which was clearly 
evident not long after the 9/11 attacks. There is no explanation proffered for this, 
although it clearly suggests that this Administration has done so for the same reasons 
as its predecessor, namely to produce false confessions.  It should also be noted that 
during the Obama Administration, Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis 
Blair continued to credit ‘enhanced interrogation’ with obtaining ‘high value 
information’ from detainees.121 He made this case after it was already clear that this 
‘information’ was only considered ‘high value’ at the time because it was helping the 
executive make the case for a war of aggression against Iraq.    
It is as yet unclear why the executive would want to have a system in place that is 
perfectly designed to produce falsehoods that suit its interrogators, but given the 
executive’s support for operations amounting to war against Syria, the utility of this 
regime may yet become apparent.  This presents another fundamental challenge to the 
rule of law, as the political climate that such a crisis would catalyse would both 
retroactively justify the gross violation of non-derogable rights described in this section 
and further attempts by the executive to solidify its supremacy over the law.  The only 
type of violation of non-derogable rights that can be considered more serious than what 
has been described above is the executive’s premeditated extra-judicial execution of a 
citizen, on the grounds that it has the power to do this on its own initiative.  The next 
120 Human Rights Watch, ‘Letter from Interrogators and Intelligence Officials’, (16 November 2010) 
<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/torture-and-accountability/appendix-m-
of-the-army-field-manual/letter-from-interrogators-and-intelligence-officials/> accessed 31 May 2014 
121 Scott Shane, ‘Interrogations’ Effectiveness May Prove Elusive’, New York Times (New York, 22 
April 2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/us/politics/23detain.html> 
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section will demonstrate that the executive did precisely that, and courts refused to 
prevent this, something which makes it clear that the United States has moved far 
outside of the confines of the rule of law.  
4 TARGETED KILLING 
While court challenges to the executive’s violation of non-derogable rights began 
with challenges to prolonged arbitrary detention and only later addressed torture, this 
can easily be explained by reference to the fact that the torture of detainees was a tightly 
controlled and highly secretive program designed to produce dubious evidence that 
would later be labelled ‘intelligence’ that conveniently supported the executive’s 
arguments for aggressive war.  However, the targeted killing program was even more 
secretive, as it involved acts of war itself, within both Pakistan and Yemen.  The Bush 
Administration inaugurated a program, which was described in chapter three, that 
authorized drone strikes against suspected terrorists. As chapter one established, despite 
the fact that the targeted killing program does not comply with basic norms of 
International Humanitarian Law, the Obama Administration oversaw a tenfold increase 
in drone strikes.122  This program did not lead to much litigation, however, as the cases 
presented the serious jurisdiction problems described above, and they would also 
122 See Washington Post, ‘Tracking America’s Drone War’, 
<http://apps.washingtonpost.com/foreign/drones/> accessed 31 May 2014; see also Chris Woods and 
Alice K. Ross, ‘Revealed: US and Britain launched 1,200 drone strikes in recent wars’, Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, (Washington, 12 December 2012) 
<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/12/04/revealed-us-and-britain-launched-1200-drone-
strikes-in-recent-wars/> 
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challenge the use of military force, something which creates the danger of flouting 
public opinion.   
That said, a test case presented itself when the executive, which traditionally kept 
these programs very secret, openly announced its intention to subject an American 
citizen to a drone strike.    On April 6, 2010, the New York Times reported that after a 
discussion within the National Security Council, President Obama authorized the extra-
judicial killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki.123  His father Nasser al-Aulaqi then asked a federal 
trial court to enjoin the killing124. The Al-Aulaqi lawsuit was filed on August 30, 
2010.125  
Nasser al-Aulaqi sought a declaratory judgment stating that the targeted killing 
program, insofar as it targeted U.S. citizens who did not present concrete, specific and 
imminent threats to life or physical safety, was unconstitutional.126  He also sought an 
order requiring the executive to disclose the criteria used to identify its targets.127  The 
executive filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiff lacked standing to file a 
claim and that adjudicating the claims would require the court to decide non-justiciable 
123 Scott Shane, ‘U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric’, New York Times (New York, 6 
April  2010) <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.html> access 31 May 
2014 
124 Ibid 
125 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at Prayer for Relief, Al-Aulaqi v Obama [2010] 
2010 WL 3478666 (District of the District of Columbia) 
126 Ibid para. 11 
127 Ibid 
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political questions.128 The motion was granted.129   However, the court’s decision that 
Nasser al-Aulaqi did not have standing to bring the suit as his son’s next friend was 
paradoxical.  The court concluded that such a suit must be brought personally, since 
‘Al-Awlaki can access the U.S. judicial system by presenting himself in a peaceful 
manner’, a leap of logic that depends on the premise that ‘[a]ll U.S. citizens may avail 
themselves of the U.S. judicial system if they present themselves peacefully.’130 First, 
it should be noted this presumes that those administering the targeted killing program 
will act in accordance with the Constitution, even after the executive has already 
concluded that its guarantees do not apply to the targeted person. Second, the court 
opined that Al-Awlaki could turn himself in merely because of its allegation that there 
is ‘there is nothing preventing him from peacefully presenting himself at the U.S. 
Embassy in Yemen.’131  Since the executive was actively trying to kill him this assertion 
is highly questionable. 
The court also dismissed the suit for presenting a non-justiciable political question. 
The court rested its reasoning chiefly on the precedent provided by El-Shifa v. United 
States.132 In it, the ‘D.C. Circuit examined whether the political question doctrine 
128 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at para. 19-35, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama [2010] 2010 WL 3478666 (District 
of the District of Columbia)  
129 Al-Aulaqi v Obama [2010] 727 FSupp2d 1 (District of the District of Columbia) 
130 Ibid 18. The court’s spelling of Anwar Al-Awlaki’s name has been adjusted to correspond with the 
way it has been transliterated within this chapter. 
131 Ibid 17 
132 El-Shifa v United States [2004] 378 F3d 1346 (D.C. Circuit) 
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barred judicial resolution of claims . . . seeking to recover damages after their plant was 
destroyed by an American cruise missile. President Clinton had ordered the missile 
strike’.133 The court reasoned:  
[T]he plaintiff asks this court to do exactly what the D.C. Circuit forbade in 
El-Shifa—assess the merits of the President’s (alleged) decision to launch an 
attack on a foreign target. Although the ‘foreign target’ happens to be a U.S. 
citizen, the same reasons that counseled against judicial resolution of the 
plaintiffs’ claims in El Shifa apply with equal force here.134 
 
Although the court decided that it would not address Al-Awlaki’s claim that he 
should not be killed without due process, it opined further: 
[I]t does not appear that any court has ever—on political question doctrine 
grounds—refused to hear a U.S. citizen’s claim that his personal constitutional 
rights have been violated as a result of U.S. government action taken abroad. 
Nevertheless, there is inadequate reason to conclude that Anwar Al-Awlaki’s 
citizenship—standing alone—renders the political question doctrine 
inapplicable to plaintiff’s claims.135 
 
Owing to this conclusion and the court’s concern that the relief sought ‘would be 
vastly more intrusive upon the powers of the Executive’  than those typically sought by 
a petitioner seeking habeas corpus, and because ‘the questions posed in this case require 
expertise beyond the capacity of the judiciary and [since there is a purported need for] 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision by the executive’,136 the court held that 
the claims were non-justiciable. This was presented as a felicitous result that avoided 
demonstrating ‘a lack of respect due to coordinate branches of government’, and 
133 Scott Shane, ‘U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric’, New York Times,( 6 April 2010) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.html> accessed 31 May 2014 
134 Ibid 70 (emphasis added) 
135 Ibid 75  
136 Ibid 77 (internal quotation marks removed; emphasis added) 
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creating ‘the potentiality of embarrassment of multifarious pronunciations by various 
departments on one question’.137 
In summary, the court decided not to examine the merits of a suit brought on behalf 
of a United States citizen who claimed he was the subject of an executive death warrant 
issued without due process on two grounds.  First, because of speculation and adverse 
inferences the court concluded that the plaintiff had no standing to bring the suit. It did 
so despite the fact that this prudential consideration has routinely been waived when 
‘human lives are at stake’. American courts have often expressed disdain for the 
argument that such a case should turn on ‘fine points of procedure or a party’s technical 
standing to bring a claim’ in that circumstance.138 However in this case a judicially-
crafted limitation was used to trump constitutional claims of the highest importance.  
Second, and more importantly, the case was dismissed because the court did not 
believe that the judiciary possessed the power to determine the constitutionality of a 
decision by the President to issue an executive death warrant.  Instead, it held that such 
a decision is best left to the executive branch itself, to which an almost obsequious level 
of deference is apparently due, even from the courts that were set up to enforce the 
limitations of the constitution against the executive.  Again, this abject abandonment of 
the judiciary’s most fundamental responsibility simply cannot be reconciled with the 
rule of law. 
137 Ibid 72, 77 
138 Rosenberg v United States [1953] 346 U.S. 273, 294  (United States Supreme Court) (Clark, J, 
concurring for six Justices) 
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5 SECRECY OF EXECUTIVE ACTION 
As described in the sections above, the secrecy of the executive’s efforts involving 
the systematic violation of non-derogable rights was an integral feature of these 
programs and essential to defeating court challenges, as appellate courts pronounced 
themselves helpless to proceed in the face of stonewalling by the executive.  As this 
section will demonstrate, sections of the federal judiciary were quick to erect further 
barriers to court challenges by affirming the right to keep evidence of violations of 
fundamental rights out of the hands of those who would seek to hold the executive 
accountable.  The judicially created doctrines invoked by the courts when dismissing 
lawsuits challenging prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, and extra-judicial 
executions, which include the doctrines of qualified immunity and so-called ‘special 
factors’, jurisdictional bars, heightened standing requirements, and the political 
question doctrine, have all been highly effective means of denying relief to plaintiffs 
who alleged violations of jus cogens norms.  Another contributing factor has been the 
withholding of government records that should have been provided to those bringing 
the lawsuits pursuant to FOIA requests, or in response to discovery requests made in 
the course of this litigation.   
Given the fact that these lawsuits are now consigned to failure by the judicially 
created doctrines that facilitate the evasion of any review on the merits of claims against 
the executive, one might argue that restrictions on public records are superfluous, and 
thus do not affect the assessment of whether or not the United States is in compliance 
with the norms of the rule of law.  However, this would fail to account for the additional 
political benefit of keeping certain activities secret.   
If the executive branch carries out programs that, if disclosed, would shock the 
public, maintaining secrecy is integral to preventing the sort of political backlash that 
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occurred after the revelations of the Church Committee, which helped to restore the 
rule of law.  Accordingly, as the final hope for the restoration of the rule of law in the 
United States is the prospect of legislative action catalysed by public outrage, the 
executive’s attempts to keep its most dubious programs secret is clearly pertinent. 
That said, an exhaustive summary of attempts to obtain information from the 
executive about programs that violated jus cogens norms is outside of the scope of this 
thesis.  Instead, this subsection will detail the efforts of journalists and non-
governmental organizations working in the area of civil and human rights to obtain 
information on the targeted killing program.  One of the key cases involved an attempt 
to obtain information from the executive about the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki.  The 
proceedings illustrate how the above-described judicially created rules have created a 
system where it is possible for the executive to keep almost anything secret, even 
programs that violate the fundamental rights of its citizens.   This will provide further 
proof that the United States can no longer be considered a rule of law state, as the 
executive cannot be subjected to any form of oversight if it can withhold information 
about its violations of non-derogable rights at will. 
Before discussing how the decisions of appellate courts have made obtaining such 
information virtually impossible, it should be noted that the executive branch provided 
the lead to the judiciary.  Despite campaign promises to restore transparency, the 
Obama Administration has done the opposite.  One example of this is an executive 
order that allows for retroactive classification of a document.  This means that someone 
may file a valid request for a government record, but before it is released, the executive 
can decide that it should have been considered classified and therefore exempt from 
FOIA, despite the fact that those who created the document saw no need to consider its 
contents confidential, if ‘the original classification authority [in its sole discretion] 
236 
 
Chapter 4: The Judiciary and Executive Overreaching 2003-2012 237 
determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be 
expected to result in damage to the national security’.139   
The effects of this regime become apparent when one considers New York Times v. 
Department of Justice,140 which sought information ‘about the legal basis . . . for 
authorizing the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki’.141  In particular, the suit sought 
to compel disclosure of an OLC memorandum written in 2010 and signed by David 
Barron, which ‘concluded that Mr. Awlaki could be legally killed’.142  The quality of 
the legal reasoning of this memorandum appears highly questionable, since leaks have 
139 Executive Order No. 13526, ‘Classified National Security Information’ (29 December 2009) 
section 1.1(a)(4) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-
security-information> accessed 31 May 2014 
140 New York Times v Department of Justice [2012], 11 Civ. 9336 (CM) (Southern District of New 
York) 
141 Department of Justice ‘Request Under Freedom of Information Act, Nathan Wessler’, American 
Civil Liberties Union, (Washington, 19 October 2011), 3 
<http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/awlaki_foia_final_2011_10_19.pdf> accessed 31 May 2014 
142 Ibid, quoting Charlie Savage, ‘Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen’, New York 
Times, (New York, 9 October 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-
memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all> 
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confirmed that it failed to even mention a key provision of the Constitution that 
specifically prohibits extra-judicial execution.143   
This perception of flawed legal reasoning is not helped by the statements of the 
Attorney-General of the United States, who defended the program by stating that the 
due process mandated by the Constitution ‘is not necessarily judicial process’, even 
when the right being taken away is not Social Security Disability Insurance payments 
before a judicial hearing,144 but when a citizen is being deprived of his life after a 
process145 conducted by counter-terrorism officials.146  Other officials from the 
Department of Justice also asserted on the executive’s behalf that no court possessed 
any jurisdiction to question whether this deprivation of life was a violation of a citizen’s 
Constitutional rights.147  Giving these assertions, disclosure of the legal justification in 
the OLC memorandum for this program is of paramount importance to the rule of law. 
The executive responded to the suit by moving to dismiss it, refusing to confirm or 
deny the existence of the OLC memorandum because ‘this would cause harm’ by 
revealing ‘information about the interests, priorities and capabilities of the subject 
143 Ryan Patrick Alford, ‘The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: Consequences of Targeted Killing of 
Citizens’ [2011] Utah Law Review 1203, 1271-1272 
144 Mathews v Eldridge [1976] 424 US 319 (United States Supreme Court) 
145 It should be noted that the defendants in Star Chamber proceedings had, in fact, significantly more 
procedural due process.  See Ryan Patrick Alford, ‘The Star Chamber and the Regulation of the Legal 
Profession 1570-1640’, (2011) 51 American Journal of Legal History 653 
146 Savage supra n 142 
147 Al-Aulaqi supra n 129 
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agencies’.148  This is a very strange assertion, since the requested document would 
presumably contain only a legal argument, since that is what it purports to be.  In its 
response to this motion, the New York Times clarified that it ‘seeks only legal analysis, 
not the details of any operation, past or future, which can properly be subject to 
redaction, if necessary’.149  In addition, it noted that the government provided no 
explanation why ‘legal analysis is properly characterized as a national security 
secret’.150 
Despite the cogency of the plaintiffs’ arguments, the court dismissed the case, but in 
doing so exposed the way in which earlier appellate court rulings made it impossible 
for the plaintiffs to prevail under any circumstances, regardless of the importance of the 
information they sought to the rule of law.  Perhaps owing to this distressing conclusion, 
the trial court’s opinion lapsed into the first person: 
I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem 
because of contradictory constraints and rules—a veritable Catch-22.  I can find 
no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the 
Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain 
148 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, New York Times v 
Department of Justice [2012] 11 Civ. 9336 (CM) (Southern District of New York) 
149 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13, New York Times v Department of 
Justice [2012], 11 Civ. 9336 (CM) (Southern District of New York) 
150 Ibid 13 
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actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, 
while keeping the reasons for their conclusion a secret.151 
 
 The court noted that because the government chose to label the requested documents 
as classified, a request to the judiciary was fruitless. ‘It lies beyond the power of this 
Court to determine if a document has been improperly classified’.152  Accordingly, the 
trial court cannot order the disclosure of ‘final policies that have been adopted by the 
Executive to target individuals and to decide whether or not they can lawfully be killed 
by Executive fiat’.153 
What is most notable is that the trial court found that it was compelled to reach this 
conclusion by the ‘thicket of laws and precedents’ despite the fact that it appears to 
have concluded in dicta that the targeted killings were in fact extra-judicial 
assassinations punishable under domestic law.  It came to this conclusion after pointing 
out that the statute forbidding ‘Foreign murder of United States nationals . . . contains 
no exception for the President . . . or anyone acting at his direction . . . . Presidential 
authorization does not and cannot legitimize convert action that violates the constitution 
and laws of this nation’.154 
The court also noted that the ‘literal language of the Fifth Amendment, the Treason 
Clause, and the cited statutes notwithstanding, the Administration . . . has gone so far 
as to mount an extensive public relations campaign in order to convince the public that 
151 New York Times v Department of Justice [2013], 11 Civ. 9336, 4-5 (CM) (Southern District of New 
York) (emphasis added) 
152 Ibid 38 
153 Ibid 60 
154 Ibid 18-19 
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its conclusions [about its authority to order extra-judicial executions] are correct’.155  
Accordingly, the court implicitly argued that despite the fact that the executive 
authorized covert operations that unlawfully killed citizens and argued at length that it 
has the power to do so, the court cannot order the executive to release its own rationale, 
or even compel them to admit formally and on the record that it engaged in these 
operations.   
Unfortunately, as the next section will demonstrate, it is impossible for the victims 
of state-sanctioned murder and other violations of non-derogable rights to bring 
successful court challenges without these classified documents.  As the trial court noted, 
‘the Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me’.156  
Presumably, the nature of this crisis of the rule of law is such that when the executive 
construes a law, it ‘means precisely what [it] choose[s] it to mean—neither more nor 
less’, as ‘the question is which is to be master—that’s all’.157  The trial court might as 
well have observed that its opinion was the death knell of the rule of law, since it 
concludes that despite the fact that the executive is committing murder that no court 
can order it to release the documents that might make it possible for any court to hold 
it accountable for that crime. 
6 UNLAWFUL SURVEILLANCE 
 In addition to keeping information about the executive out of the hands of those who 
sought to challenge its violation of citizens’ non-derogable rights, the higher courts 
155 Ibid 19 
156 Ibid 
157 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (Collins Clear-Type Press 1934) 205 
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systematically empowered the right of the executive branch to gather information about 
the citizenry.  As this section will demonstrate, it also used this power against its critics, 
and in particular against those who challenged its policies, in an echo of Nixon’s abuses. 
As the last chapter detailed, the executive argued that it could ignore the laws and 
constitutional provisions restricting warrantless surveillance, owing either to the 
AUMF or its purported reserve powers, triggered by what it characterized as a state of 
war.   Again, while it is difficult to understand how the authorization to deploy troops 
in battle implies clearance to eavesdrop on conversations, the OLC was prepared to 
provide the necessary legal justification.  Problematic legal reasoning was simply 
beside the point, because the relevant memorandum was kept secret, even from the 
agencies that conducted the surveillance. ‘In late 2003, the NSA’s General Counsel and 
the Inspector General sought access to Mr. Yoo’s memoranda . . . Mr. [David] 
Addington angrily rebuffed them’.158 
 This tight secrecy was motivated by the audacity and scale of the ‘President’s 
Surveillance Program’ which dwarfed the Cold War NSA programs in scale.  This 
program was gargantuan. It involved diverting every single personal communication 
transmitted across the telecommunications companies’ trunk lines. The NSA simply 
inserted a shunt that relayed all of this communications traffic from these hubs to their 
headquarters, where all of these messages could be parsed.159  This rendered 
158 House Committee on the Judiciary Majority Staff Report to Chairman John C. Conyers, Jr. 
‘Reining in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and Recommendations Relating to the Presidency of 
George W. Bush’, (Government Printing Office 2009) 147 
159 Declarations of Mark Klein and Scott Marcus, Amnesty v Blair [2008] 08 Civ. 6259 (Southern 
District of New York) 
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unnecessary the earlier methods of obtaining this type of data, which often involved 
knowingly providing false information in warrant applications.160  
 While the executive insisted that it was merely conducting surveillance on al-Qaeda 
terrorists, such that the President’s Security Program and other operations might appear 
to be implied by the AUMF, this mandate was quickly extended. Attorney-General 
Alberto Gonzales later revealed that the NSA was ‘not just targeting terrorists but 
anyone deemed “affiliated” or “working in support” of terrorists’.  One prominent law 
professor noted that ‘this definition casts so wide a net that no one can feel certain of 
escaping its grasp.’161 These anxieties appeared warranted given a widely publicised 
statement of the chief executive.  As he said before a joint session of both legislative 
bodies, ‘[e]ither you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’.162 
After the 9/11 attacks, peace activists were perceived as not being ‘with us’, and this 
led to abuses that continued long after 2001, especially after the executive put into place 
its strategy of extending the crisis period by launching new wars.  In 2005, a leak 
revealed that the Counterintelligence Field Agency, hereinafter referred to as CIFA, 
database contained extensive records of spying on the political activity of anti-war 
160 Philip Shenon, ‘Secret Court Says F.B.I. Aides Misled Judges in 75 Cases’, New York Times, (New 
York, 20 November 2001) <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/23/us/secret-court-says-fbi-aides-
misled-judges-in-75-cases.html>  
161 Letter from Laurence Tribe to the Hon. John Conyers, Jr., United States House of Representatives, 
(6 January 2006)  
162 George Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, (20 September 
2001) <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> 31 May 
2014 
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groups opposed to the Iraq War. In it, innocuous activities, such as a meeting at a 
Quaker meeting house, were described as a ‘threats’.163  The range of targets for this 
surveillance was also extended to include academics, as ‘military personnel also 
attended academic conferences and tracked participants’ private statements’.164 The 
military intelligence agencies were not alone. ‘CIFA was far from unique. The FBI, 
returning to its old habits, was also spying on antiwar [sic.] activists . . . the FBI’s 
Pittsburgh office kept the interfaith Thomas Merton Center under surveillance’ for at 
least three years165   
What is particularly problematic about this surveillance is that was fed into vast 
databases and cross-linked, in a manner that the architects of Operation CHAOS, as 
described in chapter two, could only have dreamed about.  ‘One of the CIFA-funded 
database . . . dubbed “Person Search,” is designed “to provide comprehensive 
information about people of interest.”’  Presumably, this linked to the PSP’s and other 
databases, and could provide information about those whom any particular activist 
called or e-mailed and field reports from undercover agents, and other files, at the touch 
of a mouse.  The Total Information Awareness database was the result of ‘a huge data 
163 Lisa Myers, Douglas Pasternak, and Rich Gardella, ‘Is the Pentagon Spying on Americans’ NBC 
News (14 December 2005), <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10454316/#.UPYFgIbLFhE> 31 May 
2014 
164 Frederick Schwarz and Aziz Huq, ‘Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of 
Terror (New Press, 2007) 134 
165 Ibid 135 
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mining scheme ... [that] track[ed] Americans’ credit-card transactions, website visits, 
travel records, bank transactions, and [linked to] other database files at the Pentagon’.166   
The use of these technologies and methods of surveillance against anti-war activists 
makes it ‘disturbingly clear that the mistakes of the past [and in particular, the Nixon 
Administration] are being repeated once more.  Rather than focusing on the nation’s 
enemies, intelligence services are trained on American dissenters from the 
government’s policies’.167   
 That said, any keen student of Nixon’s presidency, including the many located in the 
executive branch after the 9/11 attacks, as the last chapter pointed out, would have 
remembered that his efforts to control the anti-war movement were not incidental to his 
agenda.  Rather, as described in chapter two, the Church Committee and other 
investigations revealed that escalating the Indochina War was an integral part of his 
attempt to free the executive from all legal restraint and oversight.  Accordingly, 
destroying the movement that stood in the way of an expanded war and concomitant 
crisis was essential to Nixon at that time.  It is entirely possible that Cheney and others 
saw the movement against the Iraq War in the same manner, given the similarities in 
their goals.  Cast in this light, the assumption that the Bush Administration sought to 
use the intelligence agencies in the same manner as Nixon and for the same ends does 
166 Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American 
Democracy (Little, Brown & Co., 2007) p. 115. 
167 Schwartz and Huq supra n 159, 135 (emphasis in original) 
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not appear unwarranted, and this was confirmed by subsequent revelations about these 
programs.   
 These efforts to implement surveillance and control would present as serious a 
challenge to the rule of law as the ‘White House horrors’ that brought about Nixon’s 
resignation.  However, in the absence of a thorough congressional investigation, 
opponents of the executive who were subjected to unlawful surveillance and other 
abuses can only turn to the courts. 
The first serious challenge to warrantless surveillance of peace activists, scholars 
and others engaging in constitutionally protected political activity was brought on 
January 17, 2006.168  The suit alleged that the ‘NSA engaged in wholesale data-mining 
of domestic and international communications’ in violation of FISA, and that some of 
the plaintiffs would have been targeted for surveillance merely because of the topics 
they researched on the internet.169  The plaintiffs included the American Civil Liberties 
Union, owing to its work in connection with the United Nations Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, which involved the investigation of ‘special interest’ detainees 
who were ‘rendered . . . to detention and interrogation facilities operated by the CIA 
168 Complaint in ACLU v NSA [2006] 06 Civ. 10204 (District of the District of Columbia)  
<http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset_upload_file137_23491.pdf> accessed 31 May 2014 
169 Ibid 15-16 
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outside U.S. sovereign territory’, including Khaled el-Masri, whose case was discussed 
in section three above.170  
The executive’s eavesdropping on these privileged attorney-client communications 
made this legal representation more difficult.  Journalists and scholars also alleged that 
their work investigating law-breaking by the intelligence community, including the 
NSA, in the case of the author James Bamford, was now more difficult, as their sources 
believed they were being subjected to warrantless surveillance.171  Owing to these 
effects on constitutionally protected speech, these plaintiffs alleging violations of their 
free speech and associational rights, along with violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
and noted that this surveillance violates the principle of separation of powers because 
it was authorized   . . . in excess of his Executive authority under . . . the United States 
Constitution and contrary to limits imposed by Congress.172 
The trial court’s ruling in this case was a stirring rebuke to an overreaching 
executive.  Despite the fact that the NSA withheld numerous documents on the assertion 
of ‘state secrets privilege’, the court held that this information was not required in order 
for the plaintiffs to establish their standing, and to make the prima facie case of a 
constitutional violation that would justify an injunction.173  On the question of standing, 
the absence of which was invoked by appeals courts when dismissing claims after the 
9/11 attacks, on the basis that plaintiffs cannot prove they were targeted by the 
170 Ibid 18 
171 Ibid 44-46 
172 Ibid 59 
173 ACLU v NSA [2007] 436 FSupp2d 754 (District of the District of Columbia) 
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executive without access to secret documents that cannot be released, the court reasoned 
as follows: 
[I]f the court were to deny standing based on the unsubstantiated minor 
distinctions drawn by Defendants, the President’s actions in warrantless 
wiretapping, in contravention of FISA, Title III, and the First and Fourth 
Amendments, would be immunized from judicial scrutiny. It was never the 
intent of the Framers to give the President such unfettered control, particularly 
where his actions blatantly disregard the parameters clearly enumerated in the 
Bill of Rights. The three separate branches of government were developed as a 
check and balance for one another.174 
 Citing the Keith Case, the trial court noted that these plaintiffs now complained 
about the sort of activity that had brought down the Nixon Administration. 
Furthermore, it noted that Congress had prohibited these practices by FISA, which did 
not acknowledge any constitutional reserve powers in the executive.  It also observed 
that the Fourth Amendment was itself a response to this sort of executive overreaching, 
in the form of the general search warrants executed in the American colonies.  Quoting 
the Steel Seizures Case, the court reasoned: 
[E]mergency powers are consistent with free government only when their 
control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them. That is 
the safeguard that would be nullified by our adoption of the ‘inherent powers' 
formula. Nothing in my experience convinces me that such risks are warranted 
by any real necessity, although such powers would, of course, be an executive 
convenience . . . . With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have 
discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the 
Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary 
deliberations.175 
 The trial court concluded that the PSP was contrary to statute and unconstitutional.  
In doing so, it refuted the notion that the executive possessed emergency powers that 
would allow it to ignore duly enacted laws. ‘[T]he Office of the Chief Executive has 
174 Ibid 771 
175 Ibid 778 
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itself been created, with its powers, by the Constitution. There are no hereditary Kings 
in America and no powers not created by the Constitution. So all “inherent powers” 
must derive from that Constitution’, which grants the executive no emergency 
powers.176  It also concluded that the AUMF could not be construed to support this 
activity, as this would amount to a general statute implicitly overruling another, FISA, 
which was more specific. 
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, this ruling was never put into effect.  It was stayed 
immediately and subsequently vacated by the Sixth Circuit.177  The court held that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring any of their claims, since they could not demonstrate 
that they were subjected to warrantless surveillance. ‘[B]ecause of the State Secrets 
Doctrine [the plaintiffs] cannot . . .  produce any evidence that any of their own 
communications have ever been intercepted by the NSA, under the TSP, or without 
warrants’.178  The court did not appear to appreciate the irony of allowing a defendant 
to frustrate plaintiffs’ constitutional claims by refusing to turn over the documents they 
need to prove those claims.   
Rather than decrying a Catch-22, in the same manner as the trial court in New York 
Times v. Department of Justice, the Sixth Circuit created one.  The pattern that emerges 
from the court challenges after the 9/11 attacks is clear. Plaintiffs are barred by a 
‘thicket of precedents’ that block their path to a review on the merits the appellate court 
176 Ibid 781 
177 ACLU v NSA [2007] 493 F3d 644 (D.C. Circuit) 
178 Ibid 653 
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opinions disposing of these claims persist and proliferate, creating precedents that 
doom future lawsuits challenging violations of constitutional rights. 
For instance, a subsequent suit challenging warrantless surveillance filed in the 
Southern District of New York, Amnesty International v. McConnell, was dismissed 
owing to the plaintiffs’ purported failure to demonstrate their standing to sue, in which 
the decision of the Sixth Circuit in ACLU v. NSA was cited multiple times.179  This is 
another example of a case in which a clear failure of the executive to comply with its 
obligations during the discovery process was exacerbated by the circuit courts’ 
willingness to create precedents  that deprive the trial courts of any ability to challenge 
disingenuous assertions of ‘state secrets privilege’, in the same manner that they were 
stripped of the ability to challenge the retroactive classification of documents as ‘secret’ 
after they become the subject of FOIA requests, as seen in New York Times v. 
Department of Justice.   
There are other pertinent examples of this process. During the discovery process, 
the plaintiffs in Amnesty International requested a legal opinion purportedly justifying 
the FBI’s participation in warrantless wiretapping programs.  Accordingly, a document 
which appears to be a legal memorandum from the FBI’s general counsel, was 
disclosed.  However, despite the fact that it was initially marked ‘Precedence: Routine’ 
and ‘All information contained herein is unclassified exc[ept] where shown otherwise’, 
four months after it was written, shortly before it was turned over to the plaintiffs, it 
was reclassified as ‘Secret’.  As a result, the legal analysis was redacted from the 
179 Amnesty International v McConnell [2009] 646 FSupp2d 633 (D. C. Circuit) 
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version given to the plaintiffs.180  It is unclear how a legal analysis could be a state 
secret, but this was the rationale for the redaction.   
This principle is now not only accepted by the courts, but embodied by some of 
them.  One example is found in the decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review, hereinafter referred to as ‘FISCR’, a special court set up to hear 
appeals of rulings disposing of the challenges of telecommunications providers and 
other data carriers to the orders of the executive to turn over their customers’ private 
information.  The political nature of this special court, whose members are personally 
selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, which is at present a highly 
politicized position, will be discussed in the next chapter.   
In 2007, an unnamed telecommunications company refused to carry out the 
executive’s demands that it turn over records without being served with warrants.181  
This was a perilous course of action. The former CEO of Qwest Communications 
argued that it was punished for refusing to comply with such an order by losing out on 
government contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. He was also subsequently 
180 See ‘Memorandum of the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation’, (1 October 2010) 
<http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/faafoia20101129/FAAFBI0072.pdf> accessed 31 May 2014 
181 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, ‘Court Affirms Wiretapping Without Warrants’, New York Times, 
(New York, 16 January 2009 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/washington/16fisa.html?_r=2&hp&> accessed 31 May 2014 
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prosecuted for insider trading.182  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
dismissed these objections, as did FISCR on review.183   
These decisions are made in secret.  The public is never even informed that 
challenges to requests for warrantless surveillance have ever been made.  However, in 
a ‘rare public ruling’, FISCR decided to affirm the constitutionality of the program.  It 
did so in an opinion that was itself redacted.  Not only are the executive’s justifications 
for violations of fundamental rights now being withheld from the public, but a court of 
laws now does the same.  It is unclear how this could be reconciled with the rule of 
law.   
These secret opinions demonstrate that certain courts that have become ever more 
compliant to the demands of the executive. In particular, subsequent sections of this 
chapter will demonstrate these courts have been amenable to arguments about the need 
for secrecy that make judicial review of violations of non-derogable rights impossible. 
6 JUDICIAL TOLERANCE OF UNILATERAL WAR-MAKING  
As earlier sections of this chapter and the last chapter demonstrated, one of the key 
reasons for the executive’s violation of non-derogable rights was to generate 
‘intelligence’ that would purportedly justify aggressive war.  As during the Nixon 
182 Ellen Nakashima and Dan Eggen, ‘Former CEO Says U.S. Punished Phone Firm’, Washington Post 
(Washington, 13 October 13 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/AR2007101202485_pf.html> accessed 31 May 2014 
183 In Re: Directives [redacted text] * Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, [2009] FISCR No. 08-01 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court) 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fiscr082208.pdf> accessed 31 May 2014 
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Administration, a vicious circle was a dangerous possibility. Violations of jus cogens 
norms could be used to launch wars, which would then justify more violations of non-
derogable rights.  Accordingly, the courts’ response to the executive branch’s 
destruction of the rule of law after the 9/11 attacks would need to address the 
executive’s claim that it possessed the unilateral right to declare and wage aggressive 
wars.  Just as Nixon’s claims to this power needed to be rebuffed in order to restore the 
rule of law after the invasion of Cambodia, the courts would need to respond to similar 
claims made after the 9/11 attacks in order to terminate the crisis created by this new 
state of emergency.  Unfortunately, as this section will demonstrate, this was not the 
case.   
The final critical failure after the 9/11 attacks of higher courts to support the rule of 
law implemented in the congressional resurgence of 1974-1980 can be found in its 
consistent refusal to give any effect to the War Powers Resolution.  The WPR reasserted 
‘the Constitution’s broad textual commitment to Congress’s key role in the war-making 
system’.184 Section 1542 requires that the executive notify the legislature whenever 
troops are committed to hostilities. Despite arguments from the executive’s own 
184 Bruce Ackerman and Oona Hathaway, ‘Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of 
Presidential Legality’ (2011) 109 Michigan Law Review 453 
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lawyers and academics who propagate fringe theories about scope of the Constitution’s 
Declare War Clause,185 ‘its constitutionality is not seriously in question’.186   
After this notification, if Congress does not pass a resolution approving the extension 
of hostilities within ninety days, the executive must withdraw them.  While the 
executive branch argue that this provision is an ‘unconstitutional abridgement on the 
President’s unitary power as Commander-in-Chief’,187 during the congressional 
resurgence even the OLC accepted that it was constitutional.188  Accordingly, if the 
President authorizes the military’s use of force, even in a rescue mission, he must 
comply with the WPR.  When Congress remained jealous of its constitutional 
prerogatives, the executive did what the statute required. For example, in 1975, 
President Ford’s conduct during the crisis precipitated by the capture of the SS 
Mayaguez conformed scrupulously to the WPR’s requirements.189 
That said, when the executive has failed to comply with the WPR, the courts have 
consistently refused to enforce it.  This is best illustrated by outcome of the lawsuit 
challenging the unilateral decision of President Obama to intervene during the Libyan 
185 John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace (University of Chicago 2005) 97-100 
186 Brian J. Lithwack, ‘Putting Constitutional Teeth Into a Paper Tiger: How to Fix the War Powers 
Resolution’, (2011) 2 National Security Law Brief 2, 4 
187 Ibid 13 
188 Theodore Olson, ‘Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: Presidential Power to Use 
Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization’ (Washington, Office of Legal Counsel, 12 
February 1980) <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/cases/4aOpOffLegalCounsel185.pdf> accessed 
31 May 2014 
189 Lithwack supra n 186, 5 
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Civil War, by attacking the government and armed forces of Libya.  It should be noted 
that the Security Council Resolution does not itself provide the requisite authorization 
under the domestic law of the United States, 190 and Congress did not authorize the 
intervention within sixty days of its initiation as the WPR required. 
Kucinich v. Obama191 was filed after ‘Speaker [of the House of Representatives 
John] Boehner sent a letter to President Obama informing him that the ninety-day 
period under the War Powers Resolution would pass on June 17th and that the President 
ha[d] failed to comply with the statute’.192  Despite the fact that the executive failed to 
comply with both the WPR and the Constitution, the court dismissed the suit.  It did so 
without reaching its merits, relying instead on two judicially-created doctrines 
described above. These are the doctrines related to standing, as discussed in the cases 
in the previous section discussing warrantless surveillance, and the political question 
doctrine, which was invoked to dismiss the claims of citizens subjected to targeted 
killing, as discussed in section three above. 
As the suit was brought by ten members of the House of Representatives who voted 
for the law that the executive ignored, it would appear that they suffered a cognizable 
injury. This would ordinarily be enough to justify standing.  However, in what appears 
to be an attempt to evade responsibility for addressing such injuries, the D.C. Circuit 
has developed a restrictive view of legislator standing.  This doctrine holds that the 
190 War Powers Resolution 1973 , Public Law 93-148 
191 Kucinich v Obama [2011] 821 FSupp2d 110 (District of the District of Columbia) 
192 Ibid 113 
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judiciary should not address the executive’s violation of a statute if the issue is still 
susceptible to ‘political resolution’.193   
This doctrine ignores the fact that the WPR represents the already-existing political 
resolution of the crisis of the rule of law created by Nixon’s arguments that it could 
declare war on its own initiative.  If the executive is willing to ignore a constitutionally 
valid law, it is unclear why Congress’ power to pass another law should be seen as a 
potential solution to the problem.  Once the executive contends that it has the power to 
ignore the laws in the interests of national security in general, i.e., the OLC opines that 
any attempt by Congress to restrain the executive’s power to declare war to protect the 
nation would be unconstitutional—what would a statute that explicitly rejects that view 
accomplish?  As Judge Kavanaugh stated in his partial concurrence in El-Shifa v. 
United States:  
There is good reason the political question doctrine does not apply in cases 
alleging statutory violations.  If a court refused to give effect to a statute that 
regulated Executive conduct, it necessarily would be holding that Congress is 
unable to constrain Executive conduct in the challenged sphere of action. As a 
result, the court would be ruling (at least implicitly) that the statute intrudes 
impermissibly on the Executive’s prerogatives under Article II of the 
Constitution.  In other words, the court would be establishing that the asserted 
Executive power is exclusive and preclusive, meaning that  Congress cannot 
regulate or limit that power by creating a cause of action or otherwise.194 
 
A judicial decision applying the political question doctrine to claims under the WPR 
would endorse the OLC argument about the executive’s unreviewable powers to act in 
the interests of national security.  As such, the only option that might remain for 
Congress would be to impeach the president.  The courts’ adoption of the above-
193 Kucinich v Bush [2002] 236 FSupp2d 1, 23-24 (District of the District of Columbia), citing 
Chenoweth v Clinton [1999] 181 F3d 112, 116 (D.C. Circuit) 
194 El-Shifa v United States [2011] 607 F.3d 836, 857 (D.C. Circuit) 
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described view of legislator standing, which serves the same function as the application 
of the political question doctrine to claims under the WPR, thus puts the legislature on 
the horns of a dilemma.  Congress can either do nothing and tolerate the erosion of the 
rule of law, or act and risk a constitutional crisis, as the courts stand idly by, in sharp 
contrast to their conduct during the Watergate crisis, as described in chapter two. 
The court adjudicating Kucinich v. Obama did not address the political question 
doctrine, ‘as the Court has concluded that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring the claims 
alleged in their complaint, it need not proceed to the related issue of whether the 
plaintiffs’ claims present non-justiciable political questions’.195  It is clear, however, 
that the precedents of the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit would otherwise have 
compelled the trial court to find that the issue presented was non-justiciable on that 
ground. At the outset of the Cold War, the Supreme Court held that ‘[c]ertainly it is not 
the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation—even by a citizen—which 
challenges the legality . . . of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces 
abroad or to any particular region’.196  Despite intervening legislation, the higher courts 
have cleaved to this position across five decades.  The precedents are so well-settled 
that the trial court in Kucinich openly expressed frustration, in another unusual lapse 
from decorum, with the legislators’ attempt to litigate the issue of whether the executive 
was complying with the WPR:   
[T]he Court finds it frustrating to expend time and effort adjudicating the 
relitigation of settled questions of law. The Court is simply expressing its dismay 
that the plaintiffs are seemingly using the limited resources of this Court to 
achieve what appear to be purely political ends, when it should be clear to them 
195 Kucinich v Obama [2011] 821 FSupp2d 110, 124 n 9 (District of the District of Columbia) 
196 Johnson v Eisentrager [1950] 339 US 763, 789 (United States Supreme Court) 
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that this Court is powerless to depart from clearly established precedent of the 
Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit. 
 
As early in the Cold War as 1950, the Supreme Court believed that it was self-evident 
why the judiciary should not scrutinize the executive’s decision to commit troops to 
hostilities, a proposition with which many surely agreed owing to the prevailing 
political climate.  That said, the Supreme Court has not explicitly reaffirmed this 
conclusion after Congress acted to define the precise scope of the legality of any 
deployment of the military, via the WPR.  It need not do so, however, as long as the 
D.C. Circuit is willing to absolve the executive of its responsibilities under that statute.  
It has done so,197 and the trial courts whose opinion it binds have been forced to follow 
this holding repeatedly.198 
These judicially-created doctrines that allow for these rulings are simply an attempt 
by the courts to shirk their responsibility to intervene when the executive ignores a 
statute, which is a basic requirement of the rule of law. As noted above, this is especially 
important when the executive ignores the law in order to prolong a crisis that will likely 
empower it to behave lawlessly.  The reason why sections of the judiciary are so eager 
to develop and rely on these doctrines must wait until the next chapter, while the next 
section must merely demonstrate that the Supreme Court has indeed been quite willing 
to let the holdings of the D.C. Circuit that threaten the rule of law stand, especially 
197 Crockett v Reagan [1982] 720 F2d 1355 (D.C. Circuit) 
198 See e.g. Lowry v Reagan [1987] 676 FSupp 333 (District of the District of Columbia); Sanchez-
Espinoza v Reagan [1983] 568 FSupp 596 (District of the District of Columbia) 
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when it can do so unobserved, and when this would have little to no effect on public 
perception of the Court as a guardian of non-derogable rights and the rule of law. 
7 THE STRATEGIC DENIAL OF CERTIORARI 
The question that remains to be answered after detailing the judiciary’s inadequate 
response to the destruction of the rule of law in the ten years after the 9/11 attacks is 
how the Supreme Court has managed to preserve its credibility, even as the courts, as 
described in the sections above, have utterly failed to re-implement the rule of law by 
holding the executive accountable for its violations of non-derogable rights.  It should 
again be noted here that after deciding Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court has not 
arrested the development of judicially created doctrines that prevent trial courts from 
reaching the merits of lawsuits alleging violations of non-derogable rights.  On June 11, 
2012 it disposed of seven cases with one-line orders denying review.  In these cases, 
the D.C. Circuit held that petitioners had no right to habeas corpus on the basis of a 
presumption of regularity that must be extended to patently unreliable intelligence 
reports.199  Earlier, the Court declined review of Kiyemba v. Obama, in which the D.C. 
Circuit held that the district courts possessed no power to order the executive to release 
199 Order Denying the Writ of Certiorari in Latif v Obama, Al-Bihani  v Obama, Uthman v Obama, 
Almerfedi v Obama, Al-Kandari v Obama, Al-Madhwani v Obama, Al-Alwi v Obama [2012] 132 SCt 
2741 (United States Supreme Court) 
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a detainee who was granted the writ, or even to order the executive to produce the 
detainee before the court.200   
On the same day, the Supreme Court declined review of Lebron v. Rumsfeld, which 
held that José Padilla could not bring a lawsuit against those who ordered him to be 
tortured, as they were allegedly entitled to qualified immunity in the course of their 
official duties, which purportedly included authorizing violations of non-derogable 
rights.201  The rights of former Guantánamo detainees to bring these suits was 
foreclosed by the decision in Rasul v. Myers, which held that federal courts had no 
jurisdiction of these claims.  This holding ignored the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Boumediene.  Despite the openly disdainful tone of this opinion, the Supreme Court 
declined the petitioners’ request for review.202 
These decisions led to serious consequences.  Adnan Latif was a Yemeni detainee 
who argued persuasively that he was visiting Afghanistan in order to obtain free 
medical treatment from Islamic charities.  He alleged that his neurological issues, for 
which he sought help in Afghanistan, were aggravated by the detention regime, but 
despite the fact that ‘he had been cleared for transfer [i.e., acquitted of wrongdoing] . . 
. he could see no end to his confinement, and he killed himself’.203  Further suicides 
would not be surprising, as: 
[A] lawyer who has represented a number of Guantanamo prisoners, said the 
sense of despair among prisoners overall seems to have worsened since the 
200 Kiyemba v Obama, [2011] 131 SCt 1631 (United States Supreme Court) 
201 Lebron v Rumsfeld [2012] 132 SCt 2751 (United States Supreme Court) 
202 Rasul v Myers [2009] 130 SCt 1013 (United States Supreme Court) 
203 Statement of Lawyers Who Represented Adnan Farhan Latif,  Lawfare Blog (11 September 2012) 
<http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/statement-of-latif-legal-team/> accessed 31 May 2014 
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Supreme Court announced in June that it would not review the way courts were 
handling the men's individual challenges to their confinement. ‘There are a lot 
of guys who are having a really hard time ... Many of them have lost any hope 
that they are ever going to be released regardless of their status.’204 
 
Lawsuits challenging the targeted killing of citizens have yet to reach the Supreme 
Court, or even the D.C. Circuit, although its invocation of political question doctrine, 
which purportedly prevents a citizen from challenging the ‘targeting decisions’ of the 
executive branch, was recently allowed to stand in El Shifa v. United States.205  The 
same is true for lawsuits challenging the violation of the War Powers Resolution.206 
The Supreme Court did agree to address the doctrines that purportedly justify the 
executive’s failure to respond to requests filed under the Freedom of Information Act 
and the retroactive classification and redaction of documents sought in discovery during 
litigation challenging warrantless surveillance.207  However, it decided to do so only 
after the executive requested this, after it lost an appeal in the Second Circuit that 
overturned the decision of the district court in Amnesty International v. McConnell.208 
The Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs had standing to sue despite the executive’s 
refusal to turn over documents that would have proved that the plaintiffs were being 
204 Ben Fox, ‘Guantanamo Bay Prisoner Dies in Detention’, Associated Press, (Washington, 9 
September 2012), <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/10/guantanamo-bay-prisoner-
dies_n_1871100.html> accessed 31 May 2014 
205 El-Shifa v United States [2011] 131 SCt 997 (United States Supreme Court) 
206 See e.g. Chenoweth v Clinton [2000] 120 SCt 1286 (United States Supreme Court) 
207 Clapper v Amnesty International [2012] 132 SCt 2431 (United States Supreme Court) 
208 Amnesty International v Clapper [2011] 667 F3d 163 (Second Circuit) 
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subjected to warrantless surveillance.209  The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is 
still pending, although it is instructive to consider that when it was asked to review the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision that disposed of claims owing to alleged lack of standing and 
the executive’s invocation of the state secrets privilege,210 the Supreme Court declined 
to issue a writ of certiorari.211 
 This chapter has outlined a clear pattern of evasion of responsibility, facilitated 
by the creation of judicially created doctrines that prevent trial courts from reaching the 
merits of constitutional challenges to the executive.  The next chapter will address the 
question of why these federal appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court and the 
D.C. Circuit, created this ‘thicket of precedents’ that makes it impossible for trial courts 
to grant substantive relief to those alleging that the executive has violated their non-
derogable rights. 
8 CONCLUSION: COURTS’ COMPREHENSIVE FAILURE 
 This thesis has demonstrated that in order to be a rule of law state, the executive 
must not be able to define the scope of its own powers, whether in an emergency or 
otherwise.  Its activities must be confined to legal limits, delimited and policed by the 
legislature and the courts.  This was the common vision of the Framers of the United 
States Constitution which undergirds its doctrine of the separation of powers, and which 
guarantees the rule of law (as it is defined by the common consensus of legal scholars, 
as set forth by the Rio and Lagos Congresses of the International Commission of 
209 Amnesty International v McConnell [2009] 646 FSupp2d 633 (United States Supreme Court) 
210 ACLU v NSA [2007] 493 F3d 644 (Sixth Circuit) 
211 ACLU v NSA [2008] 128 SCt 1324 (United States Supreme Court) 
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Jurists).   However, as chapter two made clear, while the separation of powers can 
survive transient crises unscathed, the executive is empowered significantly in periods 
of prolonged war.  The second half of the twentieth century saw the United States 
slipping outside of the rule of law paradigm.  If Nixon had successfully implemented 
his agenda, it is likely that the executive would have become permanently 
unaccountable for its violations even of jus cogens norms, aggressive wars, and 
possibly even for creating a system of mass prolonged arbitrary detention.  However, 
Congress and the Courts prevented this by resisting his agenda and commencing 
procedures to impeach Nixon, ending the Indochina Wars, and by passing legislation 
that formally ended the emergency powers and tightly circumscribed its control of the 
intelligence community.   
 As chapter three made clear, the rule of law as re-established in the congressional 
resurgence of 1974-1980 did not survive the 9/11 attacks intact.  The executive was 
again given wide-ranging emergency powers, which it used to violate non-derogable 
norms.  It then sought to expand its own powers by claiming a non-existent 
constitutional right to overrule the other branches of government when purportedly 
acting in the interests of national security.  The end result was a set of secret laws that 
authorized executive branch officials to subject people to illegal surveillance, 
prolonged involuntary detention and torture, and to launch wars of aggression without 
any legislative involvement.   
 After the immediate crisis passed, the question that presented itself was whether this 
would be a transient crisis of the rule of law like that created by the Civil War, or a 
permanent state of emergency like that which followed the Second World War, which 
threatened to create a boundless executive branch that violated non-derogable rights as 
a matter of course, with no accountability.  The answer would await the responses of 
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the judiciary and the legislature to executive illegality. Would these branches of 
government reassert themselves, as they had during the Nixon Administration, or would 
the absence of a response further empower the executive? 
 The first set of challenges to the new executive resurgence was brought in the courts.  
As noted above, the third, and perhaps the key, criterion of a rule of law state is that the 
judiciary must be able to hold the executive accountable when they violate fundamental 
rights.  As this chapter has demonstrated, this is no longer even possible in the United 
States.  Owing to the precedents and new doctrines described in this chapter, in 
particular, the political question doctrine, the state secrets privilege, and restrictive 
approaches to standing and jurisdiction that prevent courts from addressing abuse that 
occurred outside of the nation’s borders, the federal courts cannot exercise any 
oversight or restrain the executive’s most serious violations of non-derogable rights.   
 Accordingly, the executive is free to arbitrarily detain, torture, kill, engage in 
limitless warrantless surveillance and retroactively classify and withhold information 
relating to all of these activities.  No court at present can even reach a consideration of 
the merits of lawsuits challenging this conduct, to the frustration of many trial courts 
that have been presented either with clear evidence of violations on these jus cogens 
norms. These often present compelling cases that the executive has violated their non-
derogable rights, which could easily be proven conclusively, if only the records 
detailing the executive’s unconstitutional conduct were not withheld by the executive. 
 It is as yet unclear why the federal appellate courts would develop doctrines that 
prevent the judiciary from policing the boundaries of the rule of law. This issue will be 
discussed in the next chapter, which will examine the ICJ’s fourth criterion, namely 
that the judiciary be willing to restrain the executive, in addition to being formally 
empowered to do so.  Given that this chapter has demonstrated that the Supreme Court 
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and the D.C. Circuit have taken away the power to restrain executive conduct from the 
judiciary, what remains for the next chapter is an explanation of why they were willing 
to aid the executive in dismantling the rule of law. The key to this explanation will be 
the close connections between these two branches of government, as illustrated by the 
appointments process, which allows the executive to choose those who will sit in 
judgment over its attempts to subvert the laws.   
 At the conclusion of the next chapter, all that will remain is a discussion of whether 
Congress is likely to react to the end of the rule of law in the United States, or whether 
any possibility of congressional resurgence has already passed, making this lapse from 
the ICJ’s four criteria effectively permanent. 
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Chapter 5 
EXPLAINING THE FAILURE TO RE-IMPLEMENT 
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE 
EXECUTIVE 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The third criterion of effective control over the executive in a rule of law state, as 
detailed by the ICJ, relates to the powers of the judiciary.  It holds that the state’s 
organic laws must recognize non-derogable rights and give the judiciary the power to 
enforce these against the executive. The fourth criterion demands that the judiciary be 
willing to make use of its powers to enforce these rights.   
The formal proscriptions against violations of peremptory norms, which can be 
found in statutes and in the Constitution itself,1 require the judiciary to rebuke the 
executive for the programmatic lawlessness described in the previous two chapters of 
this thesis.  That said, chapter four detailed how lawsuits brought against the executive 
alleging that it engaged in conduct that clearly violates FISA and the Fourth 
Amendment have been dismissed without an examination of their merits.  Instead, 
certain appellate courts rejected these claims because of judicially-created prudential 
doctrines, which place insuperable procedural obstacles before these plaintiffs.  This 
erection of what Stephen Vladeck termed the ‘new national security canon’2 has made 
1  See supra chapter 1 
2  Stephen Vladeck, ‘The New National Security Canon’, (2012) 61 American University Law 
Review 1295, 1329 
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it impossible to successfully raise matters that are clearly committed to the judiciary by 
the Constitution and statute.  Furthermore, Vladeck has demonstrated that the doctrines 
that comprise this new canon do not follow the earlier precedents.3 In fact, the ‘new 
judicial deference’ that they mandate is a radical departure from the rule of law. 
This chapter will demonstrate that the best explanation for the unwillingness of these 
judges to uphold the rule of law is one that partly rests on the dynamics of judicial 
selection. It will show that the failure to stay within the confines of the minimum 
requirements of the rule of law is now effectively irreversible, owing to this 
colonization of the judiciary by the executive branch.  At the least, it is irreversible in 
the absence of a congressional resurgence much like what followed after Watergate.  
The possibility that Congress will reassert itself over the executive in the twenty-
first century is discussed in section four of this chapter.  That section will explain why 
this is at present virtually impossible, owing to party control over the selection and 
retention of legislators.  Owing to the dominance of party elites closely connected to 
the aggressive foreign policy which a powerful executive can alone initiate, attempts at 
legislative oversight have been desultory since the 9/11 attacks.   As this section will 
detail, Congress has empowered executive overreaching instead.  These dynamics, 
illustrated by the legislators’ failure to respond to initiatives that would hold the 
executive accountable, demonstrate that the probability that the rule of law will be re-
established in the United States in the foreseeable future is low. 
2 PRESIDENT BUSH’S INCENTIVES FOR DEFERENCE 
3 Ibid, see also supra chapter 4 
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Even before 9/11, the importance of a supportive Supreme Court was eminently clear 
to the Bush Administration.  In fact, it had become evident even before President 
George W. Bush took office, as the Court had secured his installation, after he had failed 
to secure a majority of either the country’s popular or electoral votes.4  Instead, he 
obtained his position after the Court overturned a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Florida and permitted Florida’s Secretary of State to certify a result that did not take 
into account any of the on-going recounts of disputed ballots.5 
2.1   The Roberts and Alito Nominations 
The Bush v Gore decision raised the profile of the Supreme Court more than any 
other opinion discussed in this thesis.6 Unfortunately for the Court, it diminished its 
image proportionally.  As Toobin noted, ‘[i]n 1974, the justices had risen to the 
occasion when, in United States v Nixon, they ordered the President to comply . . . with 
the rule of law.  Here in a moment of probably even greater significance, the Court as 
an institution . . . failed’.7  This failure could not have been more public or more glaring, 
4  Martin Metzner et al. The Miami Herald Report: Democracy Held Hostage, 173 (Saint Martins 
Press 2001) 
5  Bush v Gore [2000] 531 US 98 (United States Supreme Court) 
6  See Christopher P. Banks et al. (eds), The Final Arbiter: The Consequences of Bush v. Gore for 
Law And Politics (SUNY Press 2005) 
7  Ibid 
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and as Justice Stevens predicted, the Court suffered a powerful blow to its prestige, 
which depends on its credibility and impartiality. 
As will be demonstrated below, it was evident at that time that a majority of its 
justices had decided that the damage created by this self-inflicted wound was less 
important than installing a President with views about the scope and uses of executive 
power that mirrored their own.  The prime movers were those justices who had 
elaborated a broad theory of presidential powers in general while producing classified 
memoranda inside the executive branch, and developing theories of inherent reserve 
powers while working at the OLC in particular, namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Scalia.   
In any event, by 2001 the dependence of the executive on a compliant Supreme Court 
could not have been clearer, owing to the two cases that bracketed the re-emergence of 
the rule of law in the United States. These cases are Unites States v Nixon and Bush v 
Gore.8  The first demonstrated the power of an independent judiciary to help bring 
down the executive, while the second illustrated how certain justices, who were 
rewarded for promoting the powers of the executive with every significant promotion 
of their career, would take action to put an executive in place who would increasingly 
depend upon them for legal cover, owing to its drive to dismantle the rule of law. 
These developments were foreshadowed by the appointment of several of the senior 
foreign policy advisors who had served in similar capacities during the last phase of 
executive resistance to the rule of law.  Many of the officials who would serve at the 
centre of the Bush Administration had previously chafed under the enforcement of the 
8  United States v Nixon [1974] 418 US 683 (United States Supreme Court); Bush v Gore [2000] 531 
US 98 (United States Supreme Court) 
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rule of law during the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations.  In addition to those 
officials discussed in the last two chapters, they included Elliot Abrams, who served 
successively as National Security Council Senior Director for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and International Operations, National Security Council Senior Director for 
Near East and North African Affairs, and Deputy National Security Advisor for Global 
Democracy Strategy.  Abrams had earlier been found guilty of withholding information 
from Congress.9  Another of these officials was John Poindexter, who oversaw the 
surveillance projects known as Total Information Awareness and the creation of the 
intelligence databases described in the last chapter. It bears mentioning that Poindexter 
was convicted after the Iran-Contra crisis on five counts of making false statements to 
Congress.10   
Those justices who were so inclined might expect further favour if they sanctioned 
the executive’s policies and thus prevented the deposition of the administration they 
had installed.  This dynamic was not new. As noted above, Chief Justice Rehnquist was 
elevated to that position after embarrassing himself with poorly reasoned and ends-
oriented opinions that established him as ‘an outspoken proponent of executive power 
versus the other branches of government’.11 This occurred notwithstanding the 
executive’s passive awareness of his drug problem and the fact that he had possibly 
9  Cynthia Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993 
(Pennsylvania State University Press 1993) 297 
10  Ibid 299 
11 Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (Doubleday 2007) 236 
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perjured himself during the hearings that preceded his appointment as an Associate 
Justice.   
The relationship between the executive and those justices who had always depended 
upon it for advancement was now symbiotic, and precisely the opposite of the 
separation of powers upon which the rule of law in the United States depends.   The 
incentives to the executive to further reinforce this dynamic by appointing additional 
justices who would conform to this pattern were only reinforced by the Bush v Gore 
decision. 
Even before his election, Bush had made his views on the relationship between the 
executive and the judiciary clear: 
[Bush] invariably relied on the same catchphrases when describing his favoured 
judicial philosophy . . . . when Bush said that judges were ‘legislating from the 
bench,’ he meant overturning laws on individual-rights grounds . . . . The 
President—and especially Vice-President Cheney—also felt strongly that judges 
should not interfere with what they felt were the prerogatives of the executive 
branch in the conduct of foreign policy or military affairs.12   
 
This echoed Nixon’s comments during his election campaign.  Furthermore: 
 
No issue mattered more to Cheney than preserving the power of the President   . 
. . . The vice-President believed that since the Nixon years the executive branch 
had steadily ceded authority to Congress, the courts, and even to international 
institutions, and he made it his mission to arrest that decline.13 
 
Their subordinates in the executive branch clearly understood what this meant. ‘Bush’s 
staff had thought through precisely what stamp they wanted to place on the federal 
12  Ibid 260 
13  Ibid 277 
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judiciary—and a network of Scalia and Thomas acolytes was precisely what they had 
in mind’.14 
The first opportunity presented to the Bush Administration to install a jurist to the 
Supreme Court who was very deferential to the executive came with the resignation of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.  The nominee that the subordinate officials brought to his 
attention was John Roberts.  It is notable that few accounts of Roberts’ selection by the 
executive focus on two key factors that allowed Rehnquist and Scalia to pass through 
the confirmation process unscathed.  As will be discussed below, first, he had worked 
for the executive in various capacities that did not create a record of his views on 
executive power.  Second, he made it clear to the executive that he did indeed support 
its view that it possessed inherent constitutional reserve powers that place it above the 
law.15 
A year after his graduation from law school, Roberts became a law clerk to Justice 
Rehnquist.  This is seemingly evidence that he already agreed that the judiciary should 
show deference to the executive, as this was a hallmark of Rehnquist’s jurisprudence, 
and Justices carefully select their law clerks on the basis of ideological compatibility.16  
14  Ibid 260 
15  See also Albert Gore, The Assault on Reason (Penguin 2007) 228 
16  See Todd C. Peppers and Artemus Ward, In Chambers: Stories of Supreme Court Law Clerks and 
Their Justices (University of Virginia Press 2012) 99-107  
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However, we have no record of the memoranda he wrote in that capacity, since 
Rehnquist was still alive when he was nominated and thus they remained confidential.17   
Immediately after clerking, Roberts joined the executive branch, taking a position 
reserved for those who were being groomed for greater things. He was appointed 
special assistant to the Attorney-General of the United States, having been 
recommended by Justice Rehnquist, according to the Attorney-General’s Chief of Staff, 
and Roberts’ immediate superior at the time, Kenneth Starr.18  This was a highly 
political position. His most notable act in that capacity was writing a memorandum that 
argued that it was possible to eliminate some of the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisdiction, that is, whether the ‘power to emasculate the Court’ existed.19  The extreme 
nature of this advice is demonstrated by the fact that it contradicted the Reagan 
Administration’s OLC’s position and the fact that it was ignored by Attorney-General 
William French Smith, despite the fact that he admitted to possessing ‘revolutionary 
zeal’ at that time.20 The next year Roberts began serving as Assistant White House 
Counsel, which is perhaps the only position where loyalty to the executive is prized 
even more highly than at the OLC, since this office is not part of the Department of 
Justice, and as such has no theoretical obligation to do justice, but rather merely to serve 
17  Rehnquist died three weeks before Roberts was formally appointed by the President, but his passing 
was too late for any of his files to be archived and catalogued before that time. 
18  Geoff Colvin, ‘On history’s stage: Chief Justice John Roberts Jr.’ Fortune Magazine, (New York, 3 
January 2011) < http://www.samachar.com/On-historys-stage-Chief-Justice-John-Roberts-Jr-
lbdxS5jjfia.html> accessed 31 May 2014 
19  Toobin supra 11, 263 
20  Ibid 
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the chief executive as faithfully as possible.  Naturally, no record of his privileged 
advice to the executive has been made public. 
‘With perfect timing, Roberts left the Reagan White House shortly before the 
administration nearly imploded during the Iran-Contra scandal’.21  However, he 
returned very shortly thereafter as principal deputy to his mentor Kenneth Starr, who 
himself is best remembered for serving as Bill Clinton’s investigator and the primary 
force behind his impeachment, which was due to lies about an extramarital affair.  
According to Starr, Roberts was ‘my very closest [sic.], most trusted adviser’.22 Again, 
Roberts’ internal legal memoranda at the Solicitor General’s Office are not public 
records.  Owing to this, and to his failed nomination to the D.C. Circuit in 1992, he 
avoided ‘amass[ing] an extensive paper trail of controversial decisions’.23   
Roberts was eventually confirmed to a seat on the D.C. Circuit’s bench on May 8, 
2003.  By the time that he was nominated to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist, Roberts 
had authored only 49 opinions.  Very few of these were controversial, as they generated 
only three dissents.24  However, one amounted to a clear signal to the executive that 
Roberts shared its views on inherent reserve powers to ignore existing laws.  This case, 
Hamdan v Rumsfeld,25 involved a challenge to features of the military tribunals at 
Guantánamo Bay, which were erected in response to the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
21  Ibid 
22  Colvin supra n 158 
23  Toobin supra n 11, 264 
24  Congressional Record, Senate, vol. 151, part 16, 21205 
25  Hamdan v Rumsfeld [2005] 415 F3d 33 (D.C. Circuit) 
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Hamdi v Rumsfeld.26 In the opinion deciding that case, a bare majority on the Supreme 
Court had insisted that the detainees receive some form of due process.  Accordingly, 
in Hamdan, the petitioner argued that even these new procedures did not comply with 
the minimum requirements of the Geneva Conventions.27  This was indisputable, but 
Roberts ruled that ‘the Geneva Conventions cannot be judicially enforced’.28   This 
holding was later reversed by the Supreme Court, but Roberts ‘had proved himself 
worthy’ to Cheney nonetheless.29 
Shortly after his nomination, Roberts was confirmed by the Senate without 
difficulty, on a vote of 13-5 within the Senate Judiciary Committee and 78-22 on the 
floor.30  Toobin concluded that ‘[h]is obvious intelligence [and] abundant qualifications 
. . . would have made sustained opposition difficult’.31  This conclusion is correct, but 
it should be noted that it rests upon two unstated premises.  First, that the Senate should 
accept that Robert’s executive branch service constituted abundant qualification, as he 
26  Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2004] 542 US 507 (United States Supreme Court) 
27  Hamdan v Rumsfeld [2005] 415 F3d 33 (D.C. Circuit).  Hamdan’s convictions were ultimately 
overturned in 2012.   
28  Ibid 
29  Toobin supra n 11, 277 
30  United States Congressional Senate Reports, no. 15017 (Government Printing Office 2007) 
31  Toobin supra n 11, 278 
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had barely two years’ service as a judge at the time of his nomination to the nation’s 
highest court.  
Second, it ignores the fact that ‘sustained opposition’ might well have been possible 
if all of his memoranda written while he served the executive were made public. The 
ranking member of the opposition party on the Senate Judiciary Committee’s request 
for these was rejected on privacy grounds, which that member then described as a ‘red 
herring’.32 Despite that objection, the Committee allowed the confirmation to proceed 
without receiving the memoranda, rewarding both obstructionism and the winning 
strategy of grooming compliant justices within the OLC, the White House Counsel and 
Solicitor-General’s Office, and other positions where their legal advice would remain 
confidential and subject to claims of privilege. 
The confirmation of the next Justice would provide further proof that this was the 
optimal strategy for undermining the independence of the judiciary.  As will be 
demonstrated below, Samuel Alito was another lawyer who had prospered due to his 
allegiance to the executive.  By following the path blazed by Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Roberts, he quickly reached the heights of the American judiciary.  After one year as a 
law clerk, he joined the Solicitor General’s Office, like Roberts, this was directly after 
the ‘Reagan Revolution’, a time when ideological correctness was at a premium.  It was 
there, working alongside those senior figures mentioned earlier in this section, that he 
‘quickly established himself as an enthusiastic supporter of the Reagan 
32  Douglas Daniel, ‘White House Won't Give Out All Roberts Memos’, Associated Press 
(Washington, 24 July 2005) <http://www.truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/56052:white-house-
wont-show-all-roberts-papers> accessed 31 May 2014 
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Administration’.33  In 1985 he joined the OLC, during the tenure of Attorney-General 
Edwin Meese, one of Reagan’s closest and most ideological advisors, who was 
implicated during Alito’s term of service in the Iran-Contra Scandal.34  He was then 
appointed to be the chief federal prosecutor for New Jersey, and a mere three years 
later, given a lifetime appointment to the Third Circuit, at the young age of forty.35 
The existence of a fast-track to the judiciary for executive branch officials who 
agreed that it could expand its powers at will was exposed during Alito’s Supreme 
Court confirmation hearings.  When Alito had filed an application for a position within 
the OLC, he had attached a personal statement.  As it was written before he joined the 
executive branch, it was not protected from discovery by attorney-client privilege. The 
executive branch lawyers who vetted his candidacy for the Supreme Court had not, 
however, found this at the National Archives.  Instead, it was found by journalists after 
Bush announced Alito’s nomination.36 
In this personal statement, Alito pledged fealty to every ideological premise of the 
Reagan Administration, and insisted that these represent his own core values.  ‘I am 
and always have been . . . an adherent to the same philosophical views that I believe are 
central to this Administration’.37  This quickly became an issue during the confirmation 
33  Toobin supra n 11, 311 
34  Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-up (W. W. Norton 2007) 
371-386 
35  Almanac of the Federal Judiciary Volume Five (Aspen 2001) 5  
36  Toobin supra n 11, 311 
37  Samuel Alito, Jr., Personal Qualifications Statement, 15 November 1985, 
<http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/alito/111585stmnt.html> accessed 31 May 2014 
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hearings, as it made clear that Alito was being disingenuous when he claimed that he 
could address the issue of abortion with an open mind. While he had insisted that he 
would approach any case that challenged Roe v Wade38 with an open mind, he had said 
in his 1985 statement that, in addition to sharing all of the Administration’s views, ‘I 
am particularly proud of my contributions in recent cases in which the government has 
argued . . . that the Constitution does not protect a right to an abortion’.39  When asked 
directly by Senator Schumer whether that was still his view, he refused to answer.  
Toobin described his performance in these hearings by noting that ‘Alito was a dreadful 
witness on his own behalf—charmless, evasive and unpersuasive’.40 
The significance of abortion in contemporary American politics is impossible to 
overestimate.  Accordingly, it was this discrepancy that defined his confirmation 
hearings.  Indeed, the personal statement is now labelled the ‘personal statement on 
abortion’ when it is no such thing.41  Unfortunately, this distracted the Senators’ 
attention from other assertions in the personal statement that lead one to believe that 
Alito was nominated for a seat on the nation’s highest court precisely because he did 
not believe in the importance of an independent judiciary.  He wrote as follows: 
In the field of law, I disagree strongly with the usurpation by the judiciary of 
decisionmaking [sic] authority . . . . The Administration has already made major 
strides towards reversing this trend through its judicial appointments, litigation, 
and public debate, and it is my hope that even greater advances can be made 
38  Roe v Wade [1973] 410 US 113 (United States Supreme Court) 
39  Alito supra n 37 
40  Toobin supra n 11, 315 
41  Alito supra n 37 
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during the second term, especially under Attorney-General Meese’s leadership 
at the Department of Justice.42 
  
From this statement alone, one may reasonably conclude that Alito was allying 
himself with Nixon, Rehnquist, Cheney’s and Roberts’ views about the limited powers 
of the judiciary.   As they did, Alito states that he believes that one of the key ways to 
impose this view is through the appointment of judges who will not challenge the 
executive’s ‘decisionmaking authority’.  This plausible interpretation becomes more 
troubling when one considers that Alito’s comments appear to indicate his awareness 
that he was interviewing for a position that would groom him for a judicial appointment. 
Alito goes on in his personal statement to say ‘I believe very strongly in the 
supremacy of the elected branches of government’.43  This is a problematic opinion for 
a future Supreme Court Justice to espouse, as that court is charged by the Constitution 
to exercise oversight over the elected branches, and to correct them when they overstep 
their bounds.  Alito, when confronted with this at his confirmation hearings, said only 
that this was ‘a very inapt phrase’, although it has a clear meaning within the context 
of Nixon and Rehnquist’s influential views on executive supremacy.44   
Despite his evasive testimony, the failure of the executive to release all of the 
memoranda he had written, and the clear signals he had given to the executive of his 
view on its powers relative to those of the judiciary, the Senate did not reject Alito’s 
candidacy.  While on paper it appears that the vote confirming him was significantly 
closer than Chief Justice Roberts’, this is misleading.   While the final floor vote was 
42  Ibid (emphasis added) 
43  Ibid 
44  Toobin supra n 11 
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58-42 in favour of confirmation, this result was guaranteed when the discussion on his 
candidacy was closed.45  The vote that actually counted was that which ended the 
debate, which occurred after a motion for cloture.  The margin here was 72-25,46 very 
close to Roberts’ totals.   
The difference between the tallies on the two votes during Alito’s confirmation 
reveals something significant about the ways in which the Senate’s scrutiny of the 
executive’s nominees had by that point become dysfunctional and insufficiently 
protective of an independent judiciary and the rule of law.  A number of Senators voted 
against confirming Alito on the final vote, but voted in favour of closing the debate, 
something which they knew would ensure his confirmation.  By doing so, they would 
be able to tell their constituents that they had opposed the nomination, despite the purely 
symbolic nature of this action.  In essence, these members winked at the executive, 
showing deference but reserving the right to assert that they had not done so, at least to 
those who do not understand the significance of cloture votes.   
Among those who split their votes cynically against a filibuster but later nominally 
opposed Alito’s confirmation were many powerful members of the opposition party 
such as Daniel Inouye, who would later become the Senate’s President pro tempore,47 
and Joseph Lieberman, future Chair of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs.48  In addition, the attempt to prevent cloture was effectively 
45  David S. Rutkus, Supreme Court Nominations (Capitol 2005), 45-46 
46  Ibid 
47  United States Government Manual 2011 (2011, Government Printing Office) 17 
48  See United States House of Representatives Telephone Directory (Government Printing Office 
2007) 318 
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sabotaged by that party’s leader, Harry Reid, who had stated publically that ‘everyone 
knew’ he would be unable to gather enough votes to prevent the termination of the 
debate.  Joe Biden, the future Vice-President, ultimately voted against cloture even 
though he had spoken out publically against an attempt to prevent a vote.49  In any 
event, the effort to avoid cloture was effete, as Senator John Kerry, the future Secretary 
of State had decided to initiate the campaign while at a skiing resort in Switzerland, 
something which did not pass unnoticed.50  Accordingly, one might plausibly 
characterise this attempt to block Alito’s confirmation as nothing more than political 
theatre, which diminished the Senate.  The Senate’s failure to do more to check the 
executive as the Constitution intended and the reasons for this will be discussed in the 
next chapter below, in substantial detail. 
2.2   Kagan Nomination Confirms the Pattern Crosses Political Lines 
As established above in chapter four, the patterns of executive expansion and its 
claims of supremacy have not been affected by the transition between the Bush and 
Obama administrations in any fundamental way.  As will be demonstrated here, this is 
also true with respect to the tactics of judicial nomination designed to protect the 
executive’s power, which allowed it to create the parallel detention regime, apply 
torture, restrict access to the courts, and permit extra-judicial killing, as described in the 
49  Charles Hurt, ‘Biden Says Filibuster on Alito Unlikely; Up-or-Down Vote Expected’, Washington 
Times (Washington, 7 November 2005) <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-138405459.html> 
accessed 31 May 2014 
50  Charles Babbington, ‘Kerry Defends Senate Filibuster on Alito as “A Vote on History’”, 
Washington Post (Washington, 28 January 2006) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/27/AR2006012701405.html> accessed 31 May 2014 
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last chapter.  The key proof for this continuity in the drive for an executive branch 
which is above the law stems from the choice of Elena Kagan for a seat on the Supreme 
Court. 
In choosing to focus on Kagan’s nomination and confirmation, this thesis must 
justify its choice not to discuss that of Sonia Sotomayor.  Sotomayor’s nomination can 
be explained as a departure from the general pattern established by Nixon and Reagan’s 
nominations of Rehnquist and Scalia, as adopted and refined by Bush, as evidenced by 
the confirmation of Roberts and Alito, just as the nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor 
can be seen as aberrational in the context of the ‘Reagan revolution.’ At that time there 
was an overriding pressure upon the executive, which caused it to momentarily 
disregard the incentive to create a deferential Supreme Court.  In both cases, this 
pressure came from identity politics.51 
At the time of Reagan’s election, there had never been a woman on the Supreme 
Court’s bench.  Owing to the success of the feminist movement over the past two 
decades, the male domination of the nation’s highest court could not continue without 
exacting upon the executive a great political price.52  Because of the dearth of 
Republican-affiliated women with experience at the highest level of the legal profession 
51  Kevin Schultz, America Unbound (Wadsworth 2010) 454 
52  Susan Welch, et al., Understanding American Government (Thompson Wadsworth 2008) 448 
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and with excellent academic credentials, the executive’s choice of Sandra Day 
O’Connor53 was tightly constrained.   
Similarly, when Obama was elected, the Supreme Court had never had a Justice of 
Hispanic origin.  Since this demographic group constituted a major voting block that 
was central to his prospects for re-election, Obama needed to nominate a Hispanic 
justice, preferably a woman, owing to concerns about gender equity on a still male-
dominated Court. Sonia Sotomayor was the obvious choice.  She had effectively been 
a Justice-in-waiting, and undoubtedly would have secured a nomination much earlier 
had Al Gore’s election not been subverted in 2000.  Sotomayor was simply the 
candidate Obama was constrained to nominate, as she was the only candidate who had 
both the right demographic profile and the judicial and academic credentials, standing 
head and shoulders above other potential candidates.54  
Conversely, after the retirement of Justice Stevens, who was the most consistently 
independent Justice during the Bush Administration, and the least deferential to the 
executive at that time,55 the President had a relatively free choice, such that an observer 
might easily gauge his priorities by reference to the nominee’s characteristics.  This 
53  O’Connor was a graduate of Stanford Law School serving on the Arizona Court of Appeals at the 
time.  Henry Julian Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Rowman & Littlefield 2008) 266 
54  Sotomayor had attended Princeton and Yale Law School, and had eighteen years of service in the 
federal judiciary, including ten on the Second Circuit.  See Meg Greene, Sonia Sotomayor (ABC-CLIO 
2012) 139-147 
55  Denise L. Hudson, The Rehnquist Court: Understanding its Impact and Legacy  (Greenwood 2007), 
40-42 
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would provide a leading indication of whether judicial independence or deference to 
the executive would be prized during the new Administration, and if the latter, whether 
the executive would resort to the same techniques that were employed by the Reagan 
and Bush Administrations.   The adoption of these techniques would demonstrate that 
the Obama Administration was likewise committed to the erosion of judicial 
independence and of the rule of law itself, especially if it chose to nominate an executive 
branch insider whose record could be obscured with claims of privilege or 
confidentiality. 
At the time of her nomination, Elena Kagan had no judicial experience.  Justice 
Sotomayor was the author of 380 judicial opinions, from which one could glean her 
approach to the issues and to the separation of powers.56  Kagan had no public record, 
as she had pursued a career within the executive branch.        
After clerking, Kagan served two short and undistinguished periods in large-firm 
legal practice and academia, which merely indicated that she was following a well-
travelled road towards a legal position of significance in government. Kagan then began 
her service within the executive branch as Assistant White House Counsel.    Her legal 
advice to the executive in this position apparently demonstrated sufficient political 
56 Stevens’ lack of deference has been a longstanding feature of his approach to constitutional 
interpretation and jurisprudence; see generally e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Political Questions, Judicial 
Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs?  (Princeton University Press 1992) 
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acumen, as she was soon appointed Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic 
Policy and Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council.57   
As was the case with the other Justices who served as executive branch lawyers 
before their appointment to the bench, Kagan left government with the change of 
administration, which highlights the political nature of her work within that department.  
Her departure underscores this point because lawyers who work in more neutral 
capacities within the executive branch, i.e., at the Department of Justice, do not 
typically resign when the opposing party’s candidate is elected to the presidency.58  
Kagan returned to academia, but published very little, something observers concluded 
was a calculated attempt not to generate a paper trail that would impair her nomination 
to the nation’s highest court. By this point, as in Roberts’ case, the executive’s ambition 
to place her in this position was made clear by a failed nomination to the D.C. Circuit.59  
In 2009, Kagan was appointed Solicitor-General of the United States, the person 
responsible for arguing the executive’s position before the Supreme Court.  At the time 
57  Susan Navarro Smelcer, From Solicitor General to Supreme Court Nominee (Diane Publishing 
Company 2010) 14 
58  Barry Leonard, Investigation of Allegations into Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice 
(Diane Publishing Company 2010) 3 
59  See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical 
Analysis (Duke University Press 2003) 392 n 47 
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of her nomination, Kagan had never argued before any court.60  She was nominated to 
replace Justice Stevens shortly over a year later. 
At the time of her nomination, commentators noted that the lack of any evidence of 
her views on certain key legal issues, including the independence of the judiciary, the 
separation of powers, and inherent reserve powers purportedly possessed by the 
executive, was viewed positively by the Administration.61  This dearth of information 
was attributable to the fact that ‘her academic career is surprisingly and disturbingly 
devoid of writings or speeches on most key legal and Constitutional controversies, and 
. . . she has spent the last year as Obama’s Solicitor General’.62  
  Nevertheless, there were indications within this scant record that Kagan 
consistently supported the expansion of executive power.  In 2001, a law review article 
she published addressed the ‘proper limits of executive authority, and the view she 
advocated was clearly one that advocated far more executive power than had been 
previously accepted’.63  Neal Katyal noted that there was an essential continuity 
between the views she expressed in this paper and those advocated at that time within 
the Bush Administration’s OLC, although her ‘claims of executive power are not 
limited to the current administration . . . . Anticipating the claims of the current [Bush] 
60  Nina Totenburg, ‘Seen as a Rising Star, Kagan has a Limited Paper Trail’, National Public Radio 
(Washington, 9 May 2010) <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126611113> 
accessed 31 May 2014 
61  Ibid 
62  Glenn Greenwald, ‘The Case Against Elena Kagan,’ Salon Magazine (Washington, 13 April 2010) 
<http://www.salon.com/2010/04/13/kagan_3/> accessed 31 May 2014 
63  Ibid 
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administration, Kagan argued that . . . the President has the ability to effect 
comprehensive, coherent change’.64  William West, in commenting on Kagan’s article, 
noted that ‘[s]he is certainly a fan of presidential power’.65 
This conclusion is firmly reinforced by the statements Kagan made to the Senate 
during her confirmation hearings for the Solicitor-General’s position.  At that time: 
[S[he agreed wholeheartedly with . . . the rightness of the core Bush/Cheney 
Terrorism template:  namely, that the entire world is a battlefield, that war is the 
proper legal framework for analyzing all matters relating to Terrorism, and the 
Government can therefore indefinitely detain anyone captured on that battlefield 
(i.e., anywhere in the world without geographical limits) who is accused (but not 
proven) to be an enemy combatant.66 
 
This agreement was particularly evident after ‘[t]here was no daylight between Ms. 
Kagan  . . . and [Senator] Lindsey Graham . . . as he led her through a six-minute 
colloquy about the president’s broad authority to detain enemy combatants.’67 For this 
reason, when the executive’s potential nominees for the position as Stevens’ 
64  Neil K. Katyal, ‘Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch From 
Within’, (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 2314, 2343-2345 
65  Sasha Isenberg, ‘Obama taps Harvard Law School Dean as Solicitor General,’ Boston Globe 
(Boston, 6 January 2009); see also Eric Lichtblau, ‘Potential Justice’s Appeal May Be Too Bipartisan’, 
New York Times (New York, 16 May 2009) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/us/17kagan.html?_r=0> accessed 31 May 2014 
66  Greenwald supra n 262 
67  Lichtblau supra n 65 
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replacement were evaluated, the New York Times opined that Kagan ‘supported 
assertions of executive power’.68 
It is likely that it was her endorsement of the new detention paradigm, which, as 
demonstrated in the last chapter, entails an approach to executive power that is not 
compatible with the rule of law, that accounts for the ringing endorsement she secured 
from some of the engineers of the Bush Administration’s demolition of the separation 
of powers, such as M. Edward Whelan III, who was the first head of the OLC during 
the Bush Administration.  Whelan argued that ‘on issues of executive power and 
national security, Kagan is far from the Left’, and he also approved of her ‘display[] 
[of] genuine admiration and appreciation for Justice Scalia’.69   
2.3   The Court’s New Balance of Power on Rule of Law Issues 
Owing to Kagan’s academic credentials, her largely confidential record of service 
to the executive branch, and support of its claims of power, she was confirmed.  As she 
replaced Justice Stevens, who was before his retirement the most able defender of the 
role of an independent judiciary in enforcing the rule of law’s minimum limitations on 
68  ‘Possible Candidates,’ New York Times (New York, 9 April 2010) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/09/us/politics/20100409-stevens-candidates.html> 
accessed 31 May 2014 
69  Ed Whelan, ‘’Will the Left Oppose Elena Kagan?’ National Review (Washington 10 March 2010) 
<http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/49237/will-left-oppose-elena-kagan/ed-whelan> 
accessed 31 May 2014 
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executive power,70 her appointment had the capacity to fundamentally alter the balance 
of powers between the executive and the other branches of government. 
In 2012, the Court declined to exercise certiorari over seven habeas corpus petitions 
in a single day,71 reaffirming, as demonstrated in the last chapter, a detention and 
torture regime antithetical to the rule of law.  This decision can be explained by the fact 
that by this time the Court was dominated by Justices who had longstanding 
connections to the executive.  John Roberts is the Chief Justice, while the Senior 
Associate Justice is Antonin Scalia.  They can rely on Clarence Thomas, who happens 
to be another official from the Reagan Administration, for support.  Thomas rarely casts 
a vote that diverges from Scalia’s.72  As described above, these three strong supporters 
of executive deference were soon joined by Samuel Alito and, during the Obama 
Administration, Elena Kagan.  Justices with a history of close connections with the 
executive now comprise a majority on the Court.73   
On the Supreme Court, the majority rules, as Justice Brennan made clear:   
At some point early in their clerkships, Brennan asked his clerks to name the 
most important rule in constitutional law.  Typically they fumbled, offering 
Marbury v. Madison or Brown v. Board of Education as their answers.  Brennan 
would reject each answer, in the end providing his own by holding up his hand 
with the fingers wide apart.  This, he would say, is the most important rule in 
70  See supra chapter 4 
71  Order Denying the Writ of Certiorari in Latif v Obama, Al-Bihani  v Obama, Uthman v Obama, 
Almerfedi v Obama, Al-Kandari v Obama, Al-Madhwani v Obama, Al-Alwi v Obama [2012] 132 SCt 
2741 (United States Supreme Court) 
72  Richard Malphurs, Rhetoric and Discourse in Supreme Court Oral Arguments (Routledge 2013) 
186 
73  Toobin supra n 11, 327-329 
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constitutional law.  Some clerks understood Brennan to mean that it takes five 
votes to do anything, others that with five votes you can do anything.74  
 
It remains to be seen how these five justices might use this power to aid the executive 
branch.  However, it should be noted that owing to the advent of the executive’s 
successful strategy of appointing Justices who proved themselves while serving within 
the executive branch, the Court is left with a minority of only three independently-
minded Justices who are likely to stand up for the rule of law.  These Justices, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor, are a minority of three.  That number is significant.  While 
Justices can exercise substantial power by forcing the majority to state its views clearly 
on the record, a minority of three is too small for this purpose, as it takes four justices 
to accept a petition for appellate review.75 
As the next section will demonstrate, this dysfunctional pattern of judicial selection 
is also spreading to the influential circuits that rest directly beneath the Supreme Court 
in the hierarchy of the American federal judiciary, something which allows the pro-
executive majority of Justices to silently uphold executive power, by merely declining 
review.  As noted in chapter four, the circuit court with the greatest amount of oversight 
over the executive is the D.C. Circuit.76  This fact makes it the intermediate appeals 
court which the executive has the greatest incentive to control. The next section will 
demonstrate that the same dysfunctional strategies of judicial selection have been 
74  H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision 
(University of Chicago Press 2008) 16 
75  Lyle Denniston, ‘Is the “Rule of Four” Firmly Intact?’ Panel Discussion, Yale Law School, (18 
September 2009) <http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics/Lyle_Denniston.pdf> accessed 31 
May 2014 
76  See supra chapter 4 
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employed to shape the D.C. Circuit’s bench so that it is much more amenable to the 
claims of power made by the executive, destabilizing the separation of powers and the 
rule of law. 
3  EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTROL OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
‘The D.C. Circuit has long been thought of as the second most powerful court in the 
land and a good breeding ground for the Supreme Court’.77 The first of these premises 
gives the executive an incentive to control it. The second premise, the prospect of 
promotion, provides the means to accomplish that end. This court’s importance stems 
from the fact that it supervises a solitary district court that has jurisdiction over the 
governmental agencies and officials located in the nation’s capital.  Accordingly, ‘there 
is a built-in temptation to benefit the agency that can benefit the presiding judge’s 
career.’78 Of the Justices now on the Supreme Court, three served previously on the 
D.C. Circuit, where they did yeoman service and proved themselves worthy. A fourth, 
Kagan, was nominated for such a position.   
The court’s power to derail the executive’s agenda became clear in the 1970s, as it 
began to exercise a larger administrative jurisdiction, owing to the Watergate crisis.  At 
the height of the investigation into the Nixon Administration’s misconduct, the court 
exercised its infrequently-used power to undertake en banc review of over ten cases 
involving criminal charges against executive branch officials or their agents.79  
77  Christopher P. Banks, Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court (Johns Hopkins University Press 
1999) 4 
78  Charles Ashman, The Finest Judges Money Can Buy (Nash Publishing 1973) 233 
79  Banks supra n 77, 106 
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Executive control over the D.C. Circuit is, for these reasons, perhaps even more 
desirable than control over the Supreme Court, since it passes unnoticed. Preventing 
challenges to the enlargement of its own powers from reaching the Supreme Court 
allows the executive to avoid scrutiny and prevents that Court from being placed under 
the pressure that this entails.  The Court’s failure to review the D.C. Circuit’s 
judgments, even when they approve of executive prerogatives that destabilize the rule 
of law, are rarely noticed.80   
Denial of review garners little notice because of the nature of the Supreme Court’s 
docket.  It is commonly thought that the Court is overburdened.  Between 1970 and 
1997, roughly four thousand petitions for certiorari were filed at the Court each year.81  
Throughout this period, the Court granted ‘slightly less than four percent’ of these 
requests.82  There was a decline, however, in the rate of certiorari granted for cases 
from the D.C. Circuit during this period, something which Christopher Banks has 
argued is correlated with the increasing ideological convergence between the two 
courts.83  This dynamic becomes increasingly apparent over time. By 2009, only 
slightly more than one per cent of petitions for review of D.C. Circuit decisions were 
granted.84  Banks notes that ‘[t]his data is persuasive evidence that the United States 
80  El Shifa v United States [2011] 131 SCt 997 (United Sates Supreme Court) (writ of certiorari 
denied) 
81  Banks supra n 77, 108 
82  Ibid 
83  Ibid 108-110 
84  Melanie Wachtell and David Thompson, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari 
Petition Procedures’, (2009) 16 George Mason University Law Review 237,  241 
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Supreme Court has let the D.C. Circuit define the scope of legal policy in administrative 
law . . . after 1970’85 
This data also presents some evidence that the D.C. Circuit’s decisions to affirm 
broad executive powers, as described in chapter four, are part of a concerted attempt to 
take pressure off the Supreme Court, and that this is possible due to a majority of judges 
on both these courts’ benches that support the executive, since ‘the Court uses its 
discretion to deny certiorari more and grant it less, especially if both courts are 
ideologically compatible in membership’.86  While this remains to be demonstrated, 
more evidence can be adduced in favour of this hypothesis if it can be shown that the 
executive attempted to create the necessary ideological compatibility by nominating 
judges to the D.C. Circuit that are amenable to its assertions of broad and troubling 
powers, in the same manner as it did with respect to the Supreme Court. 
There is ample evidence that the executive attempted to gain control of the D.C. 
Circuit by appointing judges friendly to its aims in the period that followed the 
congressional resurgence and the concomitant re-imposition of the rule of law.  After 
Reagan’s election, it became apparent that he ‘was going to have a number of 
opportunities to change the D.C. Circuit’s membership . . . [and] viewpoints on topics 
like litigant access to courts [and] separation of powers’.87  Reagan’s first nominee was 
Robert Bork, one of Nixon’s key allies during the Watergate crisis.  Bork continued to 
serve on the D.C. Circuit after he failed to secure confirmation to the Supreme Court.  
85  Banks supra n 77, 114 
86  Ibid 116 
87  Ibid 53 
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He was followed onto the Court by Antonin Scalia and Kenneth Starr, another leading 
executive branch insider. 
After appointing Judge Silberman, Reagan’s next nominee was James L. Buckley, 
then serving in his administration as Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance.88 
Buckley was previously the President of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. These 
entities were broadcasters of American propaganda into Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, which were closely associated with the intelligence services.89  This was 
followed by the confirmation of Laurence Silberman, who served as Acting Attorney 
General during the Watergate crisis, having recently been promoted from the position 
of Deputy Attorney General, where he was charged with overseeing the OLC during 
the dying days of the Nixon Administration.  He later served as Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, which at the time was a key Cold War battleground.  At the time of his 
appointment he was a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control 
and Disarmament and the Department of Defense Policy Board.90  In essence, these 
two judges were executive branch insiders with links to the intelligence community. 
  The rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court brought more 
scrutiny to the appointment of radical proponents of the imperial presidency to the D.C. 
Circuit.  However, the aforementioned judges formed a distinct and powerful block on 
88  Jeffrey Brandon Morris and Chris Rohmann, Calmly to Poise the Scales of Justice: A History of the 
Courts of the District of Columbia Circuit (Carolina Academic Press 2000) 323 
89  See G. R. Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy (Yale University Press 1997) 
46-51 
90  ‘Biographical Entry: Judge Laurence H. Silberman’ United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit <http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/content/VL+-+Judges+-+LHS> 
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the court, which, like the corresponding faction on the Supreme Court, would be 
strengthened considerably after the 9/11 attacks by the nominees chosen by George W. 
Bush, namely Janice Rodgers Brown and Brett Kavanaugh.91  By the time when the 
detention and torture regime was coming under sustained pressure in the lower courts, 
the D.C. Circuit could be controlled by this block. The four Reagan nominees, joined 
by another three confirmed during the Bush Administration, constituted more than half 
of the judges to whom these critical appeals might be assigned. 
As a result of this ideological alignment, the Supreme Court could rely upon the 
D.C. Circuit to dispose of cases brought by those challenging the executive’s policies 
that undermine the rule of law.  The last piece of proof for the argument that this was a 
concerted strategy comes from the fact that the Supreme Court decided to channel most 
of these cases to the D.C. Circuit exclusively, in ‘one of the most important decisions 
made by the United States Supreme Court in the terrorism-detention litigation in the 
past decade’, which occurred in an ‘all-but-unnoticed “GVR” order’92 in Bush v 
Gherebi.93  With this order, the Supreme Court forced all executive detainees to bring 
suit under the watchful eyes of the D.C. Circuit, despite there being no compelling 
reason why that should be the case, other than the implicit trust that these cases would 
be decided in a manner that relieved the Supreme Court of responsibility and scrutiny.94  
This order served to derail extant challenges in the forums that were the most attentive 
91  See ‘Material-Support Law Called Anti-Terror Warning of Choice’ in Issues in Peace and Conflict 
Studies (Sage Publications 2001) 384  
92  Stephen Vladeck, ‘The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene’ (2011) 41 Seton Hall Law Review 1451 
93  Bush v Gherebi [2004] 542 US 952 (United States Supreme Court) 
94  Ibid 
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to claims that the rule of law was being undermined by the executive, such as the 
Second Circuit.95  
This exclusive jurisdiction, now being exercised not only over claims brought by 
Guantánamo prisoners but those alleging wrongful conduct from Afghanistan to 
Germany, has been used to dispose of claims against the executive with increasing 
regularity. As noted above, the D.C. Circuit has eviscerated the holdings of the much-
vaunted Supreme Court opinions that subjected the executive to minimal legal 
restraints.  The foremost among these cases was Boumediene v Bush,96 which granted 
petitioners the right to habeas corpus.  Since Boumediene was decided four years after 
Gherebi, the Court knew at the time that the case was decided that the D.C. Circuit 
would be the court deciding on the proper scope of its holding in practice.  
Unfortunately, but predictably, the D.C. Circuit subsequently eviscerated Boumediene.  
By the time of Kiyemba, it was clear that the ‘constant . . . is the [D.C.] court of appeals’ 
refusal to apply, or even acknowledge [Boumediene].’97 
After the Court declined certiorari to Kiyemba and the seven other post-Boumediene 
cases that it disposed of in a single day of one-line orders, it is impossible not to 
conclude that delegating the responsibility to the D.C. Circuit was part of a calculated 
strategy of reducing the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence to a mere rhetorical 
shell.  This active or passive collusion between the two courts allowed the minimal 
legal restraints on the executive branch erected in the line of cases leading to 
95  See Rumsfeld v Padilla [2004] 351 F3d 695 (D.C. Circuit) 
96  Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 723 (United States Supreme Court) 
97  See ‘A Right Without a Remedy’, New York Times, (New York, 28 February 2011) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01tue1.html> 
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Boumediene to be dismantled.  This was done without significant public attention, 
which reduces the probability of the popular outrage which catalysed resistance to the 
executive during the Nixon Administration.  In addition, this minimized the risk of 
harm to the Supreme Court’s prestige, which was painstakingly rebuilt in the years 
following Bush v Gore.  This encouraged the public to continue to believe in the power 
of an independent judiciary, which the separation of powers requires and the rule of 
law in the United States depends on, but which is not actually present.  This plan would 
have been impossible to implement, however, without the pro-executive majorities on 
both of these courts, which itself required the subversion of the judicial selection 
system described above in section four. 
The previous chapter detailed a troubling pattern of deference by the nation’s two 
most important courts, the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit.  As Stephen Vladek 
persuasively argued that the creation of this new ‘national security canon’ cannot be 
attributed to normal processes of doctrinal development, the hypothesis explored in this 
chapter was that this new judicial deference might be explained as a by-product of a 
breakdown of the mechanisms of judicial selection.   
It is now possible to argue that the Supreme Court has effectively been colonized by 
the executive branch.  Not only are there no longer enough Justices committed to 
judicial independence and the rule of law to overturn a decision that favours the 
executive, they are not enough to even accept such a case.  This fact is of particular 
importance owing to the colonization of the D.C. Circuit, to which the Supreme Court 
has directed the cases that challenge the executive’s new regime of prolonged 
involuntary detention, torture, and extra-judicial execution.  A ruling of the D.C. Circuit 
is effectively the final word on challenges to the executive’s violation of non-derogable 
rights, as there are not enough votes for certiorari to the Supreme Court.  This process, 
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as demonstrated above, protects the image of an independent judiciary while denying 
any publicity to lawsuits challenging the executive.   
At this stage, it is possible to conclude that there has been a comprehensive failure 
of the rule of law in the United States.  The executive has been able to determine the 
scope of its own powers, divorced from legislative oversight.  It then assumed 
emergency powers to violate non-derogable rights, which cannot be challenged in the 
courts, owing to the existence of new rules that make the Constitution’s guarantees 
meaningless, and higher courts that are entirely unwilling to hold the executive legally 
accountable, as the rule of law requires.   
It remains for this thesis only to determine whether this crisis is likely to be 
permanent, and to address the objections of those scholars who believe that there are 
other mechanisms of accountability that might hold the executive accountable.  In 
particular, the possibility of a legislative resurgence must be considered, in addition to 
the assessment of the likelihood that executive overreaching might again provoke 
impeachment proceedings. 
4 CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH  
As the executive branch is not subject to any legal control, it can no longer be said 
that the United States is being governed in accordance with the fundamental norms of 
the rule of law, as defined by the International Commission of Jurists in the manner 
described in chapter one.  Furthermore, it is by now quite clear that this situation cannot 
be rectified by the courts themselves. Jurists in the lower courts who have attempted to 
impose legal sanctions upon the executive have been reversed by the appeals courts that 
are now firmly controlled by the executive branch. 
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The question that remains for this thesis to answer is whether these abuses, which 
mirror in many ways the situation during the Nixon Administration, as described in 
chapter two, might be curtailed in the near future by a congressional resurgence, in a 
manner similar to that which re-installed the rule of law in the United States in the years 
immediately following the Watergate investigations and Nixon’s resignation.  The 
legislature continues to possess the formal powers required for it to re-implement the 
rule of law in the same manner as it did between 1972 and 1976, as addressed in chapter 
two above.98  However, this thesis must discover whether it is likely that these powers 
are likely to be put to use in the near future. 
This section will address whether a congressional re-imposition of the rule of law is 
likely by analysing the legislature’s responses to the revelations of executive 
overreaching and violations of non-derogable rights in the ten years following the 9/11 
attacks, across the administrations of presidents Bush and Obama.  It will explore 
legislative reactions to the exposure of clandestine programs related to involuntary 
detention, torture of these detainees, illicit wiretapping and the use of agencies 
explicitly dedicated to foreign intelligence surveillance within the United States, the 
misuse of dubious intelligence obtained as a result of these abuses, and the executive’s 
initiation of aggressive war in the absence of legislative authorization.   
This section will demonstrate that Congress has failed to check and oversee the 
executive branch in the twenty-first century.  Instead, it will show that the legislative 
branch has continued to extend the discretionary powers of the executive upon request, 
98  See chapter 2, supra, see also House Committee on the Judiciary Majority Staff ‘Report to John C. 
Conyers Jr., Reigning in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and Recommendations related to the 
Presidency of George W. Bush’ 13 January 2009) 
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and failed to discipline the executive branch even when it has overstepped these 
remarkably broad grants.  However, the chapter will firstly describe Congress’ 
unwillingness to police the boundaries of the rule of law, as established by the 
legislation comprising the congressional resurgence discussed in chapter two, and then 
account for its acceptance of these abuses and the further extensions of unreviewable 
power by the executive that followed. 
4.1 Congress’ Response to Arbitrary Detention  
The Guantánamo Bay detention camp was not established by legislation, but merely 
by orders to the military issued by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  Plans 
for the re-purposing of facilities, which were originally built to house HIV positive 
Haitian refugees, and its staffing were put into motion on December 21, 2001.99   An 
announcement that prisoners of war accused of terrorism would be brought there was 
made by the Pentagon on December 27, 2001.100  Congress’ response to this 
information was remarkably muted.101 The Congressional Record reveals that the first 
legislative discussion of detention camps, which occurred over a month later, after the 
traditional Christmas break, came in the form of Senator Ben Nelson’s announcement 
of a bi-partisan fact-finding trip, which had every indication of being a public relations 
exercise, as Nelson decided in advance to absolve the executive, saying ‘I can’t imagine 
99  Karen Greenberg, The Least Worse Place: The First 100 Days of Guantanamo (Oxford University 
Press 2006) 23-26 
100 Ibid 38 
101 Ibid 
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… that the United States is giving anything other than humane treatment . . . . It is 
certainly going to be the case [sic] of humane treatment’.102 
Accordingly, despite the fact that the executive decided to revive a facility that was 
unconstitutional when it housed refugees103 without consulting Congress, there were 
no immediate complaints about the executive’s initiative.  This was despite the fact that 
it did so when the legislature, which was not in session, could not respond.  
Furthermore, since the facilities that dated back to the Haitian refugee crisis were 
insufficient, executive branch officials submitted a funding request on February 1, 2002 
to Congress, which was duly authorized.104  In the ten years following this, the 
legislature has never refused to provide funds necessary to run and expand the detention 
camp. Without these funds, the facility could not operate.105  As later sections of this 
chapter will demonstrate, this was merely the first evidence of a general pattern that 
would emerge, in which the legislative branch would consistently enable the 
executive’s indefinite arbitrary detention of suspects. 
Congress later made its support for the parallel detention regime eminently clear 
after the Supreme Court issued its first opinions challenging the executive’s theories 
about its rights to establish and run this facility and to set up military tribunals without 
any legislative authorization or oversight.  As noted in chapter four, the Court finally 
102 Congressional Record—Senate (24 January 2002) 192 
103 Haitian Centers Council v Sale [1993] 823 FSupp 1028 (District Court for the District of 
Columbia) 
104 Greenberg supra n 99, 177-180 
105 See generally William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law and the Power of 
the Purse (Oxford University Press 1994) 
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held in 2006 in the case of Hamdi v Rumsfeld106 that the detainees were entitled to the 
common protections of Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention, and that Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals established to determine whether the detainees were ‘enemy 
combatants’ were not constitutional.  This opinion stated that these tribunals were not 
consistent with existing legislation on military tribunals, in the form of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.  In essence, the Supreme Court rejected the OLC’s theory that 
the executive possessed an inherent constitutional power derived from its all-
encompassing ability to trump any law in the interest of national security to erect new 
military courts without the due process that the Constitution requires, or even with the 
requirements of natural justice.107 
Congress responded to the Court’s erection of this minor obstacle by passing the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006.  As described in earlier chapters, this statute 
provided explicit legislative authorization for the executive’s existing practices at 
Guantánamo, thus nullifying the Hamdan and Hamdi opinions.  It is important to note 
that the United States was no longer in the state of panic induced by the 9/11 attacks, 
and numerous criticisms of Guantánamo were lodged by foreign nations and non-
governmental organizations, and by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights by 
2006.108 Congress’ response to these objections was to explicitly authorize the ‘judicial 
black hole’.  Foremost among the objections to Guantánamo were allegations that rather 
106 Hamdi v Rumsfeld  [2006] 542 US 507 (United States Supreme Court) 
107 Hamdan v Rumsfeld [2006] 548 US 557, see also supra chapter 4 
108 See supra chapter 1 
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than housing ‘the worst of the worst’ terrorists,109 or fanatics bent on suicide attacks 
who ‘would chew through hydraulics lines’ of the aircraft transporting them,110 that 
many of the detainees were clearly factually innocent, and that they were being denied 
natural justice to hide precisely that fact.111 
4.2 Congress Regularises the Judicial Black Hole: The 2006 MCA 
As this subsection will demonstrate, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
hereinafter referred to as the ‘MCA’, accomplished five things.  First, in response to 
Supreme Court’s determination that the detainees were owed the protection of Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions,112 it created by statute the category of ‘unlawful enemy 
combatants’, to replace the label of ‘enemy combatants’ that was invented by the OLC 
in a memorandum that concluded, on the basis of the legal reasoning described in 
chapter three,113 that the detainees possessed no rights under the laws of war.  Second, 
it authorized the military commission that the Court held in Hamdi could not be 
109 Comments of Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Ken Ballen and Peter Berger, ‘The Worst of the Worst?’ 
Foreign Policy (Washington, 20 October 2008) 
<www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/10/19/the_worst_of_the_worst> 
110 Comments of General Richard B. Meyers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in 
Elspeth van Veeren, ‘Clean War, Invisible War, Liberal War: The Clean and Dirty Politics of 
Guantanamo’, in Alexander Knapp (ed), Liberal Democracies at War: Conflict and Representation 
(Bloomsbury 2013) 94 
111 See generally Andy Worthington, The Guantánamo Files (Pluto Press 2007) 
112 Hamdan v Rumsfeld [2006] 548 US 557 (United States Supreme Court) 
113 See supra chapter 3 
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established without legislative authorization.  Third, in establishing these commissions, 
it regularized indefinite detention by creating a jurisdiction to which the prisoners could 
now purportedly be lawfully subjected.  Fourth, it stripped detainees of the ability to 
petition for the writ of habeas corpus.  Fifth, it endorsed the executive’s earlier 
enlargement of its own powers, in direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision that 
this was unconstitutional and a grave violation of the separation of powers that 
undergirds the American rule of law. 
In creating the status of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’, Congress chose to deliberately 
ignore the Geneva Convention, which extends its protections to members of militias 
and volunteer corps.114 While the MCA appears to recognize this fact, it simply 
designates by fiat all members of the Taliban and ‘associated forces’ as unlawful 
combatants, for reasons that are not explained.  Those bearing arms for the de facto and 
effective government of Afghanistan at the time of the 2002 invasion, even when 
bearing arms openly and as part of a responsible command structure, are defined as 
‘unlawful enemy combatants’, merely because the legislation says so.  In drafting this 
statute, Congress endorsed the executive’s view that the members of the Taliban and 
associated forces, by resisting the American invasion, were terrorists.115  This provided 
114 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, article 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
(entered into force 21 October 1950) 
115 In doing so, they followed the lead provided by the executive branch, see ‘Executive Order 13440,  
‘Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention 
and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency’ (20 July 2007) 
<https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13440.htm> accessed 1 June 1, 2014; see also Allison Danner, 
‘Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story’, (2007) 43 Texas International Law 
Journal 1 
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the legal basis for a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as 
CSRT, to conclude that Omar Khadr, who at the time of the alleged offense was a fifteen 
year old child soldier, was guilty of murder in violations of the laws of war and of 
material support of terrorism because he threw a grenade at an armed American 
soldier.116 In addition, the legislation made it clear that it was the executive that was to 
have the exclusive power to submit someone to the jurisdiction of these tribunals.  Any 
decision of the Secretary of Defense to bring someone to Guantánamo for that purpose 
was now considered ‘dispositive’ of the issue.117 
Both the Geneva Conventions and the Supreme Court’s Hamdi opinion make it clear 
that trials held to determine that status of prisoners must comply with the rules of natural 
justice.118  The MCA, in establishing the procedures for the military trials or CSRTs, 
fell short of that mark.  It prevented any lawyer without a security clearance from 
representing detainees,119 which allowed the executive branch to bar any attorney by 
denying him or her that clearance, as this decision is now unreviewable in the courts.120  
The MCA prevented defence attorneys from invoking the Geneva Conventions at the 
116 Michelle Sheppard, Guantanamo’s Child (John Wiley & Sons 2008) 1-3 
117 United States Code, title 10, section §948c (d) 
118 Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2006] 542 US 507 (United States Supreme Court) 
119 Marjorie Cohn, ‘Five “High-Value” Guantanamo Detainees Improperly Presumed Guilty’, 
TruthOut <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/17367-five-high-value-guantanamo-detainees-
improperly-presumed-guilty>  
120 The Supreme Court has held that the denial of a security clearance is non-justiciable.  Department 
of the Navy v Egan [1988] 484 US 518 (United States Supreme Court) 
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CSRTs.121  It stripped away the procedural protections of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, including the right to a speedy trial and the right not to incriminate oneself.122 
The final provision was particularly problematic, as the next subsection will discuss 
how Congress determined that alleged confessions obtained using torture were to be 
admissible in the CSRTs. 
That said, it was the MCA’s third feature that was the most problematic.  In 
abrogating the detainees’ right of appeal, it insulated these tribunals from any challenge 
before an objective and neutral magistrate.  Now, not only was the executive branch the 
prosecutor, judge and executioner, as the MCA explicitly authorized the imposition of 
the death penalty,123 it was now unaccountable.  This was accomplished via the 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions, which state that ‘No court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on 
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United 
States [viz. the executive] to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is 
awaiting such determination’.124 
These provisions stood for something more significant than simple evasion of 
judicial scrutiny.  They were also a legislative endorsement of the OLC’s earlier 
position that only the executive should be able to determine whether someone was 
properly subject to its jurisdiction, which the executive itself both created and defined.   
121 United States Code, title 10, section §948b (g) 
122 United States Code, title 10, section §948b (d)(1)(B) 
123 United States Code, title 10, section §948d (d) 
124 United States Code, title 10, section §950j (b) 
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Shortly before the creation of this Star Chamber, then White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales said that certain protections provided by the Geneva Conventions were 
‘quaint’, and thus the executive could ignore them.125 In passing the MCA Congress 
affirmed that ‘the President has the authority for the United States to interpret the 
meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions’.126 This provided authority for 
the executive’s claim that no other branch of government could judge whether its 
decision that Article 3 simply did not apply was in error. 
What was worse, the same section of the MCA stated that these powers granted to 
the executive were not, in fact, a delegation of power from the legislature, as this might 
support an argument that Congress could revoke them. Instead, the legislation specified 
that these powers were ‘[a]s provided by the Constitution’.127 This was entirely in line 
with Yoo’s memoranda of early 2002, as discussed in chapter three.  Here, Congress 
was not merely over-delegating. Rather, it was disclaiming any responsibility for 
making sure that the executive faithfully executed the law.  The Geneva Conventions, 
as treaties ratified by the Senate, constitute the ‘supreme law of the land’,128 on the 
125 Alberto Gonzales, ‘Memorandum to the President, ‘Decision Re: Application of the Geneva 
Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban’, (Washington, Office 
of the White House Counsel, 25 January 2002) 
<http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/gnzls12502mem2gwb.html> 
126  Military Commissions Act 2006, Public Law 109-366 
127 Ibid section 6(a)(3)(A) 
128 United States Constitution, article 6, clause 2 
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same level as federal statutes and the Constitution itself.129 Congress now apparently 
agreed with the OLC that it was the executive branch which was empowered to provide 
binding interpretations of the laws, not the courts, and that its supremacy was derived 
from the Constitution. 
It can hardly be said that in 2006 Congress was in a state of panic, of the sort that 
reigned three days after the 9/11 attacks when it passed the AUMF.  Further evidence 
that the MCA represented a measured legislative response to the Hamdi and Hamdan 
decisions can be found in the record of the debate over the bill.  Several amendments 
that would have provided some degree of legislative oversight of the executive were 
considered and rejected.  Senator Robert Byrd proposed an amendment in the Senate 
that would have introduced a sunset clause into the legislation, such that the executive’s 
powers to subject those it designated to the jurisdiction of military commissions would 
have ended in 2011. The amendment was rejected.130  In addition, Senator Edward 
Kennedy offered Amendment 5088 to the Senate Bill,131 which would have specifically 
banned the infamous form of torture known as waterboarding.  As section three will 
make clear, the executive remained determined to use statements obtained in this 
129 See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, ‘Treaties as Supreme Law of the Land: Judicial Interpretation of 
Treaties’, (2008)122 Harvard Law Review 599 
130 Byrd Amendment <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/R?r109:FLD001:S60420> accessed 1 June 
2014 
131 Senate Amendment 5088 to Bill 3930 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?r109:1:./temp/~r109usu1dE::> accessed 1 June 2014 
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manner as evidence against detainees in the CSRTs.  Kennedy’s amendment also 
failed.132 
The passage of the MCA cannot be attributed to the fact that the party in control of 
the executive branch possessed majorities in the legislature.  During the 109th 
Congress, the Republican majority in the Senate was only 55-45.133  As described in 
chapter five, sixty votes are required to pass legislation in the Senate owing to its cloture 
rules.  Accordingly, passage of the MCA could only be assured if five members of the 
Democratic Party were prepared to vote in its favour.  In the end, eleven Democrats 
crossed the floor. While the party leadership in the Senate cast their personal votes 
against the bill, a number of the party’s power brokers, ensured its passage.  Among 
them were former Vice-Presidential candidate Joseph ‘Joe’ Lieberman, Senator Frank 
Lautenberg, and William ‘Bill’ Nelson, who consistently supported illicit extensions of 
executive power.  The Democratic Party’s leadership failed to whip the vote effectively, 
rendering their own votes against its passage largely symbolic.  There were enough 
votes to prevent cloture, but no filibuster was attempted.134 This mirrors the voting 
132 Voting tally for Senate Amendment 5088 to Bill 3930 
<http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=
2&vote=00258> accessed 1 June 2014 
133 Chris Den Hartog, Nathan W. Monroe, Agenda Setting in the U.S. Senate: Costly Consideration 
and Majority Party (Cambridge University Press 2011) 105 
134 David Friedman, ‘The Democratic Party and the Future of American Politics’, (2007) 11 New 
Politics <http://newpol.org/content/democratic-party-and-future-american-politics> accessed 1 June 
2014 
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patterns established by the Supreme Court confirmation battles, as described in the last 
chapter. 
4.3 Shoring Up the Parallel Detention Regime: The 2009 MCA 
Bipartisan legislative support for executive dominance during the ‘war on terror’ can 
best be demonstrated by detailing the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2009.  
It will hereinafter be referred to as the ‘2009 MCA’.  Like its predecessor, the 2009 
MCA was a response to a Supreme Court case that put the CSRT process in jeopardy, 
owing to the fact that the opinion pointed out that its procedures did not comply with 
the requirements of natural justice.  
In Boumediene v Bush135 the Court held that the MCA’s jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions were unconstitutional, and rhetorically rebuked, as chapter four concluded, 
Congress’ capitulation to the executive branch, insofar as the 2006 MCA gave it the 
ability to determine the scope of its own powers in a manner inconsistent with the rule 
of law. As the Court noted, ‘to hold that the political branches may switch the 
constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this court, “say 
what the law is”’.136   
In Boumediene, the Court recognized that the MCA had made the judiciary appear 
irrelevant, and it did not wish to suffer any loss in perceived power or esteem. 
Accordingly, as chapter four indicated, the Court stood up for itself.  However, as noted 
in chapter five and explained in the next section, this decision would mean nothing if 
the Court was unwilling to supervise the D.C. Circuit, to which the executive would 
135 Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 723 (United States Supreme Court) 
136 Ibid 726 
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appeal all of the writs of habeas corpus granted pursuant to Boumediene, owing to the 
provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act.137  Nevertheless, even if the detainees’ pleas 
for release would later fall on deaf ears, the Supreme Court had also made it impossible 
for the executive to proceed with the CSRTs. The opinion had also held that these 
tribunals did not grant the detainees an adequate opportunity to prove that they were 
not enemy combatants.  As it did in 2006 following Hamdi, Congress came to the rescue 
by providing explicit legislative authorization for these drumhead proceedings,138 
thereby granting the executive the power that the Court had said it had unlawfully 
assumed. 
This was not how the 2009 MCA was initially perceived.139 At the beginning of the 
Obama Administration, the executive possessed a substantial amount of good will, and 
accordingly the press and the public focused on the fact that the Act allowed detainees 
more procedural rights in the CSRTs than before.140  However, these observers failed 
to note that these were not concessions to the detainees, but rather were mandated by 
the Court.  If indeed the Obama Administration wished to continue the Guantánamo 
137 Detainee Treatment Act 2005, Public Law 109–148 
138 Military Commissions Act 2006, Public Law 109-366 
139 See e.g. Deborah Pearlstein, ‘Military Commissions, Round 3’, Opinio Juris, (23 October 2009) 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10/23/military-commissions-round-3/> accessed 1 June 2014 
140 Congressional Research Service, ‘Enemy Combatant Detainees: "Habeas Corpus" Challenges in 
Federal Court’ (Congressional Research Service 2011) 21 
<http://books.google.ca/books?id=UI4pHjIOEQAC&pg=PA22&dq=mca+2009+more+rights+procedur
al&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YHg_UoyVHMPuiQLprYCwCQ&ved=0CEcQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=mca%
202009%20more%20rights%20procedural&f=false> accessed 1 June 2014 
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show trials, as will be demonstrated below, it needed to make these changes in order to 
protect the executive from effective challenges in the courts.141 It can also be shown 
that the reflexive deference of the legislature to the executive was now something 
supported by both parties, as they demonstrated their uncritical support by approving 
additional grants of unreviewable discretionary authority whenever the executive was 
checked by the judiciary. 
When the 2009 MCA was proposed, the Democratic Party controlled the executive 
branch, and possessed majorities in both branches of the legislature.  The version of the 
bill introduced in the House of Representatives was sponsored by Isaac ‘Ike’ Skelton, 
the Democratic Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The Senate version 
was sponsored by Democratic Party Senator and power broker Joe Lieberman.  
However, the Democratic Party’s control of the Senate was not absolute.  Together with 
the two independents who voted with their party, they could only count on fifty-nine 
votes, one short of the supermajority needed to obtain cloture.  However, in a turn of 
events that mirrored the voting on the 2006 MCA, a number of Republican Senators 
broke with their own party to vote for the bill, which demonstrates that Mitch 
McConnell and John Kyl, who served as the Republican Party’s leaders in that chamber, 
chose not to whip in the vote, although they cast personal and largely symbolic votes 
against it.142 The roles the party leaders played in the kabuki theatre of symbolic 
opposition to the executive were simply reversed.  
141 This is because the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v Bush made further trials under the 
MCA 2006 impossible.  See Boumediene v Bush [2008] 553 US 723 (United States Supreme Court) 
142  See Glenn Greenwald, Interview with Senator Chris Dodd, Salon Magazine (5 August 2007)  
<http://www.salon.com/2007/08/05/dodd_interview/> accessed 1 June 2014 
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What is most important to note is that because Robert Byrd did not vote against it, 
the final tally was only sixty-five votes in favour.   This is significant, because if the 
President chooses to veto a bill, a supermajority of sixty-six votes is required to override 
that decision.  However, President Obama duly signed the legislation, making possible 
the renewal of CSRTs, which also validated detention at Guantánamo pursuant to their 
jurisdiction.  Early proceedings brought after this statute was passed involved the final 
disposition of Omar Khadr’s case.  Khadr, as noted in the last chapter was an enemy 
combatant more properly described as a child soldier. Previously, charges against him 
were dismissed, new charges were made possible by the MCA.143  Another case brought 
under the new rules was that of Ibrahim al-Qosi, who was ultimately convicted of 
material support for terrorism for having served as a cook at a training camp in 
Afghanistan.144 
A discussion of the reasons behind Congress’ capitulation to the executive over its 
unilateral power to manage the new regime of indefinite detention will be taken up in 
sections six and seven of this chapter.  The importance of discerning these factors will 
be highlighted by the next section, which will discuss legislative support for the 
executive’s position on the right to torture the detainees with impunity, thus also 
legitimating the immediate purpose of the new parallel detention regime. 
143 Roza Pati, Due Process and International Terrorism (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 414-424 
144 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Press Release: Al-Qosi Plea Is First Conviction In Broken 
Military Commissions Under Obama’ (7 July 2010) <https://www.aclu.org/human-rights-national-
security/al-qosi-plea-first-conviction-broken-military-commissions-under-obama> 
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4.4 Torture Absolved: The Detainee Treatment Act  
Chapter three concluded that the true purpose of the Guantánamo detention camp 
and the black sites was to generate reports that implicated as supporters of terrorism the 
states that the Bush Administration wanted to invade. The use of torture was considered 
by high executive officials as critical to generating a casus belli.   Accordingly, the 
continued use of torture in these camps was of vital importance to the executive.  
However, a threat to this process began to emerge as the details of waterboarding and 
other forms of torture were disseminated.  
Fortunately for the executive, Congress was again willing to declare legal many 
gross abuses of jus cogens norms, in this instance, even retrospectively.145  As noted in 
the last section, the Senate rejected amendments to the MCA that would have explicitly 
forbidden waterboarding. This was a continuation of the tacit approval for torture found 
in legislation, in particular in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘DTA’.146 
Much like the 2009 MCA, the DTA was characterized as a legislative response to 
executive abuses, one that would purportedly put a stop to unacceptable practices.147  
However, as this section will show, it is better understood in the manner set forth in the 
previous section, as a Congressional response to challenges to the executive’s crimes, 
145 Thomas McDonnell, The United States, International Law and the Struggle Against Terrorism 
(Routledge 2010) 69 
146 Detainee Treatment Act 2005, Public Law 109–148 
147 See Jules Pfiffner, Power Play: The Bush Presidency and the Constitution (Brookings 2008) 159-
160 
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and not to the violations themselves. Accordingly, Amnesty International argued that 
the amendment's loopholes make it clear that torture is now official US policy.148  
These challenges were the direct result of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal,149 
wherein numerous photographs of American jailors chaining hooded detainees in 
‘stress positions’, threatening them with dogs, and engaging in sexually-charged 
humiliation.  While the Bush Administration blamed ‘bad apples’ in the military, the 
Taguba report150 revealed that jailors were frequently used to ‘soften up’ detainees 
before interrogation using exactly these methods, which were explicitly approved for 
use at Guantánamo by officials the highest levels of the Administration.151  The parallel 
detention regime and the torture that was endemic to it spread worldwide.152  
148 Alfred W. McCoy, “Invisible in Plain Sight: CIA Torture Techniques Go Mainstream’, Amnesty 
International Magazine (London, March 2006) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20080828174831/http://www.amnestyusa.org/magazine/invisible_in_plai
n_sight.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
149 See, e.g., Associated Press, ‘Vatican calls prison abuse a bigger blow to U.S. than Sept. 11’, 
Associated Press (Washington, 12 May  2004) <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-
05-12-vatican-iraqi-abuse_x.htm> accessed 1 June 2014 
150 Antonio Taguba, ‘Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade’ (30 July 2004) 
<http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html> 
151 See generally Philippe Sands, The Torture Team (Penguin 2008).  Donald Rumsfeld had pushed for 
more lenient standards for ‘stress positions’, writing ‘I can stand for 8-10 hours a day.  Why are 
detainees limited to 4 hours?’  
152 Alfred W. McCoy, ‘Torture and Impunity: The U.S. Doctrine of Coercive Interrogation’ 
(University of Wisconsin Press 2012) 414-424 
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The photographic evidence of the torture and murder of detainees at Abu Ghraib 
sounded a chord that moved the public more than a thousand volumes of deposition 
transcripts ever could, and the reaction was visceral.153  Again, Congress would need 
to provide assurances that this was all in the past in order for the ‘enhanced 
interrogation’ of detainees to continue in the future.  Accordingly, Congress publicized 
the DTA’s provisions requiring all interrogations would now need to be in accord with 
the provisions of the relevant Army Field Manual, which purportedly did not authorize 
degrading or inhumane treatment.154  What passed largely unnoticed is that this again 
turned over to the executive the rights to define what did and did not constitute torture, 
since under the executive’s interpretation of its powers, it alone has the power to 
determine what was included in that manual.155 
Congress could merely have invoked and re-affirmed the legislation which the 
executive consistently violated, namely the provisions of the United States Code, which 
153 Douglas V. Porpora, ‘Abu Ghraib and Torture: Whither Dostoyevsky?’, in Porpora et al. (eds) Post-
Ethical Society: The Iraq War, Abu Ghraib, and the Moral Failure of the Secular Society ( University 
of Chicago Press 2013) 125 
154 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations (FM 2-22.3) 
(Department of the Army 2006) <https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2014 
155 The executive branch purports to retain the power to revise the Army Field Manuals and “additional 
guidance” on the applicability of torture bans to intelligence agencies.  See Joseph Margulies, 
Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power (Simon and Shuster 2006) 245-247, see also Center 
for Constitutional Rights, ‘CCR Praises Obama Orders, Cautions Against Escape Hatch for Torture’, 
(22 January 2009) <http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ccr-praises-obama-orders%2C-
cautions-against-escape-hatch-torture> 
316 
 
                                                 
Chapter 5: Explaining the Failure to Re-Implement Oversight 317 
‘prohibit[] torture committed by public officials under color of law against persons 
within the public official's custody or control . . . [and which] applies . . . to acts of 
torture committed outside the United States’.156  Alternatively, it could have reiterated 
the fact that the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Convention Against Torture’ 
is the supreme law of the land, since it was implemented by federal enabling 
legislation.157  Instead, the legislation simply failed to close all loopholes that allowed 
the ‘cruel and inhuman treatment’ that it purportedly prohibited.158 Given the detailed 
guidance that surrounds these international instruments, it is difficult to imagine that 
this was simply an oversight. 
By merely limiting the permissible techniques of interrogation to those listed in the 
Army Field Manual, which the executive could amend at will, Congress gave the 
executive the power to reauthorize ‘enhanced’ interrogation.  It did so, with Annex M 
of FM 2-22.3,159 as described in chapter three.  Again, the executive was to serve as the 
156 United States Code, title 18, section 2340A 
157 Congressional Research Service ‘The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of 
Implementation’, (Congressional Research Service 2009) 
158 Phillip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2013), 
271 
159 See Headquarters, Department of the Army, ‘Appendix M: Restricted Interrogation Technique—
Separation’, (Department of the Army, 2006) 
<https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/view/100.ATSC/10492372-71C5-4DA5-8E6E-649C85E1A280-
1300688170771/2-22.3/appm.htm> accessed 1 June 2014; this document explicitly authorizes the ‘Fear 
Up’ technique, had previously been understood to authorize such techniques as terrorizing detainees 
with attack dogs, as pictured in photographs released from Iraq (see photograph of detainee 
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sole judge of what constituted torture, wholly in keeping with John Yoo’s memoranda 
on the subject, but now this unlimited discretion was to be exercised pursuant to explicit 
legislative sanction. 
 The DTA also immunized the torturers, provided that waterboarding and other forms 
of torture ‘were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time they were 
conducted’160 by the executive branch.  Again, Congress acceded to the OLC’s 
argument that the law simply was what the executive said it was, despite the fact that 
the executive’s reasoning could be so poor as to amount to professional misconduct.  In 
addition, the DTA, as modified by the Graham-Levin Amendment,161 specified 
explicitly that statements that were obtained through torture were to be admitted as 
evidence in the CSRTs.  Collectively, the MCA, the Graham-Levin Amendment, and 
the DTA itself offered the executive impunity for earlier torture, the ability to introduce 
statements obtained thereby to justify further detention of the victims of torture, and the 
power to continue to do the same to detainees, after it modified the definition of torture 
as it saw fit, respectively. 
That said, the executive found even the suggestion that it might require a delegation 
of authority from Congress to accomplish these goals to be unacceptable.  Accordingly, 
Mohammad Bollendia being threatened by Sergeant Santos Cardona and his attack dog, at: 
http://rexcurry.net/dog-torture-terrorism-abu-ghraib1b.jpg.) The Washington Post revealed that these 
techniques had been brought to Iraqi detention facilities from Guantánamo.  Josh White, ‘Abu Ghraib 
Dog Tactics Came From Guantanamo’, Washington Post (Washington, 27 July 2005) 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/26/AR2005072601792.html> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
160 Public Law 109-163, division A, title 14 
161 Senate Amendment 2516, 109th Congress, lst Session (Senate) section 104 (2006) 
318 
 
                                                 
Chapter 5: Explaining the Failure to Re-Implement Oversight 319 
the Bush Administration attached a signing statement to the DTA, which stated that 
‘[t]he executive branch shall construe . . . the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary 
executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional 
limitations on the judicial power’.162   
This statement was a bold reassertion of the theory of executive power found in the 
OLC memoranda discussed in chapter three.  Here, it asserted that the Commander-in-
Chief possessed inherent constitutional powers over detainees, an assertion that the 
Supreme Court rejected earlier in Hamdi.163 However, Congress did not respond to the 
signing statement, and indeed it endorsed the same arguments in the text of the MCA.  
However, it was very significant that the executive stated quite boldly its intention not 
to be bound by a duly enacted legislation, namely the portions of the DTA that outlawed 
certain techniques of torture. The sections of the DTA barring waterboarding were so 
unpopular within the executive branch164 that it decided to openly assert that it did not 
feel that it needed to pay attention to the law of the land, even when it was enacted 
specifically to regulate its conduct with respect to non-derogable rights.   
162 George W. Bush, ‘President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense, 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic 
Influenza Act 2006’ <http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051230-8.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
163 Hamdi v Rumsfeld [2006] 542 US 507 (United States Supreme Court) 
164 Barton Gellman and Jo Becker, ‘Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power’, Washington Post 
(Washington 25 June 2007) 
<http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/pushing_the_envelope_on_presi/> accessed 1 June 
2014 
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What was even more notable, however, is that Congress, having made the rhetorical 
point in order to satisfy the public, failed to respond to the effective nullification of the 
statute’s legal effect, which the public could not have noticed.165 In this way, DTA 
functioned for Congress in the same manner as Boumediene for the Supreme Court: it 
allowed a branch of government that was under popular pressure to express its 
displeasure with obvious violations of jus cogens norms, but when the executive 
continued in the same vein, this could simply be ignored owing to the fact that this did 
not attract any publicity. 
The DTA also foreshadowed the nullification of the Boumediene opinion, as it 
contained a provision directing appeals from the CSRTs to the D.C. Circuit.166  This 
provides evidence it was clear in 2005 that the D.C. Circuit was more likely to be hostile 
to the detainees’ claims that any other court. This can be deduced from the fact that this 
provision was placed within a bill that otherwise deprives every other court from 
hearing petitions for habeas corpus, on the theory that this is vexatious and 
unnecessary.  The only plausible explanation for channelling all direct appeals from the 
CSRTs to this court is that the legislators thought that it could be counted upon to 
dispose of these in the manner that Congress intended.  Simply put, the DTA was 
designed to keep a judicial black hole where torture occurred in continued operation. In 
order to do so, Congress affirmed the executive’s argument that no other branch of 
government possessed any power to challenge its actions. 
165 Jane Meyer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How The War on Terror Turned into a War on 
American Ideals (Anchor Books 2009) 321-331 
166 Detainee Treatment Act 2005, section 1005(e)(1)(B) 
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4.5 Congress’ Consent to Executive War-making  
The analysis of the parallel detention regime in chapter three concluded that its 
purpose was to hide torture designed to produce faulty intelligence that could justify 
aggressive war against targets selected by the executive.  By isolating, and then 
torturing, detainees, the executive could obtain statements that purportedly 
incriminated other states as sponsors of terrorism.  As this thesis has explained in earlier 
chapters, the destruction of the rule of law in the United States has proceeded with a 
goal in mind. The desired objective is the preservation of unilateral American 
hegemony across the globe, even when American popular opinion and legal norms 
would not allow for the military actions that make this possible. This process also 
reinforces the power of the executive branch, creating a vicious circle of aggression.  
Congress’ response to the arguments that the executive possessed unilateral power 
to engage in aggressive war-marking would be as important in 2002—2003 as its 
response thirty years earlier, when Nixon expanded the Vietnam War dramatically 
without Congressional sanction as part of his drive to create an ‘imperial presidency’.167  
As noted above in chapters two and three, executive war-making is incompatible with 
the rule of law.  It also runs contrary to the Constitution, as the Declare War and the 
Letter of Marque and Reprisal Clauses give this authority exclusively to Congress.168 
However, the executive seized this power on the basis of its theory of executive 
167 See generally Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (Mariner Books 2004) 
168 Article 1, section 8, clause 11 
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sovereignty over matters of national security.169 This is a loophole that ultimately 
destroys the rule of law’s essential structure, because it allows the executive to catalyse 
the circumstances in which it can expand its own powers without any fear of being 
checked by the other branches of government. 
Accordingly, Congress’ response to the executive’s drive for war in various theatres 
in the decade following the 9/11 attacks would be of particular importance to either the 
preservation or the destruction of the rule of law in the United States.  The three key 
examples that will be discussed in this section are the attacks against Libya, Iraq, and 
Syria. 
4.5.1 Congress and the 2011 Intervention into the Libyan Civil War 
In February of 2011, protests against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi erupted in Libya.  
Over the coming months, the movement against his government became an open revolt.  
There was virtually no lag between the eruption of this civil war and calls by Western 
leaders for a no-fly zone over the country.170 Shortly thereafter, the United Nations 
169See e.g. John Yoo, ‘Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President: The President’s 
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations and Nations Supporting Them’ (Washington, 
Office of Legal Counsel, 25 September 2001) 
<http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70942/00110_010925display.pdf> accessed 30 May 30, 
2014, see generally supra chapter 3 
170 For example, David Cameron called for a no-fly zone on February 28, 2011, less than two weeks 
after the very first protests in Benghazi against the regime.  ‘As it Happens: Libyan Uprising February 
25’, The Times of London (London, 25 March 2011) 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2926163.ece> accessed 1 June 2014 
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Security Council quickly approved a resolution to that end on March 17, 2011.171  
Within days, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were 
conducting air strikes that were not merely aimed at keeping the Libyan Air Force from 
bombing civilian targets. Libyan ground forces, especially armoured forces which the 
rebels could not successfully defeat, were heavily targeted.172  The aim of the 
intervention was clearly regime change. NATO achieved its ultimate goal when a 
convoy transporting Muammar Gaddafi was attacked by an American drone and French 
fighter jets. Gaddafi was then killed by opposition forces while fleeing the air strikes.173 
While these military actions were authorized by the Security Council, this does not 
relieve the executive of the requirement of complying with its municipal law.  As noted 
in chapters two and three, both the Constitution of the United States and its statutory 
law require the executive to obtain authorization for the use of military force from 
Congress.174  As this section will show, the executive, while now headed by a President 
from the Democratic Party, once again revived a theory of inherent constitutional 
authority developed within the OLC to evade the requirements of the rule of law.  In 
this instance, it claimed the power to wage war, which is the most problematic instance 
171 Ibid 
172 Jonathan Marcus, ‘Libya: French plane fires on military vehicle’, BBC News (London, 19 March 
2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12795971> 
173 Thomas Harding, ‘Col Gaddafi killed: convoy bombed by drone flown by pilot in Las Vegas’, The 
Telegraph, (London, 21 October 2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8839964/Col-Gaddafi-
killed-convoy-bombed-by-drone-flown-by-pilot-in-Las-Vegas.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
174 War Powers Resolution 1973, 93–148  
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of the executive expanding the boundaries of its own powers that can be imagined.  This 
section, however, will focus on Congress’ reaction to these claims.  What will be 
revealed fits with the general pattern emerging over the course of this chapter. Namely, 
when the executive circumvents the restrictions on its power, including those explicitly 
re-imposed in the congressional resurgence, Congress now simply turns a blind eye or 
protests in the mildest possible terms.  It persists doing so until it is necessary to once 
again extend legislative delegations of unbounded discretionary power.175 
As the Libyan intervention approached the WPR’s ninety-day limit,176 there were 
rumblings in Congress about the need for a resolution authorizing military force, 
although these were curiously muted.   Speaker of the House of Representatives John 
Boehner asked the executive to ‘explain the legal grounds for failing to seek 
Congressional authorization in the 90 days since Mr. Obama informed Congress of the 
start of the mission in Libya’.177  That is, rather than challenging the illegality of the 
executive’s actions, he merely extended an invitation to the executive so that it might 
produce legal arguments that would allow Congress to continue to ignore unilateral 
executive war-making. 
The Obama Administration responded, producing an explanation that was as 
puzzling and poorly-reasoned as any of the OLC opinions written by John Yoo and his 
175 See, e.g. Glenn Greenwald, ‘Administration Tells Congress (Again) - We Won't Abide by Your 
“Laws”’, Unclaimed Territory, (26 March 2006) 
<http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.ca/2006/03/administration-tells-congress-again-we.html> 
176 United States Code, title 50 section 1544(b) 
177 Jennifer Steinhauer, ‘Boehner Warns Obama on Libya Operations’, New York Times (New York, 
14 June 2011)   
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colleagues.  Its rationale depended upon a strange distinction between the statutory 
trigger of the WPR (where the President ‘introduce[s] United States Armed Forces . . . 
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances’) and something allegedly different, which it labelled ‘kinetic 
operations’.  In doing so, the executive pressed the unitary executive theory’s theory of 
executive power to interpret the law even further than the Bush Administration. When 
the OLC refused to sign off on this theory, he overrode any advice to the contrary and 
in so doing departed from the ‘traditional legal process the executive branch has 
developed to sustain the rule of law for over 75 years’.178   The press reported on this 
as follows:   
[Attorney General Eric] Holder — concluded that sustained U.S. support for the 
NATO campaign against Libya . . . including drone strikes — amounted to 
‘hostilities’ [that triggered the need for a congressional resolution pursuant to the 
WPR]. . . . Rather than permit OLC to vet the issue, the White House adopted an 
unusual and far more informal procedure . . . . Obama . . . concluded that he did 
not need congressional approval . . . [by] reject[ing] the views of Holder and 
OLC’s acting chief, Caroline D. Krass, he also overruled Jeh C. Johnson, the 
Defense Department’s chief legal counsel.179 
 
Here, the executive openly solicited a more pliant opinion within that would support its 
preferred interpretation of a statute, in the process overruling both the Attorney-General 
and the head of the office that is charged with producing objective interpretations of the 
law to guide the executive branch.  Of course, avoiding this issue by way of an 
indefensible legal opinion would only succeed if Congress was willing to turn a blind 
178 Bruce Ackerman, ‘Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War’, New York Times (New York, 21 June 2001) A27 
179 Michael Isikoff, ‘On Libya, President Obama Evaded Rules on Legal Disputes, Scholars Say, 
msnbc.com (Washington, 21 June 2011) 
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43474045/ns/politicswhite_house/t/libya-president-obama-evaded-
rules-legal-disputes-scholars-say/> accessed 1 June 2014 
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eye.  Despite one member of the House Judiciary Committee labelling the President’s 
interpretation ‘ridiculous’,180 no formal protests were made by Congress. 
Accordingly, it can be said that Congress’ leaders successfully coordinated their 
efforts with those of the executive branch to avoid exercising oversight over the illicit 
use of war powers. Here, these powers were exercised quite openly to precipitate the 
overthrow of a foreign regime in favour of one more friendly to American interests.  
This was done in the manner that evades the requirements of the WPR, the Constitution, 
and the rule of law.181  As for the members of the legislature who were less pliant or 
eager for regime change than John Boehner and John McCain, they were caught between 
their own leadership, the executive, and the executive’s allies in the judiciary.  They 
could not get a bill through Congress’ committee structure without the support of the 
party leaders,182 and the party leaders were warned in no uncertain terms that if this 
happened, the results, for Congress, would be dire.  It is probably that the executive 
would publically humiliate the legislators by simply ignoring them, confirming their 
irrelevance publically:183  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told members of Congress 
in a classified briefing that ‘the White House would forge ahead with military action in 
180 Ibid 
181 Philip Elliot, ‘Obama trying to sway war-weary public on Syria’, Associated Press, (Washington, 9 
September 2013) <http://lubbockonline.com/filed-online/2013-09-09/obama-trying-sway-war-weary-
public-syria#.UvwToYa4Ono> accessed 1 July 2014 
182 Charles B. Cushman, An Introduction to the U.S. Congress (M. E. Sharpe 2006) 61-68. 
183 Susan Crabtree, ‘Clinton To Congress: Obama Would Ignore Your War Resolutions’, 
TalkingPointsMemo (20 March 2011) <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/clinton-to-congress-obama-
would-ignore-your-war-resolutions> accessed 1 June 2014 
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Libya even if Congress passed a resolution constraining the mission.’184  Thanks to the 
executive’s domination of certain key courts, no legislator wishing to bring a judicial 
challenge to this collusion would be able to do so, due to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Campbell v Clinton,185 penned by Judge Silberman, wherein it was held that legislators 
have no standing to bring a claim that the executive is in violation of the WPR. This 
decision is effectively the final word on the issue, as any such challenge would need to 
be brought within the jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit. 
Of course, this particular dynamic between the executive and Congress was made 
possible by a lack of public opposition to the intervention in Libya, which likely 
stemmed from the fact that Gaddafi was a longstanding hate figure in the United States 
and its popular culture.186  For an exploration of the dynamics at work in diametrically 
different climate of public opinion, this thesis must turn to the debate over Congress’ 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Iraq AUMF’.187 
4.6 Congress Deceived?  The Executive and the Iraq AUMF  
A year and a day after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush spoke at the United Nations, 
requesting a resolution that would authorize the use of military force, purportedly to 
184 Ibid, see also Robert J. Delahunty, ‘War Powers Irresolution: The Obama Administration and the 
Libyan Intervention’, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856764> 
185 Campbell v Clinton [2000] 203 F3d 19 (D.C. Circuit) 
186 Guy Arnold, The Maverick State: Gaddafi and the New World Order (Cassell 1996) 10 
187 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002, Public Law 107–243 
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enforce earlier resolutions related to weapons of mass destruction.188  While the United 
States would never obtain this final explicit authorization from the U.N., it was the basis 
for the executive’s request for military authorization from Congress, which was assured 
that a firm basis for the attack under international law would soon be forthcoming.189   
A bill was put before in the House of Representatives on October 2, 2002. Its text 
was composed entirely within the executive branch, and it was introduced at the 
Administration’s request by Speaker of the House John Dennis ‘Denny’ Hastert.190  The 
leading co-sponsor of the bill was the head of the Democratic Party in that chamber, 
House Minority Leader Richard ‘Dick’ Gephardt.191  The Senate’s identical version of 
the bill was introduced at the executive’s request by Senate Minority Leader Tom 
Daschle and co-sponsored by Trent Lott, the Senate Majority leader.192 
188 George W. Bush, ‘President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly’ 12 September 
2002 <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020912-1.html> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
189 Daily Mail, ‘Bush wins Congress backing over war on Iraq’, (16 October 2002) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-142230/Bush-wins-Congress-backing-war-Iraq.html> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
190 The Library of Congress, ‘Bill Summary & Status, 107th Congress (2001 - 2002), House Joint 
Resolution 114’, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:H.J.Res114> accessed 1 June 2014 
191 The Library of Congress, ‘Bill Summary & Status, 107th Congress (2001 - 2002)  
House Joint Resolution 114, Cosponsors’ <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HJ00114:@@@P> accessed 1 June 2014 
192 The Library of Congress, ‘Bill Summary & Status , 107th Congress (2001 - 2002)  
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The pattern that would emerge whenever the executive sought approval for military 
action was first established with the Iraq AUMF.  The executive branch and the leaders 
of both parties in the legislature formed a united front against any possible ideological 
opposition.  This included disagreement from both legislators on the fringes of the two 
parties, i.e., Representatives Kucinich and Paul, Senators Feingold and Chaffee, and 
from the public.  It became evident that the Bush Administration would not allow the 
weapons inspectors to complete their mission in Iraq, a prerequisite of a Security 
Council resolution under Chapter VII.  At this point, less than a third of Americans 
supported the executive’s new policy of immediate attacks, favouring instead the 
completion of the inspection process and a diplomatic solution.193   
Accordingly, when the United States moved to a war footing, the largest coordinated 
protests in world history were staged on February 15, 2003.194  Approximately 400,000 
people took to the streets in New York City alone, while hundreds of demonstrations 
took place simultaneously across the country.195  This was done in the face of 
obstruction and illicit surveillance by the intelligence community and the deployment 
Senate Joint Resolution 45’  <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SJ00045:@@@P> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
193 Boothie Cosgrove-Mather, ‘Poll: Talk First, Fight Later’, CBS News (23 January 2003) 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/23/opinion/polls/main537739.shtml> 
194 David Cortright, ‘The World Says No: The Global Movement Against War in Iraq’, in Thakur 
Ramesh et al. (eds) The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative 
Challenges (Pearson Longman 2006) 75-91 
195 Sue Chan, ‘Massive Anti-War Outpouring’, CBS News (15 February 2003) 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/16/iraq/main540782.shtml> accessed 1 June 2014 
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of far more aggressive forms of policing than seen previously, including the ‘kettling’ 
and mass arrests of peaceful protesters.196   
Doubts about the casus belli remained widespread, and reached almost to the top 
echelons of American society. Criticism came from various quarters, including the 
higher ranks of the military itself.  Time Magazine noted that almost one in three senior 
officers ‘question[ed] the wisdom of a pre-emptive war with Iraq’.197  Accordingly, 
Congressional approval was of crucial importance to the executive, as it would be able 
to point to this authorization for the invasion when the case for war fell apart, after it 
became evident that that Iraq no longer possessed a weapons of mass destruction 
program.198  The executive knew that its rationale for war was problematic.  This was 
the reason that their intelligence community needed to work so diligently to launder 
faulty sources and conclusions through their allies’ agencies.  
In the case of the story of Iraq’s supposed attempts to buy yellowcake uranium from 
Niger, this was pushed through Italian military intelligence.199 The unfounded 
196 New York Civil Liberties Union, ‘Arresting Protest’ (April 2003) 
<https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/nyclu_arresting_protest1.pdf> accessed 1 June 
2014 
197 Mark Thompson and Michael Duffy, ‘Donald Rumsfeld: Pentagon Warlord’, Time Magazine (19 
January 2003) <http://nufon.tripod.com/0061.htm> accessed 1 June 2014 
198 ‘Blix Casts Doubt on WMDs’, The Guardian (Manchester, 19 May 2003)  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20130827033434/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/23/iraq1 
> accessed 1 June 2014 
199 Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe D’Avanza, ‘Doppiogiochisti e dilettanti tutti gli italiani del Nigergate’, 
La Repubblica (Rome, 24 October 2005) 
<http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/iraq69/sismicia/sismicia.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
330 
 
                                                 
Chapter 5: Explaining the Failure to Re-Implement Oversight 331 
allegations of mobile chemical weapons laboratories made by the informant dubbed 
‘Curveball’.  He was later revealed to be ‘the brother of a top aide of Ahmad Chalabi, 
the pro-western Iraqi former exile with links to the Pentagon’.200 His statements were 
bolstered by citing the documents of the German intelligence service in which they 
were found, but the executive did not reveal that those intelligence reports did not 
evaluate his claims positively.201 
These claims became the basis for the ‘sixteen words’ used by President Bush to 
goad Congress and the American public to war in his State of the Union Address of 
January 2003, namely ‘[t]he British government has learned that Saddam Hussein 
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa’. They were also the basis 
for Colin Powell’s infamous PowerPoint presentation to the United Nations Security 
Council.202  The Secretary of State was so concerned about the veracity of the 
yellowcake allegations that he refused to cite them in that speech.203 These suspicions 
were well grounded, as the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
revealed eleven days before the State of the Union address that these allegations were 
200 Luke Harding, ‘Germans accuse US over Iraq weapons claim’, The Guardian (Manchester, 2 April 
2004 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/02/iraq.germany> accessed 1 June 2014 
201 Ibid 
202 United States Department of State, ‘PowerPoint Presentation Accompanying the Secretary's Speech 
at the UN’ <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17434.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 
203 Arthur Borden, A Better Country: Why America was Right to Confront Iraq (Hamilton Books 2008) 
45-46 
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based on forgeries.204  Before his speech, Powell expressed doubts about the mobile 
weapons laboratories. He continued to do so until he was personally presented with the 
assurances of the Director of the CIA.205 
Congress accepted these assurances uncritically and without independent 
investigation.206 Accordingly, the bill passed through both chambers in just over one 
week.207  Numerous amendments that would have limited the grant of unlimited 
discretion over whether to actually launch the attack were rejected, even as the 
executive equivocated over whether it might proceed in the event that it could not 
secure the passage of Security Council resolution under Chapter VII.208  These included 
the Spratt and Levin Amendments, which would have required such a resolution from 
the Security Council,209 and the Byrd Amendments, which would have specified that 
204 Carl W. Ford, ‘Memorandum to the Secretary: Niger/Iraq Uranium Story and Joe Wilson’, (7 July 
2003) <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122494.pdf> 
205 Joby Warrick, ‘Warnings on WMD “Fabricator” Were Ignored, Ex-CIA Aide Says’. Washington 
Post (Washington, 25 June 2006) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/24/AR2006062401081_pf.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
206 Richard W. Stevenson, ‘Remember “Weapons of Mass Destruction?” For Bush, They Are a 
Nonissue’, New York Times (New York, 8 December 2003) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/politics/18PREX.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
207 Library of Congress, ‘Bill Summary & Status  107th Congress (2001 - 2002)  Senate Joint 
Resolution 45’, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:S.J.Res45:> accessed 1 June 2014 
208 Donald E. Neuchterlein, Defiant Superpower: The New American Hegemony (Potomac Books 
2005), chapter 3 
209 Clerk of the House of Representatives ‘On Agreeing to the Spratt of South Carolina Substitute 
Amendment, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives’ (10 October 2002); Clerk of the House 
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the legislature was not agreeing that the executive possessed unspecified inherent 
constitutional powers to go beyond the text of the Iraq AUMF,210 and which would 
have placed a time limit on the use of the authority granted by that statute.211 
Accordingly, when President Bush made the decision to begin the war the Iraq 
AUMF was passed.  Thus, he could assert that he was in full compliance with the WPR 
and the constitutional requirement of congressional approval for military action.212 The 
executive, however, consistently maintained that it possessed an independent 
constitutional power to go to war against Iraq.  The question that must be answered is 
why the executive sought this approval despite its own interpretation of its unbounded 
ability to act in the interests of national security.  The answer is simple. The executive 
did not want to be forced to take full responsibility for the Iraq War, in the event that it 
of Representatives, ‘On Agreeing to the Amendment (Levin Amdt. No. 4862)’, 107th Congress, U.S. 
Senate (Library of Congress, 10 October 2002) 
210 Winslow T. Wheeler, The Wastrels of Defense: How Congress Sabotages U.S. Security (Naval 
Institute Press 2004) 220 
211 Michele L. Swerz, Women in the Club: Gender and Policy Making in the Senate (University of 
Chicago Press 2013) 213 
212 This thesis will not address the argument that the requirements of the Declare War Clause are not 
met by a statute that is not styled as a declaration of war. 
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would become deeply unpopular.213  In securing a statutory basis for its actions, it 
would also insulate itself from criticism from the legislators.214 
Congress made a very bad bargain with the executive.  In exchange for the 
appearance of continued relevance in foreign affairs, they diffused the executive’s 
responsibility for aggressive war-making.215  By means of the OLC’s opinions, the 
executive made it clear that it did not seek the Iraq AUMF owing to matters of principle. 
However, it appears that Congress failed to understand the executive’s true 
motivation.216 
The first element of a pattern of manipulation was established with the passage of 
the AUMF. It remained to be seen whether Congress would prevent the executive from 
duplicating it.  The key question that remains is whether the legislators learned anything 
from their precipitous and unqualified support for the executive in 2002. After learning 
that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, legislators concluded that the 
intelligence presented to them to justify that assertion was, at the very least, deeply 
flawed.  At this point, the Senate convened a Select Committee, hereinafter referred to 
213 See Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (Oxford University Press 2004) 
122-126  
214 Mary Cardaras, Fear, Power, and Politics: The Recipe for War in Iraq after 9/11 (Lexington Books 
2013) 218 
215 Seth Harold Weinberger, Restoring the Balance: War Powers in an Age of Terror (Greenwood 
2009) 17-22 
216 William Boardman, ‘America’s “Permanent War”: The “Authorization to Use Military Force” 
Forever?’, Global Research (May 26, 2013) <http://www.globalresearch.ca/americas-permanent-war-
the-authorization-to-use-military-force-forever/5336452> 
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as the ‘Senate Iraq Intelligence Committee’ or ‘SIIC’, to investigate the executive’s 
representations about the Iraqi weapons programs and the way in which these were 
generated.217  The investigation proceeded in two phases, both of which revealed 
systematic manipulation of the legislators by the executive, something made possible 
by its control over the intelligence community and an absence of any effective 
congressional oversight.218 
The first line of inquiry for the SIIC was the executive’s determined attempts to link 
Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 attacks.  This ‘had been a strongly implied accusation made 
obliquely against Iraq in Administration statements since 2001’.219  These statements 
were a key pillar of the executive’s case for war, along with allegations related to 
weapons of mass destruction.  However, the Iraq AUMF itself, which was written by 
the executive, stated that Iraq was ‘continu[ing] to aid and harbor other international 
terrorist organizations’220   
When pressed, the executive would admit that the intelligence that supported this 
assertion was limited to proof that Hussein aided the organizations such as the People’s 
Mujahedeen of Iran, which committed acts of terrorism within the Islamic Republic, 
217 The formal name for this committee was Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. 
218Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussein, When Governments Break the Law: The Rule of Law and the 
Prosecution of the Bush Administration (NYU Press 2009) 7-9 
219 Albert L. Weeks, The Choice of War: The Iraq War and the Just War Tradition (ABC-CLIO Books 
2009) 68 
220 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002, Public Law 107–243, 
whereas clauses, preamble 
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and which the United States subsequently protected after the invasion of Iraq, for 
possible future use against Iran.221  However, the executive continued to promote 
theories about Iraqi support for al-Qaeda, even after these were discredited by the 
intelligence community.222  While Dick Cheney continued making these claims, the 
President made ambiguous statements about Iraqi support for terrorism.  Most of his 
audience took this to mean anti-American terrorism, owing to the Vice-President’s 
unsupportable allegations.  The Senate Iraq Intelligence Committee refuted these 
claims in the Phase I report, concluding that ‘there was no evidence to support Iraqi 
complicity or assistance’ in the 9/11 attacks.223 
This SIIC also addressed the intelligence related to WMD, the second and apparently 
more substantive leg supporting the case for war.  It concluded that not only was there 
no evidence that Iraq possessed these weapons, but that the executive consistently 
distorted intelligence reports to justify its agenda.  The first of these conclusions was 
located in the Phase I report, which concluded that the Secretary of State’s case for war 
was based on ‘information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) for inclusion in Secretary Powell’s speech [that] was overstated, misleading, or 
incorrect’.224 
221 James Risen, State of War (Free Press 2006) 218-220 
222 Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 (Ballantyne Books 
2012) 571 
223 United States Select Senate Committee on Intelligence,  ‘Report on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq’ (9 July 2004) 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108srpt301/pdf/CRPT-108srpt301.pdf> 
224 Ibid 15 
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The explosive evidence of the executive’s pressure on the intelligence analysts to 
alter their findings, which is the corollary of the directives to the torturers at 
Guantánamo to produce false confessions about Iraqi involvement as described in 
chapter three, would remain hidden until the publication of the Phase II report.  This 
was the SIIC’s key failure.  Senators Rockefeller, Durbin, and Levin made clear that 
the Committee was forced to put off its consideration of ‘how intelligence on Iraq was 
used or misused by Administration officials in public statements and reports’.225  
Accordingly, ‘the Committee’s phase one report fail[ed] to fully explain the 
environment of intense pressure in which Intelligence Community officials were asked 
to render judgments on matters relating to Iraq when policy officials had already 
forcefully stated their own conclusions in public’.   
The public release of the Phase II reports was delayed until July of 2008.  During 
the three year interval, President Bush was re-elected and served almost all of his 
allotted final term.  In short, the report was held back until it could have no real effect 
on the executive, since when it was finally released the legislature possessed no clear 
incentive to hold it accountable, given the fact that the Bush Administration was now 
in its final four months. 
This lengthy postponement was quite unfortunate, since it revealed many facts that 
seemed to call for more than merely a stern rebuke.  First, it concluded that the executive 
‘repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, 
contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe 
225 Ibid 449-464 
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that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed’.226  This was only 
possible because the executive created what amounted to a new intelligence agency that 
was designed to produce alleged facts that more seasoned analysts would have rejected 
out of hand.  It was because of the revelations of the false assertions generated by the 
Department of Defense’s Office of Special Plans and the termination of internal 
inquiries into its activities227 that the SIIC could conclude that the executive crossed the 
line between ‘relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the 
American people that you know is not fully accurate’, and in this manner having 
knowingly ‘led the nation into war under false pretences’.228 
Certain delays in the release of this revelatory report are difficult to explain.  While 
the Republican members of the SIIC were able to use procedural tactics to slow the 
committee’s work before 2006, the midterm elections yielded a Democratic majority in 
the Senate,229 which should have allowed Senator Rockefeller to proceed swiftly 
226 Michael Heazle, Uncertainty in Policy Making: Values and Evidence in Complex Decisions 
(Earthscan 2010) 122 
227 See Minority of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ‘Whether Statements by U.S. 
Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Reports’, in ‘Additional and Minority Views, 
SIIC Phase II Report’, (5 June 2009) <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/080605/phase2b.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
228 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Press Release: Select Committee on Intelligence on the 
U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq Press Release of Intelligence 
Committee Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence’, 
(5 June 2008) <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775> accessed 1 June 2014 
229 Suzanne Struglinski and Lisa Freidman, (eds), Almanac of the Unelected Staff of the United States 
Congress (Bernan Press 2010) 10 
338 
 
                                                 
Chapter 5: Explaining the Failure to Re-Implement Oversight 339 
towards its completion and release to the public.  One possible factor, which will be 
discussed in the following section, is that the leadership of the Democratic Party wanted 
to reduce any possible pressure for impeachment,230 which this chapter will argue was 
the only remaining method for legislative control of a runaway executive that openly 
disdains the requirements of the rule of law, in the same manner as the Nixon 
Administration.  However, before addressing this issue, the next subsection will 
examine whether Congress has internalized the conclusions of the SIIC report, such 
that it might resist future temptations to give the executive unfettered discretion to wage 
war.  The test that reveals whether it learned the lessons of Iraq would come in the form 
of the Obama Administration’s drive for aggression against Syria in 2013. 
4.7 Congressional Gormlessness: An AUMF Against Syria? 
The Syrian Civil War began with protests in March of 2011, which were inspired by 
similar uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East known collectively as the ‘Arab 
Spring’.231  The governing regime’s use of the military to suppress protests sparked an 
armed rebellion shortly afterwards.  It appeared very likely from the outset of these 
protests that the United States would promote regime change, as this was its declared 
policy.  This was the case since at least 2002, when John Bolton added Syria to the 
Bush Administration’s ‘Axis of Evil’ owing to the conclusion it was a ‘state sponsor[] 
230 See infra section 5, see also House Committee on the Judiciary Majority, ‘Staff Report to John C. 
Conyers Jr., Reining in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and Recommendations related to the 
Presidency of George W. Bush’ (13 January 2009) 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_rpt/imperial-final.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 
231 See generally Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the 
Middle East (Westview Press 2012) 
339 
 
                                                 
Chapter 5: Explaining the Failure to Re-Implement Oversight 340 
of terrorism that [is] pursuing . . .  weapons of mass destruction’.232  Syria was one of 
the few nations in the region that opposed the American war of aggression against Iraq, 
souring Syrian-U.S. relations that until then were improving, to the point where a 
presidential summit in Geneva was possible.  Indeed, Bill Clinton met with Bashar-al-
Assad.233  However, the Obama Administration continued the Bush Administration’s 
policies toward Syria.  Additionally, in 2010 it contended publically that Syria was 
providing missiles to the Hezbollah for use against Israel.234 In addition, the release of 
State Department’s classified diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks revealed that the United 
States ‘secretly financed Syrian political opposition groups and related projects’ from 
at least April of 2009’.235 
232 John R. Bolton, ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction’ 
(Speech of 6 May 2012) <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/beyond-the-axis-of-evil> accessed 1 
June 2014 
233 Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (Seven Stories Press 2002) 74-77 
234 Agence France Presse, ‘Syria providing “wider array” of missiles to Hezbollah: US’, Agence 
France Presse (Paris, 23 April 2010) <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gS-
2z3_h12KyrCYwnFyVNwCmYO-A> 
235 Craig Whitlock, ‘U.S. Secretly Backed Syrian Opposition Groups, Cables Released by WikiLeaks 
Show,’ Washington Post (Washington, 18 April 2011) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-
secretly-backed-syrian-opposition-groups-cables-released-by-wikileaks-
show/2011/04/14/AF1p9hwD_story.html> 
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In the summer of 2012, the head of the CIA and the Secretary of State first proposed 
that the United States provide arms to and train the rebel forces.236 It should be noted 
that during the previous three years, it did so indirectly, by ‘quietly encourag[ing] Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to ship weapons into the country’.237  In addition, ‘U.S. 
special operations troops have been secretly training Syrian rebels with anti-tank and 
anti-aircraft weapons since late [2012]’.238  The executive made the decision to move 
forward openly with these plans in June of 2013.239  At this point, plans were now being 
made at the highest levels of the executive branch for a bombing campaign and the 
enforcement of a no-fly zone over Syria.240  However, it did not openly advocate going 
236 Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, ‘Backstage Glimpses of Clinton as Dogged Diplomat, Win 
or Lose’, New York Times (New York, 2 February 2013) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/us/politics/in-behind-scene-blows-and-triumphs-sense-of-
clinton-future.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&> accessed 1 June 2014 
237 Mike Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, ‘U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to 
Syrian Rebels’, New York Times (New York, 13 June 2013) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-
weapons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 1 June 2014 
238 David S. Cloud and Raja Abdulrahim, ‘U.S. Has Secretly Provided Arms Training to Syria Rebels 
Since 2012’, Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, 31 June 2013) 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/21/world/la-fg-cia-syria-20130622> accessed 1 July 2014 
239 Ibid 
240 Ibid 
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to war until two months later, purportedly in response to the use of chemical weapons 
in Ghouta on August 21, 2013.241 
The United States seized upon this incident as a casus belli for aggressive war-
making.  As this subsection will demonstrate, in attempting to make its case, the 
executive used the same playbook as it did in 2002. Congress apparently learned 
nothing from the Select Committee’s reports, as the same tactics achieved the same 
result.  We will see that once again the executive made public statements about WMDs 
that were unsubstantiated and even contradicted by the nuanced intelligence reports, 
and in order to bypass these, the executive relied on the ‘stovepiping’ of intelligence.  
This involved the creation of special intelligence analysis units controlled at the highest 
level of the executive branch, which appropriated and interpreted raw field reports 
without allowing analysts from the relevant agencies that nominally report to Congress 
to scrutinize or interpret this data.  As in 2002, this frequently involved the laundering 
of this stovepiped information through foreign intelligence agencies, which produced 
data which could be cited by the executive to Congress, but which it would argue could 
not be revealed. 
The executive hoped that, as in 2002, the credibility of its senior officials presenting 
intelligence reports would allow it to assemble an international coalition that would 
give the intervention the appearance of legitimacy, or even the sanction of international 
241 Hannah Allam, James Rosen and Jonathan Landay, ‘U.S. Appears to Weigh Military Response to 
Alleged Syrian use of Chemical Weapons’, McClatchey Wire Service, (Washington 25 August 2013) 
<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/08/25/200333/us-appears-to-weigh-military-response.html> 
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law if the Security Council could not approve a resolution,242 because its processes were 
‘broken’ by states that did not agree with the executive’s proposals.243  As President 
Obama said in late August 2013:  
If the U.S. goes in and attacks another country without a U.N. mandate and 
without clear evidence that can be presented, then there are questions in terms of 
whether international law supports it.  Do we have the coalition to make it work? 
And, you know, those are considerations that we have to take into account.244 
 
Unfortunately for the executive, its plans for an international coalition were dashed 
when the first and most important partner for such an endeavour was relegated to the 
side-lines by decisive legislative action.  The Parliament of the United Kingdom, the 
United States’ partner in the ‘special relationship’, decided against joining the proposed 
military campaign.  This was ‘disastrous’ to the executive’s initiative, as its ‘plans for 
air strikes against Syria were thrown into disarray’ by the vote.245  In part this response 
242 David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
(Kluwer Law International 2001) 39-42 
243 Max Fisher, ‘Samantha Power’s Case for Striking Syria’, Washington Post (Washington 7 
September 2013) available online at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/09/07/samantha-powers-case-for-striking-
syria/ 
244 David Bosco, ‘How President Obama Undermined His Legal Case for Syria Action,’ Foreign 
Policy (Washington, 26 August 2013  
<http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/26/how_president_obama_undermined_his_legal_case_
for_syria_action> accessed 1 June 2014 
245 Paul Lewis and Spencer Ackerman, ‘Obama's Syria Plans in Disarray after Britain Rejects Use of 
Force’, The Guardian (Manchester, 30 August 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/obama-strike-syria-britain-vote> accessed 1 June 
2014 
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can be attributed to doubts about the casus belli.  As Peter Flatters noted ‘[w]ith the 
Prime Minister claiming that intelligence findings were compelling enough to warrant 
action, the remarkable thing was Parliament’s response – namely that it did not believe 
him, or rather that it insisted on seeing the evidence for itself’.246 
 It was not surprising that the Members of Parliament took this position on the 
intelligence findings.  What was released to them was a three-page memorandum from 
the Joint Intelligence Committee, which focused on the conclusion that chemical 
weapons, referred to in the report as ‘CW’, were used in Ghouta.  On the crucial issue 
of who used them, it said ‘there is no credible intelligence or other evidence to 
substantiate the claims or the possession of CW by the opposition’.247  Accordingly, 
MI6’s argument can be paraphrased as a syllogism.  Namely, all chemical weapons in 
Syria belong to Assad, chemical weapons were used, and therefore Assad used chemical 
weapons.  Unfortunately, begging the question by assuming the major premise was 
illogical, since in fact there appeared to be credible evidence that the opposition 
possessed these weapons, at least to observers like Carla Del Ponte, a member of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic appointed by the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Speaking on behalf of the Commission months 
246 Peter Flatters, ‘Syria shows MPs need independent analysis of intelligence’, Politics.co.uk (London, 
2 September 2013) <http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2013/09/02/comment-mps-must-be-
trusted-with-more-intelligence-info> accessed 1 June 2014 
247 Jon Day, ‘Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘Syria: Reported 
Chemical Weapons Use’, (29 August 2003), 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/Jp_115_JD_P
M_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 
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before the Ghouta attacks, she noted that ‘according to what we have established so far, 
it is at the moment opponents of the regime who are using sarin gas’.248 
Whether or not Del Ponte’s tentative conclusions were correct is beside the point. 
What is crucial to note is that the British intelligence community completely failed to 
address them, which if true would have invalidated the central premise of its case for 
war.  It appears that Parliament was entitled to reject such an argument.  It remained to 
be seen, however, whether Congress would simply give the executive the benefit of the 
doubt, and abdicate its responsibility to oversee and scrutinize the conclusions of the 
intelligence agencies. 
It appears that Congress was only presented with this opportunity because of 
Parliament’s rebuke to the British executive.  Initially it appeared that the executive 
branch in Washington was prepared to begin the bombing campaign without seeking a 
congressional resolution.  However, after the British declined to join a coalition, it was 
plainly apparent that the American executive would then have borne all of the 
responsibility for the intervention, both in the eyes of the world and in domestic public 
opinion.  As in the case of the Iraq War, the proposed aggression was deeply unpopular 
both at home and abroad. At the end of August 2013, only 29% of those polled favoured 
‘the U.S. conducting military airstrikes against Syria in response to reports that the 
248 Damian McElroy, ‘UN Accuses Syrian Rebels of Chemical Weapons Use,’ The Telegraph 
(London, 6 May 2013) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10039672/UN-
accuses-Syrian-rebels-of-chemical-weapons-use.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
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Syrian government used chemical weapons’, and only 21% favoured ‘the United States 
and its allies supplying weapons to the Syrian rebels’.249 
Accordingly, on August 31 the executive presented a draft of a bill to Congress 
entitled the ‘Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces’.250  It was a 
considerably broader authorization than the Iraq AUMF. In fact, the better comparator 
is the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.251 It did not limit the use of force to Syria, but rather 
‘within, to or from Syria’, and appears to propose the creation of a worldwide mandate 
to prevent the ‘use or proliferation’ of ‘chemical or other weapons of mass destruction’ 
so as to ‘protect the United States and its allies and partners against the threat posed by 
such weapons’.252  Bruce Ackerman described this draft bill as ‘nothing less than an 
open-ended endorsement of military intervention in the Middle East and beyond’.253 
In support of the bill, the executive sent Secretary of State Kerry to the Senate.  Kerry 
served in a surprisingly similar role as that played by Secretary Powell ten years earlier.  
249 Pew Research Center ‘Poll: Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 2013 N=1,000 adults nationwide. Margin of error ± 
3.7; ABC News/Washington Post Poll. Aug. 28-Sept. 1, 2013. N=1,012 adults nationwide. Margin of 
error ± 3.5) <http://www.pollingreport.com/syria.htm> accessed 1 June 2014 
250 CNN Staff, ‘Text of Draft Legislation Submitted by Obama to Congress’, Cnn.com, (31 August 
2013) <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/31/us/obama-authorization-request-text/index.html?hpt=hp_t1> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
251 Southeast Asia Resolution, Public Law 88–408; see generally supra chapter 2 
252 Ibid 
253 Bruce Ackerman, ‘Bait and Switch’, Foreign Policy (3 September 2013) 
<www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/03/bait_and_switch_obama_syria_congress?page=0,1> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
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He presented assertions about WMDs as fact, cited foreign intelligence reports which 
could not be divulged, and make assertions that were in fact not in line with the available 
American intelligence reports. This was precisely what the Senate Select Committee 
found so objectionable about manipulation of intelligence before the Iraq War.254 Kerry 
made bold assertions about the high level of certainty that the Assad regime was 
responsible, relying on communications intercepts by German, French and Israeli 
intelligence that he would not disclose.255 Assertions about British confirmation of 
technical intelligence on the sarin gas would follow several days later.256   
Kerry also clearly hedged his answer when he was asked about whether the executive 
envisioned American ground troops deploying to Syria.  Kerry denied that there were 
any plans to do so, although he noted that it might be necessary in the event that the 
United States needed to ‘secure’ the chemical weapons possessed by the Assad 
254 See United States Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, ‘Report on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (Washington, July 9, 2004)’, ‘Report on 
Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by 
Intelligence Information (Washington, June 5, 2008’) 
255 Zeina Karam and Kimberly Dozier, ‘Doubts Linger Over Syria Gas Attack Evidence,’ Detroit 
News, 8 September 2013 
<http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20130908/NATION/309080015/Doubts-linger-over-Syria-gas-
attack-evidence> 
256 Patrick Wintour, ‘Sarin Gas Was Used In Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, Says David Cameron,’ 
The Guardian (Manchester, 7 September 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/sarin-syrian-chemical-weapons-cameron> 
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regime.257  This was presented as though it were a mere detail, although released 
intelligence reports reveal that Syria has approximately one thousand tonnes of 
chemical agents, which according to one study would require seventy-five thousand 
soldiers to assume custody.258   
The high probability that ‘boots on the ground’ will ultimately be required is made 
clear once one demonstrates that Kerry has misrepresented the consensus within the 
intelligence community on an issue of vital importance.259  When asked about the 
presence of Salafist or al-Qaeda affiliated militants in the ranks of the Syrian opposition 
forces, Kerry minimised their importance in a manner that is belied by intelligence 
reports, which contradict both his figures and the reality of the situation, which is that 
at that time, the mujahedeen of the al-Nusra Front, allegedly affiliated with al-Qaeda in 
Iraq and Ayman al-Zawahari, were the most effective and influential force in Syrian 
257 Garance Franke-Ruta, American 'Boots on the Ground' in Syria? John Kerry's Facepalm Moment, 
The Atlantic, (Washington, 3 September 2013) 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/american-boots-on-the-ground-in-syria-john-
kerrys-facepalm-moment/279312/.> accessed 1 June 2014 
258 Barbara Starr, ‘Military: Thousands of troops needed to secure Syrian chemical sites,’ Cable News 
Network (22 February 2012) <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/22/military-thousands-of-troops-
needed-to-secure-syrian-chemical-sites/> accessed 1 June 2014 
259 David Martosko, ‘Revealed: Pentagon knew in 2012 that it would take 75,000 ground troops to 
secure Syria's chemical weapons facilities’ (London, 5 September 2013) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2411885/Syrias-chemical-weapons-Pentagon-knew-2012-
75-000-ground-troops-secure-facilities.html#ixzz2tAsg3ndw> accessed 1 June 2014 
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resistance.260  While it is impossible to evaluate the veracity of the foreign intelligence 
reports upon which Kerry relied, if his use of American reports provides any guide, his 
speeches have likely distorted them as thoroughly as Colin Powell’s did, when he 
vouched for the Bush administration’s claim that WMDs were present in Iraq. 
The Senate leadership’s response demonstrated that its members learned little if 
anything from the Select Committee’s reports, as they took an immediately favourable 
attitude towards both Secretary Kerry’s presentation and the executive’s draft bill.261 
The Republican leadership, in Ackerman’s words, gave it ‘carte blanche’.262  In fact, 
the Senate amended the bill to explicitly authorize the executive to pursue regime 
change, by stating that ‘the policy of the United States … [is] to change the momentum 
on the battlefield in Syria’.263  As in 2002, the leadership of both parties in both 
chambers of Congress rallied behind the executive, with Republican Party Senators 
McCain and Cantor taking the lead in the Senate and the Democratic Party leadership, 
particularly Nancy Pelosi, whipping in the votes in the House of Representatives. This 
260 Reuters, ‘Hundreds of Syria Rebels Vow Loyalty to Al-Qaeda Groups,’ Reuters (Washington 21 
September 2013) <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/09/21/2003572649> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
261 Josh Rogen, ‘Senate Breaks Own Rules in Rush to Vote on Syria War’ Daily Beast (4 September 
2013) <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/04/senate-breaks-own-rules-in-rush-to-vote-on-
syria-war.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
262 Ackerman supra n 253 
263 Niels Lesniewski, ‘Text of Senate Draft Syria War Authorization’, Congressional Quarterly Roll 
Call (3 September 2013) <http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/text-of-senate-draft-syria-war-authorization/> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
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demonstrates that the legislative branch remains incapable of the oversight of 
intelligence that is necessary for the effective control of the executive branch that the 
rule of law requires.  In order to determine whether this was merely a lapse, or evidence 
of a systematic breakdown of legislative oversight, this thesis must explore the reasons 
behind this failure, which will follow in the next sections of this chapter. 
Unfortunately for the executive, the process of securing formal Congressional 
sanction for an assault on Syria was derailed when the Russian government seized upon 
a statement by Secretary of State Kerry and made a well-publicized proposal to 
supervise the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.264 The Obama Administration 
lobbied the members of the United Nations Security Council for a resolution requiring 
Syria to disarm, with threats of force should this timetable not be met, or if the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons declares Syria not to be in 
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.265  Syria forestalled the passage 
of a motion to authorize force by beginning the process of self-disarmament, although 
the United States did not abandon its attempts to seek an international authorization for 
the use of force.  Rather, it continued to argue that the disarmament is not proceeding 
264 Dave Espo and Julie Pace, ‘Obama delays Syria vote, says diplomacy may work’, Associated Press 
(10 September 2013) <http://www.ksl.com/index.php?nid=235&sid=26795165&fm=most_popular> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
265 Michael R. Gordon, ‘Kerry Presses Security Council to Act on Syrian Arsenal,’ New York Times 
(New York 19 September 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/world/middleeast/kerry-
challenges-security-council-to-take-syria-action.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
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rapidly enough, and that the United Nations should encourage compliance by 
threatening force.266    
However, the resolution the United States proposed, like Resolution 1441,267 would 
not have been made pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and thus 
will not actually authorize the use of force as a matter of international law.268  Russia 
remained concerned that a ‘tough resolution’ referring to the ability to use ‘all necessary 
measures’ for its enforcement would nevertheless set the stage for an American attack, 
using the same rationale employed by President Bush in 2002, when he argued that 
Resolution 1441 provided the necessary authorization.269   
Commentators have argued that the danger of a successful United Nations resolution 
is:  
[T]hat it puts the U.S. on the same path as in Iraq: a cat and mouse game with 
inspectors, repeated confrontations over compliance, and mission creep that 
draws the U.S. inexorably into a war. Indeed, a United Nations resolution similar 
to the French proposal, which sets up a strict schedule for Assad to give up his 
weapons and includes penalties for noncompliance, would immediately increase 
America’s military commitments in Syria.270 
266 Paul Richter, ‘Kerry warns Syria of Possible U.N. Action Over Chemical Arms Delay’, Los 
Angeles Times, (31 January 2014) <http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-kerry-syria-
chemical-arms-20140131,0,7658514.story#axzz2tAy3eMqN> accessed 1 June 2014 
 
267 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) Concerning Iraq’, S/RES/1441 (8 
November 2002) 
268 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS 16 (24 October 1945) 
269 Ryan Lizza, ‘Could Obama’s Syria Diplomacy Lead to War?’ The New Yorker (13 September 
2013) <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/09/could-obamas-syria-diplomacy-
lead-to-war.html> accessed 24 October 1945 
270 Ibid 
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The SIIC phase two report revealed this is the executive’s preferred gambit, and 
accordingly it is rational to conclude that a Security Council resolution would set the 
nation on a course towards war which cannot be reversed, but the question that remains 
is whether Congress could halt this drive to war by voting down a bill for the 
authorization of the use of military force in Syria.  The indications as of October 2013 
were negative. It appeared that the executive would not seek statutory approval, but 
would instead rely on the authority of the Security Council resolution alone, as it did 
when intervening in the Libyan Civil War.  Secretary of State Kerry said that ‘said it 
was for the US to decide whether to attack Syria without congressional 
endorsement’,271 and Senate leaders appeared to concur that they would not need to 
give their approval in the event of a Security Council resolution,272 despite the fact that 
such a resolution would not be pursuant to Chapter VII, as was the Libyan 
Resolution.273 
This, however, would in fact be doubly problematic, as the executive would have 
neither the formal support of international or domestic law for its aggression.   The 
271 Patrick Wintour, ‘John Kerry Gives Syria  Week to Hand Over Chemical Weapons or Face Attack’, 
The Guardian (Manchester, 10 September 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/us-
syria-chemical-weapons-attack-john-kerry> 
272 Associated Press, ‘Administration seeks Congress' support for Syria plan’ Associated Press (17 
September 2013) <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/17/obama-syria-
congress/2829139/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Usatoda
ycomPolitics-TopStories+(USATODAY+-+Politics+Top+Stories)> accessed 1 June 2014 
273 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Iraq’, S/RES/1973 (17 
March 2011) 
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Obama Administration, however, clearly believes that it can survive with the support 
of senior party leaders alone, which it has secured and continues to keep appraised of 
its efforts.274  This is clearly not in compliance with any form of the rule of law, and a 
failure to impeach the President should the attack take place would clearly demonstrate 
that Congress is completely incapable of fulfilling its constitutionally mandated role of 
overseeing the executive branch.  That said, the next section will demonstrate that over 
the past decade it has become clear that Congress simply will not consider 
impeachment, even on the basis of the most egregious violations of non-derogable 
norms and the unilateral expansion of the executive’s discretionary powers. 
4.8 Congress’ Failure to Consider Impeachment  
The ultimate technique of legislative control over the executive is the remedy of 
impeachment, which allows Congress to remove executive branch officials from 
office.275  The provisions for impeachment might allow for the punishment of an 
executive that has attempted to become immune from legislative oversight, and this 
process could also inaugurate the re-installation of the rule of law, as it did at the end 
of the Nixon Administration, as described in chapter two.  Given the continued 
existence of this process well into the twentieth century, it remains for this thesis to 
explore whether it could save the rule of law in the United States in the twenty-first.   
This section will show that it cannot, by demonstrating that, while still formally in 
existence, impeachment is by now a moribund method of legislative control, as the 
events of the last ten years demonstrate that it has fallen into desuetude.  It will attempt 
274 Associated Press supra n 272 
275 United States Constitution, article 2, section 4 
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to detail how the leadership of both parties in the legislature have consistently blocked 
attempts to invoke this possibility.  The reasons for this reticence, which relate to the 
incentives on legislators to favour war, will be explained in the next section below.  
Given the failure of Congress to seriously consider the impeachment of President Bush, 
even after the exposure of serious misconduct, it is possible to tentatively conclude that 
no assertion of executive supremacy over the laws would provoke this response from 
the legislature as it currently constituted. In addition, the following sections will also 
demonstrate that it has become increasingly less likely that Congress will find out about 
these forms of misconduct, making the existence of a formal remedy for executive 
malfeasance largely moot. 
As was briefly described in chapters one and two, the head of the executive branch 
can be removed from office following a vote on articles of impeachment in the House 
of Representatives that commits the President to a trial in the Senate.  This procedure 
was used during Andrew Johnson’s administration. Johnson’s failure to comply with a 
single statute was seen by the legislative branch during this era as a matter serious 
enough to warrant impeachment.276  As noted in chapter three, President Nixon was 
also the subject of these proceedings, although Nixon resigned shortly before a 
scheduled vote on the Articles of Impeachment, after he was told by his advisors that it 
was certain that he would be convicted in the Senate.277  He was to be charged with 
‘violating the constitutional rights of citizens’, ‘endeavouring to misuse the Central 
Intelligence Agency’ and committing other abuses ‘in a manner . . . subversive of 
276 Chester G. Hearn, The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (McFarland & Company 2007) 154-203 
277 Bill Rhatican, White House Under Fire (AuthorHouse 2005) 399-400 
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constitutional government’.278  As noted in chapter three, this assertion of legislative 
superiority over the executive set the stage for the congressional resurgence that 
reconstructed the rule of law in the United States for the twentieth century.   
This section will attempt to show, however, that if Congress wanted to pursue the 
same course of action following the revelations that the executive branch engaged in 
similar misconduct as Nixon during the twenty-first century, it has clearly missed its 
chance.  On the basis of the revelations described in chapters three through six, it is 
impossible to imagine any form of misconduct that could yet occur that would be more 
deserving of impeachment. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated here that the issue of 
impeachment was placed squarely before the legislature over the past decade, but the 
legislators rejected each of these initiatives, thereby demonstrating that this remedy for 
an overweening executive has been reduced to a vestigial constitutional status. 
As described in the last section, efforts to impeach President Bush were impeded 
significantly by the indefensible delays in the production of the Phase II report of the 
Senate Select Committee charged with investigating the manipulation of intelligence 
by the executive to justify an attack on Iraq.  However by 2005, certain legislators in 
the House of Representatives believed that the ‘Downing Street Memo’279 revealed that 
the executive engaged in impeachable misconduct.  The memorandum of the minutes 
of a British Cabinet meeting noted that ‘Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through 
278 House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, ‘Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, 
President of the United States: The Final Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives’ (Government Printing Office, 1974)  
279 Matthew Rycroft, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister's Meeting, 23 July’ (23 July 2002) 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20110723222004/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article387374
.ece> accessed 1 June 2014 
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military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence 
and facts were being fixed around the policy’.280   
On this basis, Representative John Conyers secured thirty-eight co-sponsors for a 
resolution calling for an investigation of whether impeachment was appropriate.281  
Further efforts to this end followed in early 2006, but these were effectively shut down 
by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, who indicated that ‘impeachment was off the 
table’, 282 i.e., not approved for the legislative agenda set by the majority party in 
Congress.283  It is notable that the Speaker of the House made these statements in 
response to a resolution seeking an investigation.  It appears that Democratic Party 
leaders decided that whatever sort of evidence that it might unearth, this would be 
beside the point.  The motivation for this refusal to consider impeachment will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
After SIIC’s Phase II report was finally issued, Representative Dennis Kucinich 
introduced a draft bill containing articles of impeachment against President Bush.  The 
charges included ‘interfering with and obstructing Congress's lawful functions of 
overseeing foreign affairs and declaring war . . . . [by] allowing, authorizing and 
sanctioning the manipulation of intelligence analysis by those under his direction and 
280 Ibid 
281 109th Congress, House Resolution 365 (Rep. John Conyers, Sponsor) 
282 Charles Babington ‘Democrats Won't Try to Impeach President,’ Washington Post (Washington, 12 
May 2006) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/11/AR2006051101950.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
283 Nancy Zuckerbroad, ‘Pelosi Says Democrats Are Ready to Lead’, Associated Press (8 November 
2006) <http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2006Nov08/0,4670,Pelosi,00.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
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control’; ‘declar[ing] the right to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely, without charge and 
without providing them access to counsel or the courts’; ‘authoriz[ing] . . . as official 
policy[] [w]ater-boarding, beatings, faked executions’ and other forms of torture; 
‘establish[ing] a body of secret laws through the issuance of legal opinions’; 
‘authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens’; and with having 
‘used signing statements to claim the right to violate acts of Congress even as he signs 
them into law . . . [and having] proceeded to violate the laws the statements claimed the 
right to violate’.284 
As chapters three through six demonstrated, all of these charges were substantiated.  
However, the House of Representatives, which was still presided over by Speaker 
Pelosi, a very effective leader of the Democratic majority in that chamber,285 declined 
to vote on the bill.  Instead, this bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee for further 
consideration, where it was disposed of without fanfare.286   
Some indication of why these bills failed can be found in Representative Conyers’ 
introduction to the report of the House Judiciary’s exhaustive survey of executive 
overreaching, ‘Reigning in the Imperial Presidency: Lessons and Recommendations 
Relating to the Presidency of George W. Bush’.287  He wrote: 
The simple fact is, despite the efforts of impeachment advocates, the support and 
votes have not been there, and cannot be expected to materialize . . . .  The 
284 Senate Select Committee supra n 227 
285 Ronald M. Peters, Jr. and Cindy Simon Rosenthal, Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the New American 
Politics (Oxford University Press 2010) 229 
286 David Swanson, Daybreak: Undoing the Imperial Presidency and Forming a More Perfect Union 
(Seven Stories Press 2009) 129 
287 House Committee on the Judiciary Majority Staff supra n 98 
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resolution I offered three years ago simply to investigate whether an 
impeachment was warranted garnered only 38 cosponsors in the House, and the 
Democratic leader in the Senate [Harry Reid] labelled it ‘ridiculous’.288 
 
Accordingly, it is clear that the impeachment resolutions introduced by Conyers and 
Kucinich were blocked by the leaders in each legislative chambers of the party 
nominally opposed to the one occupying the executive.  To understand the motivations 
underlying this course of action, this thesis must turn in the next section to the 
explanation of the incentives for the reflexive support for the executive described in this 
chapter’s last five sections.  Once these have been exposed, this thesis can deal with the 
counter-argument that impeachment might later prove to be an effective means of 
legislative control. 
4.9 Explaining Congress’ Tolerance and Inaction  
Scholars describing Congress’ inability to stand up to the executive’s onslaught on 
its constitutional powers in the ten years following the 9/11 attacks have not been kind 
to the legislative branch.289 They describe a problematic pattern that begins with its 
failure to exercise any meaningful role in decision-making on matters that are allegedly 
related to national security, as ‘members [of Congress] throw off the weight of 
constitutional responsibility and legislative prerogatives in the face of a difficult 
decision that pits Congress[] . . . against the executive’s view of the national interest’.290   
288 Ibid 12 
289 See e.g. Thomas E. Mann and Norman Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing 
America and How to Get It Back on Track (Oxford University Press 2008) 
290 Jasmine Farrier, Congressional Ambivalence: The Political Burdens of Constitutional Authority 
(University of Kentucky 2010) 112 
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Prominent theorists such as ‘James P. Pfiffner and Louis Fisher . . . argue that 
Congress largely abdicated its duties . . . in the face of executive branch exaggeration, 
obfuscation, and outright falsehoods about imminent danger to the United States from 
Iraq and the connection between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 hijackers’.291  These 
scholars argue that this pattern continued throughout the Bush Administration’s term, 
even after the party in opposition regained control of both houses of the legislature. ‘In 
2007—2008, with the Democrats now in the majority, new intelligence policy battles 
between the White House and Congress [emerged] . . . and, ultimately, after several 
skirmishes, Bush prevailed’.292  ‘On the rare occasion that Congress led the 
administration to a different position . . . somehow it allowed itself to be overrun 
again’.293   
As was argued in chapter three, the same dynamic continues to frustrate 
congressional oversight over intelligence policy and national security matters during the 
Obama Administration.  While there was considerable dissent within Congress over the 
course of the past decade, this has not led to a congressional resurgence, despite the 
egregious nature the misconduct.  Jasmine Farrier described the inefficacy of these 
attempts at oversight and control as follows: 
Congressional committees . . . question[ed] the nation’s intelligence problems 
related to 9/11, the Iraq War, and the administration’s management of the War 
on Terror in general.  Confirmation hearings for new members of the executive 
branch raised questions about how delegated powers were used.  Even scathing 
291 Ibid 118 
292 Ibid 116 
293 Ibid 153 
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criticism from members of the president’s own party in dozens of oversight 
hearings did not yield . . . changes in policy.294 
 
Instead, those members of Congress who merely ‘advocated the House and Senate’s 
traditional prerogatives to review the administration’s requests were branded 
obstructionists, or worse’295 and side-lined by their parties’ leaderships at crucial 
moments, such as when attempts at control over the executive were made in the form of 
the draft bills and amendments described above.  It appears from the foregoing that the 
only opposition that was tolerated by the party’s legislative leadership was rhetorical 
opposition with no practical effect, which mirrored the ineffectual critiques of the 
executive’s conduct pronounced by the Supreme Court described in chapter four.   In 
both cases, it is simple to demonstrate that these admonitions did not serve the function 
of preserving the rule of law in the United States. 
Any explanation of Congress’ failure to check the executive in any meaningful way 
demands an analysis of the incentives and pressures on its members, whether these come 
in the form of negative reinforcement that conditions the legislators not to oppose the 
executive, or positive ones that encourage more active support.  This investigation 
should begin with the question of whether the failure to exercise oversight and control 
has any consequences for these individuals.  Scholars have concluded that it does not.   
As Douglas Kriner predicted: 
As long as members of Congress can rest secure in their re-election prospects 
even as popular confidence in Congress as an institution plummets, the impetus 
. . . will be lacking.  Until voters begin to value effective oversight as much as 
294 Ibid 159 
295 Ibid 
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academics . . . electoral incentives may continue to trump institutional incentives 
to protect Congress’ power from a wayward executive branch.296 
 
In the three years since Kriner made this prediction, popular confidence in the 
legislative branch has fallen to its lowest level on record.  As of June 13, 2013, only ten 
per cent of Americans said that they possessed ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of 
confidence in Congress. Not coincidentally, the highest rating for the legislature came 
directly after the Watergate hearings and President Nixon’s resignation.297  However, 
the likelihood of incumbents being re-elected to either chamber remains both constant 
and exceptionally high. In 2012, the percentage chance of re-election was at or above 
ninety per cent for these legislators.  This figure is roughly consistent with the mean 
level over the past twelve years.298   
Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that legislators’ failure to conduct meaningful 
oversight of the executive did not affect their ability to remain in office.  However, one 
might argue in response that a legislator may not merely want to remain on the back 
benches, in a position of little to no prominence or influence.  The question of what is 
required to thrive and succeed in the legislature, including obtaining positions of 
296 Douglas Kriner, ‘Can Enhanced Oversight Repair the “Broken Branch”’, (2009) 89 Boston 
University Law Review 793 
297 Elizabeth Mendes and Joy Wilke, ‘Americans' Confidence in Congress Falls to Lowest on Record’, 
Gallup Politics (13 June 2013) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/163052/americans-confidence-congress-
falls-lowest-record.aspx> accessed 1 June 2014 
298 Doug Mataconis, ‘House And Senate Incumbent Re-Election Rates Top 90%’, Beyond the Beltway, 
(13 December 2012) <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/house-and-senate-incumbent-re-election-
rates-top-90/> accessed 1 June 2014 
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leadership within a party, provides insight into the issue of whether there are powerful 
disincentives to confronting the executive. 
The development of these forms of negative reinforcement took place after the 
congressional resurgence. The historian Walter Karp has suggested that the correct place 
to begin one’s inquiry into the reassertion of executive power is the Carter 
Administration.299  Karp describes how the tumultuous disruption of the party system 
after Watergate allowed James ‘Jimmy’ Carter, the governor of Georgia and an outsider 
candidate deeply and morally committed to international peace, to prevail over the 
preferred nominees of the Democratic Party establishment, in particular Henry ‘Scoop’ 
Jackson,300 a war hawk and fervent anti-communist.301  It should be noted that Jackson 
later became a key influence on the neo-conservative intellectuals described in chapter 
three, especially Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. Wolfowitz and Perle were both on 
Jackson’s staff in the early 1970s, and Perle served in this capacity for eleven years.302  
Jackson also supported Nixon despite the revelations about his abuses of executive 
power, and in the wake of the resignation provoked by legislative investigations and the 
Supreme Courts’ decision in United States v. Nixon Jackson nevertheless called Nixon 
‘the first American President toppled by a mob’.303 
299 Walter Karp, Liberty Under Siege (Franklin Square Press 1993) 
300 Ibid 1-18 
301 Stephen Pelletiére, Israel in the Second Iraq War: The Influence of Likud (Greenwood Publishing 
2010) 16 
302 Janice Wedel, Shadow Elite (Basic Books 2009) 191 
303 Karp supra n. 299, 39 
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Karp detailed the opposition within Congress and the Democratic Party to Carter’s 
efforts to bring about peace with the Soviet Union, something which will shed 
significant light on the incentive structures that emerged during the period. As will be 
demonstrated below, these rewards and punishments continue to influence legislators’ 
inclinations to support the executive branch whenever its foreign policy agenda leads 
inexorably to war. In particular, Karp detailed how ‘one of Carter’s first steps was to try 
to reform the intelligence agency [the CIA]’,304 and his attempts to do so, which began 
with an attempt to remove its director, George H.W. Bush, were blocked by Congress.   
Next, this section will detail how Congress failed to support President Carter’s efforts 
to reach a comprehensive disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union, and subjected 
his plan to transfer sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone to blistering criticism.  This 
was followed by the unprecedented decision of the members of his own party to attempt 
to strip a sitting chief executive of his status as the party’s nominee in the upcoming 
presidential election.  This section will show that Congress’ hostility to Carter can be 
attributed to its renewed support for aggressive war, which in turn must be explained by 
reference to the connections between legislators and what President Eisenhower labelled 
the ‘military industrial complex’. 
Carter was elected in 1976 after the failure of a ‘Stop Carter’ alliance involving 
almost all of the most powerful legislators and party bosses of the Democratic Party, 
including the Mayor of Chicago and Democrat kingmaker, James Daley.305 As will be 
detailed below, the opposition to Carter was motivated largely by his desire for peace. 
304 Russ Baker, Family of Secrets (Bloomsbury Press 2009) 305 
305 Karp supra n 299, 15-16 
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  Remedial action following the failure to prevent Carter’s election would soon 
follow. A mere nine days after his election, an alliance of politicians and public 
intellectuals was formed, known as the Committee on the Present Danger.  This 
organization, which was a ‘who’s who of the Democratic establishment’, will 
hereinafter be referred to as the ‘CPD’.  It was supported by the leaders of America’s 
trade union federation, and leading industrialists such as Richard Mellon Scaife, a 
billionaire who gave Nixon an illegal million-dollar campaign contribution.306 The CPD 
announced a ‘declaration of war against Carter’s hopes for arms control and improved 
relations with the Soviet Union’, which they repeatedly compared to Neville 
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement.307  
The CPD’s central claim was that the Soviet Union was committed to obtaining 
military supremacy over the United States and defeating it.  As in the case of the 
preparation for the Iraq War and the interventions into the Libyan and Syrian Civil Wars 
described above, the CIA became a battleground in which competing assessments and 
interpretations of foreign state’s intentions would stand or fall as justifications for 
aggressive American foreign policy.  Congress and the executive were again on the 
opposite sides of this battle, but on the sides opposite to the positions they would assume 
in later policy disputes over aggressive war.    
Carter refused to allow George H.W. Bush to continue in office as the Director of the 
CIA, despite Bush’s appeals to remain.308 Instead he nominated Theodore ‘Ted’ 
306 Robert Kaiser, ‘Money, Family Name Shaped Scaife Burdens of Wealth’, Washington Post (3 may 
1999) A1 
307 Karp supra n 299, 20 
308 Baker supra n 304, 305 
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Sorenson, who was ‘the most important aide the President [Kennedy] had ever hired’.309  
Sorenson, like Kennedy, was a proponent of international peace and effective arms 
control, and was an opponent of the Vietnam War. He was one of the few public figures 
to commend Daniel Ellsberg for revealing the executive branch’s lies about the Vietnam 
War by leaking the Pentagon Papers, in actions that prefigured those of Chelsea 
(formerly Bradley) Manning, Edward Snowden, and the other whistle-blowers 
described in the next section.310  Paradoxically, the CPD and its legislative allies would 
keep Sorenson from being confirmed to lead the CIA precisely because he was an 
opponent of falsified intelligence, and possibly because he would have been a powerful 
ally for Carter, who ‘had been elected with a mandate and an ambition to open up the 
government’ in response to this sort of manipulation.311  Sorenson was exceptionally 
attuned to the pressures on the executive to accede to suggestions for aggressive action, 
having served under Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the demands for rapid 
escalation of American involvement in Vietnam after the assassination of Ngo Dinh 
Diem.312 Accordingly, it is likely that he would not have provided support for bellicose 
foreign policy.    
On January 13, 1977, the Senate Intelligence Committee examined affidavits from 
Sorenson in which he asserted that the release of the Pentagon Papers presented no threat 
to the national security of the United States, and that the classification system for 
309 Laurence Learner, The Kennedy Men: 1901-1963 (Harper Collins 2001) 359 
310 Ted Sorenson, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History (Harper Collins 2008) 
311 Baker supra n 304, 305 
312 Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War : The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford 
University Press 1997) 100 
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intelligence-related documents was ‘grotesquely overblown’.313 The Senate responded 
with outrage at this defence of someone who was by now tarred as a traitor. Sorenson’s 
fate was sealed when the Senate Majority leader, who was a member of Carter’s own 
party, said at a press conference that he would not endorse Sorenson, without even 
bothering to inform the President in advance.314  As Karp chronicled: 
To gauge the full measure of the victory—and of Carter’s stunning defeat—
parliamentarians delve into the archives and report that . . . the last time a Senate 
of the President’s own party had done such as thing was 1925 . . . . and the lesson 
is: How feeble is a President with no party to support him.315 
 
After Sorenson’s nomination failed, Carter nominated Admiral Stansfield Turner, 
who proved to be a ‘fish out of water—actually as unfamiliar with the inner workings 
of the agency as George H.W. Bush had pretended to be’ who was ‘unprepared for the 
ruthless internal politics of the CIA’.316 
Turner was loathed by those intelligence professionals found at the top ranks of their 
agencies, who remained devoted to the idea that war with the Soviet Union was 
inevitable.  The memoirs of the then-head of French intelligence service give some 
indication of how heretical any doubts about this proposition were at the time.  He wrote, 
‘[i]f the head of the CIA began by questioning the power and tenacity of his country’s 
principal enemy . . . there was little hope for the integrity of the agency’.317  Turner was 
313 Karp supra n 299, 28 
314 Ibid 
315 Ibid 29 
316 Baker supra n 304, 305 
317 Alexandre de Marenches and David Andelman, The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage 
in the Age of Terrorism (William Morrow & Co. 1992) 
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opposed by his own deputy, Hank Knoche, who bypassed his superior and 
communicated through a back-channel to the National Security Council.318 
In addition, less than a year before Carter took office, Bush appointed a special group 
of analysts who would produce politicised and faulty raw intelligence at the CIA 
director’s bequest.  Their conclusions were not subjected to the normal vetting process, 
as detailed above when discussing the manipulation of intelligence before the Iraq War, 
in order ‘to get around the analysts who did not sufficiently hype the Soviet threat’, and 
who ‘had accurately determined that the USSR was already in decline’.319  This group, 
known as ‘Team B’, included both Wolfowitz and Paul Nitze, who also served as 
founding members of the CPD.320  The stage was thus set for the debate over competing 
estimations of Soviet military spending and military preparedness, which would itself 
determine the probability of success for Carter’s arms control agenda.   
With Knoche in effective control over the CIA, the professional analysts who 
supported arms control with accurate assessments of Soviet military technology and 
strategic aims never stood a chance. The CIA soon ‘shifted 180 degrees’ and produced 
an estimate that constituted ‘a high barrier for the Carter Administration to overcome in 
its pursuit of arms control’, as it turned the Committee for the ‘Present Danger[’s] alarms 
into the new official orthodoxy’,321 something made easier by the support of the labour 
movement.  During this period, the AFL-CIO, ‘in partnership with right-wing lobbyists 
318 Baker supra n 304, 306 
319 Ibid. 260; 432 
320 Mike Gravel and Joe Lauria, A Political Odyssey: The Rise of American Militarism and One Man's 
Fight to Stop It (Seven Stories Press 2008) 126 
321 Karp supra n 299, 27 
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for U.S. nuclear supremacy’ produced a film ‘depicting the folly of détente and the 
menace of arms control’.322 It appeared that the intelligence community, the think-tanks 
allied to it, and the labour movement were all in favour of an aggressive foreign policy 
and concomitant levels of military spending, and thus solidly against Carter. The 
incentives that produced this hawkish approach will be discussed in the next section of 
this chapter. 
 Carter’s attempt to formalize the Vladivostok Accords and make them binding was 
subject to constant obstruction in Congress by the Democratic Senate Majority leader, 
who even attempted to prevent the President from lobbying the members of his own 
party with seats in that chamber.323  In a bid to block a SALT II treaty, Congress 
repeatedly forced Carter to ask the Soviets for further concessions, with which they 
thought no adversary could agree.  However, the USSR was in fact under severe 
economic pressure, as the CIA concluded prior to Team B’s formation.  Accordingly 
Leonid Brezhnev agreed to each proposal in turn.324  Despite the fact that the treaty was 
never formally ratified by the Senate, the Soviet Union complied with its provisions for 
the next seven years.325 Clearly the Soviet Union was not nearly as belligerent as the 
proponents of increased military spending would have the American public believe, but 
they succeeded in scuttling any policy initiatives that would expose the possibility of 
effective peace-making. 
322 Ibid 
323 Ibid 41 
324 Brezhnev agreed to further concessions on SALT II. 
325 Keith L. Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan 
Administration (University of Michigan Press 1991) 177 
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Carter faced considerable opposition to all of his attempts to reduce the aggressive 
posture of the military, which was especially fierce when he proposed reductions to the 
footprint of the American armed forces overseas.  Congress would seize upon statements 
from experts or military officials that would reinforce Scoop Jackson and the CPD’s 
chosen narrative.  The congressional narrative was that Carter sought to weaken the 
nation in a manner that was practically treasonous.326  Four months into his presidency, 
the commander of United States forces in South Korea, Major General John K. Singlaub, 
claimed that Carter’s plans to withdraw troops would inevitably lead to war.327  Singlaub 
later became a full-time critic of initiatives for peace, joining a Democratic congressman 
from Carter’s home state to found the Western Goals Foundation, ‘which was supposed 
to blunt subversion, terrorism, and communism in the United States . . . filling a gap 
created by the disbanding of House Un-American Activities Commission and what he 
considered the crippling of the FBI in the 1970s’.328 
The backlash over this redeployment was minor compared to what the President 
experienced as he negotiated the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which involved the transfer 
of sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone to the country in which it is located by 
1999.329  As Carter recalls of those days in his memoirs:  
326 Karp supra n 299, 19-42 
327 Ibid 50 
328 Associated Press, ‘McDonald's peers note tragic irony’, Associated Press (2 September 1982) 
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=I9kRAAAAIBAJ&sjid=p-
4DAAAAIBAJ&pg=6859%2C844160> accessed 1 June 2014 
329 Officially, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal and 
the Panama Canal Treaty 1977. 
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Antagonistic House committees held public hearings even before the 
negotiations were completed.  That summer, a stream of witnesses and some of 
the committee members had paraded before the television cameras their 
arguments that the treaty was illegal, unpatriotic, a cowardly yielding to 
blackmail, a boon for communism and a threat to our nation’s security.330 
 
These battles made it clear that legislative support for the executive after 1976 did 
not hinge so much on the party affiliation of the legislator and the President or even on 
the legislator’s view of the relative constitutional powers of these branches of 
government.  According to Karp, the President was ‘surprised that . . . [Senator] John 
Stennis would try to weaken his presidency by providing a forum for a few retired 
military officers to declaim against Soviet threats to the Caribbean, when this self-same 
Stennis was so strong a champion of a “strong presidency” that he was prepared to lie 
through his teeth to conceal Nixon’s impeachable offenses from the Senate’.331 
The perception of Carter as ineffectual and weak on matters of defence and national 
security was largely responsible for his defeat at the hands of Ronald Reagan in the 1980 
Presidential election, which was facilitated by the Democratic Party’s remarkable 
betrayal of Carter by allowing candidates to challenge him in the party’s primaries 
before the presidential election.332 Reagan managed to project the opposite image, and 
was quite prepared to antagonize the Soviet Union to that end.333  This is well-known, 
but what is less widely understood is how Congress, including or perhaps especially the 
330 Quoted in Karp supra n 299, 59-60 
331 Ibid 60 
332 Burton Hersh, The Shadow President: Ted Kennedy in Opposition (Publishing Group West 1997) 
39-42 
333 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Duke 
University Press 1997) 17-39 
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members Carter’s own party, made this possible by furthering the CPD’s narrative of 
national security, which Reagan successfully appropriated.  The question that remains 
is why these members of the legislature would act in such a manner.  Why would they 
respond so favourably to the attempts of an assortment of public intellectuals, generals, 
trade union leaders, and industrialists dedicated to increasing military spending and 
confronting America’s purported enemies? 
The key to understanding this lies in identifying an appropriate label for precisely 
this confluence of interest groups, one that was first used by President Eisenhower in 
his farewell speech to the American people, on the conclusion of his second term as 
President in 1961.  The term Eisenhower used was the ‘military-industrial complex’, 
although earlier drafts of this speech used the clearer but less rhythmic phrase ‘war-
based industrial complex’.334  In this speech, Eisenhower, a former Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces in Europe and architect of the D-Day landings, warned the 
nation: 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry 
is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, 
even spiritual — is felt in . . . every office of the federal government . . . . we 
must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and 
livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils 
of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, 
whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential 
for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. We must never 
let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. 
We should take nothing for granted.335 
 
334 John Milburn, ‘Papers shed light on Eisenhower's farewell address’. Associated Press (10 
December 2010) <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-12-10-eisenhower-address_N.htm> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
335 Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘Military-Industrial Complex Speech’, Avalon Project (17 January 1961) 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp> 
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By the end of the Cold War, the arms industry encompassed a much larger portion 
of the American economy and organised labour than it did in 1961.  It remains one of 
the most profitable industries,336 and the captains of industry associated with it are 
among the nation’s most wealthy.  In addition, the use of American military power props 
up many other industries, such as the oil industry and others that rely on favourable 
access to raw materials and foreign markets.337 It even supports the American economy 
as a whole, insofar as the status of the American dollar as the world’s key reserve 
currency allows the United States to continue to subsidize its economy even as its public 
debt reaches unprecedented levels.338  The Cold War was vital to American capitalism, 
and this created an incentive for many influential sectors of society to oppose Carter’s 
dovish agenda, which will be explored more fully below. 
This does not answer the question of why the drive for military aggression and 
massive expenditures on arms was successfully defeated by Congress in 1973 and then 
re-embraced in 1976.  Changes in popular opinion are undoubtedly significant. As 
described in chapter two, the Vietnam War was unpopular by the time of Watergate. 
However, the key to this issue are the changes that occurred during the interim to the 
rules that govern donations to politicians.  In 1971, Congress passed legislation allowing 
336 Hossein Askari, Amin Mohseni, and Shahrzad Daneshvar, The Militarization of the Persian Gulf: 
An Economic Analysis (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 9 
337 Rolf Hackmann, Globalization: Myth, Miracle, Mirage (University Press of America 2005) 202-
203 
338  Alex Merck, Sustainable Wealth: Achieve Financial Security in a Volatile World of Debt 
(John Wiley & Sons 2010) 96-102 
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for corporate campaign contributions,339 which were outlawed in 1907,340 although it 
continued to forbid any corporation that had existing contracts with the government 
from doing so or forming a political action committee to that end. This measure barred 
defence contractors from influencing legislators in one highly effective manner.  
However, amendments passed in 1974 to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
removed this limitation, and opened the floodgates allowing the defence industry’s 
influence to inundate the political terrain. Further amendments followed in 1977, in 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision Buckley v. Valeo,341 which struck down many 
of the remaining limits on campaign contributions as violations of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of free speech.342   
At this point, it increasingly became possible for corporations and labour unions to 
use unlimited amounts of ‘soft’ money that supported candidates indirectly, by 
supporting their stances on issues, rather than the politicians themselves, in theory. 343 
The effect on the American politics was predictable, and has continued and accelerated 
over the course of the following three decades.344  The net effect of this development is 
that success in American politics is now inextricably linked with fund-raising, which 
339  Federal Election Campaign Act 1971, Public Law 92–225 
340  Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Statutes 864 
341  Buckley v Valeo [1976] 424 US 1 (United States Supreme Court) 
342 James T. Bennett, Stifling Political Competition (Springer 2009) 69-75 
343 Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Packaging The Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential 
Campaign Advertising (Oxford University Press 1996) 378-445 
344 Ibid 446-524 
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not only secures re-election but also power and influence within parties, as the ability to 
direct the way in which campaign funds are spent is of vital importance to these 
organizations.345   
As the next section will demonstrate, by the twenty-first century there was a very 
close nexus between support for war and political success in the United States, for 
precisely the above-described reasons.  This explains how after the congressional 
resurgence, the legislature can swing between opposition to the aberrational executive 
branches directed by administrations who supported initiatives for peace and support for 
those who agitate for war, even at the expense of the credibility of the institution of 
Congress itself.  It will become clear that American federal legislators, owing to the 
nature of the campaign financing system, have not managed to serve as a check on the 
executive when it exercises its powers, including those it has appropriated to itself in 
contravention of the Constitution, in order to violate non-derogable rights so that it 
might produce justifications for aggressive war.  This thesis has attempted to 
demonstrate that the executive’s ability to launch wars on its own initiative is not only 
a repudiation of the rule of law, but that it makes possible a dynamic in which the 
executive becomes entrenched against attempts to reinstall the constitutional order, and 
which catalyses violations of non-derogable rights that protect this position.  It 
demonstrated that the incentives that prevent the legislature from controlling executive 
war-making are of the highest importance to the rule of law.  This highlights the 
importance of the question of whether it is possible for the legislature to interrupt a self-
reinforcing cycle of aggressive war and an unchecked executive’s violations of non-
345 Barbara Sinclair, Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making (University 
of Oklahoma Press 2006) 140 
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derogable rights.  If the answer is no, it is difficult to imagine how the crisis of the rule 
of law in the United States can be described as other than a permanent state of 
emergency, with no prospects for a return to constitutional governance in the immediate 
future. 
4.10 Can There be a Rule of Law Without Oversight?  
In chapters four, five and six, this thesis indicated that there seems to be ineffective 
oversight in foreign affairs over the executive branch, and that there are no indications 
that the judiciary or legislature are capable of re-imposing the checks and balances to 
discretionary executive power that the rule of law requires, owing to structural problems 
related to the selection process for both federal jurists and legislators.  While this would 
appear to foreclose the conclusion that the United States is governed in accordance with 
the minimum requirements of the rule of law, as outlined by the International 
Commission of Jurists and discussed in chapter one, this thesis must examine an 
influential contemporary counter-argument.  While this thesis will not revisit the 
definition of the rule of law, it is possible to address these arguments by discussing 
whether the alternatives that these authors propose for judicial and legislative control 
over the executive branch are adequate substitutes. 
Eric Posner is a Professor at the University of Chicago, and son of Richard Posner, a 
prominent judge and longstanding proponent of strong executive power.346 Adrian 
Vermeule is tenured at Harvard University.  He previously clerked for Judge Sentelle of 
the D.C. Circuit, which, as discussed in chapter five, was key to the demolition of the 
346 See Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press 2003) 
375 
 
                                                 
Chapter 5: Explaining the Failure to Re-Implement Oversight 376 
rule announced in Boumediene.347 Together, Posner and Vermeule write in The 
Executive Unbound that despite the absence of effective legal control over the 
executive, it is nonetheless subject to limitations that should be considered sufficient, 
even by those who advocate for the rule of law.348  They present this claim in opposition 
to critics whom they label as liberal legalists who ‘define tightly constrained executive 
power as an essential element of the rule of law’, a point of view which they do not 
define adequately,349 although they present David Dyzenhaus as an example of this sort 
of theorist.350 
What is most remarkable about this argument, the most prominent response to 
constitutional scholars concerned with the massive expansion of executive power and 
concomitant lack of any checks on these broad grants of discretionary power, is that it 
concedes most of these scholars’ premises.  However, Posner and Vermeule argue that 
not only is legal control over the executive undesirable, but purportedly impossible, 
especially during an undefined time of ‘crisis’.351  This, they suggest, is partly because 
347 Sentelle was also on the appellate panel (along with Judge Laurence Silberman) that reversed the 
convictions of Oliver North and John Poindexter, who executed the executive branch’s plans to defy 
Congress during the Iran-Contra crisis, discussed in chapters two and three. United States v Poindexter 
[1991] 951 F2d 369 (D.C. Circuit) 
348 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 89-112  
349 Louis Fisher, ‘Book Review: Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the 
Madisonian Republic’, (2011) 38 Congress & the Presidency 347 
350 Posner and Vermeule supra 348, 90-97 
351 Ibid 5-15 
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of the apparent need for effective and immediate responses in times of crisis and partly 
because of the nature of the administrative state, which concentrates more power in the 
executive branch by necessity.  Critics of Posner and Vermeule have pointed out the 
paucity of this argument.352   
It is also remarkable that Dicey, who created the modern definition of the rule of law 
precisely because of the prospect of the administrative state, is referenced precisely once 
in the book, as an example of a ‘liberal theorist’.353  Jürgen Habermas, who has written 
extensively and authoritatively on the subject of the problem of authentic political 
representation and legitimacy in administrative states,354 is not cited at all.  In contrast, 
the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt is given pride of place as a proponent of executive 
dominance, as he provides the model for ‘a new [and, for the authors, desirable] political 
order”.355 
The failure to discuss Habermas’ conceptions of civil society and the public sphere 
are understandable, however, given Posner and Vermeule’s under-developed ideas 
about public opinion and political responsibility, which posit and depend upon the idea 
352 See e.g. Richard Pious, ‘Book Review: Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: 
After the Madisonian Republic’, in [2011] Presidential Studies Quarterly 864 
353 Posner and Vermeule supra n 348, 5 
354 Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (MIT Press 1991) 
355 Posner and Vermeule supra n 348, 51-54, 15 
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that356 the executive branch is always responsive to the wishes of those that vote.  This 
remarkably formalistic and reductive view of the political process, which ignores the 
importance of campaign financing as discussed in the last section, is oversimplified, 
even by the standards of rational choice and game theory in political science.357  As 
Richard Pious notes, ‘[i]n this entire discussion, there is not a word about bureaucratic 
or interest group lobbying for such black and grey holes [i.e., explicit and implicit 
delegations of unreviewable authority to the executive] not a word about iron triangles 
and issue networks, not a word about political action committees and campaign finance’.  
The conclusion is also empirically false, as demonstrated by the polling about the Iraq 
War and the aggressive interventions into the Libyan and Syrian Civil Wars discussed 
in the last sections. 
 Another key flaw in Posner and Vermeule’s argument that pressure from the 
electorate is an effective substitute for legal responsibility is the fact that public opinion 
can only be mobilized against the executive’s efforts if these actions are not kept secret.  
As chapters two and three indicated, the executive has gone to great lengths to keep its 
violations of non-derogable rights secret.  Chapters four and five noted that courts no 
longer have the right to disclose information on these violations, even to the victims, 
owing to the creation of prudential doctrines such as the state secrets privilege.  Earlier 
sections of this chapter demonstrated that Congress delayed exposing the pattern of the 
executive’s repeated violations of jus cogens norms.  
356 See Harvey Mansfield, ‘Is the Imperial Presidency Inevitable?’ New York Times (New York, 11 
March 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/books/review/book-review-the-executive-
unbound-by-eric-a-posner-and-adrian-vermeule.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 1 June 2014 
357 Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (Yale University Press 1994) 
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Recent events demonstrate that congressional oversight has become even less 
effective, as the legislature now assists the executive to keep abuses of its discretionary 
authority from the public. Congress’ response to the disclosure of mass surveillance by 
the NSA in 2013 is a telling example.  After the executive’s statutory powers were 
expanded repeatedly by the Patriot Act358 and various amendments to FISA, it was 
revealed by Edward Snowden, a contractor for the agency turned whistle-blower,359 that 
this agency routinely and indiscriminately collected telephone calls, e-mails, and 
information shared via social media from over one billion people, including American 
citizens.360  Not only did Snowden reveal a vast illegal and unconstitutional domestic 
spying program, but he revealed that Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, 
the United States’ most senior intelligence official, lied under oath when testifying about 
surveillance before a congressional oversight committee.  Clapper, when asked by a 
Senator if ‘the NSA collect[s] any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions 
of Americans?’ he replied ‘No’.361  However, after Snowden’s revelations, Clapper 
358 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001, Public Law 107-56 
359 Glenn Greenwald, ‘NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily’, The 
Guardian (Manchester 6 June 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order> accessed 1 June 2014 
360 Ibid 
361 Glenn Kessler, ‘James Clapper's “Least Untruthful” Statement to the Senate,’ Washington Post 
(Washington, 12 June 2013) ‘http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/james-clappers-
least-untruthful-statement-to-the-senate/2013/06/11/e50677a8-d2d8-11e2-a73e-
826d299ff459_blog.html 
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apologized and admitted his answer was ‘clearly erroneous’, although he defended 
himself by, saying ‘mistakes happen’,362 echoing Nixon’s famous statement that 
‘mistakes were made’. 
A small number of legislators called for Clapper to be prosecuted for perjury or 
obstruction of justice, as was recently the case with the baseball player Roger Clement 
who lied to Congress about his use of performance-enhancing drugs, and earlier for 
Oliver North and John Poindexter, although their convictions were overturned by Judges 
Silberman and Sentelle.  They also called for the release of secret OLC memoranda 
which authorized this type of surveillance, which undoubtedly provided explicit 
authorization for ignoring both statutory law and the Constitution and establishing 
beyond doubt that Clapper knew he was not telling the truth before Congress.363  
However, these proposals came to nothing.  President Obama said unequivocally to a 
particularly broad section of the public and in response to Snowden’s revelations that 
‘there is no spying on Americans’.364 He then headed off calls for a congressional 
investigation by announcing an internal executive branch review of whether laws were 
broken, ostensibly to be overseen by Clapper.  Congress accepted this executive-branch 
review of its own conduct, rather than rejecting it like it did the Rockefeller 
Commission, as described in chapter two.  The President pre-empted calls for Congress 
362 Ibid 
363 ‘Letter of Twenty-Six Senators to James Clapper’ (27 June 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/28/senators-letter-james-clapper> accessed 1 
June 2014 
364 Greg Henderson, ‘Obama To Leno: “There Is No Spying On Americans”’, National Public Radio 
(Washington, 13 August 2013) <http://m.npr.org/news/front/209692380> accessed 1 June 2014 
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to launch an investigation like Church Committee’s.  This appears to demonstrate that 
there is little to no prospect of Congress reinstalling the oversight necessary to the rule 
of law as it did from 1974 to 1980.   
Glenn Greenwald noted that after these revelations, Congress was far more 
concerned with the purported illegality of making the executive’s illegal conduct public 
than with the wrongdoing that was revealed.365  This is lamentable, as Snowden revealed 
that it was not only Clapper who lied to Congress, but rather multiple ‘senior 
administration officials’366.  He also noted that ‘[b]eyond its criminality, lying to 
Congress destroys the pretence of oversight. Obviously, members of Congress cannot 
exercise any actual oversight over programs which are being concealed by deceitful 
national security officials’.367  However, instead of focusing on this serious challenge to 
the rule of law, senior legislators fixated on the whistle-blower, who performed a public 
service in bringing this mendacity and illegal conduct to their attention. Chairperson of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Diane Feinstein called Snowden a 
traitor,368 and approved of the executive branch’s remarkable act of international 
provocation, interfering with the flight path of a head of state in an attempt to arrest 
365 Glenn Greenwald, ‘James Clapper, EU play-acting, and political priorities’, The Guardian 
(Manchester 3 July 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/03/clapper-lying-
snowden-eu-bolivia> 
366 Miller supra n 176 
367 Greenwald supra n 365 
368 Jeremy Herb and Justin Sink, ‘Sen. Feinstein calls Snowden's NSA leaks an “Act of Treason”’, The 
Hill, (Washington, 10 June 2013) <http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/304573-
sen-feinstein-snowdens-leaks-are-treason> accessed 1 June 2014 
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Snowden.369 She did so while ignoring the fact that the executive was acting in a way 
that rendered her committee’s oversight merely nominal.370 
These divergent and disproportionate responses to the revelations of executive 
wrongdoing and those that reveal it, is in fact common in twenty-first century America. 
John Kiriakou, a former CIA case officer and senior investigator for the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee was sent to prison for revealing details about the waterboarding of 
detainees to a journalist.371  Private Manning was subjected to conditions the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur for Torture concluded amounted to cruel and inhuman 
treatment,372 before being convicted and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison for 
presenting evidence about activities such as the ‘collateral murder’ recording.  That 
video documents the killing of unarmed Iraqi civilians and Reuters journalists by an 
369 Catherine E. Shoichet ‘Bolivia: Presidential Plane Forced To Land After False Rumors Of 
Snowden Onboard,’ Cable News Network (3 July 2013) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/world/americas/bolivia-presidential-plane> accessed 1 June 2014 
370 Raju Chebium, ‘Feinstein to Review Surveillance Programs: But Critics Expect Little From 
Hearings,’ Gannet Wire Service (Washington 24 August, 2013) 
<http://www.statesmanjournal.com/article/20130825/NEWS/308250026/Feinstein-review-
surveillance-programs> 
371 Steve Coll, ‘The Spy Who Said Too Much: Why the Administration targeted a C.I.A. officer’, The 
New Yorker (New York, 1 April 2013), 
<http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/04/01/130401fa_fact_coll> accessed 1 June 2014 
372 Ed Pilkington, ‘Bradley Manning's treatment was cruel and inhuman, UN torture chief rules’, The 
Guardian (Manchester, 12 March 2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/12/bradley-
manning-cruel-inhuman-treatment-un> accessed 1 June 2014 
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American helicopter gunship.373  Julian Assange, who helped to bring the video to light, 
was indicted in secret by an American grand jury,374 in a proceeding that involved no 
judicial oversight, but merely a presentation by executive branch officials.375  Shamai 
Leibowitz, an Israeli-American lawyer, was convicted for releasing classified 
documents, which his trial judge admitted having not seen,376 as the executive deemed 
them too sensitive to reveal in camera to a federal court.  Leibowitz revealed these in 
order to document his concerns about ‘aggressive efforts to influence Congress and 
public opinion . . . regarding strike[s against] nuclear facilities in Iran’.377 Congressional 
concern with punishing those who reveal executive branch wrongdoing, rather than with 
its violations of non-derogable norms and plans to launch the wars that reinforce the 
cycle of unaccountability, demonstrates that the legislative branch will not play the same 
role that it did after Watergate at any time in the near future.  
373 Al Jazeera,‘Video shows “US attack” on Iraqis’. Al Jazeera English (Doha, 5 April 2010) 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2010/04/201045123449200569.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
374 Michael Hastings, ‘WikiLeaks Stratfor Emails: A Secret Indictment Against Julian Assange?’, 
Rolling Stone (New York, 28 February 2013) <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/national-
affairs/wikileaks-stratfor-emails-a-secret-indictment-against-assange-20120228> accessed 1 June 2014 
375 United States Department of Justice, Grand Jury Manual (Government Printing Office 1991)  
376 Maria Glod, ‘Former FBI employee sentenced for leaking classified papers’, Washington Post 
(Washington, 25 May 2010) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/24/AR2010052403795.html> accessed 1 June 2014 
377 Scott Shane, ‘Leak Offers Look at Efforts by U.S. to Spy on Israel’, New York Times (New York, 5 
September 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/us/06leak.html?pagewanted=all> 
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Perhaps most disturbingly, the United States has attempted to interfere with the 
reporters who have helped whistle-blowers bring these abuses to the public’s attention. 
Journalist Glenn Greenwald’s courier was held at Heathrow Airport for nine hours 
pursuant to legislation pertaining to terrorism suspects, during which time he was 
questioned about Snowden and Greenwald’s activities, allegedly at the request of 
American authorities.  All of his files on this story were seized.378  Speaking about the 
executive branches of the United States and the United Kingdom, the editor-in-chief of 
the Manchester Guardian noted that ‘[t]he governments are conflating journalism with 
terrorism and using national security to engage in mass surveillance. The implications 
just in terms of how journalism is practiced are enormous’.379  The rule of law itself is 
affected by this criticism of reporting, as legislative oversight now relies entirely on 
these exposés of executive wrongdoing, as thanks to these leaks we know that 
intelligence officials lie to Congress.  If there are no whistle-blowers, the executive will 
not only be able to violate non-derogable rights with impunity, but it will be able to do 
so in secret. 
Greenwald did the legislature a great service, by demonstrating how Congress has 
been ‘blocked’ from receiving ‘the most basic information’ about the activities of the 
378 Glenn Greenwald, ‘Glenn Greenwald: detaining my partner was a failed attempt at intimidation’, 
The Guardian (Manchester, 13 August 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/18/david-miranda-detained-uk-nsa>  accessed 
1 June 2014 (David Miranda, who carried files between Greenwald and the journalist Laura Poitras, is 
also Greenwald’s domestic partner). 
379 David Carr, ‘War on Leaks Is Pitting Journalist vs. Journalist’, New York Times, 25 August 2013 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/business/media/war-on-leaks-is-pitting-journalist-vs-
journalist.html?pagewanted=1> accessed 1 June 2014 
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intelligence community.  The executive has denied it this information about the violation 
of non-derogable rights. It does so at while executive branch officials perjure themselves 
about these activities before the legislature and prosecute those who attempts to reveal 
that fact.  Congress’ indifference to this blatant manipulation reveals that it has no 
intention of performing the oversight and control functions over the executive that the 
rule of law requires. 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that it fails to re-impose the rule of law for the same 
reasons that it pre-empted peaceful overtures to the Soviet Union.  The war-based 
industrial complex is simply too profitable, and it has become excessively easy to 
influence the legislators with these profits.  The military budget of the United States has 
remained constant at approximately seven hundred billion dollars a year over the past 
decade,380 most of which is distributed to American defence contractors.381  This is a 
larger figure than the total of all discretionary federal spending.382  In addition to this, 
there is now a large lobby formed by the contractors who support covert intelligence 
activities, as the secret ‘black budget’ for the intelligence agencies, which was leaked 
by Edward Snowden revealed that approximately fifty billion dollars is spent in this 
manner annually.  The majority of expenditures are made in the form of payments to 
private sector contractors.  This is a figure ‘larger than the sums received by the 
380 David Isenberg, ‘Budgeting for Empire: The Effect of Iraq and Afghanistan on Military Forces, 
Budgets, and Plans’, Independent Policy Report (30 January 2007) 
<http://www.independent.org/pdf/policy_reports/2007-01-30-budgeting.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014 
381  Leon V. Sigal, The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending (1999, Greenwood Publishing) 
pp. 153-171 
382 Alexander DeVolpi et al. (eds), Nuclear Shadowboxing: Legacies and Challenges, vol. 2, 5-42 
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Department of the Interior, the Department of Commerce and NASA this year 
combined’.383  Accordingly, the same dynamic of a powerful lobby allying itself with a 
hawkish executive in a manner that prevents effective legislative oversight as described 
above with respect to the defence industry can now replicate itself within the private 
sector arms of the intelligence community. 
The war-based military-industrial and intelligence complex is able to exert 
considerable influence over legislators by means of campaign spending that has also 
expanded exponentially over the past decade.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission384 allowed for so much corporate spending that 
the head of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe opined that this judgment might create an 
electoral system that violates the ODIHR’s two core requirements of ‘giving voters a 
genuine choice and giving candidates a fair chance’, insofar as this ruling ‘threatens to 
further marginalize candidates without strong financial backing or extensive personal 
resources, thereby in effect narrowing the political arena’.385 
383 Russia Today, ‘Snowden reveals US intelligence’s black budget: $52.6 billion on secret programs’, 
Russia Today (Moscow, 29 August 2013) <http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-black-budget-176/> 
accessed 1 June 2014 
384 Citizens United v Federal Elections Commission [2010] 558 US 310 (United States Supreme 
Court) 
385 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ‘Press Release: Head of OSCE election body 
concerned about U.S. Supreme Court ruling on election spending’, Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (22 January 2010) 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20130112213852/http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/51838> 
386 
 
                                                 
Chapter 5: Explaining the Failure to Re-Implement Oversight 387 
This prediction was clearly correct, as major defence contractors took advantage of 
the new rules to that end.  Their power to do so effectively is illustrated by the fact that 
one conglomerate alone, Koch Industries, distributed up to two hundred and fifty million 
dollars during the last election cycle, by making full use of the panoply of tax-exempt 
vehicles, most of which were prohibited from making campaign-based expenditures 
before the Buckley decision.386  The same dynamic is now presumptively at play with 
respect to garnering support for the intelligence activity that leads to war.  It was recently 
revealed that the ‘lawmakers who upheld NSA phone spying received double the 
defense industry cash’.387 
After the information detailed in this section is given due consideration, it is 
impossible to conclude, as do Posner and Vermeule, that the executive’s sensitivity to 
public opinion can make up for the lack of legal restraints on the executive that are 
otherwise required in a rule of law state.  Instead, it is clear that the executive 
manipulates public opinion by disguising its abuses and aggressively prosecuting those 
that would reveal them.  At the same time, defence contractors and others with a vested 
interest in helping the executive branch incite the nation to war spend vast amounts of 
money to shape public opinion and to secure the election of legislators who will not 
interfere with executive war-making. 
386 Alex Seitz-Wald, ‘Koch Brothers Break New Ground in Dark Money’, National Journal 
(Washington, 13 September 2013) <http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/koch-brothers-break-new-
ground-in-dark-money-20130913> accessed 1 June 2014 
387 David Kravets, ‘Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying Received Double the Defense 
Industry Cash’, Wired Magazine (San Francisco, 26 July 2013) 
<http://www.wiredcom/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/> accessed 1 June 2014 
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5  CONCLUSION: THE EXECUTIVE CANNOT BE CHECKED 
 The answer to the question of whether Congress has restrained the executive in 
the decade following the 9/11 attacks is clearly a resounding ‘no’.  This was not only 
true in the shocked aftermath of the attacks.  Rather, this state of affairs continued 
throughout both terms of Presidents Bush and Obama’s administrations. Furthermore, 
this chapter demonstrates that Congress was not merely negligent in failing to conduct 
oversight and to restrain the executive when it violated non-derogable rights, but also 
that it has actively enabled the executive by enacting legislation that broadened its 
discretionary authority when these administrations’ aggressive agendas were 
challenged, whether by the courts or the public at large. 
In addition, and as described above, Congress has not merely broadened the scope 
of these grants of discretionary authority that do not accord with the rule of law, as 
detailed in earlier chapters.  The legislature also accepted continued assertions by the 
executive that it was not subject in any way to oversight by the other branches of 
government when it argued that it was acting to defend the nation from vague and 
ambiguous threats.  Accordingly, Congress not only authorized continued indefinite 
arbitrary detention and passed legislation with loopholes allowing for continued torture, 
it accepted without comment the executive’s statements that it could not be bound by 
this legislation.   
Congress also allowed the executive to set a precedent that it did not need legislative 
approval for the extended use of force overseas and that it could ignore the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973.  It appears increasingly likely as of late 2013 that the executive will 
engage in acts of aggressive war against Syria without the approval of Congress, or 
even a resolution from the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
without provoking any reaction from the legislature.  Like the Supreme Court, Congress 
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has abdicated all responsibility for overseeing and restraining the executive’s powers.  
Instead, the executive has been permitted to continue to violate a range of jus cogens 
norms as part of its agenda to justify acts of international aggression. 
Owing to the release of substantial amounts of evidence that the executive 
manufactured the case for war with Iraq, Congress was forced to investigate this 
wrongdoing.  It duly reported on this impeachable misconduct.  However, the report’s 
release was delayed so as to have no impact, and party leaders made it eminently clear 
that they would block any attempt to hold the executive accountable.  As the general 
conclusion found in the next chapter will detail, now that the executive claims the power 
to subject the nation’s citizens to indefinite arbitrary detention and extra-judicial 
execution, there appears to be no line that the executive can cross that will induce 
Congress to re-introduce the legislative oversight that the rule of law requires. 
As this chapter details, this inaction can be explained by exploring the reasons 
behind Congress’ contrary reaction when the executive attempted to achieve durable 
peace.  This led to an examination of the financing of the election campaigns of federal 
legislators by the war-based industrial complex, a coalition of interest groups bound 
together by their common desire to profit from continued American aggression.  It 
exercises their ever-increasing control over the legislators’ prospects of continued 
success.  This chapter revealed that it obtained this level of control owing to the 
deregulation of the campaign financing system. 
For these reasons, it is possible to conclude at this point that the twenty-first century 
crisis of the rule of law, characterized by an executive committed to expanding the 
boundaries of its own power to the point where it can violate non-derogable norms with 
impunity, is no longer temporary or anomalous.  Neither the courts nor Congress is 
willing to re-impose the limitations that characterize this form of constitutional order.  
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There is at present virtually no possibility of another congressional resurgence, as the 
legislative branch appears entirely beholden to those interests groups that support the 
executive supremacy that makes American aggression possible, even when it is 
consistently unpopular with the electorate. 
This chapter also addressed the argument that public opinion can serve as enough of 
a check on the executive to salvage the rule of law in the United States, in the absence 
of the oversight of the judicial and legislative branches, which these theorists admit is 
now non-existent.  This is because it was demonstrated that owing to the executive’s 
control of both the intelligence community, which violates non-derogable rights under 
the cloak of official secrecy, and the public prosecutors, who have been instructed to 
bring the most serious charges imaginable against those who bring the executive’s 
wrongdoing to light, it is now as impossible for the public to become adequately 
appraised of these violations of non-derogable rights as it is for Congress to conduct 
the requisite oversight. 
Accordingly, this thesis can now proceed to its conclusion.  After recapitulating the 
findings of the first six chapters, it will be possible for it to conclude that the United 
States is no longer governed in accordance with the most fundamental norms of the rule 
of law, which constitute its most minimal and indispensable requirements.  
Furthermore, it will conclude that there is no prospect of any termination of this crisis 
of the rule of law in the near future.  Rather, what is more likely is additional extensions 
of a permanent state of emergency, as further international aggression leads to 
reinforced executive power and still more violations of non-derogable norms, as part of 
a self-reinforcing and vicious circle. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
1  WHAT THIS THESIS DEMONSTRATED 
This thesis addressed the question of whether the United States can still be 
considered to be governed in accordance with the fundamental norms of the rule of law 
after the drastic changes to its legal order that took place after the 9/11 attacks.1  In 
order to address this question, it was necessary to create an operational definition of the 
rule of law, to chart the changes against this definition, and further, to determine the 
likelihood that the abrogation of basic norms of the rule of law, and the constitutional 
crisis that abrogation created, might soon be terminated by the actions of either the 
judicial or legislative branches.2 
In order to demonstrate the defensibility of this answer, the conclusion will briefly 
recapitulate the findings of the six preceding chapters in which this thesis formulated a 
definition of the rule of law with which the United States has been in compliance for 
most of its history.  However, as the following sections will detail, this thesis described 
how the 9/11 attacks created an environment in which the executive branch was able to 
enlarge its own powers, such that it was able to violate key non-derogable rights with 
impunity.  These sections will reiterate that the responses of the judicial and legislative 
branches have not been adequate, and in fact that Congress and the federal courts are 
1  See supra section 1.1.2 (chapter one, section 2: all cross-references below follow this format) 
2  See supra section 1.5.2 
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compromised in such a manner as to prevent them from taking action to re-implement 
the rule of law. 
As this conclusion will indicate, this is an important subject to address because this 
situation has allowed the development of a state of affairs in which the executive asserts 
that it possesses power to violate non-derogable rights in the context of the war on 
terror, which it also reserves the right to define, without any restraint from the other 
branches of government.  This thesis has argued that this is not only inconsistent with 
the rule of law, but that it creates a real danger of widespread violations of non-
derogable norms continuing and becoming the new norm during a future crisis. 
The rule of law was the most important legal development of the early modern era.  
Before to the Early Modern era, the executive claimed only to be morally bound to 
observe the laws, and that no earthly power could judge it, much less restrain it.  In the 
legal orders that preceded the rechtsstaat, it is unclear whether rights as such can really 
exist, insofar as they are unenforceable whenever the executive finds them particularly 
inconvenient.  The rule of law made possible a set of non-derogable rights, most 
importantly the right not to be subjected to prolonged detention without a trial, not to 
be tortured, and not to be executed pursuant to orders issued by the executive on its 
own authority.  Lettres de cachet, torture warrants, and acts of attainder were all to be 
consigned to the dust-bin of history. 
The United States has played a leading role in the promotion of the rule of law 
internationally, which makes its deviation from the basic norms of that legal order 
particularly troubling.  It is unclear whether it can continue to play this useful role on 
the world stage while it continues to engage in certain practices, such as the operation 
of the Guantánamo Bay camps and related sites, such as the ‘Black Prison’ at the 
Parwan Detention Facility, and as it engages in the practice of targeted killing. 
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This thesis has also attempted to address the question of whether the political context 
in the United States is such that one might expect that this crisis might soon pass, or 
whether the new legal order has become entrenched and solidified.  If this has indeed 
become a permanent state of emergency, without guarantees that violations of non-
derogable norms can be reviewed and terminated by the other branches of government, 
then this thesis has raised a number of questions that will need to be addressed in the 
future.   
The key issue to be addressed will be how those interested in international human 
rights can raise awareness of the fact that the United States is not in compliance with 
the basic norms of the rule of law, as part of a broader effort to consider how this might 
be corrected.  As this is a complicated problem given the breakdown of its legal order 
since the 9/11 attacks, this is outside of the scope of this thesis, but the conclusion will 
outline the problem, which is the essential first step in any attempt to redress the state 
of affairs that this thesis describes. 
2  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
In chapter one, this thesis demonstrated that the United States committed such 
serious violations of non-derogable rights in the period following the 9/11 attacks, for 
which no one has been held accountable, that it is now appropriate to ask whether it is 
still a rule of law state.3 Chapter two outlined the nation’s constitutional framework 
prior to the 9/11 attacks, which contained a separation of powers that, when enforced, 
prevented the abrogation of the rule of law in all but transient constitutional crises until 
the twentieth century. Despite the rupture created by the Cold War, this thesis showed 
3  See supra chapter 1.7 
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that from 1974-1980 a constitutionalist resurgence catalysed an enforceable legal order 
that prevented the executive from overturning the rule of law.4 Chapter three addressed 
the period following the 9/11 attacks in which the Bush Administration evaded all of 
these restrictions on its powers by means of a legal theory of executive supremacy over 
the interpretation of the Constitution that invented specious implicit reserve powers, a 
theory that was adopted in pertinent part by the Obama Administration, which it uses 
to continue to violate the same jus cogens norms with impunity.5 Chapter four 
examined the Supreme Court of the United States’ response to this challenge to the rule 
of law to find that it has been hesitant and minimalistic. Further, the Court’s reticence 
allowed the executive to continue its wrongdoing after token adjustments of policy and 
administration. These adjustments were approved by certain key appellate courts that 
have been effectively ‘captured’ by the executive branch. These courts have produced 
rulings that fail to uphold the rights announced by the Supreme Court, but the Supreme 
Court has refused to review them.6 Chapter five demonstrated that this systematic and 
reflexively deferential decision-making by the nation’s highest courts can only be 
explained by reference to the appointment of jurists who are best characterised as 
executive branch loyalists, who have already proven their reliability through service to 
the executive in politicized, secretive, and unaccountable positions within that branch.7 
This chapter also traced the responses of Congress when it was confronted with 
4  See supra chapter 2 
5  See supra chapter 3 
6  See supra chapter 4 
7  See supra chapter 5 
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concerns about the executive’s compliance with the post-Watergate statutes that protect 
the rule of law. It showed that the legislature failed to restrain the executive and, instead, 
either passed statutes that further enable the violation of non-derogable rights or ignored 
the express statements of the executive that it believes it is not bound by the laws.8  That 
chapter detailed in particular how Congress has refused to perform the meaningful 
legislative oversight that the rule of law requires. This thesis found, in fact, that 
Congress is incapable of doing so due to the power of the military-industrial complex 
in American politics and the way it has given incentives to allow the executive to further 
an agenda that makes possible aggressive war-making.9   
The following six subsections of the conclusion will outline these findings in more 
detail.  They will revisit the basis for its answer to the question of whether the United 
States can be considered a rule of law state, and inform its approach to the further issue 
of whether it is reasonable to assume that this state of affairs is not merely temporary, 
but instead likely to persist on the basis of the structural flaws identified in the preceding 
chapters and summarized here. 
2.1 The US’ Abrogation of Non-derogable Norms After 9/11 
The introduction addressed the issue of whether it was appropriate to consider 
whether the United States, which is often considered the leading champion for human 
rights and democracy around the world, was no longer a rule of law state. Despite its 
self-image, over the past decade the United States has been accused by leading human 
8  See supra chapter 5 
9  See supra section 5 
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rights organizations of systematic violations of jus cogens norms.10  These began with 
the creation of the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, which was constructed to house 
persons that are subjected to what has repeatedly been determined to be indefinite and 
arbitrary detention.11   
These detainees, among others, including those held without records as ‘ghost 
detainees’ at secret prisons known as ‘black sites’ in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, 
were subjected to what the executive would also later admit was torture, inasmuch as it 
involved such actions as waterboarding some detainees hundreds of times.  In doing so, 
the executive made use of a technique that was defined as torture several decades 
earlier.12 
Lastly, chapter one described the executive branch’s initiation and increasing 
reliance on a practice known as targeted killing, in which persons suspected of 
involvement in terrorism were subjected to extra-judicial execution.13  Numerous 
international observers, including the relevant Special Rapporteur, concluded that this 
could not be justified under International Humanitarian Law, as it took place outside of 
10  See supra section 1.1 
11  Ibid; see also section 3.4 
12  See supra section 1.1, see also section 3.4 
13  See supra section 1.1, 2; see also section 4.4 
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war zones.14  Furthermore, this practice violates certain basic guarantees of the 
Constitution of the United States, especially when applied to American citizens .15   
As the executive branch of a state cannot commit more serious violations of non-
derogable rights than indefinite arbitrary detention, torture, and violations of the right 
to life itself, it was possible for this thesis to conclude on this basis that its central 
question, namely whether the United States can still properly be considered a rule of 
law state, was appropriate.  Because international instruments make it clear that it is not 
possible for a state to reserve the right to violate non-derogable rights and maintain this 
status, the introduction concluded that it was clearly appropriate to address whether the 
United States is a rule of law state.  Most fundamentally, if the executive can commit 
violations of non-derogable rights with impunity, the state cannot be characterized as 
being in compliance with the minimum demands of the rule of law, since the rule of 
law emerged to supplant precisely that state of affairs.16 
Accordingly, the first chapter established the need for this thesis to explore the issue 
of how it was possible for executive to violate these norms on its own initiative, and to 
address whether this was evidence of the irreversible decline of a constitutional order 
that protected the basic norms of the rule of law.  This set the stage for the next chapter’s 
discussion of the particulars of the legal framework that the executive needed to 
undermine in order to seize the power necessary to commit these violations of non-
derogable rights without any possibility of being held accountable. 
14  See supra section 1.1, 2; see also section 3.4 
15  See supra section 1.5.1; see also Ryan Patrick Alford, ‘The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: 
Consequences of Targeted Killing of Citizens’, [2011] Utah Law Review 1203  
16  See supra section 1.5 
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2.2 The United States’ Failure to Respect Non-derogable Norms 
The second chapter of this thesis described how the Constitution of the United States 
implemented the rule of law in the United States.17  It described how this constitutional 
order was durable enough to withstand serious crises, including a civil war, without 
being fundamentally threatened.18  However, this chapter subsequently described how 
the Second World War, which merged seamlessly into the Cold War, created the pretext 
for a permanent state of emergency that allowed the executive to operate outside of the 
confines of the rule of law for most of its duration.19   
As chapter two outlined, the Cold War made it possible for the executive to extend 
its powers beyond all constitutional limits, although mass violations of non-derogable 
norms did not occur.20  However, this level of restraint was in doubt when the Cold 
War approached its apex. During the early nineteen-seventies, President Nixon’s failure 
to win the Vietnam War brought America to the brink of a popular uprising against 
him.21  This led to a major constitutional crisis known as Watergate, when it became 
public knowledge that Nixon used the executive powers enlarged by the Cold War to 
conduct illicit domestic surveillance on a large scale. It also became known that he 
considered sweeping measures, including indefinite arbitrary detention, in response to 
the crisis, which was made particularly acute by exposure of his aggressive and 
17  See supra section 2.1 
18  See supra section 2.1 
19  See supra section 2.2 
20  See supra section 2.2 
21  See supra section 2.3 
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unilateral war-making against Cambodia.22  As this chapter detailed at length, owing to 
Nixon’s unpopularity with the people, the prospect of rebellion, and the fact that the 
other branches were very close to being rendered irrelevant during his drive for an 
‘Imperial Presidency’, the judiciary and the legislature took steps to remove him from 
office. The Court ordered the executive to turn over the Watergate tapes to the 
legislative committee investigating his misconduct.  That committee then voted in 
favour of the Articles of Impeachment that forced his resignation.23 
Chapter two then outlined how public exposure of Nixon’s attempt to effectively 
create a presidential dictatorship led Congress and the courts to re-implement the rule 
of law by creating and enforcing new statutes.24  These statutes explicitly repudiated 
Nixon’s theory of executive supremacy, which he pithily expressed as ‘if the President 
does it, then it is not illegal’,25 and the theory of constitutional reserve powers that 
undergirded it, which were originally formulated by Nixon’s chief legal counsel, 
William Rehnquist.26   Foremost among these legal developments after Watergate that 
re-established the rule of law were the enactment of the Non-Detention Act, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the War Powers Resolution, along with the creation 
of legislative oversight committees charged with ensuring that the executive did not 
22  See supra section 2.3 
23  See supra sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 
24  See supra chapter 2  
25  Interview with David Frost, printed in the New York Times (New York, 20 May 1977) B10 
26  See supra section 2.3 
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violate citizens’ non-derogable rights, or expand its own powers so that it might again 
do so in secret.27   
This new balance of governmental powers that protected the rule of law from the 
executive was in actuality the paradigm that existed before the Second World War. The 
separation of powers, buttressed by the statutes passed during the congressional 
resurgence, protected the rule of law until the 9/11 attacks.  The third chapter of this 
thesis described the ways in which the safeguards erected by Congress and the courts 
were dismantled by the executive shortly thereafter. 
2.3 The Creation and Maintenance of an Unaccountable Executive 
Chapter three detailed a new quasi-legal framework for executive control over 
intelligence and foreign policy developed within the OLC shortly after the 9/11 attacks.  
Dusting off theories of implicit constitutional reserve powers that lay dormant since 
Rehnquist’s tenure, a cadre of neo-conservative officials, many of whom were veterans 
of the Nixon Administration, instructed compliant executive branch lawyers, most 
notably, John Yoo, to write legally binding memoranda. These secret memoranda 
purportedly explained how the executive could make unilateral decisions to detain, 
torture, and kill alleged wrongdoers, and lastly, to launch aggressive wars, all without 
congressional authorization.28  They also argued that the courts could not review the 
executive’s actions, although these assertions were also isolated from court review by 
their classification as state secrets.29   
27  See supra section 2.6.2 
28  See supra section 3.4.2 
29  Ibid 
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In addition to detailing the OLC memoranda setting up a theory of presidential 
primacy, chapter three also detailed the rise of another form of executive law-making 
that sought to supersede the statutes that would otherwise restrain it, namely signing 
statements.30   Rather than secretly overruling the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, as did the OLC memoranda, the signing statements openly declared that the 
executive was unwilling to abide by duly enacted laws, including those which limited 
its ability to violate non-derogable norms.31 
Chapter three continued by describing the Obama Administration’s adoption of this 
theory of executive supremacy.32  While it repealed some memoranda written by John 
Yoo and others, the new administration adopted the same theories repeatedly in its own 
internal regulations. In addition to continuing to issue signing statements, the new 
executive also adopted identical reasoning to that drawn up by John Yoo in his 
memorandum on the unilateral use of force.33  President Obama argued on this basis 
that he possessed the inherent constitutional authority to unilaterally initiate hostilities 
against Libya, and the Administration later argued that he was not bound by the War 
Powers Resolution. His Secretary of State threatened to ignore any legislative action 
that would seek to restrain his war-making.34   
30  See supra section 3.4 
31  Ibid 
32  See supra section 3.4 
33  Ibid 
34  See supra section 6.4 
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Accordingly, by the conclusion of chapter three, it was possible for this thesis to 
demonstrate that the Obama Administration is firmly committed to continuing to rule 
by decree when it comes to the violation of non-derogable rights within what it labels 
the war on terror. This thesis brought forward the example of a speech by the General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense to demonstrate this commitment, wherein the 
General Counsel indicated the executive unilaterally expanded the definition of those 
subject to Congress’ authorization for the use of force.35  This chapter demonstrated 
that this Administration dramatically expanded the targeted killing program. It also is 
claiming for the first time the constitutional authority to target its citizens.  It continues 
to assert the same specious arguments to prevent the release of Guantánamo detainees, 
while pretending that it would prefer to do otherwise.36  Accordingly, at this point it 
was clear that the constitutional crisis created by executive response to the 9/11 attacks 
continued into the second decade of the twenty-first century, and that the executive 
would continue to govern in a manner that was inconsistent with the rule of law, unless 
the other branches of government were prepared to intervene.  Unfortunately, as the 
next three chapters would explore in detail, other branches did not, and could not 
intervene. 
2.4 The Courts’ Failure to Restrain the Executive 
Chapter four examined whether, after the immediate crisis period that followed the 
9/11 attacks, the federal courts stepped in to restrain the executive branch, such that it 
would no longer be unaccountable. This required a reappraisal of the role of the 
35  See supra sections 3.4 
36  See supra sections 3.4 at and 3.4; see also section 4.2 
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Supreme Court of the United States from 2003 onwards.  While many have argued that 
the Court’s decisions addressing indefinite arbitrary detention at Guantánamo Bay were 
important rebukes to the executive, careful examination of these decisions revealed that 
they produced only a rhetorical effect.  Critically, they refused to address squarely the 
issue of whether the executive possessed a legitimate power to expand its own 
powers.37   
In particular, chapter four detailed how the Court also failed to address the most 
important case that came before it during that era. This is the case of José Padilla.  
Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested within the United States. He was held and 
tortured by the military after being classified an unlawful enemy combatant. Despite 
this set of actions being explicitly barred by statute, the Court avoided deciding the case 
by invoking the most technical reasons to decline jurisdiction, failing even to rebuke 
the executive for these gross violations of jus cogens norms and its explicit refusal to 
observe the laws.38   
This chapter also demonstrated that the Court was only willing to craft narrow 
rulings when it overturned even the most problematic administrative decisions. The 
Court also granted purely nominal relief to those who suffered violations of their non-
derogable rights,39 and it left the subsequent enforcement of its decisions to the lower 
courts. However, when detainees and others began to prevail on these claims at trial, 
the intermediate-level federal appellate courts intervened, overturning rulings against 
37  See supra section 4.2 
38  Ibid; see also supra section 3.4 
39  See supra section 4.2 
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the executive in connection with arbitrary detention, torture, and warrantless 
surveillance.40   
These courts, for reasons that are explored in chapter five, created elaborate doctrines 
that allow the executive to avoid facing decisions on the merits when it is charged with 
even the most serious allegations of wrongdoing. These doctrines comprise a set of 
jurisdictional and evidentiary rules—foremost among them the political questions 
doctrine and the state secrets privilege—that have made the access to the courthouse 
that the Supreme Court mandated in its narrow decisions utterly meaningless, as 
numerous statements of federal trial judges lamenting these doctrines have made 
clear.41  Chapter four also demonstrated that it is now impossible for these plaintiffs to 
obtain information about the abuses to which they were subjected during the discovery 
process, the absence of which these appellate courts, most notably, the D.C. Circuit, the 
Seventh Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit, have then used to justify dismissals of these 
lawsuits.42 
Chapter four demonstrated that these doctrines make it impossible for defendants 
making the most serious allegations against the executive to receive justice—and, in 
addition, showed that the Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction over appeals 
challenging the executive’s violation of non-derogable norms.43 Owing to these 
developments, it was possible for this thesis to conclude that the judiciary can play no 
40  See supra sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.6  
41  See supra section 4.6 
42  Ibid 
43  See supra sections 4.3 to 4.6 
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meaningful role in controlling the executive’s violation of non-derogable rights, 
violations which, as the previous chapter demonstrated, continue unabated.44  
Accordingly, it became apparent that that the statements of the Supreme Court in cases 
such as Boumediene v Bush have only the rhetorical effect of creating a simulacrum of 
judicial oversight, which disguises the absence of the rule of law.  
2.5  Explaining the Development of a Deferential Judiciary 
Chapter four exposed the way that decisions of the higher federal courts in recent 
cases involving challenges to the executive are frequently so poorly reasoned and 
inconsistent with existing jurisprudence as to be inexplicable except by reference to 
extra-legal factors. The accumulation of this type of decision suggests that legal 
oversight of the executive is not possible.  Accordingly, chapter five addressed the 
question of how this state of affairs came to be, despite constitutional requirements that 
the judiciary perform this task.  This issue is vital for this thesis to address because it is 
not merely a troubling aberration.  Rather, it is evidence that allows us to predict 
whether the judiciary could play a more constructive role in re-implementing the rule 
of law. 
The history of the relationships between the executive and the judiciary that this 
thesis reviewed began with the courts’ role in Watergate. The thesis approached that 
history in order to answer a question. Namely, what accounts for the remarkably 
different approaches of the higher federal courts in 1974 and in the twenty-first century?  
Chapter five concluded that the answer lies in the changing nature of Supreme Court 
appointments. Its analysis began with an examination of the changes to the 
44  See generally supra chapter 3 
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appointments process to the higher levels of the federal judiciary during the Nixon 
Administration, a process which acquired an increasing importance as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s demonstration of its willingness to impede an overweening executive 
during the constitutional crisis of Watergate.45 
Shortly before Watergate, the executive began to place jurists onto the benches of 
the nation’s most influential courts because of its faith in their loyalty.  Chapter five 
demonstrated that this process has shaped the Supreme Court of the United States 
decisively, as it now populated with five judges with close and longstanding 
connections to the executive branch.  This majority of executive branch loyalists 
comprises Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito, and Kagan.  These justices take 
similar stances on executive powers regardless of the party of the President who 
nominated them.46 
 By the time of Alito’s appointment, the Senate had access to more information about 
the nominees’ approaches to executive power than ever before. In Alito’s case, this led 
to a Senate discussion of the application form Alito submitted for employment within 
the executive, in which he made clear his views on executive supremacy over the 
judiciary. His views were so extreme that members of Senate noted that they effectively 
repudiated the rule of law.47  However, despite this, Alito was confirmed as a Justice of 
the Supreme Court.  In addition to the foregoing, chapter five detailed how the Senate 
confirmed numerous judges with very problematic views of executive power and ties 
45  See supra section 2.3 
46  See supra section 5.2 
47  See supra section 5.2 
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to the executive branch to courts that are nearly as important, particularly the D.C. 
Circuit.48 
This discussion set the stage for the analysis later sections of that chapter.  Those 
sections addressed Congress’ failure to take the threat of executive dominance 
seriously, not merely in judicial confirmations but in all of the areas in which it was 
charged with the legislative oversight that is essential to maintaining the rule of law.  
These sections would reveal that the legislative branch was as compromised as the 
judiciary, although for different reasons, and equally ineffective in thwarting the 
executive’s drive for a new imperial presidency. 
2.6 Congress’ Failure to Exercise Oversight and its Explanation 
 Chapter five also discussed Congress’ response to the executive’s attempts to enlarge 
its own powers and to render itself immune from all oversight.  It revealed that this 
history is not at all encouraging for those concerned with the erosion of the rule of law 
in the United States.  It began by detailing how Congress supported the executive each 
time Supreme Court judgements would have otherwise required it to modify its 
practices, however slightly.  In particular, Congress twice allowed the executive to 
revive the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo Bay, which the 
executive established and conducted on the basis of its theory of the executive’s 
inherent authority.49  The re-establishment of these tribunals gave the detention facility 
renewed purpose and allowed for such dubious prosecutions as that of Omar Khadr, a 
48  See supra section 5.2 
49  See supra section 6.2, 384-394 
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fifteen year-old child soldier who threw a grenade after being attacked by American 
forces in Afghanistan.50 
 This chapter evaluated Congress’ rare legislative initiatives to stem the executive’s 
violations of non-derogable rights, and showed how these were easily by-passed by the 
executive, at which point Congress simply ignored the pertinent signing statements. 
The most prominent of the examples discussed was the statement attached to the 
Detainee Treatment Act, which purported to ban torture.51  In it, the executive openly 
admitted that it would not change its practices.  Members of that executive continued 
to defend waterboarding as essential to American security.  However Congress made 
an ineffectual and wholly rhetorical response. This, unfortunately, served to persuade 
the public that torture was now banned. Chapter four demonstrated that it still 
authorized.52  That chapter also discussed Congress’s failure to address problems 
related to the statutory authorizations for the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq, which 
were so broad that the executive was able to assert in 2013 that these also allowed them 
to conduct aggressive military operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.53 
The final sections of chapter five shifted the thesis focus. At this stage, the thesis 
begin to inquire into why President Bush was not impeached by Congress, or sanctioned 
in any way by the legislature.  It demonstrated that the House Judiciary Committee 
provided both chambers of Congress with evidence of far more serious violations than 
50  See supra section 6.2.1, 387-397 
51  Ibid 396-397 
52  See supra section 5.4 
53  See supra section 5.4 
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those that led to Nixon’s resignation, as detailed in the report of the majority staff to 
Representative John Conyers. As well, Congress possessed successive reports of the 
Special Senate Committee on Intelligence that investigated the executive’s 
manipulation of pre-war intelligence.54  The chapter discussed the attempts by members 
of the leadership of both parties to block even the discussion of impeachment.55 
 Accordingly, chapter five subsequently sought to explain why Congress, like the 
courts, has proven itself so willing to stand by while the executive usurped its critical 
functions.  This discussion focused on investigating the means by which legislators 
attain office and obtain leadership positions in the parties that control Congress.  The 
chapter detailed how ever-increasing amounts of money are required, and noted that the 
key sources of these funds have been the lobbies associated with military and 
intelligence contracting.56  Chapter five concluded that the rise of what President 
Dwight Eisenhower labelled the ‘military industrial complex’ affected American 
politics on a fundamental level, by catalysing legislators’ near reflexive support for the 
executive’s attempts to promote aggressive war.57   
Chapter five concluded that the existing political-economic structure of the United 
States prevents the legislature from re-establishing the rule of law in the same manner 
that it did during the congressional resurgence of 1974-1980. Moreover, the elimination 
of restrictive campaign finance laws ensures the pre-eminence of the military-industrial 
54  See supra section 5.4 
55  See supra section 5.4 
56  See supra secion 5.4 
57  Ibid 
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complex in forging American foreign policy, which as a result will be consistently 
aggressive and supportive of violations of non-derogable rights.  Foremost among these 
violations include the creation of a secret detention regime and policies enabling torture 
that were designed to implicate Iraq as a supporter of terrorism, so that it could be 
presented to the American public as an appropriate target of an invasion.58 
3  CONCLUSIONS THAT CAN BE DRAWN  
 On the basis of the foregoing, it is possible at the conclusion of this thesis to 
argue that the United States is not in compliance with the fundamental norms of the 
rule of law state, and that there is no meaningful prospect of the rule of law being 
restored in the United States in the near future. It is important to be clear about the 
implications of this conclusion. Furthermore, it is also vital to understand what this does 
not entail.  The United States remains a country where its citizens enjoy broad political 
and social rights, which are routinely adjudicated in its courts.  However, in the context 
of what it calls the war on terror, the executive detains, tortures and kills those it 
suspects of links to terrorism in secret, and without review.  It continues to expand the 
scope of its own powers to do so, both geographically and conceptually, by authorizing 
itself to abduct these suspects worldwide before subjecting them to arbitrary detention 
with no judicial review in Afghanistan, and by arguing that no other branch of 
government can challenge its determination that the targeted killing of American 
citizens is constitutional. 
 As this thesis has demonstrated, a state with an executive that cannot be 
prevented from systematically violating non-derogable rights at will cannot be 
58  Ibid 
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considered a functioning rule of law state.  The fact that the President is nominally 
accountable to the electorate is immaterial, as there are numerous examples throughout 
history of elective dictatorships, none of which could ever be considered to be governed 
in accordance with the rule of law.  Additionally, the power of the military-industrial 
complex over the electoral process makes the mandate of the electorate an increasingly 
minor constraint on the new imperial presidency.  
One final objection that could be offered to this conclusion is that despite the fact 
that the executive possesses no limitations on its powers, it exercises them sparingly, 
and largely outside of its own borders. Even despite the war on terror, the executive 
branch of the United States’ government recognizes that its citizens are the bearers of 
rights, derived from both its Constitution and the international treaty regime.  There is 
no debate on the question of whether citizens possess a broad set of substantive rights.  
The problem is the creation of constitutional theory that allows the executive to violate 
non-derogable rights with impunity.  Even if it exercises these powers infrequently 
within the nation’s borders at present, it is troubling, as it provides the executive with 
a set of unreviewable and secret powers to violate jus cogens norms, including those of 
its citizenry, during a future crisis. 
What this thesis has demonstrated is that rule of law in general cannot exist owing 
to the good graces of an unaccountable executive. Benevolent dictatorship is simply 
inimical to the normative core of the rule of law.  Finally, it should be noted that, as 
chapters two and three discussed, substantial attacks on the United States have always 
created a climate in which there is considerable pressure on the executive to engage in 
mass violations of non-derogable norms.  The attack on Pearl Harbor led to the 
involuntary detention of the Japanese-American community, but this did not persist 
long after the war ended. Conversely, the 9/11 attacks created a parallel detention 
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regime of detention, torture, and a system of extra-judicial execution that remains 
firmly in place long after the danger passed.  
The United States’ failure to comply with the fundamental obligations of the rule of 
law has created a dangerous state of affairs, in which non-derogable norms are at serious 
risk of being violated at will.  While these violations are infrequent within its own 
borders at present, the prospect of what might occur in the event of another seriously 
unsettling act of violence is deeply troubling.  Before this occurs, it is vital for those 
interested in human rights to address how the rule of law has been 
dismantled, and how to reassemble its legal architecture. 
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